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ABSTRACT 
This study makes the assumption that community participation in the governance of mineral 
resources is a requirement of sustainable development and that through a fundamental 
rights-based approach, it can be made effective. The concern is that an affected community 
should not only be involved in the decision-making process, but its view must also influence 
the outcome in respect of whether or not a mineral project should take place and how it 
should address development issues at local level. It is assumed that this legal approach will 
improve mineral governance by bringing more transparency and accountability. In many 
African resource-rich countries, community participation has until now been practiced with 
more of a soft approach, with the consequence that it has been unable to eradicate the 
opacity existing in the management of revenues generated by mineral exploitation and also 
deal efficiently with the recurrence  of fundamental rights violations in the mineral sector. 
Obviously, the success of the fundamental rights based-approach is not absolutely 
guaranteed because there are preconditions that must be fulfilled. The synergy between 
community participation and some relevant concepts like democracy, decentarlisation, 
accountability, (good) governance and sustainable development must be well balanced for 
the participation process to bring positive outcomes. Also, because the fundamental rights 
based-approach is conceived here within the framework of the African Charter of Human 
and People’s Rights, its normative and institutional components, despite the potential to 
make participation effective and successful, require that some critical challenges be 
addressed in practice. The study ends with the conclusion that the fundamental rights based-
approach is appropriate to make community participation effective in the mineral-led 
development process taking place at local level, provided that its implementation is kept 
reasonable.    
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Chapter one: Introduction 
1.1 Background to the study 
 
Africa’s vast endowment of mineral resources has continuously nourished and offered the 
hope that the people living on this continent will experience rapid economic growth and 
attain development. From the pre-colonial period to the present day,1Africa has gradually 
been discovered as one of the richest continents with the largest reserves in the world of 
some important mineral resources.2Although the premise of mineral-led development3 
does not find acceptance with all scholars,4 studies have demonstrated that where there is 
appropriate governance, the exploitation of mineral resources can generate large revenues 
that significantly boost economic growth and reduce poverty.5 Countries like the United 
                                                             
1 The history of Africa reveals that by the end of the nineteenth century, traditional chiefs of African 
communities had already established commercial relations with Europeans in respect of certain mineral 
resources. In Tanganyika, for instance, the chief Msiri was involved in the commerce of ivory and copper. 
A similar trade in gold existed in the Lobi region of West Africa. However, the formal and large-scale 
exploitation of mineral resources in most African countries started during the colonial period with the 
creation of mineral companies owned by the colonials (Parker J. and Rathbone R. African history: A very 
short introduction (Gosport: Oxford University Press, 2007) 94-96 ; Stock R. Africa South of the Sahara: 
Geographical interpretation 2nd ed. (New York : Guilford Press, 2004)125 ; Ndaywel I. Histoire générale 
du Congo (Paris : Duculot, 1998) 388; Katja W. “Gold mining and Jula influence in precolonial southern 
Burkina Faso” (2007) 48 (3) Journal of African history 395-414; Association Africaine de Défense des 
Droits de l’Homme (ASADHO) “Rapport préliminaire sur l’éxploitation illégale des ressources naturelles 
en RD Congo” in (2004) 004 Supplément au périodique des droits de l’Homme 1-25, 2). 
2 Platinum (60%), gold (42%), diamonds (88%), manganese (82%), cobalt (55%), phosphate (66%), 
chromium (44%) and aluminium (45%).See the See African Mining Vision 2050 (AMV) (2009) 3; 
available at http://www.africaminingvision.org/ [accessed on 3/6/2013] 
3  The use of “mineral-led development” as an expression throughout this study should not be interpreted as 
advocating a monolithic model of economy where the mineral industry is seen as the unique sector 
relevant for speeding up economic growth, but rather as one that plays a leading role in a diversified 
economy of a country largely endowed with mineral resources. 
4 For a pessimistic view, see AutyRM. “Resource abundance, growth collapses and policy” in Auty RM. 
(ed.) Resource abundance and economic development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 315-328; 
Sachs JD. and Warner AM. “Natural resource abundance and economic growth” (Havard University, 
1999); available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/warner_files/natresf5.pdf [accessed on 5/6/2011]. 
5 Jeschke M. “Extractive Industries Review” in Visser W. et al. (eds.)  The A to Z of corporate social 
responsibility (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2010) 25; Lederman D. and Maloney WF. “Neither curse 
nor destiny: Introduction to natural resources and development” in Lederman D. and Maloney WF. (eds.) 
Natural resources: Neither curse nor destiny (Stanford University Press/World Bank, 2007) 3; Ferranti D. 
et al. From natural resources to the knowledge economy: Trade and job quality (World Bank, 2002) 4; 
World Bank “Strategy for African mining, mining unit, industry and energy division” in World Bank 
Technical Paper No 181 (World Bank, 1992) 3-4; the Report of the United Nations Economic and Social 
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States, Canada and Australia are known for the role played by mineral resources in the 
transformation of their economies.6 Thus, after several centuries of prospecting and 
exploitation,7 it was expected that the revenues generated by these diversified mineral 
resources should have provided African countries with sufficient means to offer a better 
quality of life to their peoples, enjoying all the benefits and opportunities available in the 
context of development. The ongoing situation is disappointingly far from that scenario. 
Despite large mineral endowments, too little has been achieved. The continent is still 
immersed in a blatant contrast between its immense mineral wealth and the abject poverty 
in which the majority of its people live.  
 
Africa remains the developing region with the highest extreme poverty rate, with a 
considerable number of people living on less than one dollar per day.8 Many children are 
not schooled, while numerous young men and women are desperately wasting away in 
unemployment.9 As if that were not enough, the existence of a defective health system in 
many countries has hastened the spread of HIV/AIDS across the continent and this has 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Council (UNECOSOC) on “The exploitation of mining in Africa” (E/ECA/CFSSD/6/7, September 2009) 
2-3. 
6  Despite disagreement among scholars on the extent to which mineral resources may have contributed to the 
development of these countries, it is at least acknowledged that this industry has played a role in the 
transformation process of these three societies. See Weber-Fahr M. “Mining and development: Treasure or 
trouble? Mining in developing countries” Research paper in the mining and development series (World 
Bank and International Finance Corporation, 2002) 3; Leveille E. “Natural resources: Unavoidable curse 
or manageable asset?” in (2009) Journal of Politics & International Affairs 108-125, 108-109; Power TM. 
Digging to development? A historical look at mining and economic development (Boston: Oxfam, 2002) 
4; Szirmai A. Dynamics of socio-economic development: An introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) 283. 
7  It has been reported that the oldest mines in the world are in Africa, like the Ingwenya mine in Swaziland, 
which was exploited 20000 years ago. AMV (2009) 10. 
8 See the report of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) “Poverty reduction and the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)”; available at http://www.undp.org/africa/poverty.shtml 
[accessed on 3/2/2011].  
9 See United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) Institute of Statistics Fact 
Sheet “Out-of-school children: New data reveal persistent challenges”, available at 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/FactSheets/Documents/fs12_2011_OOSC_EN.pdf[accessed on 24/12/2010]; 
International Labour Organisation Global employment trends for youth: Special issue on the impact of the 
global economic crisis on youth (August 2010) 3-4. 
3 
 
significantly contributed to the hardships experienced by the peoples of Africa.10 The 
general socio-economic conditions under which African peoples live today are critical and 
it has become obvious that the long exploitation of minerals has not served as a catalyst for 
the transformation of African countries from underdeveloped to developed economies.  
This failure to launch development, coupled with conflicts and fundamental rights abuses, 
has given credit in Africa to the thesis that an important endowment in mineral resources 
can be a curse.11 Several scholars writing on the relationship between the mineral industry 
and development in developing countries have adopted an approach based on the 
“resource curse” theory.12 
This latter theory rests on an observation according to which many resource-rich countries 
tend to perform more poorly in terms of sustainable economic growth than resource-poor 
countries.13 
In the midst of this tragedy,14 the situation of local communities living around and that are 
directly affected by mineral projects is particularly alarming. It has become customary 
that, instead of being beneficial, the expansion of mineral activities in developing 
countries drains and causes a damaging effect on local communities.15   In many African 
countries, leaders of affected communities complain continuously that their communities 
                                                             
10 See UN Economic Commission for Africa(UNECA) “Report of the Commission on HIV/AIDS and 
governance in Africa” (2008); Moser G. and Ichida T. “Economic growth and poverty reduction in Sub-
Sahara Africa”, IMF Working Paper WP/01/112 (August 2001) 15.  
11Ballard C. and Banks G. “Resource wars: The anthropology of mining” in (2003) 32 Annual Review of 
Anthropology  295. 
12 David GA. and Tilton JE. “Why the resource curse is a concern” (2008) Mining Engineering 29-32; 
Brunnschweiler CN. and Bulte EH. “The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and red 
herrings” in (2008) 55(3) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 248-264; Lederman and 
Maloney (2007); Kronenberg T. “The curse of natural resources in the transition economies” in 12 (3) 
(2004) Economics of transition 399-426; Mikesell RF. “Explaining the resource curse, with special 
reference to mineral-exporting countries” in (1998) 23(4) Resources Policy 191-199; Auty RM. Sustaining 
development in mineral economies: Resource curse thesis (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
13 Mikesell, Id., 191; Kronenberg, Id., 399-400; Auty, Id., 1-3.  
14 The tragedy is perceivable in the controversial fact that many African countries, despite their important 
mineral potential, appear on the IMF’s list of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). Of the forty 
countries listed in 2010, thirty-three were from Africa. See IMF Factsheet; available at 
  http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm[accessed 24/12/2010]. 
15 De Echave J. “Dialogue processes: Evolution and stages” in Conflict, consensus and dialogue in the 
mining sector (International Development Centre, 2004) 4-6, 4; Ballard C. and Banks G. (2003) 289. 
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do not enjoy the benefits of mineral exploitation and that they are deprived of considerable 
portions of their land to the benefit of large-scale mineral companies without fair 
compensation.16 They contend that their share in the revenues received by the central 
government are not returned to them and that mineral activities are being conducted in a 
manner that causes serious degradation to their environment with factors like water 
pollution, deforestation and high levels of toxicity and pollution resulting from air 
emissions.17 In some countries, communities living around mineral areas have been 
exposed to violent conflicts over the control and exploitation of mineral resources.18 In 
general, many local communities affected by mineral projects have not so far gained 
significant benefits enough to build their economies. 
                                                             
16 See the case of communities living in Walikale, Mongbwalu and Ituri in DRC as reported by Bineta M. 
“RD Congo: A qui rapporte l’exploitation des mines?”; Available at www.syfia.info/index.php5 [accessed 
on 24/12/2010]. See also the discussion of the case of the Mambia community in Guinea, the Sanso and 
Gouaniaka communities in Mali and of the communities living in Missingir in Mozambique in Cotula L. 
“Legal tools for citizens’ empowerment, getting a better deal from natural resource investment in Africa: 
Highlights and lesson learned (2006-2009)” in the Report made in the context of a campaign organised by 
the International Institute for Environment and Development (2006-2009) 3. 
17 For instance, in DRC it was reported that the exploitation of uranium that took place in the province of 
Katanga, precisely in the Shinkolobwe area, was extremely harmful to the surrounding communities 
because of high radiation levels. See Misabiko G. “Mine uranifère de Shinkolobwe: D'une éxploitation 
artisanale illicite à l'accordentre la RD Congo et le groupe nucléaire français Areva” (ASADHO, 2009) 16, 
18, 19, 21, 33-42.It should be remembered that the uranium used in the fabrication of the first nuclear bomb 
(the Manhattan Project) and that killed thousands of civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II 
was extracted from Shinkolobwe. This means that bad governance of this mineral resource represents a 
high risk not only for the gravely affected local communities, but for the whole international community. 
Devastating effects may well go beyond national borders. See also the case of the Sukuma community in 
Tanzania discussed in Kitula AGN. “The environmental and socio-economic impacts of mining on local 
livelihoods in Tanzania: A case study of Geita district” (2006)14 Journal of Cleaner Production 409-410. 
Marcos rightly observes that these negative impacts have generated a sceptical attitude in affected 
communities towards mineral projects. Marcos A. “Unearthing governance: Obstacles and opportunities for 
public participation in mineral policy” in (ed.) Bruck CE. The new “public”: The globalization of public 
participation (Washington: Environmental Law Institute, 2002) 236. 
18 See for instance, the case of communities living in Bomi (Liberian War: 1989-1996, 1999-2003), in Kivu 
(DRC Wars: 1996-1997, 1998-2003), in Cabinda (Angolan War: 1975-2001), in Kono and Tongo (Sierra 
Leone War: 1991-2002). See Olukoju A. Culture and customs of Liberia (Westport: Greenwood Publishing 
Group, 2006) 6; Eichstaedt P. Consumming the Congo: War and conflict minerals in the world’s deadliest 
place (Illinois: Lawrence Hill Books, 2011) 2; Malley-Morrison K. State violence and the right to peace 
(Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009) 64-67; Lincoln J. Transitional justice, peace and 
accountability: Outreach and the role of international courts after conflict (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011)38. 
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It is common sense that people living in the area surrounding a mineral project may expect 
that the profits from the project would spark off prosperity that would help to realise their 
development. Benefits generated by the exploitation of mineral resources should 
contribute to the realisation of socio-economic rights19 in a sustainable manner. The major 
benefit that affected communities should draw from the exploitation of mineral resources 
is the improvement of their quality of life through the construction of such necessary 
infrastructure as hospitals, schools and roads, the creation of new job opportunities and the 
ability to finance other vital activities like agriculture and farming.20 Added to this, is the 
necessity to protect and conserve the environment so that the development achieved can be 
sustainable and ethical. 
The failure experienced by most African countries to achieve these development goals 
through the mineral industry reveals that the mere endowment of resources does not in 
itself unconditionally amount, or lead to the improvement of the socio-economic 
conditions of the poor. Devoted efforts must be made to channel the management of 
mineral resources towards the realisation of these development goals at local level. This is 
to assume that there is, indisputably, a bridge between possessing abundant mineral 
resources and the achievement of development; that bridge being the practice of 
governance which serves the function of catalyst. Decisions, policies and actions made in 
respect of the mineral industry determine the extent to which mineral resources may either 
enhance or hinder development.21 This challenges any attempt of absolutism in 
approaching the resource curse theory. Indeed, the establishment of a strong system of 
governance characterised by virtues such as transparency and accountability can reverse 
the resource curse in any resource-rich country. Therefore, what is relevant is to develop 
an optimistic approach which does not remain focused on this pejorative theory, but rather 
                                                             
19 Socio-economic rights are rights that create entitlement to the satisfaction of human social needs (food, 
water, health care, education, shelter … etc.) and the amelioration of economic conditions of the poor. 
Mbazira C. Litigating socio-economic rights in South Africa: A choice between corrective and distributive 
justice (Cape Town: Pretoria University Law Press, 2009) 3; Brand D. “Introduction to socio-economic 
rights in the South African Constitution” in Brand D. and Heyns C. (eds.) Socio-economic rights in South 
Africa (Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2005)3. 
20 UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific The contribution of transnational mining 
corporations to the Asia-Pacific region (New-York: UNESCAP, 1992) 28. 
21 Rees J. Natural resources: Allocation, economics and policy (Methuen, 1985) 56. 
6 
 
undertakes progressive reflections on how good governance practices can be generated in 
African countries enjoying significant resource endowment. It is with this perspective that 
the African Mining Vision (AMV) adopted by the African Union (AU) in 2009 contends 
that increasing the governance capacity of African countries in the context of a diversified 
economy and with appropriate institutions, knowledge and infrastructures can overturn the 
legacy that mineral resources are a curse, by optimising the positive inputs of their 
exploitation into the development process.22 
In respect of affected communities in Africa, their long exclusion from the decision-
making process appears as a major reason explaining why the mineral sector has failed to 
launch economic development at local level. Decisions on mineral projects have generally 
remained confined to the context of the classic bilateral model (state/mineral company) 
which actually failed to capture the interests of these communities.23 Obviously, this 
model of governance is undemocratic and illegitimate, because people directly affected by 
such decisions do not participate in the decision-making process. This is a defect that has 
long marked the history of the governance of mineral resources on the continent. 
Although Africa has a long history of mineral exploitation, it was only between the1980s 
and the start of the1990s that the issue of local communities’ entitlement to benefit from 
the mineral industry began to be formally contemplated.24 
During the pre-colonial period, African communities were organised and did not ignore 
the commercial value of mineral resources. The major economic activities at that time 
were characterised by the use of land for agriculture, farming and harvesting, and mineral 
resources were used both to make traditional weapons25 and for commercial exchange26 
                                                             
22 AMV (2009)14-29. 
23 See the case of affected communities mentioned previously, supra notes 15, 16 and 17. This experience is 
not only proper to Africa. In Latin America, the same binary model of mineral resources governance had 
disregarded interests of local communities. See De Echave (2004) 4.  
24 This assertion is inferred from initiatives that took place on the African continent between the 1980s and 
the 1990s which aim to put back people at the centre of development process in Africa people(see for 
instance the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation (1990) 
(Hereinafter the Arusha Declaration)). 
25 See, for instance, the case of iron mining by the Khoi-Khoi group in Southern Africa in Fyle M. 
Introduction to the history of African civilisation: Precolonial Africa (Lanham/Oxford: University Press of 
America 1999) 58; the case of copper mining by the Bemba and Sanga groups in central Africa. Kikontwe 
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between communities or groups in order to obtain from one another goods that they were 
lacking. It is difficult to determine whether products exchanged for mineral resources 
really benefited the entire community during that period. In Latoki’s view, the reverence 
due to the chief and all notables by members of the group does not favour the thesis of an 
equitable redistribution of wealth within the African pre-colonial society, simply because 
wealth was managed at the discretion of the leading caste and that, for such reason, it is 
doubtful that any member of the group could make them accountable.27 Omorogbe takes 
the opposite view and affirms that during the pre-colonial period, people were participants 
in the process of making decisions in their community and they benefited from the trading 
of the community’s resources.28 The opposing views of these two scholars reveal that a 
blanket statement cannot fully describe the diversified situation of African communities 
during the pre-colonial period. Nonetheless, it is believed that the common reality in most 
African communities of that time is that, though traditional chiefs, elders and notables 
were highly venerated, their role was often to watch over, defend and protect the interests 
of the entire community, to secure the land that was generally conceived as a res 
communis,29 against invasion or other disasters.30 Thus, it can be assumed that they where 
entrusted with the responsibility to act as guarantors of the community’s interests.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
EG. La prise en compte des droits humains des populations dans les contrats miniers en RD Congo: Cas des 
Sanga de Kolwezi (Unpublished thesis/CIDEP Université ouverte, 2009) 1.  
26 Under the pre-colonial period, commerce in mineral resources was based on the “exchange principle” that 
consisted of one people exchanging what they had for what another people had. This is why, for instance, 
Ghana could exchange gold with Dahomey and the Ivory Cost for “aquaqua clothes”. See Perbi A. 
“Slavery and the slave trade in pre-colonial Africa” Paper presented at the University of Illinois, USA 
(5/4/2001) 3.    
27 Latoki P-E. “La thèse de l’unité africaine traditionnelle: Ses dessous et ses conséquences sur l’Etat en    
Afrique’’ (2009) 14 Cahiers de psychologie politique, revue d’information, de réflexion et de recherche 1. 
28 Omorogbe Y. “The legal framework for public participation in decision-making on mining and energy 
development in Nigeria: Giving voices to the voiceless” in Zillma DN., Lucas AR. and Pring G. (eds.) 
Human rights in natural resources development: Public participation in the sustainable development of 
mining and energy resources (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 551. 
29 Egede E. Africa and the seabed regime: Politics and international law of the common heritage of mankind 
(London/New York: Springer 2011) 65; Kameri-Mbote A.P and Cullet P. “Law, colonialism and 
environmental management in Africa” (1997) 6 (1) Review of European community and intermnational 
environmental law 25. 
30 Mahao NL. “Colonial rule and the transformation of chieftaincy in Southern Africa: A case study on 
Lesotho” in (2007) 2 Speculum Juris 207-208. 
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Actually, what renders tricky the question as to whether communities derived benefits 
from the profits of mineral exchange during the pre-colonial period is the presence of a 
class of slaves in many African communities.31 The existence of slavery in pre-colonial 
communities suggests that because some people were regarded as merchandise, they were 
automatically disqualified from any enjoyment of goods and commercial revenues 
belonging to the community. In the system of commercial exchange, the Asante Kingdom 
successfully obtained slaves from Nigerian and Benin communities in exchange for gold 
on a number of known occasions.32 Clearly, this was an unjustified33 consecration of the 
concept of “inequality” which is drastically opposed to modern fundamental rights values 
supporting a democratic society, like freedom, equality and human dignity.34 
At the end of the nineteenth century, following the exploration of the continent previously 
undertaken by many Europeans, a new period of colonisation started in many African 
countries.35 During this period, mineral resources were governed and managed according 
to the goodwill of colonisers who established firms36 in many African countries that 
enjoyed extensive rights and facilities, the main objective of which was the provision and 
export of raw materials to industry in their home countries and to generate profits for their 
economies.37 In this respect, colonisers imported into the African continent the European 
conception of the private right to property which was fundamentally opposed to the 
                                                             
31 Ciment J. The Atlas of African-American history (New York: Media Projects Inc., 2007) 11. 
32 Perbi (2001) 3. 
33 Nowadays, it is generally admitted in many societies that a fundamental right, including the right to 
equality, may suffer some limitations, provided that they are justified on objective grounds. Currie I. and 
De Waal J.The Bill of Rights handbook 5thed (Wetton: Juta, 2008) 237.   
34 This is not to contend that democratic practices were totally absent from pre-colonial Africa, but the 
situation is well described by Nzongola’s reference to a “measure of democracy” to reflect the complex 
mix of both democratic and tyrannical practices that existed during that period and which should be seen, 
of course, within the context of the values of that time. See Nzongola GN. “The state and democracy in 
Africa” in Nzongola GN.and Lee MC. (eds.) The state and democracy in Africa (Harare/Trenton: Africa 
World Press, 1997) 10.  
35 For instance, colonisation started in 1830 in Algeria, in 1880 in Benin, 1885 in Botswana, in 1892 in 
Burkina Faso, 1884 Cameroun, 1885 in DRC. 
36 For instance, the exploitation of mineral resources was formally conferred between the end of the 1880s 
and the beginning of the 1900s to the following colonial companies: Union Minière du Haut Katanga (in 
DRC), The British South Africa Company in the then Rhodesia (in Southern Africa), the Royal Niger 
Company (in Nigeria), the Imperial British East Africa Company in East Africa (in Kenya). See Ndaywel  
(1998) 388; Omorogbe (2002) 553. 
37 Kameri-Mbote and Cullet (1997) 25. 
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communal approach to property that largely existed within many African communities.38 
What is noticeable about the colonial period was the construction of such infrastructure as 
roads, hospitals and schools, but these did not generally reach or serve the rural areas 
where a large percentage of the local communities lived.39 The infrastructure was basically 
dictated by the economic interests of colonisers and their pretention to “civilise” 
Africans.40 Obviously, the concern for affected communities during this colonial period 
was quasi-inexistent. African peoples no longer had access to the mineral resources and 
profits generated by their exploitation. Instead, they were subject to forced work. Being 
part of the entire population of the colony, affected communities were also denied the right 
to freely dispose of the country’s natural resources. This model of governance was 
undemocratic as it took the decision-making to the level of the metropole, far from African 
peoples themselves.41 
As a result, a struggle to come out from under the shadow of colonisation and gain 
independence started in the 1950s. One of the leitmotifs supporting the claim of African 
leaders was the need for recognition of the right to self-determination as part of 
sovereignty and independence.42 The argument advanced by developing countries during 
discussions held at the United Nations (UN) was that, to ensure that natural resources 
profited the development of their peoples, developing nations had to be free to decide how 
and to what extent these resources were to be exploited.43 Consequently, the UN 
                                                             
38 Kameri-Mbote and Cullet (1997) 25. 
39 Grosse P. “Colonial migration and the law” in Podar P. et al (eds.) A historical companion to post-colonial 
literatures: Continental Europe and its empires (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008) 220; 
Ochola SA. Minerals in African underdevelopment (London: Bogle-L’Ouverture Publications Ltd, 1975) 
134. For instance, Fonjong notes that in Cameroon, these infrastructures were made sometimes in the part 
of the country where they were not dictated by socio-economic needs. Fonjong N. Transforming rural 
space through non-governmental efforts in northwestern Cameroon (New York: Nova Science, 2007) 149. 
40 The colonisers’ ideology was well typified in Livingston’s formula of the three “C’s”: Christianity, 
Commerce and Civilisation”. Pakenham T. The scramble for Africa (New York: Random House, 1991) 
xxii. 
41 National Research Council Democratization in Africa: African views, African voices (Washington: 
National Academy Press, 1992) 7. 
42 Schrijver N. Sovereignty over natural resources: Balancing rights and duties (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997) 6; Elian G. The principle of sovereignty over natural resources (Alphen aan den 
Rijn and Germantown: Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers, 1979) 98. 
43 Schrijver (1997) 86.This is what is identified as the external right to self-determination, to mean the ability 
of people to free themselves against colonial or race oppression through either independence or secession. 
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recognised the right to sovereignty over natural resources as a principle of international 
law to allow developing countries to realise their development goals and improve the 
living conditions of their peoples.44 Surprisingly, however, the position held by African 
political leaders was characterised by a certain duplicity manifested in two paradoxical 
attitudes depending on whether they were in the international forum or at the national 
level.  
At the international level, they placed emphasis on the need to protect their countries’ 
natural resources against foreign exploitation, as these resources were needed to serve the 
realisation of their people’s development.45 At the same time, at the national level, African 
political leaders requested their peoples to first consider political freedom and 
independence and not emphasise development that would, presumably, follow as a 
consequence.46 This duplicity reveals the truth that African political leaders understood 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources as conferring them a discretionary power in 
the governance of their nations’ resources and in the design of development plans.47 This 
is why, a few years after gaining independence,48 African peoples began to experience 
bitter disappointment as they witnessed their high expectations regarding their 
development falling by the wayside. They quickly found their own political leaders 
transforming into new oppressors, almost behaving like former colonisers through a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
See Sterio M. “On the right to external self-determination: ‘Selfistans’, secession, and the great powers’ 
rule” in (2010) 19(1) Minnesota Journal of International Law 137-176. 
44 Sovereignty and self-determination imply the right for a people to freely determine their political 
autonomy and to pursue their socio-economic development. But at the time the principle was consecrated 
in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (Resolutions 523 (VI), 626 (VII), 1803 
(XVII), 3201 (S-V1), 3281(XXIX)), the true subject of this right was not clearly determined as these 
resolutions referred indistinctly to state, people and nations. 
45  Schrijver (1997) 82. 
46 Mangu AMB. “State legitimacy and leadership development in Africa” Paper presented at the 7thAfrica 
Governance Forum Building the Capable in Africa UNDP/Ouagadogou, Burkina Faso (October 2007) 2. 
47  Duruigbo E. “Permanent sovereignty and peoples’ ownership of natural resources in international law” in 
(2006) 38 George Washington International Law Review 35. 
48  The study will consider the 1960s as the end of the colonial period because by then many African colonies 
had gained their independence, followed later on by Angola, Cape Verde, the Comoros, Mozambique, 
São Tomé (1975), the Seychelles (1976), Djibouti (1977), Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990) and South 
Africa (1994).  
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dictatorial and coercive system.49As the years passed, the rift between African peoples and 
their national political leaders became more perceptible, with only the elite dominant class 
having free access to resources of the state at the expense of ordinary people who 
continued to live in deepening poverty.50 
At the time when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963, 
African heads of state and government did not give much attention to the need for a 
legitimate development agenda51 and fundamental rights issues appeared in the OAU 
Charter merely as general statements regarding the welfare and well-being of Africans.52 
The OAU Charter did not proclaim either individual or people’s rights. Although article 2 
of the Charter contained a call to African states to promote cooperation between them and 
intensify their efforts to achieve a better life for African peoples, such a formulation was 
more a statement of intent than the recognition of a people’s rights. The OAU was pre-
occupied with more pressing issues such as unity, non-interference in internal affairs and 
liberation.53 During this period, the paradigm of development was construed on the belief 
that a highly centralised state was the correct system for achieving economic development 
for the entire country.54 The political system adopted by many African states rested on 
unified structures of administration that were exclusively accountable to the central 
government.55 The mineral sector did not escape this highly centralised administration, 
                                                             
49 Mangu (2007) 2; Ake C. Development and democracy (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1996) 4-
5; Ake C. “The unique case of African democracy” (1994) 69 (2) International Affairs 240.   
50  Ake (1994) 240; Duruigbo (2006) 35-36. 
51 A “legitimate development agenda” should be understood as a development agenda that has the adherence 
and support of the people concerned.  
52 Mangu AMB. “The changing Human rights landscape in Africa: Organization of African Unity, African 
Union, New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the African Court” (2005) Netherlands Quarterly 
of Human Rights 381; Ankumah EA.The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996) 4. 
53  See OAU Constitutive Act, Preamb. and art. 2. See also Mangu AMB. The road to constitutionalism and 
democracy in post-colonial Africa: The case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Unpublished Doctoral 
thesis, University of South Africa, 2002) 2. 
54 McCarnet PL. “Reviving local government: The neglected tier in development” in McCarnet PL. (ed.) The 
changing nature of local government in developing countries (Torento: University of Toronto Press, 1996) 
3; Adejumobi S.  ‘‘The African experience of popular participation in development’’ in Adejumobi S. and 
Olukoshi AO. (eds.) The African Union and new strategies for development (Amherst: Cambria Press, 
2008) 102. 
55 Adejumobi (2008) 102. 
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because, having the desire to affirm their sovereignty over natural resources, many African 
governments had either nationalised or developed an advanced system of controlling 
interests in mineral companies.56 The central government enjoyed the exclusive 
prerogative of deciding what was good or bad for the entire nation and affected 
communities had to abide by the will of rulers who were not democratically elected. The 
protection and promotion of the interests of affected communities throughout the 
exploitation of mineral resources were the least of the concerns of African governments. 
This is what makes Adejumobi to reach the general conclusion that “the post-colonial 
period has been marked by a steady erosion of faith in the power of the state to promote 
equitable development”.57 
In the early 1970s,58 the issue of converting the potential of natural resources into effective 
means to build up sustainable development at the local level, progressively started to 
become an international concern59 with discussions held at the UN sub-commission on the 
prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities, regarding the marginalisation 
that indigenous peoples were suffering within states.60 The outcome of these discussions 
led to the establishment of a working group on indigenous populations by the UN 
Economic and Social Council through its resolution 1982/34.61 The mandate of this group 
was to determine the rights of indigenous peoples and to define standards of protection for 
these rights. One year later, at its meetings in 1983, the working group identified that 
                                                             
56  See the World Bank “Strategy for…”, supra note 5, xi. After independence, many African countries 
created state owned companies to maintain a permanent control over the mineral industry. World Bank 
“Overview of state ownership in the global mineral industry: Long-term trends and future” Extractive 
Industry for Development Paper Series No 20 (World Bank, 2011).  
57Adejumobi (2008) 109. 
58 In respect of the previous period, Brownlie observes that the lack of protection of group rights in 
international instruments (Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR 1948) and the two 
International Covenants of 1966) was consecutive to the belief that “group rights would be taken care of 
automatically as the result of the protection of the rights of individuals.” Brownlie I. “The rights of peoples 
in modern international law” in Crawford J. (ed.) The rights of peoples (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 2.    
59  At the national level, a similar concern was also dealt with at the same period in countries like Canada and 
Australia with regard to the right of Aboriginal peoples. For more precision, see Netttheim G. “‘Peoples’ 
and ‘populations’: Indigenous peoples and the rights of peoples’” in Crawford J. (ed.) The rights of peoples 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 106.  
60  In the early 1980s, indigenous peoples were recognised as subjects of concern under international law by 
the UN that through resolution ECOSOC1892/34 established a working group on indigenous populations.   
61  UN Doc.E/RES/1982/34, 9 May 1982, in UN Doc. E/1982/81, 26-27. 
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among the rights of indigenous peoples were the rights to land and to natural resources and 
socio-economic rights. This was a preamble to the recognition of people’s rights at a level 
other than the national level.62 In the same vein, the UNGA adopted the Declaration on the 
Right to Development (UNDRD) in 1986, which underlines the peoples’ right to freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
Most at the same time that new developments were taking place within the international 
community, the situation on the African continent started to shift as African political 
leaders attempted to restore their bond with their peoples through the adoption of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 27 June 1981, which came into force 
on 21 October 1986.63 Indeed, beside individual rights, the African Charter highlights 
peoples’ rights.64 This initiative seemingly demonstrated the will of African heads of state 
and government to re-position their people as the centre of their governments’ concern. 
However, although a large and detailed reference to peoples’ rights is made, its writers 
decided, because of the absence of a universally accepted definition, not to include a 
definition on the concept of “people” in the Charter.65 This lack of a definition was likely 
to lead to uncertainty as to who the real bearers of these peoples’ rights were.  
Of course, it is obvious that a minimalist interpretation of the African Charter implied, at 
the least, an application of the concept to the whole population of a state. Nevertheless, 
later in the development of its jurisprudence the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights66 has taken a maximalist approach including even local communities.67 It 
                                                             
62 The outcome of the work done by the working group was the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), but this occurred only twenty-five years after the group had been 
established, namely on 13 September 2007. This was due mainly to the fact that certain states remained 
sceptical about giving recognition to certain kinds of indigenous rights, such as the right to self-
determination and the control over natural resources. Furthermore, the Declaration is not legally binding 
under international law. Stidsen S. The indigenous world (Copenhagen: Igwa, 2007) 556-561.   
63 Hereinafter the “African Charter” or “Charter”. 
64 Peoples’ right to equality (art. 19), peoples’ right to self-determination (art. 20), peoples’ right to freely 
dispose of their wealth and natural resources (article 21), peoples’ right to development (art. 22), peoples’ 
right to national and international peace and security (art. 23) and peoples’ right to environment (art. 24).   
65  See the report of the OAU ministerial meeting on the draft African Charter held in Banjabul, The Gambia, 
from 9 to 15/6/1980 (CAB/LEG/67/3/Draft Rapt. Rpt (II) 4. 
66 Hereinafter the “African Commission” or “Commission”. 
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is noteworthy that because the African Charter has made a clear demarcation between the 
people and the state in the enumeration of peoples’ rights, the sovereign power attached to 
any of these people’s rights rests on the people and not the state acting through its 
government. This approach suggests, as underlined by Mbaye68 and then Ouguargouz,69 
the idea that governmental policies may possibly clash with the interests of people.70 
Unfortunately, several years after the adoption of the African Charter, African political 
leaders have not yet accomplished much more for their peoples in terms of development. 
African people continue to suffer from abject poverty. In Adejumobi’s view, this is 
because African political leaders of the post-colonial period have addressed the issue of 
development only at the level of rhetoric.71 This is particularly true in respect of the 
mineral industry where development-oriented governance remains illusory. Until now, 
there has been a widening gap between the goals supporting the peoples’ right to dispose 
freely of their wealth and natural resources and the practice in the mineral sector. Despite 
promising discourses made by governmental officials, the over-centralisation of power and 
bad governance practices are still dominant in many African countries,72 to the extent that 
mineral projects and revenues generated through their exploitation continue to profit only a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
67 For jurisprudence, see African Commission Communication 75/92 Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire 
(1994-1995) (Hereinafter the Katangese case) and more especially African Commission Communication 
276/2003 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Groups International on 
behalf of Endoris Welfare Council v. Kenya (Hereinafter the Endorois case), where the African 
Commission made the following statement: “The African Commission is satisfied that the Endoris are a 
‘people’, a status that entitles them to benefit from provisions of the African Charter that protects collective 
rights. The African Commission is of the view that the alleged violations of the African Charter are those 
that go to the heart of indigenous rights – the right to preserve one’s identity through identification with 
ancestral lands” (para.162). 
68  Mbaye K. Les droits de l’Homme en Afrique (Paris : Pedone, 1992) 29. 
69 Ouguergouz F. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A comprehensive agenda for human 
dignity and sustainable democracy in Africa (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003) 286. 
70 The potential antagonism between government policy and the interests of the people was previously 
underlined in the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of People’s Rights proposed in 1976 by a group of 
eminent individuals in Algiers (Hereinafter, the “1976 Algiers Declaration”). 
71 Adejumobi (2008) 109. The Lagos Plan of Action, and the Final Act of Lagos adopted in 1980, that 
addressed the issue of development within the continent were left aside probably for the same reason.  
72  Despite recognition of decentralisation on paper, in practice, the centre tends to maintain important 
powers in the process of decision-making in many African countries. See Wunsch J.S.  “Why has 
decentralization failed in Africa? Assessing the lessons of self-organized, local governance initiatives” 
Paper presented at a workshop on Political theory and policy analysis at IndianaUniversity, Bloomington 
(April 2008) 7-8. 
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portion of stakeholders, and exclude affected communities. Instead of transparency, the 
mineral sector remains characterised by corruption, opacity and mismanagement of funds 
in many of African resource-rich countries. For instance, in Nigeria it was reported that, 
despite the windfall revenue of an oil boom during the 1970s, the country had lost as much 
as $380 billion between 1960 and 1999 because of corruption and mismanagement 
practices.73 Similar situations are also found in other resource-rich countries like DRC, 
Zambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia.74 Even in the implementation of the win-win principle 
advocated nowadays by all African resource-rich countries in negotiations of mineral 
agreements,75 the central government fails at times to consider interests of affected 
communities. For instance, throughout the revision process of mineral contracts operated 
in DRC in 2009, the Congolese government failed to consider improvements needed in 
affected communities living conditions.76 
Adejumobi and Szablowski observe further that another major reason for the failure of 
African governments during the post-colonial period results from the externally driven 
development paradigm imposed by the World Bank on African countries through the 
structural adjustment programme.77 This paradigm was construed on the assumption that in 
order for developing countries to emerge, they needed to attract and privilege their market 
to increase private and foreign investment.78 This explains the flow of foreign direct 
                                                             
73 Human Rights Watch “The Human rights impact of local government corruption and mismanagement in 
Rivers states, Nigeria” in Report Vol. 19 No 2 (A) (January 2007).  
74Bryan S. and Hofmann B. Transparency and accountability in Africa’s extractive industries: The role of the 
legislature (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2007) 36; Netherlands Institute for 
Southern Africa The state vs. the people: Governance, mining and the transitional regime in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (Amsterdam: Niza, 2006) 29; Pedro MA. “Mainstreaming mineral wealth in 
growth and poverty reduction strategies” Economic Commission for Africa Policy Paper1 (ECA, 2005) 5. 
75 Kimani M.  “Mining to profit Africa’s people: Governments bargain for ‘fair-deals’ that enhance 
development’’ in (2009) 23 Africa Renewal 4. The win-win principle simply means that the mineral 
agreement must be formulated in a manner that guaranteed the interest of each party interest.  
76  Kabange NCJ. “La révision par l’Etat des contrats conclus avec les personnes privées: Cas des contrats 
miniers en République Démocratique du Congo” (2010) 29 (1) Cahiers Africains des Droits de l’Homme et 
de la Démocratie 67-71. 
77Adejumobi (2008)105; Szablowski D. Transnational law and local struggle: Mining, communities and the 
World Bank (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007) 27.  
78Adejumobi, Id., 105; Szablowsk, Id., 27. 
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investments into the African continent increasing from an annual average of half a billion 
during the 1986-1990 period to three and a half billion during the 1990s.79 
Even though the paradigm should not be undermined, as foreign direct investment brings 
advantageous capital flowing into the developing economies, with the possibility of 
transfer of technologies, it has so far served only the interests of the ruling class and of 
large scale multinational companies exploiting mineral resources in the African continent, 
without giving attention to the fundamental rights of affected communities. The 
paradoxical increase of foreign investment during the 1980s and 1990s and the continuing 
impoverishing social and living conditions of the affected communities, reveal that there 
was a serious governance problem of the mineral sector under the structural adjustment 
programme. At the beginning of the 1990s, African countries were urged by the World 
Bank to liberalise their mineral sector and to reduce the involvement of the state by re-
designing their mineral legislation order to open up their markets to more foreign 
investment initiatives.80 Credibility was blindly given to the idea that an increase in foreign 
direct investment would generate development. As a result, to attract the sympathy of 
foreign mineral investors, many African countries made provisions for considerably lower 
taxation, causing their public treasury to suffer a significant decrease in revenue.81 This 
raises the argument that the design and application of fiscal policies are critical to the cash 
flow that should come from mineral exploitation. The mineral sector is supposed to 
generate important revenues through taxes and royalties that should be used to fund 
development programmes and projects at national as well as local levels. It has been 
observed that in many developing countries, including those in Africa, large parts of fiscal 
                                                             
79 See the Report of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) “Foreign direct investment 
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80  See World Bank “Strategy for African mining …” (1992).  
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Network Africa, Tax Justice Network Africa, Action Aid International and Christian Aid “Breaking the 
curse: How transparent taxation and fair taxes can turn Africa’s mineral wealth into development” 
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on 28/6/2011]; Bijlsma B. “Governing mining in Africa: African perspectives, state initiatives and 
international standards” Report made as part of a project of the International Alliance on Natural 
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income come directly from the mineral sector.82 As Bresser-Pereira rightly warns, a 
government that is unable to tax adequately cannot successfully satisfy the socio-economic 
demands and needs of its people.83 It is within the package of taxes and royalties received 
by the government that affected communities should have found their portion of funds to 
finance development activities and projects. With a lowered level of tax revenue during 
that period, coupled with bad governance practices and the absence of a legal system to 
safeguard their share, affected communities in most African countries have been deprived 
of considerable financial means to realise their development. 
It is important also to observe that the liberalisation regime of the mineral sector promoted 
by the World Bank policy had accommodated foreign investments in a political milieu of 
adversity and unrest where fundamental rights violation was almost the norm, with the 
result that, instead of being beneficial to African peoples, many of them have turned into 
unethical activities. Despite the movements for freedom and independence across the 
continent in the 1960s, the general context of post-colonial governance remained 
characterised by long periods of oppressive dictatorship and military rule in many African 
countries until the early 1990s that abused the fundamental rights of their peoples.84 
Taking advantage of the shift that occurred in the international arena at the end of the Cold 
War in the late 1980s, African countries embarked on a new movement advocating 
democracy as the appropriate model of governance all over the continent. Authoritarian 
regimes were rejected and a period of transition to democracy was launched in many 
African countries during the 1990s.85According to Nzongola-Ntalaja, the struggle for 
democracy was aimed at radically changing the poor conditions under which the people 
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lived by improving their material and social welfare.86 This assertion takes root in and 
expresses the permanent desire of African peoples to build up sustainable development 
under a participative system of governance.87 While claims for democratisation were made 
within national jurisdictions, initiatives were also taken at the regional level. 
It is in this context that, at the request of some non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and grassroots organisations, the African Charter on popular participation in development 
and transformation was adopted at a conference held in Arusha in February 1990.88 In this 
document, participants to the conference approached democracy in the context of 
sustainable development as a concept that requires what they called “popular 
participation”.89 This concept was defined as: 
the empowerment of the people to effectively involve themselves in creating the 
structures and in designing policies and programmes that serve the interests of all as 
well as to effectively contribute to the development process and share equitably in its 
benefits.90 
The aim of the conference was to reach a consensus on what should be the role of popular 
participation in the process of Africa’s development and transformation.91 Making a 
general statement on the management of resources within the continent, participants 
acknowledged that resources needed to be re-directed first to the satisfaction of the critical 
needs of African peoples in a sustainable manner; and to this end, every people must be 
                                                             
86 Nzongola-Ntalaja (1997) 13. 
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Ahmed, Secretary General of the OAU to the International Conference on Africa, Africa 40, London, 29 
October 1997, as quoted by Murray R. Human rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 74.      
88 Besides representatives of African governments and UN agencies, the conference regrouped over five 
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89 Art.11 of the Arusha Declaration. 
90 Id. 
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empowered through effective participation in a development agenda that is human-
centered.92 In the natural resources area, the new paradigm implied that affected 
communities were entitled to participate and express their views in respect of any project 
that directly affected their livelihoods and development.93 Unfortunately, this participatory 
approach to development did not match the African mining strategy developed by the 
World Bank in 1992.94 Despite recognising its relevance,95 in practice the World Bank did 
not give much consideration to popular participation in the African mineral sector, 
therefore leaving room for illegitimacy. As observed by Campbell, the World Bank only 
consulted a group of eighty mineral companies, leaving aside decision-makers and the 
representatives of affected communities.96 
In fact, there was a clear antagonism between the vision shared in the Arusha Declaration 
that regarded the involvement of people at grassroots as crucial to the process of 
development, and the World Bank’s free highway to liberalisation for the inflow of foreign 
investment in minerals as the main determinant of economic growth.97 The Arusha 
Declaration explicitly disapproved the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) 
monitored by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the following 
terms: 
 We also wish in this regard to put on record our disapproval of all economic 
programmes, such as orthodox Structural Adjustment Programmes, which 
undermine the human condition and disregard the potential and role of popular 
participation in self-sustaining development.98 
Such a pronounced opposition explains partially why the Arusha Declaration did not enjoy 
favour, because many African governments felt implicitly constrained to adhere to the 
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SAPs. As a result, the liberal regime promoted by the World Bank in the 1990s produced 
poor performance in many African countries.99 In the absence of an effective model of 
democratic governance in many African countries, the World Bank’s liberal regime took 
place under the negative influence of previous authoritarian regimes. Governments 
continued to demonstrate little political will and commitment to foster development and 
were characterised by violent repression of protests, corruption, contract opacity, 
mismanagement of royalties for their personal profit and passivity toward the 
environmental damage caused by full exploitation.100 In such a context, foreign mineral 
companies easily took maximum advantage of the liberalisation and deregulation of the 
mineral sector by conducting their operations in a manner careless of fundamental 
rights.101 Not only were foreign investors willing to work with regimes that had poor 
fundamental rights records, but they themselves have been accused of having infringed on 
fundamental rights in certain cases.102 Consequently, instead of providing benefits to 
African countries, the increase in foreign mining investments was generally detrimental.103 
 
Because of their belief in the new paradigm of governance, advocating the implication of 
those affected by decisions on development matters, NGOs and grassroots organisations 
did not give up their struggle. This was evidenced for instance, by a complaint lodged 
before the African Commission in 1996 by two NGOs on behalf of the Ogoni communities 
alleging that the Nigerian government and its external partners, Shell, involved in oil 
production in Ogoniland, had inter alia violated the fundamental right of the Ogonis to 
freely dispose of natural resources, because they did not receive significant benefits from 
the deal, and the oil had been exploited without prior consultation  with them and without 
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100 Kimani (2009) 4-5; Campbell (2010) 29; Bryan S. and Hofmann B. (2007) 8, 15-16; Lange S. “Gold and 
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Rights Watch, supra note 72.  
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102 Id., 188. 
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regard to their  environmental rights.104 In this case which has become a landmark decision 
on the contient, the African Commission did not confine the concept “people” to the   
whole population of the country, but also applied it to these local communities and found 
that the government of Nigeria had favoured the devastation of the well-being of the 
Ogonis through a systematic violation of articles 21 and 24 of the African Charter.105 The 
relevance of this decision was inter ali its demonstration of the fact that the interests of an 
affected community may at times be crushed by decisions and actions taken by the 
government in the course of its governance of natural resources. This is a solid argument 
for the defense of the necessity to associate local communities in the governance of 
mineral resources to the extent they are affected by a particular project. 
With the intensification of pressure by NGOs and grassroots organisations, African 
governments, international organisations and mineral companies finally acknowledged that 
the participation of affected communities has become a relevant factor in the governance 
of natural resources and the better achievement of development goals at local level.106 
At the UN, recognition of the paradigm had already been made in the Rio Declaration in 
1992, where states were required to facilitate the participation of their citizens in the 
decision-making process in respect of environmental issues.107 However, as previously 
underlined, the attitude of African governments during the 1990s was not positive towards 
this requirement. Further recognition of the paradigm was made in a document entitled 
“Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries”, that was adopted at a UN 
conference held on 20 May 2001, where a strong emphasis was placed on the relevance of 
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popular participation in the process of development.108 The programme of action rested on 
the idea that efforts have to be made to establish an effective institutional, legal and 
regulatory framework for popular participation and for close cooperation among all 
stakeholders.109 The World Bank also emphasised on the new paradigm of governance by 
supporting the principle that local communities must benefit from projects that affect them. 
In this respect, this instution undertook to work not only with governments, but to include 
affected communities and ensure, through best practice, that they profit as much as 
possible from such projects.110 The World Bank even published a participation source 
book where it explicitly acknowledges that the participatory approach can “improve 
projects, contribute to the development process, and help the poor”.111 
In the Constitutive Act of the AU that replaced the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
in 2001, African governments explicitly declare in article 3(g) that one of the objectives of 
the Union is to promote “popular participation”.112 Further recognition of the paradigm 
was made in the document establishing the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD), adopted in 2001 by AU member states and in which it is acknowledged that 
“many African governments did not empower their people to embark on development 
initiatives” and that one of the aims of the NEPAD is to promote “people-centred 
development”.113 The NEPAD expressly recognised the participation of all stakeholders as 
a key objective in the development process.114 In the document of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) that aims to evaluate the implementation of the NEPAD in African 
countries, emphasis is put on the participation of all stakeholders in the process of 
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assessment115 and the use of indicative criteria as to “what is being done to create an 
enabling environment for meaningful popular participation in all forms and levels of 
governance?”116 In 2002, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was 
launched by the United Kingdom’s Prime Minister Tony Blair, with the aim of improving 
governance in resource-rich countries through the publication and verification of payments 
made by companies and revenues received by governments from the exploitation of oil, 
gas, and mineral resources.117 This initiative, to which many African countries adhere, 
emphasises on the process of evaluation, the necessity for all stakeholders, including civil 
societies, to participate in the review of the EITI process.118  Later on, in 2007, at the 8th 
Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, the members adopted the African Charter on 
Democracy, Elections and Governance that directs state parties to implement the principle 
of an “effective participation of citizens in democratic and development processes and in 
governance of public affairs.”119  More specific is the participatory approach formulated in 
the 2009 AMV where African states contend that new contractual arrangements and legal 
instruments to facilitate the participation of affected communities, as well as new revenue 
distribution mechanisms for sharing portions of centrally collected rents, are to be 
considered as responses to the challenges posed by the contemporary approach to 
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development.120 Though the AMV recognises that several factors influence the success of 
the mineral industry, for instance, the pricing on the international commodity market, it 
puts an emphasis on the need for good governance practices that should involve the 
participation of affected communities.121 
The impact of the paradigm of community participation has been so significant that even 
multinational companies have started to affirm their commitment to engage in discussion 
with affected communities. After the Ogoni case was finalised by the African 
Commission, the Shell company that was involved in the matter, started to shift its 
approach and recognised that it had to adopt a participatory approach and collaborate with 
local communities affected by its activities in order to realise development projects.122 In 
2000, nine of the largest mineral companies initiated a two year project known as Mining, 
Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) through the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development and under the supervision of the International Institute for 
Environment and Development with the aim of setting out how best the mining sector may 
contribute to the attainment of sustainable development.123 In the final report of the 
project, it was rightly pointed out that: 
Ensuring that mechanisms are in place to enable local communities to play effective 
roles in decision-making is one of the greatest challenges in mining’s ability to 
contribute to sustainable development at the local level.124 
Community participation plays an important role. It is responsive to many concerns, 
namely, transparency in the management of revenues, the legitimacy of mineral 
agreements, environmental conservation and the realisation of socio-economic rights 
within affected communities. It is a tool that enables them to be partakers of their own 
development in a sustainable way. However, for almost more than a decade that there has 
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been consensus on the relevance of community participation from all the actors involved 
in the African mineral sector, the effective implementation of the paradigm is still latent in 
many African countries and often remains a simple statement of intent.  
1.2. Research problem and subject matter of the study 
 
Though consensus has been reached among all stakeholders about the relevance of 
community participation, the standard at which the paradigm needs to be enforced is still 
unclear.125 Thus far, international donor agencies, states and mineral corporations tend to 
express a preference for a soft approach which generally amounts to a process deprived of 
formal means of constraint to consider views of people affected by the project even after 
having conducted consultations. For instance, the World Bank has expressed the view that 
the involvement of affected communities in extractive industry projects must not result in 
the power to veto, but rather simply be a process of free, prior and informed 
consultation.126As a consequence, there have been cases where projects were deemed 
damaging after consultation with affected communities, but which still received the quietus 
of the government and the World Bank. For instance, despite opposition by affected 
communities and organisations of civil society, a project to construct 300 oil wells in Chad 
and a 1070 km pipeline to the Atlantic coast of Cameroon, was approved by the World 
Bank in 2001.127 Paradoxically, after ten years, the promise of achieving development for 
communities living around the area has remained unmitigated.128 Instead of poverty 
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alleviation, affected communities have been displaced without adequate compensation.129 
This is why McBeth observes that though international economic institutions have 
commonly contended that the overall operations they support bring prosperity and have a 
positive impact on the enjoyment of fundamental rights, they have been criticised for their 
support of large scale infrastructure projects that evict local people, violate their right to 
housing and affect their livelihoods, as well as violating many other rights.130A similar 
situation occurred in DRC in respect of an aluminum smelter project that BHP Billiton 
agreed upon with the central government for five billion US dollars in the province of Bas-
Congo in 2010. In spite of the rejection and calls to halt this project by NGOs, because of 
its lack of benefit to the local communities directly affected, both parties decided to 
continue with the project.131 Fortunately, two years later, the company decided at its own 
discretion not to continue with the project which was still at a very early stage.132 
All these cases are illustrative of the fact that the importance of community participation is 
reduced to a simple formality characterised by the mere fulfillment of the duty to consult. 
Even where the law makes their consent a prior condition for the launching of mineral 
operations, this requirement has generally been disregarded or undermined by the 
government.133As clearly summarised by Katy and Mamen: 
Community consultation processes are often proposed as useful instruments because 
they can empower local communities to influence decisions on mining projects. Yet 
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despite such potential, many mining consultation processes serve as a smokescreen, 
lacking substance and creating the illusion of democratic process.134 
The consequence is that affected communities are often unable to exercise real control over 
the government and the mineral corporation as regards the due consideration to be given to 
their fundamental rights.This is a misleading approach to the paradigm and the negation of 
the crucial reality that community participation is at the heart of any people-centred 
process intended to realise development at local level.135  In fact without effective 
involvement, community participation is rendered meaningless since there is no guarantee 
that the views expressed by affected communities will be considered and have an impact 
on the outcome of the decision-making process. 
To ensure that the governance of mineral resources is effectively oriented to the 
achievement of sustainable development within affected communities, it is important that 
these communities be involved and participate throughout the life cycle of the mineral 
project (negotiation, execution and closure) with the possibility of opposing any decision 
or action taken by other stakeholders that can have devastating effects on their welfare. As 
correctly underlined by Marocs, affected communities must be given the opportunity to 
learn about the impact of the mineral project before operations begin, to express their 
views in the decision-making process and to access effective remedies where damages 
occur.136 By participating actively, they will be able to direct mineral activities affecting 
their livelihood towards development objectives in their areas. 
At this stage, the softness with which the participatory approach has been applied requires 
that a more effective strategy be developed. This is because under the current approach, 
mineral projects do not easily capture the demand of affected communities for respect of 
their fundamental rights. Even the concept of Community Development Agreement (CDA) 
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instituted in some African countries137 as a strategy for affected communities’ participation 
is often loose with for instance royalties and financial benefits being considered more as 
donations rather than lawful entitlements of these communities by virtue of their 
fundamental rights.138 It has been contended that despite the benefits it can bring, if the 
CDA is to be considered as a formal agreement, the legal stipulations that it often includes 
can negatively impact on the relationship between stakeholders by fostering a counter 
productive environment of mistrust, uncertainty and confusion as to the role of each party, 
with a dependency on the mineral company which goes beyond rational limits.139 
However, as will be seen later, the relative success experienced in South Africa and the 
difficulty of enforcement in Nigeria140 demonstrate that, unless approached as a binding 
agreement rather than a soft law instrument, there is no guarantee that this strategy will 
provide more effectiveness to participation and compell other stakeholders to give due 
respect to communities’ fundamental rights in the development process.  Ribot aptly 
explains the significant difference in the ways participation may be approached, 
contending that powers that are delegated as privileges can easily be withdrawn, while 
those that are transferred as rights are hardly taken away.141 This study proposes a 
paradigm shift away from a soft model of participation to one that will be binding under a 
fundamental rights-based approach, with the possibility of enforcement before quasi-
judicial and judicial bodies. This shift towards what can be defined as a binding approach 
implies that affected communities should have access to legal mechanisms through which 
they can constrain other stakeholders to consider their views on how mineral projects 
should profit their sustainable development. These mechanisms may imply formalising the 
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relationship between stakeholders in the form of a contract which is legally binding and 
approaching judicial bodies to seek enforcement of affected communities’ fundamental 
rights. By interacting with other stakeholders from a fundamental rights perspective, 
affected communities may influence the decision-making process by organising their 
opposition against any negative elements in the governance of mineral resources from a 
legal perspective. In other words, other stakeholders will not only be obliged to make them 
part of discussions on any mineral project, but also be bound to consider their views. This 
is what is meant by “effectiveness of community participation” throughout this study. 
However, an important question remains as to how the legal implications of a fundamental 
rights-based approach to community participation must be apprehended in the specific 
context of a mineral-led development. 
The answer to this question requires contextualising participation in the ongoing 
predominant discourse on development which sees the appropriation of the development 
process by the people concerned as a relevant factor.142 This approach generally qualified 
as “people-centred development” rests on the view that “only the affected people 
themselves can define what they consider to be improvements in the quality of their life”143  
and that for such a purpose “they need to be empowered to participate in the development 
process.”144 The aim is clearly to avoid a technocratic determination of policies, decisions 
and projects, and rather to achieve an integration of the local driving force in the 
development process in respect of every initiative made by the government or other 
stakeholders, that have a direct influence on the affected communities’ livelihood.145 This 
approach of empowering affected communities to effectively take part in the development 
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process goes hand in hand with another contemporary approach which, from a legal 
perspective, perceives development as a process in which policies and programmes are 
formulated in consideration of the duty to respect and fulfill fundamental rights.146 This is 
what is known as the fundamental rights-based approach to development which means that 
the development process is carried out with due regard to fundamental rights standards and 
that the fulfillment of these rights becomes a vital goal of development efforts.147 In this 
respect, the fundamental rights-based approach to community participation appears as a 
component of the fundamental rights-based approach to development and implies a double 
dimension. 
In its first dimension, it commands that community participation be regarded as a 
fundamental right rather than a simple formality which at times takes on the appearance of 
a favour granted to local communities. This is in order to provide a certain degree of 
empowerment to affected communities in the governance of mineral resources in as far as 
their development is concerned. This implies that affected communities would not merely 
be consulted, but have for instance the right to exercising control over the financial 
bargaining and the management of revenues and ensuring that mineral companies 
demonstrate sufficient commitment with regard to the social and environmental impacts of 
their operations. This approach clearly has the benefit of making their participation more 
effective and meaningful.  
In its second dimension, it implies that community participation would constitute the 
channel through which affected communities would advocate and contend other 
fundamental rights relevant to achieving mineral-led development in their neighbourhoods. 
In this regard, the observation made by Du Plessis deserves particular attention in so much 
as this scholar rightly points out that some fundamental rights are rendered useless when 
they are not accompanied by a formal mechanism of participation for rights holders in the 
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process of their implementation.148 For instance, it is through participation that affected 
communities may ensure that a particular mineral project is respectful of their 
environmental right through its life cycle. The fundamental rights-based approach to 
community participation will help them during the discussion, execution and closure of 
any mineral project to make sure that development goals are promoted and secured.149 
The view has been expressed that development must come before fundamental rights may 
be safeguarded.150 However, drawing from the Chinese experience, it is taken for granted 
that a development process that takes place without due regard to fundamental rights 
cannot generate real development for the large majority of the poor. Despite the impressive 
economic growth experienced by China, this country is still counted among developing 
countries.151 Factors like inequalities and fundamental rights violations have led to the 
failure of the process of redistributing wealth within the Chinese society, with a continued 
and pronounced gap between the poor and the rich.152 Under the binding approach, 
fundamental rights give voice to human suffering in the development process. Their 
visibility is raised and they serve as the legal basis on which claims for improvement may 
be submitted.153 This implies that mineral policy and decisions on projects taken in the 
course of the development process must necessarily fit within the prospect of fulfilling 
fundamental rights.  For this purpose, standards defined under a fundamental rights-based 
approach would help to assess the extent to which societal norms and institutions are set up 
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to achieve development goals which forcefully include the respect of these rights, and the 
extent to which the practices in mineral governance conform with the obligations imposed 
by these rights.154 Sengupta points out that this approach would avoid a situation of 
inequality in as much as the equitable distribution of benefits remains at the heart of a 
development process that is rights-based.155 The distorsion between both concepts is no 
more conceivable since development itself is being now regarded as a fundamental 
right.156 
Viewed from this perspective, it is clear that community participation must cease to be 
approached as a simple formality, but rather as a legal tool that empowers affected 
communities with the ability to advocate and promote governance of mineral resources 
oriented towards the achievement of development goals. Nevertheless, if the fundamental 
rights-based approach must be formally implemented, it needs to find support in the 
provisions of at least one legal instrument to which affected communities may resort and 
seek enforcement.157 
In this respect, if one adheres to the view that fundamental rights from a vertical 
perspective, aimed at protecting people (individually or collectively) against abuse of 
power by their governments, then it may be contended that the African Charter qualifies 
largely in as much as it represents an empowering instrument in the people-government 
relationship. Though controversies still exist worldwide as to the origin of fundamental 
rights,158 it is established that in post-colonial Africa, people’s rights emerged from a clash 
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between African peoples and their political rulers.159 As mentioned previously, it must be 
kept in mind that peoples’ interests can at times be crushed by governmental policy, 
decisions or actions, and that it is something that often happens in the African mineral 
sector with regard to affected communities’ interests and fundamental rights.160 Thus, 
being the unique instrument on the continent that refers largely to peoples’ rights, the 
African Charter represents the appropriate normative framework that legally empowers 
affected communities to defy fundamental rights violations that may occur in their 
relationship with the government, either at the level of the center or at the local one, 
depending on arragments made within each country. Under the binding approach, 
fundamental rights entrenched in the African Charter should work as a tool in the hand of 
affected communities to make the state responsive and accountable to their own will.161 
Because affected communities are included in the concept of “people”,162 provisions of the 
African Charter may be used by them to oppose any governmental policy, decision or 
action that compromises their best interests and fundamental rights in the mineral sector. 
From a horizontal perspective, the fundamental rights entrenched in the African Charter 
may also function as a mechanism to challenge activities of mineral companies which 
threaten the safety and the developmental needs of the people affected.163 This was the 
case that the Ogonis brought before the African Commission.164 However, since the norms 
of international law have historically developed only in respect to the conduct of states,165 
it remains an open question whether the provisions of the African Charter may be applied 
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directly to mineral companies operating in African countries. At present, international law 
in this area only consists of soft law prescriptions suggesting a certain type of conduct to 
corporations in respect of fundamental rights.166 The provisions of these guidelines are not 
binding upon corporations.167 Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated in the course of this 
study, the problem is not really whether fundamental rights obligations for multinational 
companies exist, but rather who should be accountable for their violation. Under a right-
based approach to development, it makes sense that foreign mineral corporations should 
have fundamental rights obligations towards affected communities since the principle that 
the fundamental right to development of a legal person or group necessarily creates 
corresponding duties for others.168 However, the approach developed by the African 
Commission in the Ogoni case stipulates that African governments are the ones to be held 
liable for fundamental rights abuses committed by multinational corporations operating 
within their territory.169 This is seen as a result of the state’s obligation to “protect”, which 
implies the duty to take positive measures to ensure that non-state actors do not infringe on 
fundamental rights.170 Though this approach is somewhat limiting,171 its rationale resides 
in the fact that it is the government that regulates the entrance of multinational mineral 
companies into the country and determines the condition upon which these entities must 
exercise their activities. 
With regard to both these vertical and horizontal perspectives, the African Charter is 
particularly suitable to support the fundamental rights-based approach because its 
enforcement machinery offers a double level of jurisdiction where affected communities 
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may seek enforcement. Before reaching regional mechanisms of enforcement, affected 
communities are required first to exhaust domestic remedies, if available.172This naturally 
broadens the different avenues that they can take to make their voices heard in respect of 
mineral projects having direct implications on their welfare. Despite criticisms levelled at 
the African Commission,173 the African Charter enforcement machinery is preset to offer 
disadvantaged people, including affected communities, a forum where they are 
empowered to challenge the bad behaviour and practices of the government and other 
stakeholders in respect of their fundamental rights.174 This ability was reinforced with the 
establishment of an African Court with the power to deliver decisions that are binding 
upon states.175 
 
Moreover, the African Charter qualifies as an appropriate legal instrument to promote a 
fundamental rights-based approach because it goes along with the NEPAD objectives. In 
respect of the sustainable development process in the context of the NEPAD, the APRM 
has adopted the African Charter as a main standard of fundamental rights.176 Provisions of 
the African Charter should serve in the monitoring of the development process to assess 
the extent to which fundamental rights relevant to the NEPAD objectives are respected and 
fulfilled by African States. 
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Lastly, it is also noteworthy that all African states are party to the African Charter, which 
gives this instrument a complete jurisdiction over the continent. 
This study is built on the argument that community participation will be more effective 
under a fundamental rights-based approach. It stands on the belief that affected 
communities will significantly benefit from mineral resources if they are legally 
empowered to participate at different stages in the process of their governance, which 
includes steps like the decision on mineral projects, the sharing of revenues, the realisation 
of development projects and the closure of the mine. Therefore, the fundamental rights-
based approach should help create the necessary conditions for improving the governance 
of mineral resources in connection with the achievement of development goals within 
affected communities. However, the implementation of the paradigm is not without 
challenges. 
The fact that another stakeholder has to be added to the traditional binary relationship177 
with enough power to influence the governance of mineral resources implies that profound 
changes need to take place. The normative framework and the functioning of institutions in 
the mineral sector must be reoriented in many African countries to support an effective 
participatory model. The approach to development adopted by many African countries 
since independence, did not express much concern for how societal norms and institutions 
impact on the outcome of the development process.178 Campbell rightly points out that the 
way the African mineral sector is to be reoriented at present is dependant on the values 
advanced within the legal system of each country, to the extent that these values condition 
the choice of development strategies, the model of participation and the responsibilities 
and powers bestowed on stakeholders.179 In this respect, there is no doubt and it is taken 
for granted nowadays, that all African countries at least at a rhetorical level, adhere to 
“democracy”, “decentralisation” and “accountability” as key values that create conducive 
conditions for achieving development. Adherence to these values has been consecutive to 
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the ideological shift on the continent and the democratisation process launched after the 
end of the Cold War in late 1980s.180 Until now, the democratisation process remains to be 
fully realised in many African countries. In the mineral sector in particular, peoples still 
struggle to have access to resources and to share in the benefits of those resources in many 
countries richly endowed with minerals. This is either because their management is still 
over-centralised by the government181 or because the sector is still dominated by private 
interests or ownership.182 No matter the approach adopted by each country regarding the 
ownership of mineral resources,183 it is obvious that people are entitled to share in benefits 
flowing from the mineral industry in the process of achieving development. This is 
particularly true for affected communities that are the first to be subjected to the impact of 
mineral companies’ activities, and so it would be unfair to keep them outside the 
governance process. The exclusion of people from the governance of mineral resources has 
generally been inspired by such anti-values as inequality, injustice and selfishness with the 
consequence that, wherever experienced, mineral activities have always generated conflict 
and violence, infringements of fundamental rights, misery and poverty.184 Therefore, it 
becomes indisputable that for the governance of mineral resources to contribute to the 
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achievement of development goals, African countries need to adopt a democratic and 
decentralised model of management, with legal mechanisms to hold public and private 
actors accountable. This implies that the fundamental rights-based approach to community 
participation can only be conceived and viable in the context of a democratic society, 
where affected communities share a certain degree of power and are able to make political 
rulers as well as other stakeholders accountable. Therefore, among the first issues to be 
addressed in this study is how democracy, decentralisation and accountability must be 
designed to match community participation viewed from a perspective based on 
fundamental rights in the context of mineral activities that take place within or around 
affected communities. This investigation of the interconnection between participation and 
these three values is instrumental to the search for a system of good governance. This is 
because the ultimate finality of decisions and actions taken in the governance of mineral 
resources should presumably be reaching and achieving development goals. Therefore, 
since the three fundamental values are examined here from the perspective of their 
providing support for more effective community participation, their close relationship with 
the paradigm values requires that norms and institutions governing the mineral industry be 
made up of principles attached to each of them.  This is basically what is missing in the 
model of governance that currently exists in many African resource-rich countries, with the 
consequence that it makes community participation insignificant and inefficient at 
preventing bad governance practices.185 
Then, as this study is based on fundamental rights, the second issue to address should be to 
determine legal mechanisms that should be available to affected communities in a 
democratic society to enforce all fundamental rights relevant to make their participation 
effective and meaningful in the development process. Because the legal approach 
developed in this study is undertaken within the realm of the African Charter, the core of 
the problem becomes whether, and how, this instrument and its enforcement machinery 
may fill the gap and reshape the governance of mineral resources in African countries by 
making community participation really effective in the development process.This implies 
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that the African Charter and its enforcement machinery must be efficient to enhance 
democracy, decentralisation and accountability in the mineral sector and to support the 
participation of affected local communities in the decision-making process in consideration 
of their fundamental rights and development goals. The challenge for the African Charter 
and its enforcement machinery is to serve assolid ground for the fundamental rights-based 
approach to community participation in the governance of mineral resources, with the aim 
of achieving development. This problem has two implications. 
From a normative perspective, this implies that the African Charter should provide for 
community participation and give content to democratic principles that would allow 
affected communities to enjoy the power necessary to make their view be considered, and 
make other stakeholders accountable in respect of their interests and rights. This means 
that through the provisions of the African Charter, affected communities must be able to 
participate in decision-making (first dimension) and then use the opportunity to participate 
as a means through which they will enforce other fundamental rights in the pursuit of 
sustainable development (second dimension). Provisions of the African Charter should 
facilitate the full exercise of community participation in both its first and second 
dimensions and thus, give more freedom to affected communities to express and enforce 
their choices in respect of mineral projects foreseen within their areas. Nevertheless, it is 
indisputable that the interpretation of the African Charter provisions that are directly 
relevant to community participation, will confront questions or issues related to ideological 
and practical considerations attached to democracy, decentralisation and accountability. 
In concrete terms, consideration for democracy raises the question as to whether it is direct 
democracy or representative democracy that should be adopted to allow community 
participation in the governance process in the mineral sector. Though it has been 
contended that direct democracy is possible only where people are few in number as in 
ancient Athens,186 and that for this reason it may function as a participatory mechanism 
within local communities, it has been found that in practice two major difficulties 
commonly arise. The first difficulty concerns the way decisions have to be taken, meaning 
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whether decisions should be made according to a consensual or a majoritarian method of 
decision-making. While Smith observes that the exercise of direct democracy without legal 
safeguards leads to the suppression of minority voices by the dominant majority,187  Rono 
and Aboud point out the difficulty experienced by certain local communities in reaching a 
consensual decision in their assemblies, with facts like absence of co-ordination, conflict 
of leadership and opposing views.188 The second difficulty stems from the fact that many 
African countries are still characterised by a significant level of illiteracy within affected 
communities and the question has been asked whether or not it would be wiser to let 
community participation take place on an exclusively representative basis.189 The reason 
for this suggestion is that it would be easier to choose representatives from among the elite, 
that are educated and have the necessary knowledge and capacity to defend the interests of 
the community. But this is far from being the best solution, because as Smith observes, 
local elites are also capable of behaving with carelessness towards the interests and rights 
of the community.190 Rupture between representatives and the community is also 
conceivable at the local level of governance, especially when they do not show 
commitment to working for the good of their community, but rather for their own interests. 
The question here is: which form of democracy the affected communities may contemplate 
under the provisions of the African Charter? 
The effectiveness of a democratic model of governance is also dependent on 
accountability. Community participation would be meaningless if affected communities 
could not compel other stakeholders to consider their views and make them accountable in 
respect of their fundamental rights and interests in the mineral-led development process.191 
Provisions of the African Charter and institutional arrangements for their enforcement need 
to be scrutinised to determine whether they can help affected communities make the 
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government and mineral corporations accountable. This discussion forcefully enters the 
scope of the analysis of vertical and horizontal applicability of the Charter. 
 
As to decentralisation, since there is no unanimity on a single model, issues to consider 
involve the extent to which power must flow to affected communities and the level at 
which they must participate for community participation to be effective in the governance 
of mineral resources.192 Because decentralisation is a matter of degree, Zieligski makes a 
distinction between pure and mixed models.193 This scholar describes the pure model as a 
single level model which operates without any central authority and which implies the 
existence of more than one centre of decision-making, whereas the model is mixed when 
decentralised structures are interspersed with some measure of centralisation at some 
levels.194 For the purpose of this study, the model of decentralisation that is envisaged is 
one that is in anyway inclusive of affected communities, one that empowers them to such 
an extent that they are able to influence the governance of mineral resources towards the 
objective of realising development goals.195 This is because, as observed by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), most decentralisation initiatives in Africa have 
demonstrated little commitment to engage local communities in the decision-making 
process.196 Therefore, the challenge for the African Charter is also to demonstrate how far 
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its provisions may be relied on to seek reform and the creation of an appropriate 
framework through which affected communities may exercise their participation.197 
At the institutional level, what challenges the African Charter and its enforcement 
machinery is to efficiently influence the functioning of national structures involved in the 
governance of mineral resources in such a manner as to make community participation 
effective and guarantee the respect of affected communities’ fundamental rights in the 
development process. This requires a regular check on the extent to which the provisions 
of the African Charter are given effect in the domestic system, and on how far government 
representatives in the mineral sector behave and fulfill their duties with due regard to the 
fundamental rights of affected communities. It is clear that the best situation is when the 
provisions of the African Charter have explicitly been translated into domestic law.198 This 
is because government officials often tend to be more aware of national legislation.199 
However, at present this may not constitute a valid excuse because, no matter the system 
(dualistic or monistic),200 the African Charter has been ratified by all African countries.201 
This implies that the African Commission can at least fulfill its mandate in all resource-
rich countries to prevent and cure the infringement of fundamental rights of affected 
communities. Concerning the African Court, since the 1998 protocol has not been adhered 
to by all African countries, its jurisdiction remains yet limited to only certain countries. As 
will be seen, its ability to deliver binding decisions is a big opportunity for the protection 
of individuals and collective fundamental rights, but its restricted access remains a serious 
handicap. 
                                                             
197 This analysis will be particularly useful to South Africa where people press for access to mineral 
resources. 
198 Viljoen F. International Human rights law in Africa (Oxford: Oxford Unversity Press, 2007) 566. For 
instance, see the case of the Nigerian domestic law as related by Uzoukwu LI. Constitutionalism, Human 
rights and the judiciary in Nigeria, (Unpublished Doctoral thesis – Unisa, 2010) 213. 
199 Viljoen (2007) 566. 
200 In a monistic system, provisions of international treaties that have been ratified by a country are 
automatically part of the national law of that country. But, in a dualistic system, these provisions need to 
be explicitly incorporated into the domestic legal system through an Act of Parliament. See Vilojoen 
(2007) 530, 536.  
201   See The AU “List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights”; available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African%20Charter%20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples%20
Rights.pdf [accessed 8/9/2011]. 
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Obviously, community participation will affect the relationship between the government 
and affected communities.The African Commission as well as the African Court will have 
the critical task of finding the right balance between the views of these communities and 
government decisions and actions. Of course, this study does not intend to assume that the 
fundamental rights-based approach to community participation should consecrate a 
political right to self-determination that would lead an affected community to become an 
independent state.202 Despite promoting the affected communities’ fundamental right to 
participation, the study rests on the view that the government must continue to play its 
fundamental role of coordinating the national economy and of ensuring an equal 
redistribution of wealth within the society.203 As demonstrated by experience, there may be 
tension as well between affected communities and the central government in the struggle to 
control the benefits that flow from the mineral exploitation.204 In this respect, the challenge 
for the African Charter enforcement mechanisms is to get equilibrium between the 
imperative of upholding fundamental rights of affected communities and the need to 
respect the minimum autonomy of any government to decide public matters. 
All the above are part of the issues that this study intends to deal with. An in-depth 
analysis dedicated to each one of them should provide an answer to the major question of 
whether and, if yes, how the fundamental rights-based approach envisaged under the 
provisions of the African Charter would make community participation more effective and 
contribute to improving the governance of mineral resources throughout the development 
process launched at the local level. 
                                                             
202 Even though that may be the case if exclusion from governance is persistent. See the Katangese’s 
people’s case, supra note 67, para.6. See also the recent case of Soudan, where the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) as a solution to the armed conflict motivated by inter alia the fight to have control over 
revenues of oil exploitation has led to a referendum separating South Sudan as an independent country 
from the North in January 2001. For more details on the CPA, see the report of the US Committee of 
Foreign Affairs/House of Representatives on “South Sudan: The Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 
Life Support” 110th Congress, 1st Session (US Government Printing Office, Washington, January 2007). 
203 This is because benefits generated by mineral resources must not only flow at local level, but profit the 
entire nation. 
204 See the case of communities living in the Niger Delta as described by Human Rights Watch and Obi.  
Human Rights Watch The Niger Delta: No democratic dividend (22 October 2002); available 
athttp://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45d2f73a2.html [accessed on19/2/2013]; Obi C. “Oil Extraction, 
dispossession, resistance, and conflict in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta” (2010) 30 (1-2) Canadian 
Journal of Development Studies 229. 
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1.3 Aims and significance of the study 
This study aims to demonstrate that governance in the mineral sector can be improved at 
the local level in many African resource-rich countries through the effective participation 
of affected communities, and that such effectiveness can be better guaranteed under a 
fundamental rights-based approach, rather than under the soft formula promoted thus far 
by other stakeholders.205As such, it is part of the general efforts devoted in research to 
promote good governance in Africa.The objective here is to provide some insights into the 
critical issue of bringing good governance practices into the mineral sector, which can be 
better achieved through a model of community participation that is really effective, 
respectful of fundamental rights and oriented towards the realisation of development goals. 
The issue of effectiveness in respect of community participation is of such capital 
importance in the process of governance since emphasis is generally put on the need for 
empowerment and control over resources. The AMV explains the delicacy of this issue of 
mineral governance in respect of affected communities, warning that since mineral 
deposits have finite lives, the economy of any local community which is made essentially 
dependent on them could grind to a halt as years pass by if the use and management of this 
community’s share of revenues is not properly planned ahead.206 The empowerment of 
affected communities is generally regarded as an ingredient of good governance and as a 
relevant factor to generate a sound management of resources.207 As such, Couto considers 
that effective participation is achieved through a complete form of empowerment and that:  
The most complete form of empowerment involves a group taking control of some 
aspects of decision-making, implementation, planning or production, or entering 
partnership with those previously in complete authority. This form of participation 
would also involve direct representation of the groups … and entails a political 
change in the control of authority and resources.208 
                                                             
205  See, for instance, the World Bank approach developed in the background of this study. 
206 See the AMV (2009) 23. 
207 Karuhanga E. “Local self-governance and the right of people to development” in Rothchild DS. (ed.) 
Strengthening African local initiative: Local self-governance, decentralisation and accountability 
(Hamburg: Giga, 1996) 49. 
208 Couto RA. “Empowerment” in Marturano A. and Gosling J. (eds.) Leadership: The key concepts 
(London/New York: Routledge, 2008) 54, 55. 
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As for Pearse and Stiefel, effective participation refers to: 
organised efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions 
in given social situations, the part of groups and movements of those people 
hitherto excluded from such control.209 
Along the same lines, this study wants to demonstrate that these objectives of 
empowerment and control over resources can be better reached through a fundamental 
rights-based approach supported by the provisions of the African Charter and its 
enforcement machineries.210 Indeed, this study stands on the belief that by relying on the 
fundamental rights entrenched in this legal instrument, affected communities will be 
legally empowered to take the necessary actions during the decision-making process and 
thus, exercise a level of control over the governance of mineral resources, at least to the 
extent to which they are concerned. This will inevitably increase accountability and 
transparency and, therefore, improve the system of governance. The study wants to 
demonstrate that because development is largely dependent on the way natural resources 
are managed, community participation in the mineral sector is to be viewed as a relevant 
means to ensure that the needs and priorities of affected communities are highlighted and 
that the government and other stakeholders not only effectively consider their views, but 
also that decisions and actions in the sector are respectful of their fundamental rights at all 
stages of governance. 
Actually, because positive actions can  only be taken from a position of power,211 this 
study wants to underline the difference that community participation under a fundamental 
rights-based approach will make in the search for more effective participation by 
empowering people to influence policy, decisions and actions in the mineral sector.  
                                                             
209 Pearse A. and Stiefel M. “Inquiry into participation: A research approach” UN Research Institute for 
Social Development (UNRISD), Geneva (1979) as quoted by Nkunika AIZ. “The role of popular 
participation in programmes of social development” in (1987) Journal of Social Development in Africa 2, 
20. 
210 Here, a special emphasis needs to be placed on the fact that empowerment of affected communities would 
result, for instance, in their ability to bring a case before a court and get their people’s rights to economic 
self-determination, to freely dispose of wealth and natural resources, to development or to respect for the 
environment enforced in the mineral sector. They will have the ability to contend the illegality of a 
mining project, to ask for revision or cancellation of mining agreements. This is a significant 
advancement in the research for an effective participatory approach.  
211 Nkunika (1987) 20. 
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This study is significant for all parties to the trilateral relation that should be developed in 
the context of a mineral project under a participatory model of governance. For affected 
communities, the study is relevant as it seeks to develop a more efficient strategy for their 
participation in the decision-making process of mineral projects with due respect to their 
fundamental rights. Therefore, they surely should have an interest in such a study. As to 
the government, the study in so far as it can help them to adopt a new orientation which 
best matches the welfare of their peoples by shaping and upgrading their policy according 
to the implications that a fundamental rights-based approach has for governance of mineral 
resources. Mineral companies should also have an interest in this study because the 
successful inclusion of affected communities in the decision-making process will help 
prevent tension that may arise from communities’ opposition and thus cause delays in the 
commencement of the project. This study is innovative in that it addresses the issue of 
community development through the governance of mineral resources from a new 
perspective, one based on fundamental rights. The newness of this approach resides in the 
fact that contrary to the current approach which rests on a soft perception onhow 
community participation should take place, it promotes a process in which other 
stakeholders are bound to consider affected communities’ views as it is consecutive to 
their fundamental rights. Not only does it underscore the necessity to apply the norms of 
international human rights law in the area of extractive industry but it emphasises the 
effectiveness that community participation will enjoy if it takes a rights-based approach 
rather than the traditional non-binding process used so far. Many studies on the subject 
have stressed the relevance of community participation or its finality, but the question of 
its effectiveness has not constituted a major focus in the literature.212 
Therefore, the originality of the study is lodged in its research into a potentially effective 
model of community participation from a perspective of international law on fundamental 
rights, symbolising an exploration of the role that the African Charter and its enforcement 
                                                             
212See developments made under the literature review section below. 
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machineries can play in the African mineral sector, an area where fundamental rights’ 
norms have not always been welcomed.213 
Considering the context of African countries where mineral resources have not yet served 
as a catalyst for development, and taking into account the main objective laid out in the 
AMV,214 this study intends contributing to scientific efforts made in the area of social 
sciences to find out how legal theories may address and provide concerted solutions to 
societal problems raised by the exploitation of mineral resources in African rural areas. Of 
course, the legal solutions propagated in this study must not be regarded as exclusive, they 
need to be approached in a holistic perspective, with consideration of solutions developed 
and proposed by other branches of social sciences such as, for instance, sociology, 
political science and psychology.215 
1.4 Scope and delimitation 
As mentioned previously, this study focuses only on community participation as a means 
to empower affected communities to effectively partake part in the management of mineral 
resources, in order to improve governance throughout the development process with due 
respect to fundamental rights. The focus here is on effectiveness, namely, the ability of 
affected communities to influence the outcome of the decision-making process of mineral 
                                                             
213 In the African context, the reluctance towards the application of fundamental rights norms results from the 
fact that the exploitation of mineral resources has often been accompanied with extensive violence and 
infringement of rights. See the Ogoni case where the Nigerian government and Shell were accused of using 
military force as a means of oppression. See also the case of the conflict in the DR Congo, Soudan, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia and Angola. See the Ogoni case, supra note 103; Tull DM. The reconfiguration of political 
order in Africa: A case study of North Kivu (Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 2005) 194; Patey LA. 
“Crude days ahead? Oil and the resource curse in Sudan” (2010) African Affairs 1-2; Harris G., Lewis N. 
and Santos ED. “Demobilisation and reintegration” in Hariis G. (ed.) An economic and political analysis 
(London: Routledge 1999) 160. 
214 The main objective defined by the AU in the African Mining Vision 2050 is to foster an exploitation of 
mineral resources that is “[t]ransparent, equitable and optimal to underpin broad-based sustainable growth 
and socio-economic development”. AMV (2009) 3; but, for the purpose of this study, this main objective is 
approached only in respect of the situation of local communities that are directly affected by mineral 
projects. 
215 See for instance, Rono and Aboud who, from a sociological standpoint, underline the work ethic as a 
relevant factor in making community participation effectively realise development in rural areas; Rono and 
Aboud (2003) 81, 89. See also Sheleff LS. Social cohesion and legal coercion: A critique of Weber, 
Durkheim, and Marx (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997) 315-316; Kesan JP. and Shah RC. “Shaping code” 
Illinois Public law and legal theory Research papers series, Research paper No. 02-18 (September 2002) 1. 
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projects impacting on their livelihood. Due to the large flexibility that characterises the 
participatory models developed thus far and the lack of its efficiency caused by the large 
discretion that governments and other stakeholders enjoy in the consultative process with 
local communities, this study exclusively adopts the fundamental rights-based approach as 
standard. This is because of the strong conviction that the possibility of judicial 
enforcement will provide an appropriate platform for more effective participation.216 Since 
the African Charter stands as the legal foundation of this study, the analysis is limited to 
how far its provisions and enforcement machineries may support this fundamental rights-
based approach to community participation in the mineral sector. 
In addition, although natural resources refer to a vast range of resources, this study is 
limited to mineral resources. This is motivated not only by the fact that many African 
economies are dependent on the mineral sector,217 but the study puports to significantly 
contribute from a theoretical viewpoint to the advancement of one main objective of the 
AMV, which is to develop a mineral sector that serves to improving livelihoods and 
realising development in rural areas.218 In other words, while it is true that the benefits of 
the mineral industry must flow at both national and local levels, this study will limit its 
analysis to the situation of affected communities that are directly affected by the 
exploitation of mineral resources. Also, it appears relevant to determine what is covered 
here under the concept of mineral resources. They may be defined from a geocentric point 
of view or from an economic perspective. From a geocentric point of view, mineral 
resources are regarded as any natural occurring inorganic bodies in the form of either 
solids or liquids found within or upon the earth and that display chemical compositions 
and crystalline structures, but are non-renewable.219 With this perspective, the emphasis is 
put on the natural origin of mineral resources. But for economists, the approach goes 
beyond the natural occurrence of the resource. They consider that material extracted from 
                                                             
216Szablowski (2007) 122. 
217 See the case of DRC, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Zambia as explained below. 
218 See the AMV (2009) 3. 
219 Kip J. “Charateristics of the industrial mineral sector” in Kogel JE., Trivedi NC. Baker JM. andKrukowski 
ST. (eds.) Industrial minerals and rocks commodities: Markets and uses (Littleton: SME, 2006) 3; US 
National Research Council Solid-earth science and society (Washington: National Academy Press, 1993) 
149; Shepard CU.Treatise on mineralogy (New Haven: B.L Hamlen 1852) 2-3. 
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the earth must in addition have a current or potential economic value.220 Therefore, this 
study wants to combine the two perspectives and considers that mineral resources include 
here both solid221 and liquid resources found within or upon the earthly area where 
affected communities live and that may engender economic benefits to them. Oil is often 
distinguished from mineral resources in many domestic laws, but its consideration here is 
necessitated by the need to analyse the Ogoni case which involves oil exploitation in the 
Niger delta and represents a landmark decision on the continent as regards the exploitation 
of natural resources. 
 
Moreover, in the course of this study, only the post-colonial period will be considered, at 
the expense of the previous periods. Not that the study is reluctant to discuss the existence 
of fundamental rights in previous pre-colonial and colonial periods,222 but including them 
will make the scope of the research project too large; adding to this the fact that the debate 
concerning community participation in the context of development has only emerged in 
recent decades.223 
As regards the geographical scope, it would be too ambitious to attempt to study the case 
of affected communities in all fifty four African countries. Though the analysis remains a 
general one, particular attention will be given to the following resource-rich countries: 
DRC, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia. This focus was chosen because, in the 
aforementioned countries, mineral resources account for the main source of their export 
earnings,224 but with poor benefits for local communities affected by extractive operations.  
                                                             
220 US National Research Council, Id., 149. 
221 This implies that even oil is comprehended in the scope of what this study considers as mineral resources. 
222 For developments on the existence of human rights in pre-colonial and colonial periods, see Mbondenyi 
MK. Investigating the challenges in enforcing international human rights law in Africa: Towards an 
effective regional system (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, Unisa 2010) 22-26. 
223 See developments made under the literature review section below. 
224 It is reported that mineral fuels account for an average of 90 % of export earnings for Nigeria, while 
diversified mineral resources represent an average of 80% of export earnings for DRC, 50% of export 
earnings for Zambia and South Africa.  International Business Publications Export-Import Trade and 
Business Directory African countries: Mining and mineral industry opportunities handbook (Washington: 
International Business Publications, 2011) 9; Chamber of Mines of South Africa Annual Report “Towards 
sustainable growth and development” (2009-2010) 31; available at 
http://www.bullion.org.za/content/?pid=70&pagename=Annual+Reports [accessed on 5/1/2011]; Edwards L. 
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This is not to be viewed as an assertion that the contextual situation is the same for all 
these countries. Nevertheless, the fact that African countries all share “democracy”, 
“decentralisation” and “accountability” as key values in the development process and that 
they are all parties to the African Charter, makes room for the contention that the rights-
based approach to community participation can be envisaged as a standard solution. As 
some scholars have aptly pointed out, consideration for fundamental rights prevails over 
the contextual differentiation existing between societies.225 This is why Panda asserts that 
anywhere and at any time, if fundamental rights are not secured, the basic development of 
people would get throttled and the concerned society would plunge inevitably into a deep 
moral and material morass.226 Therefore, this study remains a general one in so far as it 
concerns the situation in affected communities in the African mineral sector, but it will 
refer to DRC, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia at times to demonstrate or illustrate 
certain facts and issues that need to be addressed to improve the governance of mineral 
resources all over the continent. 
1.5 Literature review  
A review of the literature has revealed that there is enough published material available to 
undertake this study successfully. A number of scholars have written about community 
participation.  
This section will highlight the major trends observed within the literature and then 
identify questions that have not yet been addressed by scholars in this field. This should 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
and Alves P. “South Africa’s export performance: Determinants of export supply” Working Paper Series No. 
95 of The Africa Region Working Paper Seriesproduced at the initiative of the World Bank in collaboration 
with South African researchers (December, 2005) 10; World Bank Report “Mining and developmentt...”, 
supra note 5,  17. 
225 Fagan A. Human rights: Confronting myths and misunderstandings (Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2009) 52-55; Kaime T. The African Charter on the rights and welfare of the child: A 
socio-legal perspective (Cape Town:PULP, 2009) 46; BellLS., NathanAJ. and PelegI. “Introduction: 
Culture and Human rights” in  BellLS., NathanAJ. and PelegI. (eds.) Negotiating culture and human rights 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001) 1-5; Duquette D. “Universalism and relativism in human 
rights” in Reidy DA. and Sellers MNS. (eds.) Universal Human rights: A moral order in a divided world 
(Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005) 59-62. 
226Panda (Lanham: 2007) 7. 
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help capture the extent to which this study intends to enrich and contribute to the 
advancement of knowledge. 
1.5.1 Major trends in the literature 
Two major trends have been identified within the legal scholarly literature on governance 
in Africa and the situation of affected communities in the mineral sector. 
First of all, drawing from the failure of the model of governance developed just after the 
1960s’ independence movements, a number of scholars have reflected on the situation of 
people in Africa227 and reached the conclusion that there can be a clash between the 
priorities of the central governmental and those of the people, and that for this reason, 
government representatives cannot be fully entrusted as the only reliable guardians of the 
peoples’ rights and interests. To some extent, people need to take charge of their own 
destiny. 
Falk, a proponent of of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples adopted in 
Algiers in 1976, has been more explicit on this view when asserting that:  
 It becomes clear that governments cannot be entrusted with the role of serving 
as the guardian of fundamental human rights … A first step is for people to 
insist upon their own legitimacy as a source of rights, even against the state”.228 
Governance in Africa remains characterised in general by a break between people and 
their political rulers, and  because people are the main beneficiary of sovereignty, their 
rights and interests must enjoy priority in all government actions.229 
Kiwanuka observes that the concept “people” may be used in contradiction to the state, 
for the purpose of protecting the fundamental rights of collectivities.230 This scholar 
underlines that this approach becomes critical when interests of the people and those of 
                                                             
227 Ouguergouz (2003) 286; Kiwanuka RN. “The meaning of ‘people’ in the African Charter of Human and 
People’s Rights” in McCorquodale R. (ed.) Self-determination in international law (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2000) 282; Falk R.  Human rights and state sovereignty (Holmes & Meir Publishers, 1981) 189-190; 
Mbaye (1992). 
228  Falk, Id., 189-190. Hereinafter the “Algiers Declaration”. 
229 In the writings of these scholars, one can easily find that there is a close symbiosis between the terms 
“state” and “government” that represent the same reality. 
230 Kiwanuka (2000) 282. 
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the state diverge.231 Writing on fundamental rights in Africa, Mbaye notes that peoples’ 
rights are often recognised instead of the rights of the state that acts simply as a general 
administrator.232 Addressing the issue of the real subject of peoples’ rights in article 21 of 
the African Charter, Ouguergouz points out that the state exercises sovereignty over 
natural resources in the name of the people by virtue of the delegation of power and that 
if exercising that power compromises the interests of the people, sanctions and actions for 
recovery must be initiated by the affected people.233 
This trend has also been developed in the writings of scholars focusing on natural 
resources. For instance, Nelson, reflecting on the decades that immediately followed the 
1960 period of independence in most African countries, observes that the central 
government has often misused natural resources and favoured an appropriation of public 
revenues by private patronage.234 The paradox between the fact that many African states 
are resource-rich countries and the poor governance characterised by a culture of rent-
seeking and corruption, which prevails in their societies has offered an empirical platform 
on which the resource curse theory has been tested.235 Ako and Uddin discuss the issue of 
the “resource curse” and consider that this phenomenon has affected good governance in 
Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa where a minority of political elites has gained control of 
political power, whether autocratically or democratically, and form governments 
consisting of what they call a “kitchen cabinet” or “inner caucus” that mismanages public 
funds generated by natural resources.236 All three scholars agree that this type of 
governance threatens particularly the livelihood of local communities that are directly 
dependent on natural resources.237But as observed previously, the resource curse theory 
                                                             
231Id. 282.  
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233 Ouguergouz F. (2003) 286-287. 
234 Nelson F. “Introduction: The politics of natural resources governance in Africa” in Nelson F. (ed.) 
Community rights, conservation and contested lands: The politics of natural resources governance in 
Africa (Washington: Earthscan, 2010) 4. 
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237 Nelson (2010) 4; Ako and Uddin, Id., 27. 
53 
 
can be challenged through the implementation of good governance practice and should 
not be regarded as an absolute to which Africa is damned forever. This is a specific 
characteristic of this study in so far as it wants to demonstrate that through community 
participation the governance of mineral resources at the local level can be freed from the 
resource curse theory. Discussing specifically the situation of affected communities in the 
mineral sector, Kimani reaches the same conclusion as Ako and Uddin and describes the 
situation as follows: 
Local communities, moreover, often have little say in how mining contracts and 
codes are formulated, even though their livelihoods are the most affected.238 
 
This divorce between affected communities and their rulers in the mineral sector has 
engendered another major trend within the academic literature. It rests on the firm 
conviction that community participation in the mineral sector is relevant and ultimately 
needed to promote and protect the fundamental rights and interests of affected 
communities in the exploitation of mineral resources and achievement of development 
goals. This is seen as a practice that contributes to good governance by providing the 
opportunity for transparency in the management of mineral resources and the benefits that 
they generate.239 
 
Scholars like Bass, Keita, Djibré, Traoré, Dembele, Samassekou, Doumbo, Kimani, Pring 
and Feldman all agree on the view that there is an increasing demand for effective 
community participation in the mineral sector as it is a critical element in the process of 
realising sustainable development.240After reviewing the World Bank policy developed 
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239 Vlaenderen and Neves (2004) 445-464. 
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during the 1980s and 1990s, Campbell reached the conclusion that the responsibility to 
define, monitor and enforce norms and standards to apply to the mineral sector rests upon 
the national government as well as affected communities.241 Gao, Akpan and Vanjik 
insist on the fact that in the settlement of issues that may arise between foreign companies 
and affected communities, national governments must promote negotiating acceptable 
solutions, rather than imposing their will upon local communities.242 Moody insists on the 
principle that a mineral project should only take place where affected communities have 
given their fully informed prior consent and that their consent would amount to nothing if 
it does not embrace the power to say “no”.243 This conventional wisdom on community 
participation is well summarised by Aidara who contends that: 
  Communities should be able to review mining contracts, find out how much 
revenue has been generated and how, and on what it is being spent, and have 
access to information about all other impacts of a mining operation.244 
 
Nevertheless, an opposite view is also encountered within the literature. Wälde goes on to 
reject participation as a means of control for affected communities, considering that it 
bears the risk of insurgency, of ethnic strife and domination, of drug dealing and 
organised criminality and that, for such reasons, participation should only be conceived in 
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243 Moody R. “Environment impact of mining: Social, economic and health impacts of mining on 
communities and human settlement” in Mining, development and social conflicts in Africa (Accra: Third 
World Network Africa, 2001) 137-138. 
244 This view was expressed by Aidara in his position as the West Africa extractive industry programme 
coordinator for the UK-based NGO Oxfam. See Kimani (2009) 4. 
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the context of a general integration of ethnic and social forces in the structure of the 
state.245 
This position is open to debate as it would be illogical for people who are the first to 
endure the consequences of bad decisions and policies taken by state representatives not 
to enjoy the ability and means to make their voice heard and their views considered to 
prevent or redress any disadvantageous decision. Though Wälde’s approach is founded on 
a genuine fear of having community participation used as a pretext to promote secessions 
within resource-rich countries, a look at the work of the African Commission246 would 
suggest that under the African Charter system, it is possible to avoid or prevent such 
deviationist practices. Compared to the huge amount of literature supporting community 
participation as a means to empower affected communities, this approach represents a 
minor view.  
The major trend developed by the above-mentioned scholars supports the view that 
community participation is likely to avoid conflict, find common interests and provide the 
mineral project with real legitimacy. Bass, Corre, González, Echavarría and Echave have 
expressly underlined that prior consultation of affected communities represents a relevant 
strategy to prevent and manage conflict between different parties to a mineral project.247 
Community participation is generally advocated by the selected scholars as responsive to 
the need for a platform where affected communities may engage in discussion with state 
representatives and other stakeholders to find common interests in mineral projects, 
instead of having an authoritarian model of governance that is careless of affected 
communities’ interests and needs. As a general conclusion, Schwarte notes that: 
 Good natural resources management therefore depends on participatory, 
transparent, open and accountable governance that ensures the effective 
                                                             
245 Wälde T. “International standards: A professional challenge for natural lawyers” in Bastida E., Wälde T. 
and Warden-Fernádez J. International and comparative mineral law and policy: Trends and prospects 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005) 232. 
246 In the Katangese, Ogoni and Endoris cases, the African Commission has successfully settled issues that 
opposed communities to their own state without any secession. 
247 Bass et al. (2004) 2; Correa (2004) 5; De Echave (2007) 4; González and Echavarría (2004) 3. 
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participation of the public in the preparation and implementation of 
environmental policies, legal frameworks, plans and projects.248 
 
All the above view scall for the establishment of a democratic system of governance in 
the mineral sector where affected communities would have a word to say in respect to 
their rights and interests. But taking into consideration the generalised situation of 
poverty that prevails across the African continent, the review of the literature has quickly 
revealed the ambiguity raised by the school of thought that considers development as a 
precondition for establishing a true democracy in any society.249 This latter approach 
implies that a successful democratisation of the mineral sector is conditioned by the 
achievement of a certain level of development within affected communities. Though this 
issue of relationship between democracy and development is discussed later on in this 
study, a question that directly comes to mind is what then would be the type of 
governance under which development would be achieved if democracy is to come 
afterwards. Another school of thought exists with such scholars as Adejumobi, Ake, 
Anyang Nyong’o, Mangu, Nzongola-Ntalaja, Przeworski and Zeleza250 who take a 
different stance and whose views tend to support the assumption that development does 
not absolutely precondition the establishment of some measure of democracy. 
1.5.2 Questions insufficiently addressed in the existing literature 
Several scholars have insisted on the need for community participation in the governance 
of natural resources in general and mineral resources in particular. However, the major 
issue on which the literature is not sufficiently informative concerns the strategy to make 
community participation really effective. Scholars tend to advocate community 
participation without much reflection on how it should be enhanced or enforced in 
                                                             
248 Schwarte C. “Public participation and oil in Uganda” Paper No 138 produced in the Gatekeeper Paper 
Series published by the International Institute for Environment and Development (December 2008) 4. 
249 See the “modernization theory” as explained in Mangu (2002) 191. 
250 Adejumobi (2008); Ake (1996); Anyang Nyong’o P. “Political instability and the prospect of democracy 
in Africa” (1988a) Africa Development, XII (1)71-86; Anyang Nyong’o P. “A rejoinder to the comments 
on democracy and political instability” Africa Development, XIII (3) 83-87; Mangu, Id.; Nzongola-Ntalaja 
(1997); Przeworski A. et al. Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the 
world, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Zeleza PT. “Introduction: The struggle 
for human rights in Africa” in (ed.) Zeleza PT. Human rights, the rule of law and development in Africa 
(Piladelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) 1-20. 
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practice. Most of them have failed to really propose a model in this regard. This is a gap 
that this thesis intends to fill by suggesting a fundamental rights-based approach as a 
suitable strategy to make community participation effective and meaningful in the 
mineral sector. 
Moreover, few scholars have approached community participation from a legal 
perspective251 and even where such an approach has been embraced there has not been a 
substantive development in respect of what should be the content of community 
participation in the mineral sector. An exception is Bass who has developed her 
understanding of what should be the right to prior consent that local communities should 
enjoy in every mineral project.252 
In the same vein, scholars have generally failed to give close attention to the possible 
application of provisions of the African Charter in the extractive industry, especially in 
connection with the situation of affected communities. Most of the writings published by 
African scholars generally comment on the Ogoni case253 which remains the major and 
most well known case of the African Commission dealing with the extractive industry. 
Nevertheless, a considerable number of scholars have generally discussed and promoted 
the rights-based approach to development, emphasising the importance of fundamental 
                                                             
251 The reason may be that community participation has been developed by many scholars more as a 
sociological concept, leaving aside the possibility for the concept to enjoy a legal dimension. Few 
exceptions include scholars like Pring GR. and Y. Noé “The emerging international law of public 
participation affecting global mining, energy, and resources development” in Zillman D., Lucas A. and 
Pring GR. Human rights in natural resources development-public participation in the sustainable 
development of mining and energy resources (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 14; Feldman 
(2002)53; Bass (2004); Correa (2004) 5. 
252 Bass (2004). 
253 Olowu D. “Evaluation of Shell's approach to conflict resolution in the Niger Delta” (2010) 10 (3) African 
Journal on Conflict Resolution 75-100; Tareri A. “A rights-based approach to indigenous minorities: Focus 
on the Urhobo and Ogoni peoples of the Niger Delta in Nigeria” in Emiri F. and Deinduomo G. (eds.) Law 
and petroleum industry in Nigeria: Current challenges : Essays in honour of Justice Kate Abiri (Lagos: 
African Books Collective, 2009) 275-306; Nwobike J.C. “The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and the demystification of second and third generation rights under the African Charter: 
Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and the Center for Economic and Social Rights 
(CESR) v. Nigeria” (2005) 1 (2) African Journal of Legal Studies 129-146; Coomans F. “The Ogoni case 
before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” in (2003) 52 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 749-760; Skogly SI. “Complexities in human rights protection: Actors and 
rights involved in the Ogoni confict in Nigeria” in (1997) 15 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 47-
60. 
58 
 
rights in the process of achieving development. Among them, Osibanjo, using the military 
regimes in Nigeria as an example, rejects the argument that it may be necessary to 
compromise fundamental rights in order to realise rapid economic development.254 
Tlakula contends that gross violations of fundamental rights are inimical to sustainable 
development and that it cannot be nurtured in countries where the rule of law does not 
exist and where people are marginalised and live in degrading conditions.255  Olowu 
insists on the need to link fundamental rights to development discourses and considers 
that the fulfillment of fundamental rights is part of the process of achieving 
development.256 Other scholars like Andreassen, Boesen, Eide, Marks, Osmani, Panda, 
Sano, Sen, Sengupta hold relatively the same view and support a rights-based approach to 
development.257 
Finally, some other questions that have been neglected within the literature relate to the 
models of democracy and decentralisation that would best foster and make effective 
community participation. Nonetheless, there is plenty of literature that addresses general 
issues related to democracy and decentralisation and accountability that may contribute to 
the discussion of these questions in this study.258 The present research will consider this 
                                                             
254 Osinbajo Y. “Human rights, economic development and the corruption factor” in Zelza PT. (ed.) Human 
rights, the rule of law and development in Africa (Piladelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) 121. 
255Tlakula P. “Human rights and development” in Zelza T. (ed.) Human rights, the rule of law and 
development in Africa (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) 109. 
256Olowu (2009) 7. 
257Andreassen and Marks (2010) xxiii-xxxx; Boesen JK. and Sano H-O. “The implications and value added 
of a Human-rights based approach” in Andreassen BA.and Marks SP. (eds.) Development as a Human 
right (Oxford: Intersentia, 2010) 45-70; Eide A. “Human rights-based development in the age of economic 
globalization: Background and prospects” in Andreassen BA. and Marks SP. (eds.) Development as a 
Human right (Oxford: Intersentia, 2010) 275-314; Osmani SR.“Globalization and the human rights 
approach to development” in Andreassen BA.and Marks SP. (eds.) Development as a Human Right 
(Oxford: Intersentia, 2010) 315-337; Panda (2007); Sen A. “Human rights and development” in Andreassen 
BA. and Marks SP. (eds.) Development as a Human right (Oxford: Intersentia, 2010) 3-12; Sengupta A. 
“The Human right to development” in Andreassen BA. and Marks SP. (eds.) Development as a Human 
right (Oxford: Intersentia, 2010) 13-44. 
258 Ake (1994); Hansen (2005); Hartmann G. and Crawford C. “Introduction: Decentralisation as a pathway 
out of poverty” in Crawford G. and Hartmann C. (eds.) Decentralisation in Africa-A pathway out of poverty 
and conflict? (Amsterdam: AmsterdamUniversity Press, 2008); Karuhanga (1996); Nzongola-Ntalaja 
(1997); Smith (2011); Reilly S. Design, meaning and choice in direct democracy: The influences of 
petitioners and voters (New York: Ashgate 2010); Susan S. “Constraints on the implementation of 
decentralisation and implications for poverty reduction-The case of Unganda” in Crawford G. and Hartman 
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literature to discuss in particular the interactions between community participation and the 
concepts of democracy, decentralization and accountability. 
Therefore, this study intends to enrich the literature on the issue of community 
participation by providing an in-depth analysis of how the concept of a fundamental 
rights-based approach should be properly conceived under the African Charter and 
applied to improve the governance of mineral resources; and thus best satisfy the interests 
and fundamental rights of affected communities. This exercise would imply not only 
discussing questions that have already drawn the attention of legal scholars, but also those 
that have been neglected.  
1.6 Research questions 
This study will deal with a number of questions, including the following: 
1. What should the appropriate definition and content of community participation under the 
fundamental rights-based approach be? Since the study upholds the idea that 
participation is not only a fundamental right, but also the means through which affected 
communities may seek enforcement of other fundamental rights in the mineral sector, 
the concern should be directed towards establishing the implications that this double 
dimension has for the definition of the concept. What is community participartion as a 
fundamental right?  How the excersice of some other fundamental rights are linked to 
the essence of community participation as a means in the pursuit of sustainable 
development goals in mineral resources governance? 
2. What, in substance, is the difference between the fundamental rights-based approach to 
community participation and the soft approach? 
3. How should the fundamental rights-based approach to community participation be 
conceived in resources-rich African countries in relation with the three key values 
(democracy, decentralisation and accountability) in order to build up good governance 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
C. (eds.) Decentralisation in Africa: A pathway out of poverty and conflict? (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2008) ;  Thörlind (2000); Zieligski (1963); Avilés Irhola (2005); Mattes R. “Controlling 
power: Africans’ views on governance, citizenship and accountability” in (eds.) Claasen M. and Alpin-
Lardié C. Social accountability in Africa: Practitioners’ experiences and lessons (Cape Town: Idasa/Ansa, 
2010) 8-24; Mair L. Safeguards for democracy (Nairobi: The New Africa Library, 1961) 2.  
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and achieve development? How far and at which levels must affected communities 
participate? Which prerogatives should they enjoy in the decision-making process? Who 
are the people that are accountable to them? And what should the extent of such 
accountability be? 
4. How far the fundamental rights-based approach will influence relations between all 
stakeholders and balance the asymmetry of power to empower affected communities 
with enough influence to accept or reject a mineral project during the negotiation 
process?  
5. What are the provisions of the African Charter that support the fundamental rights-based 
approach to community participation and how should they be interpreted?  
6. How would affected communities make use of the African Charter enforcement 
mechanisms to have their fundamental rights respected throughout the governance of 
mineral resources? What is the consideration that should be given to provisions of the 
African Charter by national courts which are the first instance of enforcement? What 
should be the appropriate attitude of national judges in the role to protect affected 
communities against fundamental rights violations by the government and mineral 
corporations?  
7. How to enhance the capacity building of affected communities to empower them with 
the knowledge of their fundamental rights in the African Charter and how they can use 
its enforcement bodies to secure their rights and interets?  
8. To what extent are government officials and other stakeholders likely to comply with 
decisions issued by the African Charter enforcement machinery upholding the claim of 
affected communities?  
9. What are the improvements that the fundamental rights-based approach to community 
participation, conceived through the African Charter system, would assumedly bring to 
the governance of mineral resources within resources-rich African countries?   
1.7 Hypotheses and expected findings   
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Since the 1960s’ movement of independence, the fallacy of an approach relying 
exclusively on the government as the protector of the people’s interests has been 
progressively perceptible in many African countries.259 If until 1990, dictatorships and 
authoritarian systems of governance existing all over the continent could partly provide an 
explanation for this breach, it has become paradoxical that despite the democratisation 
process initiated in most African countries, African people still struggle to see their 
fundamental rights and developmental needs prioritised by African rulers in the 
governance of the country. 
In this context, the current situation of affected communities in the mineral sector appears 
clearly to be one consequence of this general issue confronting the governance of African 
countries. Instead of enjoying profits brought by the exploitation of mineral resources, 
these communities continue to suffer dispossession of their land without fair compensation. 
Environmental degradation, unemployment and lack of necessary infrastructure like 
homes, schools and hospitals,260 in surrounding areas of a mineral project often create 
tension which at times degenerates into conflict and war.261 In fact, this situation stands as 
a reflection at the local level of the continued distortion that took place following the 
1960s’ decade of independence, between the people’s aspirations and the behaviour of 
African political rulers. Despite ideological changes and rhetorical shifts made in the 
political discourse all over the continent in 1990 and thereafter, and even despite the 
                                                             
259Apart from the Ogoni and Endoris cases, another illustration of the divorce that can exist between affected 
communities’ interests and those of the government is perceptible in the recent revision of mining 
agreements conducted in the Democratic Republic of Congo by the minister in charge of the mineral sector. 
Not only were affected communities or their partners in the civil society, NGOs and grassroots 
organisations, not partakers of this process, but also the ground on which the government reviewed those 
agreements was more a concern to increase financial bargain. The assessment of social and environmental 
impact within affected communities was only made up of what were the written undertakings of mineral 
companies at the time of the conclusion of the contracts, and of their own discretionary declaration of what 
they had “achieved”. See Ministère des mines ‘‘Rapports 1 et 2 des travaux de la Commission de 
Revisitassions des Contrats Miniers’’ (DRC, Novembre 2007); Available at http://minicongo.cd [accessed 
on 17/2/2011]. 
260  See the case of communities previously mentioned, supra notes 15-17; Kimani (2009) 4-5.   
261 See the case of DRC (Wars: 196-197, 1998-2003), and Nigeria (Conflict in the Ogoni land in 1996). 
Especially in DRC, the control over mineral resources in certain parts of the eastern region is still held by 
groups of rebels. 
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existence of norms protecting fundamental rights,262 the attitude of African governments 
tends to remain unchanged, or rather to move very slowly towards effectively considering 
the interests and rights of affected local communities in the negotiation of mineral 
agreements.263 
As a result, there is a permanent threat to affected communities arising from the failure of 
the policies applied and actions taken by many African governments, which put them in 
danger of seeing their potential for development noticeably diminished after the exhaustion 
of mineral resources and pollution of the environment.264 This state of affairs make the 
current need for affected communities to be part of what Zeleza describes as the struggle 
for developmental democratic states, with African people longing for a system of 
governance that can offer them not only political freedom, but also economic well-
being.265 Since the model of governance of mineral resources applied at present in many 
resource-rich African countries remains overcentralised and does not fully secure the 
fundamental rights of affected communities, the remedy to the situation calls for an 
empowerment of these communities through a model of participation that would enable 
them to act as the agents of their own developmentin the mineral sector and to watch out 
for the behaviour of other stakeholders in respect of their fundamental rights.  
Though none can fully predict the future and what success might lie ahead, this study dares 
to risk an optimistic view under a rights-based approach to community participation. 
Because the main emphasis is on “a fundamental rights-based approach to community 
participation as an improving element in the governance of mineral resources”, this study 
stands in stark contrast with the Afro-pessimism266 found elsewhere in studies undertaken 
                                                             
262 This fact is simply demonstrated by the adherence of all African countries to the African Charter. 
263 See developments discussed in the background of the study. 
264  Weber-Fahr (2002) 2. 
265Zeleza (2004) 6. 
266 The Afro-pessimism thesis rests on the conviction that Africa is irremediably damned to regression and 
chaos because several decades after the continent’s independence, its economic situation has grown 
worse rather than better. Herlitzius EM.A comparative analysis of the South African and German 
reception of Nadine Gordimer's, André Brink's and J.M. Coetzee's works (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005) 
224. 
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in Africa during the 1990s.267 Here, the concern is not to adopt a pejorative attitude or the 
traditional fatalism that often characterises the discourse on the future of Africa, but rather 
to find a positive way forward.268 This study agrees totally with the view expressed by 
Nanjira according to which, for Afro-pessimism to end, African people themselves have to 
take action to improve their economic conditions and achieve development.269 This scholar 
is right when he points out that: 
 
 Economic power in Africa cannot and shall not succeed unless it is people-based: 
there must be a bottom-up approach whereby the African people are engaged and 
involved in all the stages of their development and are empowered to participate 
sufficiently and appropriately in the decision making and procedures on issues 
affecting their daily lives.270 
 
Therefore, the major working hypothesis of this study is that by promoting community 
participation from a fundamental rights-based approach instead of bya simple consultation, 
it would be more effective and provide local communities with the legal means to enforce 
their views, secure their interests and fundamental rights, and thus improve the governance 
of mineral resources through resistance to negative elements in the development process 
taking place at local level. The main hypothesis is built on the belief that a rights-based 
approach will make community participation really effective and improve the system of 
governance in the African mineral sector. 
This emphasis on a fundamental rights-based approach to community participation is 
particularly relevant to the mineral sector that has to contribute systematically to the 
                                                             
267 See for instance Olukoshi A. “State, conflict, and democracy in Africa: The complex process of renewal” 
in Joseph. R (ed.) State, conflict and democracy in Africa (1999); Kaplan RD. “The coming anarchy: 
How scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our 
planet” in (1994) 273 (2) Atlantic Monthly 44-76; Harden B. Africa: Dispatches from a fragile continent 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1991); Rembe NS. “The system of protection of human rights under the 
African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights: Problems and prospects” in (1991) 12 (6) Human and 
People’s Rights Monograph Series 3. 
268  One can agree with Zeleza that “If [the] African story is anything to go by … African peoples will 
continue to fight for better modes of governance and development …”. Zeleza (2004) 6. 
269 Nanjira DN. African foreign policy and diplomacy: From antiquity to the 21st century (Santa Barbara: 
Greenwood Publishing Group, 2010) 492. 
270 Nanjira (2010) 493. 
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achievement of development in Africa. It has become accepted nowadays among 
Africanist scholars that the concept of development is inevitably linked to the concept of 
fundamental rights in as much as both are essentially concerned with human conditions 
and seek to enhance their capacity to enjoy a higher standard of living.271 This implies not 
only that true development cannot take place without respect for fundamental rights, but 
also that people need to be empowered to participate in any process that aims at improving 
their living conditions. This assertion opens the door to the second hypothesis. 
Since the study rests on the African Charter, the subsequent hypothesis to be tested is that 
the provisions of this legal instrument and its enforcement machinery can efficiently 
support the rights-based approach to community participation and bring the expected 
improvement in the governance of mineral resources throughout the development process 
that takes place at local level. Of course, as will be seen, few cases on natural resources 
have been brought before the African Commission in the last thirty years of adopting the 
African Charter. Nevertheless, the main focus of this study is to assess the real potential of 
the African Charter system to enhance community participation in the mineral sector. 
Finally, another hypothesis to be investigated touches on the relationship between 
community participation and the three key values previously mentioned in the context of 
this fundamental rights-based approach. It consists of the notion that the rights-based 
approach to community participation is only conceivable under democratic conditions, 
within a decentralised mode of governance and with the possibility for affected 
communities to make other stakeholders accountable. It is assumed here that there is 
interdependence between community participation and these concepts and that they are 
obliged to all co-exist together for the development process to be complete.272 
The findings and conclusions of the study are expected to confirm these above-mentioned 
hypotheses.  
1.8 Methodology 
 
                                                             
271Olowu (2009) 5; Zeleza (2004) 6, Murray (2004) 238. 
272 Avilés Irhola (2005) 29;  Thörlind (2000) 34-35; Aidoo A. “Democracy without Human rights?” (1993) 
15 (4) Human Rights Quarterly 705.  
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In an article published in 2010, Coomans, Grünfeld and Kamminga contend that the legal 
literature is poor in books that specifically focus on the research methodology in the field 
of fundamental rights, and that could be recommended to a doctoral student.273 If this 
assertion can be verified worldwide, the researcher must mention here the great 
opportunity that the University of South Africa’s Library and Research Space have offered 
to this study by providing abundant resources on the topic of research methodology, 
enough to overcome the difficulty pointed out by these scholars.274 
 
This study makes use of a number of research methods, those usually identified as 
exclusively belonging to the legal realm (the black-letter or doctrinal method and the 
international and comparative laws method) and those borrowed from other disciplines 
(the historical method, the philosophical method and the empirical method).  
Though it is true that legal and non-legal methods have evolved separately, an integrative 
approach developed between the 1960s and 1970s where legal realists and socio-legal 
scholars started to reflect on the gap between “law in books” and “law in action”.275 As 
rightly observed by McConville and Chui, the addition of research methods used by other 
disciplines has the merit and relevance to broaden the scope of legal research in terms of 
its theoretical and conceptual framework and, thus, increase the possibility of generating 
empirical evidence to answer research questions.276 
In the context of the legal research undertaken in this study, the link between the non-legal 
and legal methods used, resides in the fact that both converge to serve the aim of analysing 
community participation in the governance of mineral resources from a rights-based 
approach.277 This has precisely the advantage of making the research methodology of this 
study fully complete and well equipped to address the identified issues in connection with 
this innovative perspective that emphasises respect for fundamental rights. 
                                                             
273Coomans F. et al. “Methods of Human rights research: A primer” (2010) 32 Human Rights Quarterly 180. 
274 All resources used under the research methodology section have been found there. 
275MacConville M. and Chui WH. “Introduction and overview” in MacConville M. and Chui WH. (eds.) 
Research methodology in law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 5. 
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1.8.1 Research methods traditionally attached to the legal field 
 
1.8.1.1 The black-letter or doctrinal method 
The black-letter or doctrinal method is a legal research method that focuses on and 
scrutinises primary sources of law that involve legal instruments and to a certain extent, 
their interpretation in case law, with the aim to find out what the law is in a particular case 
and how legal reasoning and doctrines have been developed throughout the jurisprudence 
to resolve legal problems.278 
This research method is of great use to the outcome of this study in as much as it allows an 
analysis of legal instruments relevant to this study, particularly the provisions of the 
African Charter. This is helpful to find out how the African Charter enforcement 
machineries have dealt with and decided on cases involving the issue of community 
participation. 
Nonetheless, the use of the black-letter or doctrinal method will be incomplete if it does 
not review the secondary sources constituted by books and journal articles. This is 
because, as observed by Rowe, secondary sources refer to and explain the law, statutes and 
cases.279 Despite the original and innovative character of this study, it is a fact that in the 
social sciences, extensive use is made of the work of others.280 
The differentiation between both types of sources is important to this study in the sense 
that in the first case, primary sources serve to state what the law is (lege lata), in spite of 
what one thinks it should be (lege ferenda), while in the latter case, secondary sources are 
used to criticise or support a particular view or interpretation.281 
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1.8.1.2 International law and comparative law as tools for legal research282 
The review of the legal studies that in these last years have questioned the achievement of 
development through the mineral sector in Africa, demonstrates that international and 
comparative laws have been increasingly used to undertake research.283 McConville and 
Chui consider that this phenomenon results from a combination of three factors, namely, 
the growing influence of international and supra-national legal materials, the increasing 
need for legal scholars to have a look at materials from diverse jurisdictions and the 
requirements made by contemporary law schools to have their students engage in critical 
thinking.284 
 
In the context of this study, a reference to the international law is made compulsory by the 
fact that the fundamental rights-based approach to community participation is undertaken 
under the provisions of the African Charter and its enforcement machineries. The African 
Charter is an international treaty and as such, its interpretation and application calls for 
reference to international standards. To resort to international standards is regarded as a 
better method to strengthen respect for fundamental rights whenever standards developed 
at the domestic level are weak.285 
 
As to the comparative method, it serves to analyse the situation of affected communities in 
domestic legal systems that have been targeted (DRC, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia). 
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In this respect, the view expressed by Venter deserves particular attention. This scholar 
usefully points out that comparability may consist in either the proximity of legal 
problems, mechanisms and solutions or their complete diversity.286 Since in this study, the 
effectiveness of community participation appears to be a shared problem across the African 
continent and because the fundamental rights-based approach is envisaged as a common 
solution to improve the governance of mineral resources, the emphasis here is clearly much 
more on the proximity or similarity of situations found in these selected countries. At the 
AU Conference held in 2011, it was observed that African countries have diverse 
development experiences in the mineral field, but yet share common impediments.287 
Nevertheless, because the study is one that concerns the entire continent, some relevant 
facts found in any African legal system are at times included in the discussion as well. This 
implies that, despite the reference to the realities and facts found in African countries 
mentioned throughout this study, the research remains concerned with the general situation 
of affected communities all over the continent. In addition, the comparative method is also 
used to apprehend developments made even in non-African legal systems in respect of 
some issues addressed in the study. This is the case of the horizontal application issue 
which has been extensively dealtwithin the United States of America (US) legal 
system.This comparative approach with non-African legal systems also takes the 
discussion to the point where it becomes questionable whether there might be an 
opportunity for affected communities to use the avenue of extraterritorial jurisdiction under 
the exhaustion of local remedies rules. Finally, the comparative approach commands a look 
to developments made in other regional systems, namely  the European system and the 
Inter-American one, which because of their anteriority, have had forcefully to address 
some of the challenges facing their young counterpart, the African system. 
 
1.8.2 Research methods borrowed from other disciplines:  historical, philosophical 
and empirical approaches 
                                                             
286 Venter F. Constitutional comparison: Japan, Germany, Canada and South Africa as constitutional states 
(Lansdowne: Juta & Co., 2000) 18. 
287 AU “Minerals and Africa’s development an overview of the report of the international study group on” 
(AU Conference of ministers responsible for mineral resources development, 2011). 
69 
 
Legal research undertaken in abstracto will seldom produce valid knowledge.288 This is 
why plural or mixed research methods, provided they are useful, need to be used to 
enlighten the research and pave the way to a valid and reliable outcome.289 It is in this 
respect that the historical method serves to understand the real reach of the African Charter 
provisions, to seize the historical context in which they have been adopted and how they 
have been interpreted through the Charter enforcement machineries.290 
This is of great relevance, because, as observed by De Cruz, legal history is the 
precondition to the critical evaluation of the law and facilitates the understanding of how 
legal concepts operate.291 To bring out a progressive element from a system of law 
necessitates having the knowledge of what were the foundational grounds on which that 
system was built and upon which the system itself has evolved.292 Practically, this implies 
that historical factors allow an understanding of how the concept of the fundamental 
rights-based approach to community participation may be developed under the African 
Charter and how it should operate in the mineral sector within resource-rich African 
countries. In this respect, the review of the jurisprudence developed under the African 
Charter system is particularly significant, because as Lenoble and Maesschalck point out, 
reconstructing the conditions under which a judgment or  a legal decision has been 
implemented reveals the conditions and extent to which governance by law is possible.293 
The historical method has already been employed at the outset of this study to provide the 
background to the study. 
Christian attempts to define the philosophical method as a process of learning how to ask 
and re-ask294 questions, of how to relate materials, and of where to get the most reliable 
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and recent information in order to shed light on identified issues.295 If this definition can 
be relatively acceptable, it is however necessary to bear in mind that philosophical 
reasonings are not neutral at all.296 They always consist of the ideals and values to which 
one adheres to, especially where the philosophical method is deemed relevant to the legal 
field.  
Scholars who have tried to describe its role in the legal sphere ascertain that one of its 
main concerns touches on how law is to be understood in relation to morality.297 In this 
regard, philosophical reasoning can be used to support or reject legal arguments, 
depending on moral values that are advocated.298 Thus, for the purpose of this study, the 
philosophical method is used to analyse the values supporting the fundamental rights-
based approach to community participation in its perspective of improving the governance 
of mineral resources. 
The empirical research method rests on the principle that findings must be based on 
observation and the conclusions drawn from evidence.299 Though this is the traditional 
pathway used by the natural and applied sciences,300 it has become accepted that the social 
sciences are also in need of empirical evidence in their development.301 Despite the fact 
that these latter sciences are basically made up of theories, it is now contended that they 
must generate principles that may be tested and verified empirically.302 However, the 
extent to which social science must make use of the empirical method this research 
remains uncertain. In the legal field for instance, Epstein and King observe that the term 
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“empirical” has come to be given a narrow meaning in American legal scholarship, 
accounting merely for “statistical techniques or quantitative data”.303 These scholars stress 
the fact that a broader approach must be embraced in the legal academic community and 
should include qualitative analysis,304 with data collected from diverse sources, including 
for instance legislation or case law, interviews or surveys.305 
In the context of this study, the empirical research method was mainly used to achieve a 
qualitative research. Interviews were conducted with306 individuals living within a 
community or an area affected by mineral activities in DRC (precisely, in the Katange 
province where many communities are found around mineral sites), in Nigeria (in the 
Nigeria Delta area), in Zambia (Kabwe and Ndola) and in South Africa (Witwatersrand). 
Except for Nigeira where interviews were conducted through phone calls, in all other 
countries, the questionnaire was administered in person. With a total of 1200 people 
interviewed, the questionnaire asked about: whether people believe it is important that 
affected communities participate in the negotiation of ore project, whether such 
participation is seen as a requirement of democracy, whether all members of the affected 
community should be consulted or just their representatives, whether a right of veto should 
be recognised to affected communities to reject mineral projects that violate their 
fundamental rights, whether the African Charter and its implementation mechanism are 
well known by members of the affected communities and whether they know how to 
approach the African Commission and the African Court.  
Without necessarily establishing a statistical analysis, the aim of the survey was to find 
whether affected communities believe that a fundamental rights-based approach to 
community participation as supported by the African Charter could make their 
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participation more effective and improve the governance of mineral resources in the 
continent. Nevertheless, quantitative data are also given reference in terms of information 
collected from documents released by public institutions such as governments or 
international organisations and by credible non-state actors like NGOs or grassroots 
organisations. 
What is important to underline here is the fact that the study intends to respect the rules of 
inference307 on which Epstein and King have repeatedly placed an emphasis.308 
1.9 Difficulties encountered in the completion of the thesis 
The general experience is that every research project always somehow faces challenges in 
connection with its realisation. This has been evidenced in the process of completing this 
thesis through some difficulties to access information. In this respect, the difficulties have 
arisen especially in respect of countries targeted here as benchmarks. Indeed, except for 
Nigeria and South Africa for which there is relatively enough scholarly published material on 
the conditions of affected communities in the mineral sector of these countries, analyses on 
DRC and Zambia had to rely essentially on reports from international governmental 
organisations such as the UN and AU, and from NGOs. Nevertheless thanks to the vast 
collection of books at the University of South Africa library, this difficulty was alleviated as 
some scholarly publications from both countries on the issue could be finally found. The firm 
desires to reach the finishing line and overcome difficulties that arose on my way to the 
conclusion have been the leitmotiv that always revitalised me every time my inner-being felt 
like giving up.  
1.10 Outline of the study 
This study consists of five chapters. The first one sets out the content of the research by 
providing a background on the problematic issue of community participation in Africa. It 
deals with the main focus of the thesis, literature review, and methodology adopted in the 
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research. Chapter two is a discussion of the theoretical considerations on community 
participation and related concepts. It proceeds to a confrontation between the soft approach to 
community participation and the fundamental rights-based one to bring forth the difference 
this latter approach can make in the search for more effectiveness in community participation. 
This confrontation is preceded by an analysis of community participation defining the aims 
that it pursues to achieve.This analysis is important to seize the critical role that community 
participation plays in a development process that is people-centered and why it should be 
effective enough to make the view of affected communities considered. Then, the chapter 
attempts to capture how best key factors like democracy, decentralisation, governance and 
mineral resources must be apprehended in relation to community participation. The chapter 
demonstrates that in the pursuit of sustainable development, the interactions between these 
factors and community participation must be properly matched for the mineral industry to 
give positive inputs. Chapter three assesses the fundamental rights-based approach and the 
extent to which it can be used under the normative and institutional component of the African 
Charter. Through developments made these last years in the African system, it analyses the 
chances of a successful application of the approach and the possibility to improve governance 
of mineral resource in the best interest of affected communities. Chapter four is devoted to 
discuss practical aspects which represent challenges to the successful implementation of the 
fundamental rights-based approach. Chapter five which is the conclusion, provides answers to 
questions raised at the outset and provides a basis for further research work in order to 
address other issues which obviously could not all be dealt with in a single study of limited 
scope. 
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Chapter two: Theoretical considerations on community participation and related 
concepts 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with the content of community participation under the fundamental 
rights-based approach and discusses the relationship between community participation and 
some relevant concepts; especially democracy, decentralisation and accountability. 
However, because the relations between them do not happen abstractly, it was deemed 
necessary to add to the analysis of (good) governance and sustainable development, as 
these are the highest ideals that underpin the raison d’être of community participation in a 
society where the improvement of human beings’ living conditions remains the main 
concern. 
2.2 Community participation 
Several definitions of community participation are encountered in the literature. However, 
most of them are simplistic in that they only define the concept according to the need to 
have members of a community involved in the decision-making process. Pring and Siegele 
observe that the concept “participation” is rarely defined other than by simply meaning 
“implication” and that its understanding may vary considerably according to different 
societies and cultures.309 Darial, Zacharia and Rajpal view the variety of existing 
definitions as underlying not only therisk of confusion in the understanding of the concept, 
but also the importance attached to the participatory approach these last years.310 Most 
definitions tend to focus on aims attached to participation and use them as an argument to 
advocate the establishment of a participatory mechanism, without explaining how it should 
function. In connection with legislative drafting, Du Plessis observes that laws and policies 
in different countries, even when they stress the need for participation, often fail to give an 
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exposé of meaningful tools to effectively achieve community involvement in practice.311 
Only a few approaches within the literature have been identified here with what can be 
qualified as a formalistic dimension. They contain a formal element that helps determine 
the type of participation that is foreseen. In practice, two sets of formal definitions are 
encountered, namely, the one that does not attach a binding outcome to the participatory 
process and the one  that approaches participation not as a mere formality to be fulfilled, 
but more as a process through which views of participants should influence the final 
decision. It is in the latter group that the fundamental rights-based approach to participation 
fits in. 
 
From these preceding developments, definitions of community participation can be 
systematically classified into the three following categories: definitions based on the aims 
attached to participation, definitions uplifting a soft approach in terms of the considerations 
given to the views of affected communities and definitions promoting a binding approach. 
But before reviewing each category, one should bear in mind that the concept “community 
participation” is drawn from the wider concept of popular or public participation.312 This is 
why when exploring different definitions contained in the literature, what matters most is 
the meaning that has been attached to the concept of participation. It is this concept that 
actually is the keyword in so far as it describes what participants do or are supposed to do, 
depending on the level at which they are involved (international, national or local). In this 
respect, Darial, Zacharia and Rajpal observe that it is the reach and importance of a 
decision that should determine the level at which participation must take place within a 
country.313 They stress that while all the people of the country are called to be involved in 
matters of national importance, decisions of lesser scope forcefully restrain the extent of 
participation, with local matters being dealt with at local governance level.314 
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The term community itself is generally used to identify a group of people sharing 
something in common which could either be the fact that they are in the same geographical 
area or the fact that they have a common interest.315 But in practice, both factors are often 
combined to identify an existing community. This is why, for the purpose of this study, 
affected communities are considered those local communities found in African countries, 
living in a mineral area and whose livelihood is (or is likely to be) directly affected by 
ongoing mineral activities. In the same vein, it is also relevant to note the criterion that was 
developed in the Endorois case by the African Commission, which is the “distinctiveness” 
that should exist for a group of individuals to be identified as “people”. These distinctive 
features are inter alia a common historical tradition, racial or ethnic identity, cultural 
homogeneity, linguistic unity, religious and ideological affinities, territorial connection, 
and a common economic life or other bonds, identities and affinities they collectively 
enjoy or suffer from the deprivation.316 The World Bank uses the term “qualified 
community”, but in a specific context, to mean a community that is identified among the 
principal beneficiaries of a CDA.317 
 
In practice, the identification process of affected communities must be carefully conducted 
to avoid conflict between communities as was the case in Niger Delta. It was observed that 
communities which found themselves excluded while sharing similar characteristics with 
those selected, resorted to threats and violence.318 
 
2.2.1 Definitions based on aims attached to participation 
 
Darial, Zacharia and Rajpal define community participation as a process that actively and 
meaningfully involves members of a local community in the decision-making process for 
the setting of community goals and the allocation of resources to achieve them and in the 
voluntary execution of projects and programmes put in place to that end.319 
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Another definition is given by Armitage who regards community participation as a process 
by which communities act in response to public concerns, voice their opinions about 
decisions that affect them, and take responsibility for changes to their community.320 
 
According to Lish, community participation amounts to the involvement of members of a 
local community in the decision-making process and in implementing programmes; 
sharing the benefits of development programmes and their involvement in efforts to 
evaluate such programmes.321 
 
These three definitions that are used here by way of illustration share a common 
characteristic which is their emphasis on the aims of participation. After scrutinising each 
definition, one easily comes up with a clear idea of what community participation should 
achieve in practice, namely the expression of the community members’ opinions regarding 
what the objectives that need to be realised should be, how financial resources to achieve 
the defined objectives must be allocated, how members of the community must share in the 
benefits and how they perceive or assess policy, programmes and projects (proposed or 
already established thereto) against those defined objectives. The aims attached to 
participation in these definitions match those that were defined in the Arusha Declaration, 
where it was stated that participation requires: 
 
 re-direction of resources to satisfy, in the first place, the critical needs of the 
people, to achieve economic and social justice and to emphasize self-reliance on 
the one hand, and, on the other hand, to empower the people to determine the 
direction and content of development, and to effectively contribute to the 
enhancement of production and productivity that are required.322 
 
In the context of mineral activities within affected communities, definitions based on the 
aims have several important implications that deserve to be explained one by one in the 
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following paragraphs. In the context of this study, the sum of these implications is what 
may be considered as the best interests of affected communities. 
 
2.2.1.1 Mineral projects should comply with objectives defined in affected 
communities which generally encompass social, economic and environmental 
aspects 
 
On this specific point, Darial, Zacharia and Rajpal hold that the involvement of community 
members in the determination of objectives is the first and most important stage, as it 
allows them to properly consider their specific situation and set up relevant issues that need 
to be addressed.323 They conclude that in so doing, community members are able not only 
to determine possible alternative solutions, but also at the same time, restrict or exclude 
options that they do notfind suitable.324 Practically, this means that when a mineral 
company wants to establish its activities in the area, it must get in touch with members of 
communities that would be affected by their activities and discuss the project with them 
with due regard to sustainable development objectives existing in these communities. It is 
only when the mineral project complies with these objectives and is accepted by these 
communities that it should be executed. But this approach pre-supposes that before the 
arrival of the mineral company, local communities must have already agreed on some basic 
development objectives, which as mentioned previously, should include social, economic 
and environmental aspects. 
 
This procedure has the advantage of providing a measure of legitimacy to the mineral 
project. A project that respects and considers development objectives of affected 
communities is likely to succeed because of the large adhesion and support of community 
members. Far from being the case, the situation in many African countries correspond with 
cases where  central government decides on projects which in its view are better for local 
communities, without any care of what the aspirations of members of the community 
concerned are.325 Experience demonstrates that where mineral activities take place without 
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effective participation of affected communities, social unrest often occurs. One of the well 
known examples in Africa is the case where the Ogoni communities opposed the Nigerian 
government in connection with the exploitation of oil in the Niger Delta Ogoniland before 
the African Commission.326 The communities complained that the exploitation of the oil by 
Shell with the blessing of the government did not serve their welfare and had negative 
consequences like environmental degradation causing health problems, contamination of 
food sources and the destruction of houses.327 Several supporters of the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni peoples had been attacked by Nigerian security forces for “their non-
violent campaign in opposition to the destruction of their environment by oil 
companies.”328 Beeson Sara Wiwa, who was the president of this movement, was hanged 
in 1995 by the military government of Sani Abacha.329 
 
Government policy and programmes in the mineral sector cannot afford to bypass 
community participation. In fact, as underlined by Bryan and Hofman, governments that 
have a sense of accountability face two major challenges that involve on the one hand, the 
necessity to create a business climate that attracts private investments in the extractive 
industry, while on the other hand, they must address policy issues dealing with the impact 
of this industry on affected communities.330 The government policy and programmes must 
always provide space and necessary arrangements for affected communities to determine 
their development goals at local level. They should also think of how mineral investments 
should be undertaken in their areas to such an extent that they contribute to the fulfillment 
of these goals. Obviously, these community objectives must not contradict the nationally 
defined objectives, but must follow the general guidelines designed by central government 
while at the same time enjoying enough flexibility to allow affected communities to adopt 
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their own approach on certain aspects directly linked to their local realities and which 
cannot be the same all over the country.331 
 
2.2.1.2 Financial revenues generated by mineral activities should be allocated to the 
realisation of community objectives in line with priorities defined by 
affected communities  
 
This is another aim that community participation must achieve. Affected communities 
must be able to receive necessary funds from the mineral exploitation that will help them 
realise their objectives. The royalties should be paid either directly to those communities or 
alternatively indirectly through the central government, provided in this latter case they are 
transferred back in a transparent way and without delay.332 
 
The contention that affected communities must enjoy financial gain generated by mineral 
exploitation does not mean per se that they are entitled to all the royalties, but only to a 
share, which amount or percentage varies from country to country.333 In the case of the 
South African Bafokeng community, the legal wrangle against Impala in the 1990s implied 
a claim by this community for an increase of royalties.334 After the out of court settlement 
had been reached in 1999, royalties payable to the Bafokeng were increased from 14, 9425 
percent for the first and second platinum concessions and 16 percent for the third platinum 
concession to 22 percent.335This has enabled the community to increase its financial 
capacity and establish a sovereign wealth fund (Royal Bafokeng Holdings), an investment 
entity entrusted with the responsibility to oversee the growth of the community’s income 
and fund development projects.336 Members of affected communities should get the 
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maximum benefits that can be drawn from the mineral project. This implies that financial 
benefits become meaningful only when they fully serve the realisation of other types of 
benefits which includes socio-economic projects directly connected to the development 
goals. These projects often imply the construction of roads, schools, hospitals and many 
other infrastructures that are profitable to the community. The Bafokeng appear so far to be 
an exception among many affected communities on the African continent as they have 
largely succeeded to fund many development projects. Hospitals, schools and shopping 
centres have been built and a bursary system was established to stimulate students towards 
acquiring skills that should benefit the community.337 However, representatives of mineral 
companies generally argue that since they are non-elected bodies, they cannot replace the 
government with regards to its own assignments.338 Mineral companies: 
 
 would prefer paying taxes to an efficient government administration that is able to 
deliver social services at all levels. However, this is rarely the case for developing 
countries, where the situation requires that the mining industry commit additional 
funds for social uplift in the areas that they operate.339 
 
Apart from royalties, mineral companies often have to invest more money into the affected 
communities for them to be able to develop their programmes. Actually, the situation 
would be less complicated where such expenses were deductible for income tax purposes. 
This is because deduction would allow mineral companies to offset the expenses they incur 
for such projects. But this is not often the case.340 
 
2.2.1.3 Mineral projects should be evaluated before the commencement, during the 
execution and at the closure in accordance with standards matching the 
sustainable development of affected communities 
 
Communities first need to agree with the mineral company on the best way to acheive the 
project, then follow up whether the standards they have agreed upon are respected during 
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execution, and finally ensure that the land is rehabilitated at the end of  the operations. 
Before the commencement, affected communities should be able to check whether the 
project is compatible with environmental requirements and development objectives they 
want to achieve. During the execution, they should be able to interact with the mineral 
company to verify whether the project is still in line with what was agreed at the beginning 
and whether or not it is relevant to proceed with some adjustments. In this regard, a report 
prepared by the company unilaterally should be avoided as such a procedure carries the 
risk of distorting the evaluation with ambiguity, exaggeration or omission.341 For instance 
in the Niger Delta, Shell reported in 2005 that it was improving the management of waste 
disposal, but once in the field, Amnesty International noticed a significant rise of the 
quantity discharged to surface water.342 Regarding the closure of the mine, the issue is 
particularly sensitive because as mentioned previously, a mineral resource is exhaustible 
and its exploitation will come to an endsome day. Therefore, mineral companies must 
make sure that after the exploitation is over, the land is returned in conditions that would 
allow the pursuit of other useful activities, like for instance agriculture and farming. 
According to Limpitlaw: 
 
 To close a mine successfully, a trilateral consultation and problem solving 
process is required between mining companies, governments and communities. 
This process needs to commence at the design stage of the project. If conducted 
effectively, closure can be the mechanism by which capital generated through 
mineral extraction is transferred to future generations.343 
 
This view is relevant in so far as it emphasises the necessity to address the issue of mineral 
site closure by having affected people involved in the discussion, but also as it insists on 
the need to consider the sustainability question of what is transferred to the next 
generation. Actually, both elements underline the key relationship between community 
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participation and sustainable development. The involvement of the affected communities 
regarding this closure issues impose a pro-active approach to governance rather than a re-
active one. This is because the severe consequences that mineral site closure may have, 
require that actions should have been planned and foreseen long before closure.344 
 
On the one hand, closure may have severe environmental consequences. The nature of 
certain mineral resources and the high degree of transformation their exploitation has on 
the soil surface may cause pollution of the environment which may persist several years 
after the mineral site has been closed.345 As a result, where the closure of a mineral site is 
not properly planned and achieved, the life of affected communities’ members is 
jeopardised by all the re-active effects that mineral exploitation usually bring.346 
Unfortunately, land rehabilitation is a critical issue that hasoften been neglected in the 
classic binary relation involving only the government and mineral companies. In 
developing countries, it has been reported that mineral companies allocate insignificant 
amounts of money to rehabilitate the land.347 Some African countries have provisions 
addressing this issue in their mineral legislation. For instance, in South Africa, sections 42 
and 43 of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 2002 oblige mineral 
companies to make financial provision for rehabilitation upon cessation of mineral 
activities, and they remain responsible for any environmental liability, pollution or 
ecological degradation, and the management thereof, until a closure certificate is issued.348 
But in practice, many African governments have not been successful in implementing this 
rehabilitation requirement. Of course though, as in South Africa, a guarantee of 
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rehabilitation is often requested elsewhere as a pre-condition of acquiring a mineral 
licence,349 the low level of taxation which is used as an incentive strategy to attract private 
investors350 and the rate of corruption in the public sphere that is still high in many African 
countries,351 often deprive the state ofthe necessary funds to rehabilitate the land in the 
post-mining operation. Rehabilitation is very expensive. In South Africa, the auditor 
general reported in 2009 to the parliament that the cost of rehabilitating abandoned mines 
was estimated at 30 billions of Rand and in 2012, the minister in charge of mines faced 
parliament blames for failing to rehabilitate abandoned mines between 2010 and 2012, and 
for not having plans to do so between 2012 and 2013.352 To avoid such a situation, money 
needs to be secured long before closure of the operation. Accordingly, since a corrupt 
government cannot be trusted with the protection of communities’ fundamental rights and 
interests at local level, affected communities should take part in discussions and receive a 
clear explanation on how the land will be rehabilitated and on how financial resources for 
this purpose will be secured. In case they are denied the opportunity to participate and 
express their concerns, they should take legal action to compel both the government and 
the mineral company to seriously address this issue of rehabilitation. 
 
On the other hand, if the closure of a mineral site is not planned ahead, it will result in 
severe economic consequences. For instance, job loss has been reported as one of the 
challenges brought by mine closure, that needs to be properly considered. Especially for 
mineworkers, the hope of re-employment in other sectors is small, as they have skills that 
are specific to the mineral field.353 In South Africa, the World Bank predicted a loss of 
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38041 jobs because of the closure of nine mineral companies between 2002 and 2014.354 In 
fact, the need of affected communities to keep on enjoying benefits brought by mineral 
exploitation coupled with the imperative to pass a positive inheritance to future generation 
are part of the sustainability aspect of the development. Therefore, they must participate in 
discussions with other stakeholders on potential solutions for maintaining a sustainable 
situation even after closure. 
 
Ultimately, the abovementioned definitions are relevant as they provide clear indications 
on aims attached to the participation of affected communities. Wherever community 
participation cannot achieve these aims in the mineral sector, it becomes useless and 
meaningless. This is why several reflections on the subject have reached the conclusion 
that community participation is a means that serves the achievement of objectives defined 
in the development process. This view initially proposed in the African Charter for popular 
participation355 was echoed by Adejumbi who contended that through community 
participation, members of the affected community are made both the agency and the end of 
development.356 It is the means through which they would ensure that all the aims 
explained above are achieved. But community participation is also viewed as an end.357 
This is to be discussed extensively in connection with democracy, because in this context, 
it appears to be an expression of this latter concept.  
 
Despite the relevance of definitions based on the aims, it is unfortunately their failure to 
mention which form or nature community participation must take in order to be effective 
and achieve those aims, that makes them limited. From their formulation, it is not always 
easy to determine whether the definition given sees participation from a biding perspective 
or from a soft one. It is not enough to state that participation must take place, but a more 
complete definition should reflect which type of participation is considered. 
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2.2.2 A soft approach to community participation 
 
 The World Bank defines community participation as: 
 
a process through which stakeholders influence and share control 
over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect 
them.358 
 
The formal dimension of this definition results from the fact that participation is 
identified here by the Bank as a power shared by stakeholders throughout the process of 
participation. However, there appears to be an irreconciliable contradiction that one can 
be considered at the same time as a stakeholder, but without having a real power to 
influence and control the decision-making process of development initiatives. Though it 
is clear in the language of the World Bank that affected communities are included 
among stakeholders that must be empowered in the decision-making process, there is 
nonetheless much controversy in the Bank’s interpretation of what the nature of such 
power should be. Concerning the specific case of these communities, the World Bank 
has explicitly mentioned that this power to control development programmes and to 
influence the decision-making process can never amount to a veto power.359 This means 
that the Bank does not foresee a situation where affected communities can impose their 
view on other stakeholders. What constitutes a paradox in this respect is the fact that at 
the same time the World Bank has recognised that affected communities constitute what 
it has called “primary stakeholders”. The Bank has justified such primacy by the fact 
that these communities are often poor and marginalised and therefore likely to be the 
most affected of all stakeholders.360 Past experiences have sufficiently demonstrated 
that these communities are the most negatively affected in respect of their fundamental 
rights and interests. Because stakes are not the same for all parties, and affected 
communities are the most exposed, the question is why they should not enjoy such 
power to stand against any project that threatens their fundamental rights and interests. 
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The World Bank itself, after a review of 164 projects, has reached the conclusion that 
the non inclusion of affected communities in the decision-making process has very often 
resulted in inappropriate and unworkable projects.361 It seems that what matters more to 
the World Bank is simply to obtain the adhesion of affected communities in projects 
that the Bank itself assesses to be “good and relevant”. Adejumobi describes this World 
Bank approach as a tendency to emphasise a participatory model where the necessity for 
marginalised groups and interests is advocated in the discourse on community 
programmes and activities, but in a manner that does not significantly alter the existing 
power relations between stakeholders.362 For instance, as already observed, in the Chad 
Cameroon oil and pipeline project, the World Bank gave its approval and support to the 
project despite opposition by affected communities and organisations of civil society.363 
What is the most surprising is that this acquiescence of the Bank was given despite the 
fact that the environmental assessment did not comply fully with the World Bank’sown 
environmental regulation.364 It was reported that the project would destroy biodiversity 
and natural reefs.365 This behaviour of the Bank is in stark contrast to its statement that 
it would only support projects that have the broad support of affected communities.366 
In fact there is a difference between the discourse of the Bank and what is done in 
practice. While on a rhetorical note, the World Bank asserts that good consultations are 
those that enable affected communities to effectively take part in the establishment and 
execution of projects and thus, it undertakes to foster the empowerment of   
communities to monitor projects that affect them,367 however, its practice is far from 
corresponding to those asserted ideals.  
 
How would community participation be effective if affected communities could not 
enforce their views and take a stand against projects that threaten their rights and 
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interests? As Limpitlaw aptly warns, expectations of affected communities should not 
be raised to unrealistic levels and any excessive focus on compensation must be 
cautiously managed.368 Yet, the risk of exaggerating expectations is rendered high in 
Africa by the fact that many Africans living in rural areas are illiterate and uneducated. 
Their perception of what needs to be done can sometimes be excessive.  But as will be 
demonstrated later, this is not an argument to reject community participation and refuse 
even to make itcompulsory. In cases where there are conflicting interests and views, and 
parties are not able to reach consensus, it is a mistake to consider that the final views 
should be that of stakeholders that are in a position of enforcing their decisions, for 
instance mineral companies, the government or international donor agencies.369 
Actually, a balanced approach should always be considered and this could easily be 
achieved by a third party that would be neutral. This is why the recourse to an 
independent judicial or quasi-judicial body is promoted in this study because it is 
presumably a third party that is likely to guarantee that a balanced outcome is reached. 
Courts or quasi-judicial bodies are presumably “impartial” and as such, in a better 
position to measure the rationality of claims made by all parties, including affected 
communities. In this context, wherever communities’ expectations and claims are found 
to be legitimate and rational, they would be backed up by these bodies, but where they 
exceed expectations, they would simply be ignored. Even where members of affected 
communities do not have an appropriate educational background, they often have 
information about the general situation prevailing in the community and therefore, can 
easily explain to other stakeholders what the problems within their community are and 
how best they think it should be tackled.370 
 
The controversial dimension of the World Bank’s perception on what community 
participation should be, has weakened and slowed down efforts that this institution 
devised to enhance good governance practices in the extractive industry. Evaluating 
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commitments of the World Bank in connection with its undertakings in 2004, Lawrence 
and Reisch conclude that little has been done and that the Bank has failed to clearly and 
consistently apply its own policy.371 Clark also reaches the same conclusion, asserting 
that, though a set of binding policies governing the broad areas of Bank activities exists, 
including mitigation of the social and environmental impacts, there is a gap between the 
rhetoric and the implementation of the policy framework.372 The World Bank has 
generally supported the institution of the CDA but without a clear conceptualisation of 
its legal nature of being binding or not.373 In fact, the binding or non-binding nature of 
this type of agreement is generally unclear due to the fact that different terms are used to 
name it (Community Development Initiatives, Exploration Agreements, Impact Benefit 
Agreements, Global Memoranda of Understanding…).374 Where it has been clothed 
with a binding character, it has produced relative success. Though not formally named 
“CDA”, the agreement between the Bafokeng community and the mineral company 
Impala entered to in 1999 has brought some positive outcomes to the development of 
this community.375 After ten years (1989-1999) of legal wrangling, both parties finally 
reached an out of court agreement increasing royalties due to the community at 22 
percent and opening the board of the mineral company to Bafokeng’s representatives.376 
In fact, here the agreement has established a trust fund in which the Bafokeng 
Community through its representatives has entered into a joint-venture with the mineral 
corporation with the aim to channel revenues generated by the exploitation of platinum 
to the achievement of development objectives defined by the community.377As a result 
over the years, relevant infrastructures of development have been built.378 However, 
                                                             
371 Lawrence S. and Reisch N. “The World Bank Group, The Extractive Industries Review (Eir) and 
Governance: Evaluating the Bank Group’s implementation of its commitments” Paper published by the 
Bank Information Center (Bic 2006) 1. 
372 Clark DL.“The World Bank and Human Rights: The need for greater Accountability” (2002) 15 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 206-207. 
373 Environmental Resource Management (2010) 8. 
374 Id.  8. 
375 Here, the success is deemed relative because despite positive inputs in the development process, there 
is yet a profound disparity in the social conditions of the community’s members.  
376 Manson and Mbenga (2003) 45. 
377 Environment Resource Management (2010) 20. 
378 Oomen (2005) 98. 
90 
 
since entitlement to royalties and other benefits for the Bafokeng resulted from their 
right to land ownership through which they succeeded to obtain from the government a 
“preferent right to prospect and mine”,379 it is clear that the situation of this community 
is quite exceptional comparatively to many other South African local communities 
which generally do not possess the same right.380 The disparity between mineral 
landowners and the rest of the population in accessing benefits generated by mineral 
resources is what has prompted the call for nationalisation in post-apartheid.381 In 
Nigeria, the CDA has been practically labeled as Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU). Contrarily to the Bafokeng trust fund agreement, the MoU is not binding. 
Chevron and Shell have used it to establish a relationship with communities in the Niger 
Delta.382 But because of the gap between development objectives defined and the poor 
performance in practice, reluctance to pursue this kind of agreement has arisen. For 
instance, in 2012 representatives of the Benikrukru community deliberately refused to 
renew the MoU with Chevron.383 To avoid uncertainty regarding the legal nature of 
commitments made by the mineral company, it would be desirable that the CDA be 
considered as a legally binding instrument through which affected communities  would 
enforce their fundamental rights in development initiatives arising from the mineral 
project. It is predictable that as long as a general reluctance will continue to be 
displayed towards a binding approach, the effectiveness of community participation will 
continue to suffer from looseness and expectations of affected communities will remain 
a pipe dream throughout projects that it coordinates. 
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2.2.3 A binding approach to community participation under a rights-based 
approach  
 
Until now, few approaches have regarded community participation as a binding process 
with the view to guarantee its effectiveness in practice. Though the promotion of 
community participation is now considered with more enthusiasm worldwide, its 
implementation remains the hardest part of the puzzle to put in place. In this respect, a 
binding approach appears suitable as it enables affected communities to oblige other 
stakeholders to give a proper consideration to their voices and opinions. It is actually in 
this latter category that the fundamental rights-based approach promoted in this study 
should be viewed. This is simply because it supposes that affected communities possess 
some existing fundamental rights on which they can rely to control and influence the 
process of decision-making affecting them. Some of the few identified authors that have 
considered community participation under a rights-based approached are Fidlman, 
Correa, Bass, Parikh, Roman, Czebiniak, Filbey and Pring.384 
 
Fidlman considers participation as a “right” enjoyed by people in the process of 
decision-making that could affect their lives.385 
 
Drawing from the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Convention 169, Correa 
observed that: 
 
prior consultation is a formally acknowledged right, an instrument for social 
and political participation of indigenous people and ethnic groups...386 
 
Indeed, prior consultation of indigenous people is entrenched as a fundamental right in 
the ILO Convention 169. However, a closer look at this instrument will remove one 
from the scope of this study; also the fact that only one African country is part to this 
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Convention, does not allow further interest.387 Nevertheless, there is at least an interest 
in discussing the exact meaning of the right to prior consultation.  
 
It seems that the idea behind this concept is that affected communities must be 
consulted before any mineral project impacting on them is undertaken. Correa observes 
that in preliminary stages, a formal meeting involving all parties (government, mineral 
companies and affected communities) must take place and lead to the adoption of 
protocols covering the relevant subject matter of the consultation process and the 
agreement on procedures and participating stakeholders.388 Then, at the final stage, 
stakeholders, including affected communities, must share decision-making on proposals 
outlined in previous stages through a formalised declaration and agreement on the 
pertinence, feasibility or not of the project, the adjustments to be made if necessary, 
compensation to be paid to the communities and the commitment and responsibilities of 
each party throughout the execution of the project.389  
 
If this description of Correa adequately reflects on what prior consultation should be, it 
remains however questionable whether it fully corresponds to what effective 
participation should be. In this regard, Whitman and Mamen contend that participation 
and consultation should not be approached as synonymous terms, because this latter 
concept tends to be weak particularly in the mineral sector, as it mostly fails to 
explicitly require that contributions of stakeholders be incorporated in decision-making 
and that as such, it is often used by mineral companies and governments as a tokenistic 
process to placate affected communities and to avoid criticism about decisions that have 
already been foreseen.390  
 
The remarks made by these scholars are of major importance because prior consultation 
does not necessarily mean that the view of communities that have been consulted will 
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be taken into consideration. Therefore, if participation has to be matched to the right to 
prior consultation, it will merely be a procedural right but without core substance.  
 
This can be qualified as a minimalist approach suggesting that mineral companies and 
the government will only have a legal obligation to formally consult affected 
communities, without necessarily considering their views. Such an approach will bear a 
similar result with the World Bank approach where the necessity to run the participation 
of affected communities is stressed, but without a consistent outcome attached to the 
process. Apart from a substantive requirement, a procedural dimension needs to be 
added to make community participation really effective. This is why one would find the 
concept used by Bass, Parikh, Roman, Czebiniak and Filbey more appropriate. Instead 
of a right to prior consultation, these scholars speak of the right to prior informed 
consent and consideration of what it refers to: 
 
   the right of a local community to be informed about mining operations on a full 
and timely basis and to approve a mining operation prior to the commencement of 
operation. This includes participation in setting the terms and conditions addressing 
the economic, social, and environmental impacts of all phases of mining and post-
mining operations.391 
 
Defined like this, community participation not only implies a legal obligation for other 
stakeholders to consult affected communities, but also to consider the view of these 
communities in decision making in so far as the execution of the project is rationally 
depending upon their approval. The same approach was adopted by the African 
Commission in the Endorois case, but without clearly explaining what the implications 
were.392 This can be considered as a maximalist approach to community participation 
under a fundamental rights-based perspective which includes a double dimension made 
up of both procedural (consultation) and substantive (consideration of views) rights.393 
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In this respect, it is relevant to stress that prior consent must not be requested only for 
the commencement of the mineral project, but affected communities should also express 
their approval for future projects or programs consecutive to the main project, such as 
those related to development initiatives.The World Bank has pointed out that free prior 
and informed consent must not be confused with the CDA.394 Though this is correct, the 
link between both institutions is such that the CDA will presumably be easily designed 
and implemented where the relationship between the mineral company and affected 
communities is built on a formal acceptanceof the mineral project by members of these 
communities.395 As such, if the initial approbation of the project was given in a binding 
form, there is no reason why other agreements that are consecutive to such an approval 
cannot as well possess the same character. This is formally the approach embraced in 
the Nigeria Mineral law which requires the consent of the owner or occupier of the land 
prior to the license being granted to the mineral company and then adds that any CDA 
will be binding between parties.396 But unfortunately, this is far from being the case in 
practice because the government has often used its discretionary power to bypass 
landowner’s or occupier’s prior consent397 and oil companies in the Niger Delta have 
been building their relationship with affected communities on MoU which are not 
binding.398Actually, the CDA should enjoy such a biding authority to display the 
consent to a development project, but only to the extent that it represents the views 
largely shared by the community concerned. In Zambia as well where the mineral 
legislation required prior consent of the chief of the village or community concerned, 
this requirement has been disregarded in the establishment of mineral projects.399This 
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was for instance the case with the privatisation of the Zambia Consolidated Copper 
Mines in 2000 which led to the establishment of the Kansanshi mine, causing 
displacement of the people. The mine was reported to be established through a 
consultation process that was inadequate to such an extent that no compensation was 
provided to affected communities.400 Nevertheless there is apparently a dynamic of 
change initiated by the government elected in 2011 which recently took two major 
decisions, commanding a mineral corporation, first to halt its operations because ofthe 
risk of affecting communities’ health by acid mist, and then to include CSOs and those 
affected communities in meetings to discuss the issue.401 
 
The binding approach is also supported by Pring who made the assertion that 
international “hard” law on fundamental rights402 is applicable to the mineral sector and 
that treaties adopted in the wide context of sustainable development somehow offer 
opportunities for community participation to impact on mineral projects.403  It is in this 
context that the African Charter is used in this study to analyse, as the main fundamental 
rights treaty for the continent, to what extent it can support a rights-based approach to 
community participation and make it really effective in the mineral sector. At the 
procedural level, the provisions of the African Charter should be able to make 
participation compulsory and happening in conditions that are fair and transparent for 
affected communities, while at the substantial level, the Charter must enable affected 
communitiesto have their opinion considered in the decision-making process in respect 
of the achievement of development objectives, of which due respect of fundamental 
rights are part. 
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Thus for the purpose of this study, community participation is approached as a 
fundamental right in itself  and at the same time as a means  to implement other 
fundamental rights that are relevant for the achievement of aims attached to the 
participatory process, that all converge to the realisation of sustainable development. 
 
2.3 Content of community participation under the fundamental rights-based approach 
 
Community participation is viewed here as a fundamental right itself and as a means to 
enforce other fundamental rights that are relevant to the sustainable development process of 
affected communities. As such, one cannot attempt to describe its content without first 
apprehending the notion of fundamental rights. 
 
2.3.1 Definition of fundamental rights 
Before defining the concept of fundamental rights, one can legitimately wonder why this 
study does not rather use the concept of human rights. As a response to such a concern, it is 
assumed here that the notion of fundamental rights can be somehow equivalent to the one of 
human rights.404 But as will be demonstrated, the human rights concept is sometimes defined 
restrictively to such an extent that it fails to include some rights that are also fundamental to 
human beings. Peterson puts it clearly when observing for instance that in the view of some 
analysts, group rights are not part of human rights.405 In this case, the term “fundamental 
rights” seems more appropriate because it can be broadly interpreted, without any restriction, 
providing only that the right at hand has the characteristic of being fundamental. 
 
In so far as fundamental rights can be approached as human rights, one needs to note that 
these latter rights are generally perceived as rights that derive from the inherent dignity 
attached to every human being.406 Historically, human rights have remained for a long time 
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an issue strictly within national jurisdiction,407 that is until the end of the 1940’s, when they 
became internationalised.408 A study of old societies demonstrated that most of them 
possessed a system of law made up of legal instruments protecting human rights. Among the 
most widely known are for instance the Charter of Cyrus (539 BC) and the Hamourabi Code 
(1772 BC) in Babylonia that protected rights such as property, liberty and security;409 the 
work of Sages (2050-1780) in Egypt which secured the right to property for both men and 
women;410 the Magna Carta (1215) and the Habeas Coprus Act (1679) in England that 
granted some relevant rights such as the rights to freedom and to not be imprisoned except by 
order of a court; the Virginia Declaration of Rights (1176) in the United States which 
established inherent rights of men and inspired other later instruments like the American 
Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen (1789).411 At the global level, the process of human rights’ internationalisation, as 
Azinge recalls it, is traceable to some international instruments which recognised the need to 
promote and preserve human rights for the ultimate attainment of world peace after the 
Second World War.412 But yet, there is no universal and unanimous adherence to what human 
rights are. Factors such as nations’ ideological traditions and interests, and many other 
considerations generate different views and approaches varying from one country to 
another.413 
 
                                                             
407  See for instance The Magna Carta 1215 in England, The French Declaration of 1789, … 
408  Human rights emerged as a subject of concern within the international law jurisdiction after the end of 
second war. 
409  Robertson AH.and Merrils JG.Human rights in the world: An introduction to the study of international 
protection of human rights 4th ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996) 7.   
410 Kaplan LC. Politics and Government in Ancient Egypt (Kaplan: Rosen Classroom, 2004)14. 
411 Fleiner T. and Fleiner LRB Constitutional democracy in a multicultural and globalised world (Heidelberg: 
Springer 2009) 135-136, 140-142, 144-145. 
412  Azinge E (1992) 200; Internationalization of human rights through modern treaties founded its origins in the 
United Nations Charter (See the Preamb. and art. 1 (3) of the Charter) and later in the UDHR. 
413 Reichert E. “Human Rights: An examination of universalism and cultural relativism” in (2006) 22 (1) 
Journal of comparative social welfare 23–36; Gordon LP. The evolution of International Human rights 
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The unanimity between states clearly disappears when one seeks to define, clarify and 
prioritise specific human rights.414 In fact, it is not the existence of human rights that is 
questioned, but disagreements concerning their content. The divergence clearly started at the 
time following the adoption of the UDHR. While Western nations prioritised what have been 
called “first generation rights”, namely civil and political rights, communism stated and their 
allies stressed the importance of “second generation rights”, also known as socio-economic 
rights.415 As a result, both camps could not agree on a single document that would entrench 
all of these rights, and two Covenants were thus adopted, namely the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Nowadays, there is also another category of rights known as 
the “third generation rights”, but this is also not unanimously accepted. These rights are 
generally described as solidarity rights that take the form of people’s rights or groups’ 
rights.416 They have been born from the works of Mbaye who made a significant contribution 
to the establishment of the people’s right to development at international level and Vasak who 
is actually the proponent of the dividing theory of human rights into generations.417 Vasak 
justifies the three generations of human rights by the three relevant values advocated during 
the French revolution of 1789, namely liberty-equality-fraternity.418 Following this approach, 
Vasak contends that civil and political rights correspond to the need for liberty, while socio-
economic and cultural rights respond to a call for equality and solidarity and people’s rights 
fill the gap for fraternity.419 Unfortunately, if civil and political rights find acceptance by 
almost all countries regarding their view of human rights, this is not yet the case for socio-
economic and cultural rights and people’s rights, for which there is still much dissenting 
opinions. Socio-economic rights have been rejected by Western liberal countries as being 
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justiciable and enforceable rights on the ground that, contrary to civil and political rights, 
which impose mainly negative duties, their fulfillment impose positive duties upon the 
government.420 As to solidarity or people’s rights, their recognition at universal level has been 
opposed by western countries again because of a presumed fear to have many 
“unenforceable” rights in the corpus of human rights.421 This is what may perhaps explain 
that though the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was adopted 
in 2007 and consecrated solidarity’s rights, it is not a legally binding instrument under 
international law.422 
 
In the African context, the OAU Charter was the first regional instrument that dealt with the 
protection of human rights in the continent. However, it contained very little reference to the 
concept of human rights and made reference to the protection of human rights as well as 
general statements regarding the welfare and well being of Africans.423 Under both domestic 
and international pressure, African leaders adopted the African Charterin 1986 which is the 
major instrument aimed at protecting human and peoples’ rights on the continent. But even 
among African countries, the perception of human rights is not the same. While civil and 
political rights are regarded by all as a component of human rights, the view is still divergent 
especially concerning the said second generation of human rights. For instance, while South 
Africa is at present a country that is world renowned for its body of jurisprudence that treats 
socio-economic rights as judicially enforceable rights, many other African countries continue 
to regard these rights as non enforceable by a court.424 
 
Therefore, to avoid this endless debate, often inspired by ideological motivations and other 
subjective reasons, this study has chosen to take a shortcut by resorting to the concept of 
“fundamental rights”. This has the advantage of flexibility in the design of what the content 
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of human rights is by accommodating any school of thoughts. It may be the liberal conception 
of human rights or the socialist one, as long as the right at hand is regarded as being 
fundamental, it would be included in the list. This approach allmost coincides with Martínez’s 
understanding of fundamental rights when asserting that: 
 
Nowadays, it can be said that fundamental rights help … moral goal by setting up 
areas of autonomy where human beings can act freely-civil rights-; setting up 
channels for the participation in power-political rights; removing all hindrances that 
sustain discrimination and promoting the conditions to make possible a substantive 
equality-economic, social and cultural rights. In short, if I have to qualify briefly the 
function of fundamental rights at this first level of morality, I would say that they set 
up the conditions for an egalitarian liberty… fundamental rights shape the main 
content of the public ethic of modernity which contributes to the development of 
everyone's private morality by means of its transformation into law.425 
 
It is therefore a reconciling concept, the only puzzle remaining, to determine what the 
meaning of the word “fundamental” in the context of this study is. On this latter point, Alexy 
has noticed three tendencies in approaches developed as to rights that are to be regarded as 
fundamental.426 The first one that this scholar qualifies as formal, considers that fundamental 
rights are rights that have been entrenched in the constitution of a country.427 As to the second 
tendency that is said to be substantive, fundamental rights are only rights that citizens possess 
against the state.428 The third one that is qualified as procedural, considers that fundamental 
rights are rights which are so important that their protection cannot be left only to 
representatives in parliament, but requires the involvement of courts in order to translate them 
into positive law.429 As this study agrees with this scholar, all three tendencies are not 
mutually exclusive; rather they coexist in a genuine theory of fundamental rights.430  
Fundamental rights (even for those that are regarded as natural rights) are often found in 
relevant legal instruments (constitutions, international treaties or conventions, special 
legislation entrenched for that purpose…), and aim to safeguard their beneficiaries in either a 
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negative or positive dimension against any potential perpetrator (state or private persons) and 
needs judicial enforcement as a guarantee for their respect or remedy.  
 
This study finally adheres to Zemanek’s conclusion in his course at the Hague Academy of 
International law where he suggests that in the midst of different conceptions, what is 
important, is to ensure, as far as possible, the uniform application of fundamental rights that 
have been accepted in an international convention.431 Adherence to this view is justified here 
by the fact that the research work is based on the provisions of a supranational instrument, 
namely the African Charter, which makes it easily to identify fundamental rights that have 
been largely accepted on the continent and that are likely to make community participation 
effective in the management of mineral resources. This is particularly relevant in so much as 
the African Charter has embraced an integrative approach instead of a separatist one, by 
including all three generations of rights as enforceable rights, with the consequence that it is a 
legal instrument in a position to serve as a broad platform upon which all fundamental rights 
of affected communities, no matter the generation in which they are classified, may be 
safeguarded in the mineral sector.When looking at its designation, the presentation of the 
Charter as being one on “human and peoples’ rights” suggests that each type constitutes a 
distinctive category of rights.Therefore, the concept of fundamental rights makes it easy to 
include any human or people’s right in the scope of the analysis, provided that it is relevant to 
enforce community participation in the mineral sector. 
 
Fundamental rights are consequently defined here as all rights contained in the African 
Charter that are relevant to support community participation and improve governance of 
mineral resources in Africa in respect of affected communities welfare. Nonetheless, though 
this study adheres to the interdependence theory between all fundamental rights as 
ascertained in article 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action adopted by the UN 
in 1993,432 it would not be possible to look at all rights entrenched in the African Charter, but 
only those that have demonstrably a direct incidence on the subject matter of the study. Those 
selected here include the fundamental right to freely participate in government procedures as 
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stated in article 13, the fundamental right to receive information in article 9, the fundamental 
right to self-determination in article 20, the fundamental right to freely dispose of wealth and 
natural resources in article 21, the fundamental right to socio-economic development in 
article 22, the fundamental right to environment in article 24 and the fundamental right to 
have his cause heard in article 7.433  
 
2.3.2 Community participation as a fundamental right 
 
Should community participation be approached as a fundamental right, to understand its 
content would require an examination of its philosophical foundation. In this respect, the 
need for community participation in Africa appears as a resultant of peoples’ general 
demand for democratic governance in the process towards the realisation of development 
objectives.434 Indeed, the main contention is that because power belongs to the people that 
they need to exercise a certain influence and control on public matters that have a direct 
incidence on their livelihood.435 Therefore, the deduction could easily be made if democracy 
itself could be considered as a fundamental right. In this case, the fundamental right to 
participate would simply stand as a component of the fundamental right to democracy. 
However, the simplicity of such reasoning is challenged by arguments that refuse to see 
democracy as a fundamental right. Cohen contends that democracy cannot be regarded as 
being part of fundamental rights because the protection of this type of rights may as well 
exist in societies which are not necessarily democratic.436 Though the remark made by this 
scholar is pertinent, it is more appropriate to the discussion on the relationship between 
democracy and fundamental rights rather than the analysis of what the essence of democracy 
is when approached from a pure legal perspective. Here the challenge is not to compare how 
fundamental rights are accommodated by different systems of governance, including 
democracy, but rather to establish whether democracy as a concept can itself be somehow 
regarded as a fundamental right. If at least such an analysis can be made in respect of 
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participative democracy, it appears undeniable that at least under this perspective it is a 
fundamental right. This is because major fundamental rights’ instruments at the international 
level entrenches the fundamental right to participate in the government.437 This latter 
fundamental right is the legal foundation on which people participation is grounded in 
democratic systems.  Unfortunately cultural relativism, traditions and other factors have 
been taken as pretexts to reject the view that all the rights contained in these instruments 
have the nature of fundamental rights, a selective analysis being advocated as the best 
approach. This is the case of Cohen’s approach that made the claim that only some 
substantial range of rights found in international human rights’ instruments are among 
fundamental rights.438 It is in this context that though included in international instruments, 
this scholar reaches the conclusion that the right to participative democracy is not a 
fundamental right because it is not a value shared world wide.439 His conclusion results from 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Suppose...that democratic ideas lack substantial resonance in the political culture, or the 
history and traditions of the country. Then the value of collective self-determination 
itself recommends resistance to the idea that the political society should be required to 
meet the standard expressed in a principle of equal basic liberties, even if we think that 
that standard represents the truth about justice.440 
 
However, two arguments refute Cohen’s objection. The first one is found in his own 
perception of fundamental rights. When defining fundamental rights as rights that are owed 
by all political societies in light of basic human interests and the characteristic threats and 
opportunities that political societies present to those interests, Cohen seems to overlook the 
fact that democracy as well may be among the range of these rights in a given society, in 
case it has “substantial resonance in the political culture, or the history and traditions of the 
country” in this society”. Actually, instead of a generalising approach on the legal nature of 
democracy, Cohen’s hypothesis implies that, depending on the political values proper to 
each society, democracy may be regarded as a fundamental right in a particular country, 
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while not enjoying the same status in another one. If this relativist approach has to be 
adopted, Cohen’s assertion that democracy is not a fundamental right cannot be taken as an 
absolute, because depending on the case, the concept can possess this nature. 
 
Secondly, the ratification by many countries of most international instruments entrenching 
the right to participative democracy implies under international law that no matter the 
approach developed at domestic level, provisions for these instruments would be 
overpowering. Such primacy results from article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties which explicitly provides thata country “may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” But in practice, if this rule is 
easily to oppose in countries with a monistic system, this is not the case for countries with 
dualistic systems where provisions for an international instrument need to be further 
incorporated into the domestic legal system through an Act of Parliament.441 Nonetheless, 
this Vienna Convention rule consolidates what has been the view of Zemanek according to 
which countries must support the uniform application of fundamental rights that have been 
accepted in international instruments.442 It is in this respect that democracy and 
subsequently, community participation are fundamental rights at least in the African context 
because the right to participate directly or indirectly in the government is expressly 
acknowledged in article 13 of the African Charter. 
 
Also, it would be misleading to reduce the study of community participation as fundamental 
right to an analysis undertaken in isolation. As one would easily agree with Cohen this time, 
the application of some fundamental rights requires an interpretation that goes beyond 
abstract language found in the instrument,443 and involves the essence of other fundamental 
rights to facilitate their apprehension. It is in this respect that one may wonder how the 
fundamental right to community participation may be applied if affected communities are 
not able to access relevant information and then have judicial support to obtain remedies 
where necessary. The answer to this question leads to the conclusion that the rights to access 
information and justice are prerequisites for an effective implementation of community 
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participation under a fundamental rights-based approach. Concerning the first one, Breillard 
observes that “the right to be informed comes first before any form of participation. One 
cannot contribute efficiently if one is not sufficiently informed.”444 
 
As to access to justice, it has been pointed out that the right serves as a means to protect and 
enjoy other fundamental rights because it aims at obtaining remedies from judicial or quasi-
judicial bodies.445 
 
Therefore, when analysing the fundamental right to community participation under 
provisions of the African Charter, chapter four will look not only at the right to participate in 
the government in article 13, but as well as the right to access information in article 9 and 
the right for one to have his/her cause heard in article 7 which both back up the process 
towards effective participation. 
 
2.3.3 Community participation as a means to guarantee other fundamental rights 
 
As mentioned previously, the second dimension of community participation under the 
rights-based approach implies that it functions as a means through which other fundamental 
rights that are relevant to the realisation of sustainable development are to be protected in 
the course of mineral exploitation. But as observed above, it would not be possible to look at 
all fundamental rights entrenched in the African Charter. Though one way or another, all of 
them can have their own importance, only those that focus directly on development 
objectives and without which community participation would be rendered meaningless in 
the process towards sustainable development through mineral exploitation, are the ones 
considered in this study. Therefore, the list includes the right to the environment in article 24 
which is traditionally viewed an imperative for development that is sustainable; the right to 
economic-self determination in article 20; the right to freely dispose of wealth and natural 
resources in article 21 and the right to socio-economic development in article 22, which all 
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aim at empowering people to take their destiny in their own hands throughout the 
development process. 
 
Particularly, in respect of the right to freely dispose of wealth and natural resources in article 
21, one open-ended question is who should really be regarded as the owner of mineral 
resources. This is very important because it determines the extent to which people may 
claim their right to exercise control over mineral transactions. Actually, the recognition of 
their ownership is supposed to consolidate their position to claim free disposal of mineral 
resources. Unfortunately, the positions adopted by countries are really divergent. The 
situation varies from a state’s ownership,446 people’s ownership447 or a mix of state-
people448 or people-private ownership.449 Such disparity of positions unfortunately does not 
always support the relevant role that people must play in the management of natural 
resources. But as observed by Haysom and Kane, the most important question is finally who 
controls the natural resources sectors and manages benefits generated from it.450 In this 
respect, since all African countries are part of the African Charter, it seems that the approach 
adopted in this instrument must prevail, according to which the disposal of natural resources 
is regarded a fundamental right of African peoples. No matter the approach adopted by each 
country regarding the ownership of mineral resources, it is obvious that people are entitled 
to resort to benefits flowing from the mineral industry in the process of achieving 
development. 
 
2.4 Community participation and related concepts 
 
2.4.1Community participation and democracy 
 
A complete analysis of the relationship between community participation and democracy 
implies a discussion at the two levels of its dimensions, namely community participation as 
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an end and as a mean.451 But as a prerequisite to the analysis, it is important to 
circumscribe the understanding of democracy in the context of this study.  
 
Several definitions of democracy exist, but one of the most famous is that of the former 
President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865). According to Lincoln, 
democracy stands as the “government of the people, by the people and for the people”.452 
Often, this concept is well understood in opposition to other forms of government such as 
monarchy, aristocracy or oligarchy where absolute power is vested in either an individual 
or a small group of persons who do not legitimately reflect the choice of the people. 
Though Lincoln’s definition does not explain unequivocally in substance what a 
democratic government is, it has the merit of bringing out the central idea that, contrary to 
other forms, the people must be at the heart of government actions, and that the outcome of 
the decision-making process must reflect the expression of their will.453  
 
What is particularly interesting in this definition is the three dimensions that Lincoln 
attached to the concept. In this first dimension which looks at democracy as the 
government of the people, the definition places the emphasis on the ownership of power 
and authority. This simply means that in a democracy, the power and authority to decide 
belong to the people, with the consequence that wherever they are not able to exercise it 
directly by themselves, those who qualify to act on their behalf, have to be genuinely 
mandated or delegated by the people themselves. This latter requirement is based on a 
legitimacy concern which in itself forms the philosophical foundation of elections in a 
system of representation. Because decisions relating to the formulation and implementation 
of public policies are to be made by those who have been democratically elected, officials 
who run the country must be individuals that were chosen during a fair and transparent 
                                                             
451Adejumobi (2008) 100; Pring G. and Siegele L. “The law of public participation in global mining” 
International and comparative mineral law and policy: Trends and prospects (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2005) 267-268; Miraftab F. “The perils of participatory discourse: Housing policy in 
Postapartheid South Africa” in (2003) 22 Journal of Planning Education and Research 227. 
452 Caso A. We the people-Formative documents of America’s democracy (Boston: Branden Publishing, 
2011) iv. 
453 Lane JE. and Ersson S. Democracy a comparative approach (New York: Routledge,  2003) 2. 
108 
 
ballot.454 But it remains an open question whether this requirement must be contemplated 
as absolute. This is actually the theoretical objection generally raised against judicial 
review by courts when it comes to decisions made by the two other branches, contending 
that it would be undemocratically to have judges who are not elected, to question decisions 
of representatives who have been democratically elected.455  
 
Though such an approach appears to be grounded on a rational argument, the truth is that in 
any genuine democratic system, the judiciary plays a vital role as courts are established 
with the aim to inter alias protect the fundamental rights of people; adding to this the fact 
that every member of the executive is not necessarily chosen and appointed from the list of 
those who are elected. As will be discussed after exploring the definition, this democratic 
requirement of legitimacy through election raises a serious challenge in affected 
communities where members’ representation is still held through traditional chieftaincy 
acquired by heredity. The objection is that if a system of representation is to be adopted for 
the mineral resources governance at the local level, then members of an affected 
community must enjoy the right to have representatives that they have democratically 
chosen themselves. This stands as a strategy to ensure their participation at least indirectly. 
 
The second dimension, democracy as the government by the people, is linked to the first 
one in that as the power belongs to the people, it should actually be exercised by the people 
themselves. This hypothesis is generally fulfilled in a system of direct or participative 
democracy like the one that existed in old Greece (Athens) where people themselves were 
directly partakers of the decision-making process. But because in a modern state, such a 
direct involvement of the people is not always possible, this second dimension should be 
broadly interpreted to include even the system of indirect democracy. This would imply 
that not only representatives are chosen by the people through a fair and transparent 
electoral process, but also that decisions and actions they take definitely reflect the will of 
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the people.456 In other words, when participating in the governance of the country directly 
or indirectly through representatives, the people must be able to enjoy the same results, 
namely to have what they want respected and implemented in respect of their development 
objectives. Therefore, it is clear that participation must be envisaged beyond a simple 
exercise of choosing representatives. Peoples must also enjoy possibilities to exercise a 
control over their representatives in the course of their mandate. In a representative system, 
it is not always obvious to assert unequivocally what the will of the people is, because once 
elected, representatives tend to make decisions and act according to what they believe 
themselves correspond to the desires of the people.  
 
There is therefore a permanent risk of rupture in any representative system when people 
chosen to act and decide in the interest of the people fail to do so. Such a rupture is actually 
what caused the early crisis of legitimacy between African leaders457 and their people a few 
years after the 1960 round of independence.458 This risk of rupture is often attenuated in 
democratic systems through the institution of exceptional mechanisms such as 
referendums,459 petitions or even the possibility to have access to judicial remedies that can 
provide redress wherever any member of the government may have misbehaved or acted 
contrary to the best interest of the people. 
 
It also is questionable whether “government by the people” can be taken as an absolute 
principle because sometimes there are matters that are of high technicality that they require 
a certain expertise. Noveck notes that “there is the belief that the public does not possess as 
much expertise as people in the government.”460 However, even in this case, what is 
                                                             
456  This is actually one of the ultimate precondition upon which representatives are often re-elected, despite 
the fact that ethnic considerations play as well an important role in the African context. Marquez E. 
(1998) 115. 
457 Though many African leaders who fought for decolonisation of Africa during the 1950s and 1960s were 
not elected, they were trusted by their own people because they identify themselves in the fight for 
independence.  
458  Mangu (2007) 2; Ake (1996)  4-5; Ake (1994)240. 
459  Lane and Ersson (2003) 6. 
460 Noveck BS. “The single point of failure” in Van Der Hof S. and Groothuis MM. (eds.) Innovating 
Government: Normative, policy and technological dimensions of modern government (The Hague: 
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relevant for people is to get the proper explanation of what needs to be done, wherever 
necessary, or be able to request it.  
 
What is important above all is to ensure that mechanisms are in place to guarantee that the 
people’s profound aspirations are reflected in the final stage of the decision-making 
process.  As underlined in the previous chapter, this is the main dimension that is at present 
lacking in the mineral sector of many African countries. Either participation is non-existent 
or it is so insignificant and powerless that it hardly leads to the fulfillment of affected 
communities’ aspirations.This requirement goes in line with the third dimension which 
regards democracy as a government for the people. It is the highest objective of a 
democratic system that all governmental decisions and actions must converge towards the 
realisation of the people’s general interests, meeting their needs and expectations. As 
pointed out by Knight, Chigudu and Tandon, in the view of citizens, the fulfillment of their 
basic needs is an ingredient of a good society.461 In every democratic system, members of 
government have the duty to serve the people’s interests, rather than their own selfish 
interests.462 At times, they can only do so by consulting the people to find out what their 
views are on important issues raising a concern within the society.  
 
The third dimension is so relevant because it suggests that any decision or action that 
threatens or violates the interests of the people must be discarded. In the context of this 
study, it implies that project in the African mineral sector that fails to uplift the best 
interests of affected communities should not be implemented. If an update is not possible, 
then the project should simply be put aside.   
 
These three above dimensions found in Lincoln’s definition are the crossroads where 
different conceptions of democracy overlap. No matter the manner in which institutions 
and principles are organised in respective countries, any conception of democracy is 
forcefully made of at least one of these three dimensions. Considering the way decisions 
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are taken, there is what scholars call majoritarian democracy where all decisions are taken 
by the use of a simple majority (51%).463 This majoritarian model of democracy is 
opposed to other types such as the one where democracy is built upon the unanimity 
rules;464 the consociational democracy which considers that the simple majority rule leads 
to the neglect of minorities in so-called divided societies (e.g ethnic cleavage) and that 
consensus should be institutionalised as the decision-making format through all kind of 
rules that lead to power sharing;465 the elitist democracy where a group of elites acquire 
the power to decide by means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote and whose 
power may be limited through the use of institutions such as referendums and mechanisms 
set in the constitution to avoid that elitism  becomes a fascism or totalitarian regime.466 
 
There is also a distinction made between types of democracies base on the economic 
ideology adopted in a country. Thus, on the one hand there is the social democracy which 
reflects a model of democracy adopted by countries with a socialist background and which 
emphasises on the role of the state to ensure equality and social justice between citizens in 
a context where national common interests are given pre-eminence over individual ones.467 
On the other hand is the liberal democracy where the intervention of the state is limited in 
the private sphere to actions like, for instance, protecting an individual’s freedom against 
invasion by the group or other individuals, preserving law and order, enforcing private 
contracts and favouring competitive markets.468  
 
What is common to all these models, is the fact that one way or another, they all claim to 
give pride of place to the people. In present days, one of the widespread models among 
many nations is the constitutional democracy. This is a model that combines both the 
                                                             
463  Lane and Ersson (2003) 3. 
464  See the view of Buchman as explained by Lane and Ersson (2003) 4.  
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Democracy in the third world (Colorado: Lynne Reinner publishers, 2003) 13. 
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respect for rule of law and the active participation of people in the decision-making 
process according to principles established in the constitution. Here, democratic rules are 
defined in the constitution which is the supreme law of the country and whose provisions 
bind and limit everyone, from the highest state authorities to citizens. In this model, 
constitutional rules organise the framework and process through which decisions taken 
either by the exercise of direct democracy (majority in general referendum) or indirect 
democracy (parliamentary majority) should be regarded as valid.469 Limitations imposed 
by the constitution in such a context are traditionally referred to as constitutionalism, 
which is generally presented as a set of constitutional rules and procedures that restrain 
power and discretion of the government to avoid arbitrary and unfair decisions and actions 
by government.470 But, beyond this traditional approach to constitutionalism, there is the 
positive and substantive conception which emphasises values more and of which respect 
and protection of fundamental rights are parts.471 What is particularly relevant in modern 
constitutional democracy is the fact that rhetorically fundamental rights of citizens are 
given high consideration, to such an extent that they are entrenched in the constitution. 
This is what Ivison qualifies as a “rights-based constitutionalism.”472 In Mangu’s view, 
“rights promoted by such constitutionalism are not only individual and first-generation 
rights, but also collective, second and third-generation rights.”473 Most African countries 
have in their constitutions and legislation, provisions that define fundamental rights and 
duties of citizens, especially in their relation to their government and public officials. 
Unfortunately, in practice most of these rights are not given effective consideration in the 
mineral sector of many African countries when it comes to addressing the situation of 
affected communities.474 
 
                                                             
469  Mangu AMB. “Challenges to constitutionalism and democratic consolidation in Africa” (2005) 24 (3) 
Politeia 315-334. 
470  Magstadt TM. Understanding politics 9th ed. (Boston: Wadswoth, 2011) 80. 
471 Mangu AMB. “Challenges to constitutionalism...” (2005) 319. 
472  See Ivison as quoted by Mangu AMB “Challenges to constitutionalism....” (2005) 318. 
473  Id., 319. 
474  In this regard, one should refers to the historical background made in the Chapter one. 
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What is relevant to keep in mind at the end of this section is that the real dilemmas in the 
context of this study touch on which form of democracy would be appropriate between an 
indirect democracy and a direct democracy and, in case this latter form is to be adopted, 
through which decisional-mechanism (majority, unanimity or consensus rule) affected 
communities would express their views in the governance of mineral resources. Because 
direct democracy is in substance rooted in the principle that people must get involved in the 
decision-making process of public-matters, the temptation would be great for one to quickly 
conclude that it is the appropriate form to sustain community participation in the African 
mineral sector. But as will be demonstrated later, a mid-path approach seems the best solution 
to adopt in order to have a system of governance that is balanced. Such a balance would be 
necessary to prevent or attenuate negative aspects of both systems. This is why most modern 
democratic regimes are made of rules that mix different elements of direct democracy with 
those of indirect democracy, with the view to guarantee citizens the enjoyment of their 
fundamental rights.475 This mixed approach corresponds to the practice found in the Niger 
delta and the South African Bafokeng community. Because, the number of villages affected 
by the project is at times high, the company establishes discussions with representatives while 
these latter ones return and discuss relevant questions in their respective group or village with 
all members.476 
Now that a general perception of democracy in this study has been reviewed, its relation to 
community participation can easily be discussed both as an end and as a means. The 
question relates to the relationship with democracy to be established under these two 
perspectives. 
 
2.4.1.1Community participation as an end and democracy 
 
Firstly, in its perspective as an end, one should notice that participation is the essence of 
democracy.477 Indeed, the second dimension of Lincoln’s definition adopted in this study 
                                                             
475 Colombo A.The principle of subsidiary and European citizenship (Milano: Vito e Pensiero, 2000) 27. 
476 Faleti (2008) 11-12. 
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suggests that democracy is the government by the people.  This has the triple implication 
that the power belongs to the people, and that it should actually be exercised by themselves 
and that wherever the people are not able to exercise it directly, those who qualify to do it 
on their behalf must be mandated or delegated by them. Viewed like this, democracy 
corresponds to participation as an end because this latter becomes a finality of the former 
and requires that institutional arrangements be provided with participatory mechanisms 
through which the people are empowered to define or discuss policy, programmes or even 
projects and make sure that decisions and actions taken reflect their will. Contextualised in 
the mineral sector, this requirement means that institutional mechanisms must exist 
through which affected communities would enjoy the opportunity to democratically 
exercise their prerogatives in respect of mineral projects, either by themselves or through 
representatives that they have freely chosen and to such extentthat they may be impacted. 
This is what several scholars have called the democratisation of natural resources 
governance to mean the process through which the past authoritarian model of 
management must give way to the devolution of power to communities that enables them 
to effectively influence decision-making at local level.478 In this respect, the main issue to 
reflect on is what the appropriate form of democracy is in order to make community 
participation more effective in mineral activities taking place at local level?  
 
The kind of participation and the extent to which it must be allowed is a challenge faced by 
all democratic regimes.479 In old societies, democracy has been generally conceived as a 
direct involvement or participation by people.480 But nowadays, this form is said to be 
impossible to realise because of the large size of modern states and also the complexity 
                                                             
478 Nelson F. “Conservation and citizenship: Democratizing natural resource governance in Africa” in (2010) 
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attached to some issues of public interest.481Regarding this objection, a contemporary 
argument has emerged according to which no matter the country size, direct democracy 
can be realised thanks to new technologies.482 This solution is less applicable to African 
countries where many people in rural areas yet struggle to have access to new 
technologies. Nevertheless, direct democracy is still feasible at the local level where people 
are not many in number as in the ancient Athens.483 But even in this case, the complexity 
of some matters challenges the direct involvement of people at the local level. As 
previously mentioned, at times there is the presumption that officials serving in the 
government have much more expertise than ordinary people.484 This concern is particularly 
relevant in the context of African rural communities because technical aspects encountered 
in mineral projects require a certain level of education. Numbers of people within these 
communities are still uneducated and there is a risk to compromise on the raison d’être of 
community participation. Though one may agree with Kimani that affected communities 
must scrutinise all relevant aspects of mineral agreements,485 it is a fact that they need to 
acquire the minimum knowledge that would enable them to do it appropriately. Otherwise, 
the blind application of democratic principles in the decision-making process would lead to 
a negative outcome. In this respect, Stevens contends that the substance of democracy is 
not just about translation of public opinion into decision and that:  
 
making by the majority can in fact be undemocratic when the majority of citizens are 
uninformed about particular issues and about the likely consequences of the policies or 
laws that they are supporting.486 
 
Affected communities need not only possess the necessary information but also have a 
clear understanding of what the implications of mineral projects are. They must first be 
aware of what their fundamental rights are, then be able to evaluate the extent to which 
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these rights are given consideration in the project and learn how they should claim them 
whenever they are infringed or not fulfilled.  
 
Therefore because of the major problem of illiteracy existing in many African countries, 
there is a great temptation to argue that indirect democracy is the appropriate arrangement 
within which community participation must take place.487 In the view of the World Bank, 
having all members of the affected community at the negotiation table is impractical. The 
Bank’s suggestion is that only representatives should be involved in close discussions with 
other stakeholders, while the whole community should wait for public meetings in which 
their leaders report to them.488 However, even in this case, at the stage of representation, 
there are also serious dilemmas. Firstly, it has been observed that for outsider actors like 
multinational corporations, it is not always easy to identify the appropriate representatives 
of the community because of different factors like for instance political considerations, 
ethnicity and gender.489 Secondly, there is the fact that representatives may be subjected to 
corruption. For instance, it has been noticed that where representation has been carried out 
by traditional chiefs, affected communities have gradually developed a certain distrust of 
their representatives who they have accused of being corrupted to keep quiet regarding 
projects that are opposed to their rights and interests.490 In 2010, Shell and its subsidiaries 
were found liable under US law and paid fines of up to 48 million US dollars for being 
involved in transactions where money was used to bribe Nigerian officials.491 Moreover, at 
the early stage of MoUs implementation, members of the Niger Delta communities 
involved in these agreements complained that profits were only flowing to the leaders 
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instead of benefiting the whole mass of the people.492 Later on, when Chevron tried to 
change its approach by acting through established Community Regional Development 
Councils,493 traditional leaders started to complain that they felt marginalised and openly 
claimed losing homage payments and direct contact with the company.494 This example 
just illustrates how sensitive the issue is and how risky it may be to have a system that is 
exclusively representative. 
 
The conducting of interviews and research questionnaires undertaken in this study has 
revealed that people living around mineral sites all agree that an affected community must 
participate.Views are however divergent as some contend that the whole community must be 
involved in discussions and decisions because they are the ones suffering indirect effects of 
mineral exploitation, while others contend that for practical reasons, participation should only 
take place under the auspices of communities’ representatives that have been chosen.  
 
Actually, despite its inconveniencies, direct democracy remains the best system in which 
affected communities may effectively share a feeling of taking a real involvement in the 
decision-making process. But because in the present context of Africa and because of the 
technical nature of certain issues, a balance needs to be found with indirect democracy. This 
equals what Ouguergouz identifies as a “semi-direct democracy” which means a system that 
combines both types of democracy, where power is exercised by representatives, but with the 
possibility in certain circumstances of having direct intervention by affected people.495 This is 
the position embraced in this study. Affected communities should work through their 
representatives on aspects which appear complex, but their members must be provided with 
the possibility to directly discuss aspects that do not require much understanding496  and to 
hold accountable a posteriori their representatives in respect of decisions that have been 
taken. Nevertheless, even in such a balanced system, another issue to solve would be the 
mode of decision whenever members of affected communities participate directly. Here, the 
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easiest way is to first attempt to find consensus, and then if this fails, recourse to majority 
rule, but always with the possibility for minorities to seek redress inter alia before a judicial 
body in case the majority decision is abusive. As to the unanimity rule, it must be set aside 
because the possibility to reach a unanimous point of view is always limited in every human 
society or group. In the same vein, the practicability of direct participation is also dependent 
on whether or not the number of members in a given community is not very high. Otherwise, 
it might delay the decision-making process and thus negatively impact on the national 
investment climate. 
 
To successfully achieve the empowerment of people at the grassroots level, organisations that 
work closely with affected communities (for instance, political parties, CSOs and 
international donor agencies) must help communities to acquire the necessary knowledge that 
will enable them to watch over their rights and interests in the governance process regarding 
mineral resources. As will be seen later in this study, on the continental scale, the African 
Commission has a promotional mandate to inform African peoples of rights included in the 
African Charter and to make them aware of what the enforcement procedures at their 
disposalare.497 This should be used as a relevant tool to increase the level of literacy all over 
the continent, especially with regard to the protection of fundamental rights in the mineral 
sector. This is part of the capacity building process of affected communities. 
 
2.4.1.2 Community participation as a means and democracy 
 
The relationship with democracy results from the fact that this latter system is the better one 
under which the goals attached to participation can be achieved. Ako and Uddin aptly observe 
that it is within a politically democratised context that equity, accountability, participation 
and freedom are best guaranteed or at least promoted.498As mentioned previously, community 
participation must supposedly generate the community members’ opinions regarding what 
should be objectives that need to be realised, how resources to achieve them must be 
allocated, how members of the community must share in benefits and how they perceive or 
assess mineral projects proposed or already established against those defined objectives. 
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Obviously, this is possible only in a system where the freedom of expression is guaranteed.499 
Actually, when one considers the fact that community participation as envisaged here rests on 
an approach based on fundamental rights, it is clear that it would be viable only in a system 
that is supportive of fundamental rights. It has been contended that a clash between 
democracy and fundamental rights may exist in that the former can sometimes limit the 
latter.500 The proponent of this view, Gould, gives the example of capital punishment that is 
still applied in the USA as a result of democratic freedom and which constitutes a blatant 
violation of the fundamental right to life.501 Though this remark is relevant, it is not enough to 
establish incompatibility between both concepts. Actually, in a comparative perspective, one 
should quickly notice that conditions to achieve an effective and meaningful participation, 
and the aims attached to it, are more fulfilled in a democratic regime than in authoritarian 
regimes. Indeed, not only the experience demonstrates that fundamental rights’ violations 
have been less present in democratic regimes than in authoritarian ones,  the freedom of 
expression which is at the root of participation is guaranteed only under democratic 
principles.502 Therefore, community participation can be best achieved preferably in a 
democratic system. 
 
2.4.2 Community participation and decentralisation 
Community participation can effectively take place only in a country where governance is 
decentralised. This is because the concept of community participation as approached in this 
study implies that power is bestowed upon affected communities to express and enforce their 
views and to protect their rights and interests in mineral projects. A study made by a group of 
researchers under the auspices of the UNDP led them to the conclusion that participation is 
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efficient when practiced through institutionalised channels and that effective commitment to 
participation produce positive results.503 
As for democracy, several attempts to define the concept of decentralisation exist. Livack, 
Ahmad and Bird define the decentralisation as “the assignment of fiscal, political and 
administrative responsibilities to lower levels of governments.”504 Crawford and Hartmann 
consider that the notion “entails the transfer of power, responsibilities and finance from 
central government to sub-national levels of government at provincial and/or local levels.”505 
These scholars all share the view that decentralisation is not easy to define because it may 
take different forms and dimensions. While Livack, Ahmad and Bird observe that a wide 
variety of institutional arrangements may be encompassed under the label of decentralisation 
and operate at the same time within a country,506 Crawford and Hartmann point out that one 
main controversy in understanding decentralisation since the 1980s relates to the issue of 
whether the concept should be limited to the vertical dimension including the transfer of some 
power, competencies and resources from the centre to the local level, or should it also 
embrace the horizontal dimension that involves dispatch of power, competencies and 
resources at a specific level of government.507 
 
In the midst of all this ambiguity, what needs to be kept in mind is the main idea that no 
matter the form of decentralisation that is arranged in a particular country, it always implies 
the transfer of authority with some degree of autonomy from the centre of government to 
another level that is much lower.508 It is also important to notice that decentralisation must not 
be confused with the concept of deconcentration. This is because deconcentration implies that 
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the central government does not release some of its responsibilities, but only exercises them 
through its regional or provincial branches. Public officers that hold power in such a context 
at local level are not autonomous and independent; they merely represent and act on behalf of 
the central government. In this case there is no real transfer of authority, but simply a 
representation of the central government at the local level.509 But decentralisation always 
involves a real transfer of authority to local level, to such an extent that local governments 
enjoy some degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the central government in the decision-making of 
certain particular matters.  Livack, Ahmad and Bird observe that the said decentralisations 
that have taken place in many unitary countries are in reality deconcentration because they 
have not been accompanied by a transfer of power to local governments.510 Meynen and 
Doornbos make the same observation and affirm that in a number of recent examples, 
especially in West African countries, decentralisation often amounts to a selective 
deconcentration of state functions under the continued control of the centre.511 Many African 
countries have recognised decentralisation on paper, but the central government practically 
maintains important powers and a high degree of control at local level.512 Regarding the four 
countries selected in this study, though they all have well established local governments, the 
effective implementation of decentralisation principles as a means to tackle poverty issues is 
still an ongoing challenge in all of them because of the continuous tendency of the center to 
maintain a considerable control over local matters. Even in South Africa which is often 
considered as an example of relative success in this area, it has been noticed that because of 
the African National Congress’ desire to ensure central government control over the 
development planning processes in rural and urban areas, there has been a stark contrast 
between the governance theory that emphasises decentralisation within the constitution513 and 
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the high degree of interference in local government matters.514 In Nigeria, it was pointed out 
that local governments have so far played a minor role in economic development matters, 
with minimal or no input in planning or implementation of development projects , and the 
state and federal agencies being dominant.515 In Zambia, despite a good performance in 
decentralisation of the public health sector, interference by the central government in revenue 
resources due to city councils has been a serious concern for the fiscal capacity of local 
entities.516As to the situation in DRC, the central government and local governments are still 
fighting about the 40% of national resources that provinces are supposed to retain according 
to article 175 of the 2006 Constitution.517 
 
Depending on the manner and the extent to which authority and power are transferred, 
decentralisation is often viewed under the subtypes of devolution and delegation.518If it is 
generally accepted that devolution corresponds to political decentralisation,519it is unclear 
from these scholars’ writings what the equivalent for delegation is.In this regard, Gregersen, 
Contreras-Hermosilla, White and Phillips regard delegation as a component of administrative 
decentralisation.520 Moreover, while Livack, Ahmad and Bird support the existence of a fiscal 
decentralisation as a subtype, Crawford and Hartmann consider that it is not a third one, but 
just a cross cutting element of political and administrative decentralisations.521 
 
Delegation is actually a mid-path to full decentralisation in that it implies the transfer of 
authority and power for decision making to local governments or organisations that are not 
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wholly under central government control, but that are definitely accountable to it.522 In this 
type, local governments enjoy a high degree of autonomy, but they are not fully independent 
because they must report to the central government in connection to the general objectives 
and guidelines defined by the centre.523 Fiscal decentralisation implies that the power to tax, 
previously held by the central government, is partially transferred to local governments within 
the country.524 This subtype is particularly relevant in a developmental model of 
decentralisation because it enables local communities to mobilise or generate funds through 
their local structures to achieve sustainable development initiatives. Put in the context of 
mineral exploitation, it implies that mineral companies would start paying a part of the 
royalties directly to affected communities, instead of them waiting for a retrocession from 
central government. The suitability of such mechanisms is discussed in the coming section 
addressing the relationship between decentralisation and community participation. Political 
decentralisation or devolution constitutes the highest level of decentralisation in as much as 
the central government transfers the power and authority for decision-making to “quasi-
autonomous units of local governments”.525 Here local governments, without reaching the 
level of political self-determination, enjoy a greater autonomy than in the delegation, with the 
consequence that they have for instance, enough discretion to raise their own revenues and 
make investment decisions.526 
 
It is important to note that the leitmotiv of decentralisation in the field of natural resources 
resides in developmental reasons. Its supporters generally contend that decentralisation 
contributes to the sustainable management of resources and to poverty alleviation in so far as 
it enhances the effective participation of marginalised groups in decision-making and thus, 
creates an opportunity for good governance practices through the possibility to make rulers 
accountable.527 It increases efficiency, participation and good practices that lead to a better 
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and more sustainable management of natural resources and thus, to poverty alleviation.528 
This means that it is a relevant element in the process toward improving the governance of 
natural resources because it is set to contribute to the achievement of sustainable 
development within African countries. Southgate and Hitzhusen note that in many third 
world countries, the involvement of affected communities in decision-making before 
implementation has not taken place because government officials often operate on a level 
which effectively separates them from these communities, a situation which, they rightly 
conclude, precludes effective dialogue.529 In the field of natural resources, Larsen and Ribot 
note that decentralisation hardly occurs in developing countries, either because of central 
government resistance or because of the failure of local entities receiving powers to be 
accountable for.530 This has been particularly true in respect of the mineral sector where for 
very long most African governments have promoted a high centralised system of governance, 
seeing it as a way to affirm their sovereignty over natural resources.531 In Nigeria, Zambia 
and the DRC the mineral sector is still under considerable control of the central government, 
with the consequence that local communities still struggle to have access to natural resources 
and profits they generate because management is still overcentralised.532 Particularly in 
Nigeria, though the Mineral Act requires the consent of the owner or occupier of the land 
prior to the deliverance of a mineral license, the governor of the province in which the 
mineral rights are to be granted enjoy the discretion to revoke any right of occupancy within 
sixty days of the granting in accordance with section 28 of the Land Use Act, otherwise the 
license can be granted with exclusion of the land concerned.533 In Zambia also, though the 
mineral law requires prior consent of the head of the community, the practice has often failed 
to consider this aspect, the government being the one having final say on the approval of 
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mineral projects.534 In South Africa, despite the high prevalence of private ownership of 
mineral resources,535 the central government exercises a dominant influence in the granting of 
licenses.536 However, there is an exception established in section 104 of the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act (2004) where a community may request and obtain 
from the minister in charge of the mineral sector a preferent right to prospect or mine, 
provided that the land is or is to be registered in its name and that the exercise of the right 
will be used to promote development and social upliftment in the said community. If this 
right is granted, the community will be the one dealing directly with the mineral company. As 
already observed, it is thank to this mechanism that the Bafokeng community has been able to 
establish its control over the exploitation of platinum by Impala in the post-apartheid era. 
However, this mechanism is not satisfactory at all because it may easily establish 
discrimination between affected communities as those unable to prove ownership on the land 
would not enjoy the same right.    
 
This general state of affairs in mineral resource-rich countries easily opens the door to 
conflict between affected communities and their rulers whenever fundamental rights are not 
considered in projects.537 The possibility of such antagonism explains that what was sought in 
the Arusha Declaration was actually the transfer of the over-centralised power from the 
centre to the majority of people at the grass root level, with the intention to foster 
development. Participants to the Declaration observed that the political context of socio-
economic development has been characterised by impediments to the effective participation 
of the overwhelming majority of the people in social, political and economic development, 
with the consequence that the motivation of the African people to contribute their best to the 
development process has been severely constrained and curtailed.538 In this regard, 
                                                             
534 Boocock CN. (2002) 27. However, as already pointed out the commitment to shift its approach was 
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decentralisation was said to be a prerequisite for effective participation, because it creates 
avenues for initiatives and actions from people at the grass root level.539 Nowadays, most 
African countries adhere to the Arusha  Declaration discourse, however the issue of fiscal 
decentralisation remains part of the puzzle where African countries have applied diverse 
solutions, with a great tendency to maintain funds centralised at the national level.540 In DRC, 
Nigeria and Zambia, royalties are paid directly to the central government,541 while in South 
Africa a hybrid system is used with the possibility of part of the money being paid directly to 
the affected community.542 No matter what the explicit arrangements made in the legislation 
of these countries are, the final report of the MMSD has reached the conclusion that weak 
local governance and complex fiscal disbursement mechanisms at the central level makes it 
difficult for affected communities to obtain funds which should serve the realisation of 
development projects.543 For instance, in Nigeria, a study made by the African Network for 
Environment and Economic Justice noted that before 2000, only three to five percent of 
royalties were returned to the affected communities, and that only after this time the portion 
was revised upward to reach 13 percent.544 The same report noticed that, at times there was 
no clear indication of how the money was utilised.545 Because similar situations exist in other 
African countries, including the four ones studied here, there is now a high demand for 
restructurion to provide clear and transparent mechanisms for affected communities to have 
access to funds needed to finance their development.546 Which institutions should intervene 
in the management of royalties and how affected communities’ priorities in development 
should be considered, are the critical challenges facing the issue of restructuring. Mineral 
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542 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002, s. 104. 
543 International Institute for Environment and Development “MMSD final report (2002)” 210, Avaialble 
http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/MMSD-Final-Report_Local-Communities-
Mines.pdf[accessed on 25/2/2013]. 
544 African Network for Environment and Economic Justice Oil of poverty in Niger Delta (Benin City: 
ANEEJ 2004) 14-15. 
545  Id., 14-15. 
546 Williams D.  “Use royalties for communities” (21/2/2013); Available at  
http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2013/02/21/use-royalties-for-communities[accessed on 25/2/2013]; 
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companies prefer to pay a portion of royalities directly to affected communities, as these 
funds are deductible, rather than commit additional funds for social upliftment. However, 
these companies are at times afraid of such direct payments as it is fraught with trouble and 
conflicts that could easily lead to political instability.547 Facedwith such a risk, it is important 
that arrangements made in African countries find the right balance in order to avoid situations 
of conflict, while ensuring that affected communities exercise a certain degree of control over 
what should be their share and enjoy per se necessary resources to fund their development 
projects. Control of royalties by affected communities is very important in any arrangement, 
particularly because of the high propensity to corruption wildly encountered in the mineral 
sector of many African countries. The MMSD final report suggests that “revenue distribution 
should be decided through equitable decision-making structures involving representatives of 
the affected stakeholder groups.”548 Because of the opaque situation existing in the 
management of mineral revenues of many African countries, when the EITI was launched in 
2002, a new rule which obliged its member states to publish what they received from mineral 
corporations was established.549 Recent country reports reveal that Nigeria received 
68,442,328,000.00 US$ for 2011, DRC 875,938,727.00US$ and Zambia 
758,825,945.00US$.550 But South Africa is not yet part of this initiative. What is unfortunate 
about these reports is the fact that they contain no information as to how much was returned 
to affected communities and whether part of these funds were used to support development 
within these communities.   
 
All the above remarks lead one to observe that wherever the central government continues to 
exercise strong control over the decision-making process and ensuring service delivery at 
local level, one cannot speak of decentralisation. Moreover, wherever local representatives 
fail to properly fulfill their mandate to be accountable to local communities, it is quite 
impossible for the decentralisation process to bear a positive outcome because such a 
situation leads undeniably to a rupture between local government and members of the local 
community. Concerning mineral revenues, there is structural work to be done in African 
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resource-rich countries if one really wants to see fiscal revenues from the mineral sector 
benefit development within affected communities. Decentralised structures through which 
affected communities may access benefits generated by the mineral industry must be clearly 
defined and their functioning well regulated. But in any case, despite the imperative of 
community participation and no matter the form of decentralisation that has been adopted by 
a country in respect of mineral resources governance, the central government must see to it 
that the equilibrium is maintained between different provinces or communities in the process 
of development. This is because all areas of a country are not always endowed with the same 
quantity of mineral resources, tension may arise between communities as it has been the case 
in the Niger Delta.551 As aptly underscored by Limpitlaw, while the mineral industry can have 
positive insights into the development processes, there is, however, in the absence of proper 
redistribution, the risk that benefits accrue only to a small portion of the population and 
generate what can be seen as “islands of development”.552 This is why community 
participation as envisaged in this study must not lead to the full autonomy of affected 
communities in the development process. Their development objectives must fit in the 
general development process of the country, and for this the central government must 
necessarily play the role of a referee. The situation is well described in UNDP’s words that 
conclude that:  
 
it is imperative that governments address the challenge of balancing these somewhat 
contradictory realities in a manner that recognizes both the virtue of devolution of 
power, authority and resources to lower levels and the importance of realizing the 
mundane goals of national development as defined by central authorities.553 
 
The implementation of community participation through decentralisation must therefore 
strictly adhere to this necessity to maintain a general balance between local interest and those 
of the whole country. 
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2.4.3 Community participation and accountability  
 
In democratic systems, when people choose their rulers, it is with the hope that they will act 
and work towards settling issues and challenges faced within the society. This not only 
implies that they must work for their people’s interests, but also that they must demonstrate 
competency and be ready to justify their decisions. Thus, accountability should be understood 
as the process through which individuals or institutions holding power take responsibility and 
provide explanations for their decisions and actions, with positive or negative sanctions being 
attached depending on what the consecutive resultsare.554 Community participation serves 
accountability because it puts people that are affected by decisions in a position to control 
whether decisions taken by their rulers are consistent with their fundamental rights and best 
interests. Accountability is actually viewed as part of government responsiveness because it 
supposes that some individuals have acted on the behalf of some others and that these latter 
want to check whether things have been done correctly.555 It is the tool that the people use to 
assess the responsiveness and effectiveness of their government. According to Arat, the 
extent to which a government is responsive and effective to meet popular demands is likely to 
either reinforce or weaken its legitimacy.556 The more rulers implement policies and decisions 
that respect and secure fundamental rights and interests of people, the more they sustain their 
legitimacy. On the contrary, such legitimacy is threatened and may even totally disappear 
despite the fact that individuals holding power emerged from elections.557 In as much as 
community participation is a bottom-up exercise, one should notice that it implicitly has a 
connection with the notion of social accountability which includes the idea of social 
mobilisation in order to influence government priorities in public matters having a direct 
influence on socio-economic conditions.558 
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The relationship between community participation and accountability is more perceivable in a 
system of indirect democracy because in a direct system, people are normally not supposed to 
be represented and therefore there should be no one to make accountable. But this does not 
mean that accountability cannot co-exist with a participatory system. Indeed, in a system 
where representative and participative arrangements are both made and balanced, affected 
communities can make their representatives accountable in the follow up process of 
resolutions they have adopted directly themselves in connection with a mineral project.559 
Practically, it is easier to make rulers accountable in local government rather than in central 
government, because the more distant the decision-making process is removed from affected 
communities, the more difficulties are experienced in exercising control.560 This is where 
democracy and decentralisation support community participation as they take decision-
making closer to affected communities through the possibility of having a local government 
that is directly accountable to them. In this connection, Smoke asserts that the ability of 
influencing public matters that affect them directly, empowers people and gives them a real 
sense of control and autonomy.561 But as mentioned previously, this also requires building the 
capacity of these communities to such extent that they should be able to use existing tools 
through which they may make their rulers accountable.562 
 
It is also important to note that in a decentralised system, accountability has two different 
dimensions. Members of the local government should be held accountable to members of 
local communities under their jurisdiction,563 and local governments need cooperation (for 
instance, expertise, information, financial support and approval of projects...) from the centre 
                                                             
559 Blair H. “Participation and accountability at the periphery: Democratic local governance in six countries” 
(2000) 28 (1) World Development 27. 
560 See the case previously underlined of high centralisation in most African countries after the 1960s of 
independence. 
561 Smoke P. “Decentralisation in Africa: Goals, dimensions, myths and challenges” (2003) (23) Public 
Administration and Development 9. 
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in order to achieve major objectives defined at local level.564 Without the relay of the centre, 
local authorities will experience much difficulty in easily and quickly achieving their 
assignments. This is what is known in the South African decentralisation system as the 
principle of “cooperative governance”.565 
 
It is also questionable whether the concept of accountability may be extended to the 
relationship between affected communities and other stakeholders including mineral 
companies first and then, international partners like, for instance, the World Bank and the 
African Development Bank. In this regard, Gaventa contends that through accountability, not 
only will the government shift from clientelistic practices to more transparency and 
inclusiveness, but companies are also likely to behave more responsibly in terms of their 
social, environment and ethical obligations.566 If one opts for an affirmative answer, such a 
position would implicitly suggest the view that provisions of the African Charter may notonly 
enjoy a vertical application, but a horizontal one as well. Since it is a fundamental rights-
based approach that is promoted here, it would imply that not only the state, but other 
stakeholders as well must be made accountable in respect of obligations laid down in the 
African Charter. It seems accurate to underline at this stage, the fact that in any case, it is the 
state or governments responsibility that matters first, because all other stakeholders, mineral 
companies as well as international partners, cannot perform within the country without 
permission from government officials. Moreover, because one of the philosophical 
foundations upon which the idea of accountability rests, is the belief that as people are the 
ones who choose their rulers and hand over  power to them in deciding and acting on their 
behalf, as a counterpart, they must also be entitled to make them accountable. Thus, because 
the relationship between other stakeholders and the people is not the result of such a similar 
process, it would be inaccurate to establish the foundation of their accountability on the same 
level ground as of the state. If they are to be made accountable, such accountability should be 
put in a secondary position because it is government officials from whom the people have to 
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directly demand accountability. But this remark does not de facto imply that they should be 
less responsible in case damages. 
 
Therefore, the priority in dealing with the issue should in practice be given to the search of 
mechanisms through which members of affected communities may hold their rulers 
accountable in the mineral sector. Several mechanisms may be established to make office-
bearers accountable. These mechanisms vary according to arrangements made in each 
country. Therefore, depending on different countries, one may find specific institutions set up 
to conduct audits (see for instance, the Cour de comptes and Chambres regionales de comptes 
in African countries that have inherited from the French system);567 or the existence of a 
provincial Assembly with representatives that may hold members of the executive 
accountable for their acts and decisions; or an established Ombudsman who investigates 
people’s complaints regarding bad governance practices reflected in decisions and actions of 
rulers,568 or quasi-judicial or judicial bodies qualified to exercise judicial review of 
governmental decisions and actions.569 
 
Among all these mechanisms of accountability, it is obvious that this study is more interested 
in quasi-judicial and judicial means, because one should remember that the emphasis here is 
more on the fundamental rights-based approach grounded on the African Charter. By relying 
on these legal tools, affected communities should be able to force their rulers to provide 
responses to their concerns.570 The perspective is to find out how the African Charter 
enforcement machineries may help affected communities to make their rulers accountable 
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regarding mineral projects. The African Commission and the African Court should be able to 
function as institutions at which affected communities may resort to influence and exercise a 
certain level of control over rulers in the mineral sector through the enforcement of their 
fundamental rights; otherwise they will appear useless in the search for more effectiveness in 
community participation. Their potential to fulfill this function is assessed in the next chapter. 
 
2.4.4 Community participation and governance 
 
The concept of governance has enjoyed multiple approaches, generally influenced by the 
perspectives under which it has been analysed.571 Turton and Hattingh observe that 
governance as a concept is complex because several factors influence its definition and its 
understanding.572 These scholars define governance as: 
 
A process of informed decision-making that enables trade-offs between competing 
users of a given resource so as to balance protection with beneficial use in such a way 
as to mitigate conflict, enhance equity, ensure sustainability and hold officials 
accountable.573 
 
Another definition that is widely known is that of the World Bank, according to which 
Governance is“the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's 
economic and social resources for development.”574 
 
Reflecting on the subject, Börzel and Risse explain that governance refers to both structure 
and process.575 In terms of structure, governance relates to the range of institutions and actors 
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within the state who exercise the power to decide.576 As a process, the notion refers to all 
steps taken and how they are coordinated to produce decisions on matters of public interest.577 
When making a comparison between Turton and Hattingh’s definition and the one of the 
World Bank, though structural and procedural aspects are found in both, one can easily detect 
that the previous one focuses more on the way structures or actors involved in governance 
must function, emphasising for instance the imperative of accountability, while the second 
one concentrates more on what the outcome of the process, namely the development should 
be. Both approaches are complementary because successful results cannot be expected from 
the process if structures and actors do not move in an appropriate manner. Thus, from both 
the manner in which established structures function and what the outcome of the process is, 
governance can be assessed as good or bad. In Africa, because of the long experience of bad 
governance, governance has now come to be associated with “good governance” in the AU 
standard discourse. NEPAD which seeks to achieve high standards of governance describes 
the concept as being made up of good political governance, good economic governance and 
good corporate governance.578 The African Charter on Democracy also reiterates the same 
approach.579 The three componentrs are globally seen as pillars of good governance.580 
 
Initially, discussions on good governance enhanced its importance across the continent from 
the late1980’s due to the fact that the concept started to be emphasised in the conditionality 
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developed by the IMF and the World Bank.581 At present, it can be assumed that through the 
NEPAD, African countries have developed their own perception of what good governance 
should be, that it cannot be contended that it is an externally imposed concept.582 Thus, 
following the NEPAD approach, good governance: 
involves the creation of the conducive socio-economic, legal, political and institutional 
environments to foster the state’s material strength; to free people from the evils of 
abject poverty, preventable diseases, ignorance, squalor and idleness; to provide the 
citizenry with the voice to choose those who rule over them, to hold those in power 
accountable when they do not work for the greater good, to demand transparent 
structures and to fight down socially regressive policies, and to treat every citizen equal 
without regard to gender, race, ethnicity, religion, and creed.583 
 
What is important to note in this definition is that good governance is about creating 
appropriate conditions for the delivery of expected results.584 This implies that governance 
becomes useful only in as much as it produces positive and effective results and that 
structural arrangements must be preset for such a purpose. All arrangements and actions that 
could be made in any system of governance would be meaningful only in so much as they can 
produce high quality results. This latter quality is in practice determined by the relation with 
development objectives. This is what made the World Bank further assert that “good 
governance is synonymous with sound development management.”585  
 
There cannot be good governance where development objectives are not given priority when 
dealing with public matters. It is in this respect that, community participation can be 
interpreted as one element that creates conductive conditions for affected community to 
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exercise an influence on mineral resources governance towards the achievement of their 
sustainable development.586  
 
Obviously in the context of a people-centered development, good governance should lead to 
the participation of the people in the decision-making process because their involvement is 
regarded as a key factor that significantly contributes to development.587 This people-centered 
model matches the NEPAD’s vision which promotes a triangular relation between democratic 
governance, peace/security and development as the way forward for Africa.588 Since 
community participation is part of a model of governance that is democratic, a successful 
participation of affected communities reduces the risk of conflict between stakeholders 
throughout the realisation of the mineral project and other related development projects. This 
state of affairs guarantees some measure of peace and security in the mineral-led development 
process which is somehow a part of the sustainable development process of the whole 
country.  Moreover because the main objective is to achieve development goals, the claim for 
affected communities’ involvement is in line with the global African vision which seeks to 
improve governance under the NEPAD. The APRM which was established as a mechanism 
of self-assessment by African countries requires that countries indicate what arrangements are 
made to facilitate people’s participation in all forms and levels of governance.589 
Unfortunately, country’s reports have failed so far to mention the state of community 
participation in the mineral sector.590  
 
The African Charter on democracy also emphasises participation as a core ingredient of good 
governance, requesting state parties to promote citizen participation in the development 
processthrough appropriate structures.591 The UNDP goes along with this and contends that 
“good governance ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad 
consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in 
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decision-making over the allocation of development resources.”592 This particular element 
can be deduced from Turton and Hattingh’s definition when they referred to “a trade-off 
between competing users of resources”. Since affected communities are the ones whose 
livelihood is dependent on natural resources found within the area they live, it would be 
misleading trying to make “a trade-off” without their inclusion in the process of governance. 
Knight, Chigudu and Tandon rightly observe that in a democratic regime, good governance 
actually rests on three key principles that put the people at the centre of the system: People 
must be the ones to say what government should be doing, what they should be doing 
themselves and what other organisations should be doing to contribute to the improvement 
within the society.593  
 
Unfortunately, despite the praises of the democratic virtues in constitutions, these three 
principles are far from being applied in most African countries, especially in respect of the 
mineral sector.594 Bad governance practices are still recorded more than the good ones in 
many African countries. Therefore there is a permanent need to improve the system and uplift 
good governance on a daily basis through effective democratic practices. If the fundamental 
rights-based approach as embraced in this study can make community participation in the 
mineral sector operate at these three levels, the expectation to improve the system and finally 
establish good governance can be high. 
 
Community participation can improve governance of mineral resources at local level because 
it is the channel through which affected communities double-check whether standards and 
goals defined for their communities are respected before the commencement, during the 
execution and at the closure of the mineral project.595 With regard to financial aspects, 
because mineral resources should allegedly provide the government with necessary funds to 
achieve development goals, community participation would enable affected communities to 
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access information on  royalties, what the share to be paid back to communities is, and in 
which priority order the amount received is to be allocated to various existing development 
projects. This search for transparency in financial management is one of the key objectives in 
the NEPAD’s approach to good economic governance.596 Since top-down governance has 
been associated with inertia, rent-seeking behaviour, corruption and unequal distribution of 
revenues, participation which lays at the foundation of the bottom-up management system is 
regarded today as a key element that makes governance better.597  Therefore, institutions 
should exist and function properly to allow affected communities to exercise a degree of 
control on decisions and actions envisaged by other stakeholders. 
 
Affected communities should, together with other stakeholders, take responsibility for the 
achievement of development objectives. Because they have often been marginalised in the 
decision-making process, their participation needs to be guaranteed through a fundamental 
rights-based approach to such extent that it will obliged other stakeholders not only to consult 
them, but also to consider their positions in the decision-making process. This does not mean 
that a people-centered model of governance should promote people participation at the 
expense of other stakeholders’ rights and interests. Stakeholders’ relationship must be 
characterised by mutual good faith. All of them, including the people affected, must be able 
to bring valuable inputs to the table in other to find a balance in the development process.  
 
This is the type of governance that Ballard and Banks qualify in the mineral sector as a 
“three-legged or triad stakeholder model.”598 But, though affected communitiesshould leave 
space for other stakeholders in decision-making, they must be the ones having a greater 
influence on the outcome, because as mentioned previously, in democratic governance, 
people must be the ones to say what government should be doing, what they should be doing 
themselves and what other organisations should be doing to contribute to the improvement 
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within the society.599 Such involvement of people should lead to more transparency, 
accountability and respect for the rule of law, which are ingredients of good governance.600 
2.4.5 Community participation and sustainable development 
Development is sometimes associated with mere economic progress or growth.601 But as 
aptly underlined by Brookfield, this approach is not correct.602 Whenever economic growth 
does not bring positive impacts and changes for the people, it becomes meaningless to them. 
Several approaches to development can be taken but an in-depth discussion here would be 
long and the study would lose its focus. In an attempt to summarise every tendency, Sumner 
and Tribe observe that the concept can be approached in three ways, namely “development as 
a long-term process of structural societal change or transformation”, “development as a short- 
to medium-term outcome of desirable targets”  and “‘development’ as a dominant ‘discourse’ 
of Western modernity”.603 These scholars share the view that different existing approaches on 
development should at least fit within one of these categories, though they warn that 
overlapping schools of thought may exist.604 They observe that dimensions attached to the 
concept are extremely diverse, to such an extent that it is often regarded from the following 
perspective: economic, political, legal and institutional structures, technologic, 
environmental, religious, artistically or cultural.605 
 
No matter the different perspectives from which development may be approached, a 
genuine definition will always include two elements. On the one hand, since development 
supposes that a process is taking place, it will always imply that people involved in that 
process shift from a given socio-economic situation to another one. On the other hand, 
development always brings a positive impact. No one can ever speak of development 
where there is no positive change or transformation. Wherever development takes place, 
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the current situation must be much better than the previous one. However, divergences 
have appeared in practice in the way scholars and societal actors apprehend and interpret 
these two elements. This is why four decades ago Brookfield could already conclude that 
“development is what it has come to mean in the hand of numerous writers of very 
different persuasion.”606 
 
Sustainable development is, at least at a rhetorical level, the standard of development 
accepted worldwide at present. Auty and Brown observe that it has become the guiding 
principle of institutions with a focus on development issues.607 Although the origin of the 
concept is not unequivocally established,608 the first definition of the concept was given in 
1987 by the UN World Commission on Environment and Development led by Bundtland. 
The consensus among the members of the international community to opt for sustainable 
development as the standardwas officially reached at the UN Conference on Environment 
and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, where up to 178 government 
representatives adopted what is known as the Rio Declaration. In the same vein, African 
countries have made an important step by adopting the Declaration on the NEPADin 2001 
which identified the challenges to sustainable development specific to the African context 
and which established the principles that governments should follow in order to reduce and 
eradicate poverty. But, NEPAD did not define the concept of sustainable development. In 
2002, South Africa hosted the world summit on sustainable development in Johannesburg 
where commitment to achieve sustainable development goals was again expressed by 
government representatives. 
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The definition given by the Bundtland Commission regards sustainable development as “a 
development which meets the need of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.”609 While Ukpore observes that the Brundtland 
Commission’s definition is the most commonly accepted, Arko-Cobbah contends that the 
concept has been much used in international circles without clearing up the numerous 
ambiguities attached to this term.610 The difficulty of seizing the in-depth substance of this 
concept is shared by another scholar who draws the conclusion that “sustainable 
development has proved hard to define and even harder to put into practice.”611 
Thus far, the main emphasis has been put on the sustainability that must characterise 
development. This has led to the development of two major ideas in the literature. Scholars 
like Becchi, Mathis and Sabour have pointed out that a true development must be 
measured through different generations.612 This view stands as the result of the above-
mentioned definition given by the Brundtland Commission which seeks to secure 
opportunities of development for future generations as well. The widely accepted 
interpretation of the concept regardssustainable development as socio-economic 
development mixed with environmental concerns is followed.613 But in the historical 
evolution of the development concept, the adoption of “sustainable” development as the 
new standard has raised the question of its compatibility with the economic growth theory 
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which has been long advocated as the path to reach development.614 On this issue, views 
have been also divergent. For instance, a group of academics known as the club of Rome 
put forward the limits of the growth theory, predicting disaster for humankind unless 
natural resource-depleting economic and technologicalprogress were abandoned, while an 
opposing view by a scholar like Gosh contends that economic growth is indeed part of 
sustainable development.615Another view is the one of Ortiz that finds both concepts as 
incompatible.616All these divergent opinions reveal one reality which is that economic 
growth and sustainable development may possibly clash. This is the case when economic 
growth systematicallydamages the environment or ecological system.617 
 
Economic growth should be pursued, but not at the cost of sustainability. This is why in its 
report entitled “Our common future”, the Brundtland Commission agreed that “both 
concepts may be compatible, provided that the content of economic growth reflects the 
broad principles of sustainability and non-exploitation of others”.618Classically, this means 
that in the context of sustainable development, economic growth is relevant only in so far as 
it takes into consideration the protection of  the environment which is relevant not only for 
present but also future generations. While Ortiz contends that economic growth is not 
relevant for sustainable development in developed countries,619 at least this is not the case 
for African countries that are still in a developing process. Thus, in the African context, 
economic growth remains an important element in the race to achieve sustainable 
development, but not at any cost. As the mineral industry plays an important role in 
achieving economic growth, it is necessary that its operations adhere to a strict respect for 
sustainability. It would be wrong to conceive that mineral operations may effectively lead to 
true development in Africa if they areaccompanied by fundamental rights abuses. As already 
mentioned previously, inequalities and fundamental rights violations are the main factors 
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that have led to the failure of development efforts within the Chinese society to such extent 
that the gap between rich and poor continues to be pronounced.  
 
Sustainability requires that economic growth takes place with due respect for environmental 
rights.620 However, in terms of human rights, it seems that the understanding of the concept 
needs to be broadened. Indeed, as Afoaku aptly observes, sustainable development is a 
multifaceted concept which should be approached in a holistic way rather than in terms of a 
model that is simplistic and reductionist.621 The development model must be people-
centered622 and encompass all aspects relevant to improving human well-being in a 
sustainable manner. As a result, it is not correct to limit the discussion on sustainability 
exclusively to environmental rights considerations. Such an approach would stand in stark 
contradiction to the theory of interdependence between fundamentalrights.623 Beside the 
environmental rights, there are other fundamental rights that are directly relevant to 
sustainable development. For instance, how would African peoples be aware of the 
environmental impact of any project that is about take place if they cannot use their 
fundamental right of access to public information?624 Arko-Cobbah held that the 
“importance of information is being accepted more and more as a critical component in 
being able to understand the integration of the environment and development. Information is 
further needed to implement and monitor sustainable development…”625 On the other hand, 
damages caused to the environment infringe on other fundamental rights, like for instance, 
the rights to health and life. In some African countries, communities living in the vicinity of 
areas exploited for mineral and oil, experience serious degradation of the environment, 
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including water pollution and high levels of toxicity that pose deadly threats to the right to 
life and to health.626 
 
From all the above discussion,  sustainable development  is definedin this study as a 
multifaceted development that meets the socio-economic needs of the present, without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, with due and 
permanent respect given to fundamental rights at all stages of the development process. This 
broadened definition implies that sustainable development is to be analysed here as a 
fundamental right for the present generation as well as future ones, but also that the analysis 
should include all other fundamental rights directly relevant to the sustainability in the 
development process of affected communities.  
 
In connection with the subject matter of this study, it is interesting to note that at the UN 
Conference held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, participation in the decision-making process of 
those affected by decisions involving environmental and other social concerns was said to be 
a fundamental precondition for the achievement of sustainable development.627 If 
community participation has to improve governance of mineral resources, such 
improvement must be assessed in respect of the extent to which development objectives are 
achieved. These objectives should not to be considered only with a short term perspective, 
but more with a long one because sustainability requires that the needs of present 
generations must be met, without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs. In this regard, two critical questions are raised in the literature review. The 
first one concerns whether the exploitation of mineral resources indeed leads to 
development. The second one draws attention to the relationship between democracy and 
development. Because community participation is the result of democratisation within the 
mineral sector, the debate as to whether or not democratic governance is relevant to achieve 
the development process becomes relevant. 
 
                                                             
626 See for instance, the Ogoni case, supra note 104, and the case of the Sukuma community in Tanzania in 
Kitula (2006) 409-410. 
627 S. 2 of Chap. 23 of the Agenda 21/U N Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janerio 3-
14 June 1992) UN Doc.A/CONF.151/26, Resolution 1, Annex II. 
145 
 
On the first issue, views diverge to the extent that while some agree on the positive insights 
of mineral resources in the development process, others consider that abundance of these 
resources is a curse for resource-rich countries. The conventional wisdom has generally been 
that mineral resources endowment constitutes a great opportunity for development as it is 
likely to provide the government with considerable fiscal revenues through taxes and 
royalties and leads to the construction of necessary infrastructure and the transfer of 
technologies and skills.628 But far from being unanimous, this thesis has been rejected by a 
school of thought which considers that vast mineral resource endowment is a curse for 
resource-rich countries characterised by negative impacts on the development process such 
as internal conflicts, political instability and fundamental rights abuses.629 Auty, one of the 
proponents of this school, perceives the curse at two different levels when contending that: 
 
not only may resource-rich countries fail to benefit from a favourable 
endowment, they may actually perform worse than less well endowed 
countries.630 
 
This assertion firstly means that looking at individual resource-rich countries, they have not 
significantly benefited from the abundance of resources they possess, and secondly that 
compared to countries that are poorly endowed with resources, their growth tends to be 
slower than the latter.631 Taking the example of Korea and Japan that are not richly endowed 
with mineral resources, Sachs  and Warner make the following observations: 
 
 Even if natural resources are no longer a decisive advantage to economic growth, it is 
surely surprising that they might pose an actual disadvantage. Is there a curse to easy 
riches?632 
 
Several attempts to understand and explain this negative relationship between resource 
abundance and slow economic growth have been formulated by scholars supporting this 
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thesis. Facts like poor investment in human capital and education,633 absence of appropriate 
and stable institutions,634 damage caused to the environment,635 rent-seeking behaviour636 
are some of the causes identified. But when summed up, all these different factors take one 
back to the issue of governance. This is because all of them are in fact the result of a weak 
and bad system of governance.637 As pointed out at the outset of this study, the mere 
endowment of resources does not in itself unconditionally amount or lead to the 
improvement of socio-economic conditions of the poor.  
 
Depending on how the sector is governed, the exploitation of mineral resources can either 
advance or hinder the achievement of sustainable development objectives. After reviewing 
51 mineral resources-rich countries, a study made by the World Bank has come to the 
conclusion that good performance depends mostly on institutional stability, good 
management of revenues and an appropriate regulation of the mineral sector.638 Good 
governance practices forcefully represent the catalyser through which the exploitation of 
mineral resources by resource-rich countries should contribute significantly to the 
achievement of development.639 Unfortunately, wherever bad governance practices 
dominate, there is no middle path, the mineral industry will have more adverse effects than 
positive ones.  
 
What generally matters in most developing countries is their high reliance on mineral 
resources exports to boost their economy. In such a context, rulers are likely to seek more 
profits for themselves and feel more comfortable to govern in a sphere where corruption is 
in full swing.640 Moreover, they tend to promote a monolithic approach to development, 
with the consequence that the mineral sector is given more consideration and priority at the 
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cost of all others. For instance, this is what explains why many African countries have a 
slightly smaller weighted agricultural export share than mineral product exports.641Actually, 
because of the exhaustible nature of mineral resources and because of environmental costs, 
the mineral industry would do better to contribute to development in the context of a 
diversified economy.642 Resource-rich countries must be able to reinvest funds collected 
from the mineral sector in other sectors or industries that bear relatively stable and long-term 
benefits to the economy.  
 
Therefore, if the curse thesis is to be embraced, such a curse must be perceived at the level 
of (bad) governance and not the mere endowment of resources. In this connection, 
community participation indeed stands as a relevant ingredient in the sustainable 
development process because the involvement of citizens in decision-making is aimed at 
improving the quality of governance thanks to prior consent, control and accountability, all 
serving to safeguard affected communities against anti-development practices.  
 
Through community participation, affected communities should be able to advocate a 
mineral exploitation that fits within the development process that is integrative rather than 
exclusive and destructive of other relevant sectors such as farming and agriculture. 
Communities should be able to fight rent-seeking behaviour, mismanagement of funds, 
corruption and environmental destruction by relying on legal mechanisms available to them 
in order to uplift and protect their fundamental rights and interests. 
 
As to the relationship between democracy and development, the modernisation school 
actually contends that development is a precondition for the establishment of democracy. 
This implies that as a democratic exercise, participation can be successful only where a 
certain level of development already exists. Among precursors of the modernisation theory, 
one should identify Smith and Marx. Despite the fact that the former belonged to the 
capitalist school of thought and the latter to the communist one, they have come to the same 
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conclusion that modernisation or technological innovation is the basis of human progress.643 
More explicit on the issue, Marx considered that the orientation of values shared by people 
shift in connection with socio-economic development, contending that ideology changes as 
the socio-economic base changed.644  
 
Building on the foundation laid down by the modernisation theory precursors, Lipset in 
1959 described the relationship between development and democracy through the following 
assertion: “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 
democracy”.645 Since then, this statement has become famous and stands as the motto 
summarising the conventional wisdom of the modernisation theory.646 However this theory 
could not escape criticism and re-examination.  
 
One of the prominent critics in recent years emanated from the work of Przeworski and 
Limongi who started by confronting two hypotheses, seeking to find out whether 
development engenders democracy or whether it just sustains it.647 They qualify the first 
hypothesis as “endogenous”, while they consider the second one as “exogenous”.648 After 
analysing the situation in up to 135 countries between 1950-1990 they come up with the 
conclusion that, it is the exogenous version that is true, while the endogenous is wrong.649 
This latter conclusion that is also shared by many other scholars650 is accurate in as much as 
there is no “formal” requirement in terms of development for the establishment of 
democratic principles within a society. As contended by Mangu, democracy has been 
established in some countries found in developing regions in a social context of economic 
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and social hardship.651 This assertion is supported by other Africanist scholars like Nzongola 
who has aptly observed that in the African social context, the struggle for democracy is 
aimed at radically changing the poor conditions under which the people lived, by improving 
their material and social welfare. Zeleza observed that, with the light of the autocratic 
character of the structural adjustment programme and its rejection by the popular mass of 
Africans, the fight for democracy in Africa was the result of the people’s cumulative 
demand not only for political change, but also economic change, claiming new conditions of 
social life.652  
 
Nowadays, it would be misleading to support the modernisation theory that development 
stands as a precondition for the establishment of democracy. This is because such a theory 
raises a question that has not been convincingly answered by proponents of this school: 
What would then be the type of governance under which development would be generated if 
democracy is to follow? Even Smith and Marx who agree on the role played by 
modernisation in the societal changes, have failed to agree on what is the best pathway to 
modernity.653  
 
Actually, the modernisation theory can only stand in the context of the development process 
that lacks a human dignity dimension. This is because where people are at the centre of the 
development, as envisaged in this study, the development process must necessarily include 
the respect of fundamental rights. Contrary to an authoritarian system, fundamental rights 
are better protected, or rather less abused in democratic regimes.654 This is what probably 
makes Anyang Nyong’o reverse the modernisation theory and contend that democracy is a 
sinequa non condition for development.655The same position is the one shared in the 
NEPAD where African leaders asserted that development is impossible in the absence of 
true democracy, respect for fundamental rights, peace and good governance.656 
                                                             
651 Mangu (2002) 192. 
652Zeleza (2004) 5. 
653Inglehart and Welzel (2005) 16. 
654 Baumgartner SP. “Does Access to Justice Improve Countries’ Compliance with Human Rights norms? An 
empirical study” (2011) 44 Cornell International Law Journal 445, 448. 
655Anyang Nyong’o (1988) 83-87. 
656 NEPAD (2003) para. 79. 
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Without fully embracing either this latter view or the modernisation theory, this study stands 
on the view that though there is a kind of interdependence between both factors with regard 
to sustainability; if development does not precondition the establishment of democracy, at 
least this latter is likely to be consolidated in countries where some levels of development 
have already been achieved. At the same time, democracy is not the perfect, but the suitable 
system of governance under which sustainable development is to be achieved, because this 
latter type of development puts people, individually or collectively, at the centre of the 
process, requiring respect for their fundamental rights such as environmental and socio-
economic rights. This is why one should agree with Adejumobi that: “development cannot 
be sustainable except when predicated on popular participation and democratic values”.657 
 
Therefore, democracy as a core value that sustains the community participation, makes this 
latter a relevant element of the sustainable development process. Affected communities 
should democratically participate in the governance of mineral resources to allow them to 
achieve development objectives relevant to their livelihood. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter has demonstrated that “community participation” has 
become the key element concerning every major issue related to the achievement of 
sustainable development at local level. As such the way it is conceived and its interactions 
with other concepts that play a relevant role in the development process, have to be well 
adjusted in order to reach sustainable results in the governance of mineral resources. In this 
regard, among different perspectives, the fundamental rights-based approach to community 
participation appears to be the best theoretical approach to bring effectiveness in the search 
to involve affected communities in the decision-making process. This is simply because it 
makes participation binding and not optional and as such offer the opportunity to affected 
communities to enforce their views and secure their best interests at all stages of the mineral 
project. As demonstrated, this approach to community participation is only feasible where 
the governance is democratic, decentralised, accompanied with mechanisms to make rulers 
                                                             
657Adejumobi (2008) 97. 
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accountable and where sustainable development is the standard contemplated.With the high 
centralisation of the sector still prevailing in many African resource-rich countries and the 
failure to properly consider the prior consent of affected communities, even where 
established by mineral law, the next chapter will discuss the potential of the African Charter 
system to support the fundamental rights based-approach and make it applicable to the 
African mineral sector.    
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Chapter three: Community participation and the normative content of the African 
Charter 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As stressed earlier, the fundamental rights-based approach has two normative dimensions: 
community participation as a fundamental right and community participation as a channel to 
enforce other fundamental rights relevant to good governance and sustainable development 
in the mineral sector. Therefore, this chapter seeks to scrutinise and analyse relevant 
fundamental rights laid out in the African Charter on which affected communities may 
practically rely on to make their participation effective and secure their fundamental rights in 
a mineral project. One critical issue in this regard is the question as to what should be the 
reach of fundamental rights entrenched in the African Charter: Should they be limited to the 
sole vertical application or rather extended to the horizontal application?  
3.2 Review of the normative aspects 
 
3.2.1 The first dimension: Community participation as a fundamental right 
 
The analysis here focuses on the provisions of the African Charter that are decisive to 
implement community participation in mineral governance. In this regard, provisions that have 
been identified include the fundamental right to freely participate in the government in article 
13, the rights to receive information, to express and disseminate one’s opinions in article 9 and 
the right to have one’s cause heard in article 7. 
 
3.2.1.1 The right to freely participate in the government  
 
3.2.1.1.1 Scope of the right 
 
Article 13 (1) of the African Charter provides that: 
 
 Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his country, 
either directly or through freely chosen representatives in accordance with the 
provisions of the law. 
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It was inspired by article 21 of UNDHR, which provides that “Everyone has the right to take 
part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives”. It 
attempts to provide understanding of how participation should be conceived in a democratic 
system. As underlined in chapter two, though participation was acknowledged as a necessity, 
most approaches developed thus far have been simplistic in that they only define the concept 
according to the need to have members of a community involved in the decision-making 
process, without underling the binding dimension that this exercise should take on. As a 
result, there has often been great reluctance to consider participation as a legal obligation 
(see for instance, the World Bank’s radical rejection of the “veto”).658 The soft approach 
implemented so far is actually paradoxical to the perspective embodied in international 
instruments on fundamental rights, of which article 13 (1) of the African Charter is also part 
of.659 Because “participation” is formulated there as a fundamental right, it stands as a legal 
obligation and its implementation is therefore compulsory and not optional for other 
stakeholders. Practically, the implication is that holders of the right must get involved in the 
decision-making process and enjoy a certain level of power that would help them to 
advocate and secure their best interests. In fact, the fundamental right in article 13 makes 
democracy alive in so much as people are offered the possibility to influence the outcome of 
the decision-making process. In democracy, the fundamental right to participate in 
government serves as a tool that allows people to be included in matters of public 
importance with the view to prevent any outcome that may threaten their best interests.660 
But what is the real reach of this fundamental right in terms of its holders? Are affected 
communities also entitled to claim the fundamental right to participation as entrenched in 
article 13 of the Charter? 
 
The African Charter consists of both individual and collective rights. It is in the latter 
category that people’s rights that apply to groups and communities are found. Concerning 
the fundamental right to participate in the government in article 13 (1), it has been 
formulated as an individual right. This provision starts by the expression “every citizen”. 
                                                             
658 The World Bank Group management response (2003) 7. 
659 See for instance art. 21 of the UNDHR, art. 25 of the ICCPR, art. 3 of the Protocol 1 to the European 
Convention on Human rights that all entrenches participation as a “fundamental right”. 
660Horowitz DL. “Democracy in divided societies” (1993) 4 (4) 4 Journal of Democracy 18. 
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This formulation has the double implication that, on the one hand, it is a right that rights 
originally designed for individuals rather than a group, and, on the other hand, a right that is 
solely reserved to individuals who are citizens of the country where participation to the 
government is envisaged. Therefore, the question that may be asked is: because the 
fundamental right to participate in government has an individual dimension, can an affected 
community which is obviously a group, rely on it?  
 
As will be demonstrated in the review of the jurisprudence of the the African Commission, 
this fundamental right has been granted an extensive interpretation to such an extent that 
affected communities are entitled to claim their effective participation in the governance of 
mineral resources. But, the practical question is, how? 
 
Before reviewing the jurisprudence and answering this question, it is worthy to note with 
Ougeurgouz that the reach of this fundamental right includes not only direct democracy, but 
also indirect and semi-democracies.661 This means that the right can be exercised directly or 
indirectly or even in a mixed system, depending on arrangements made within a particular 
society. But as already mentioned in the previous chapter, this study advocates the middle 
path (semi-democratic participation) as the best model that can fit within the current 
situation of affected communities in the African mineral sector.  
 
3.2.1.1.2 Interpretation of the right in the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission  
 
The right to participate in the government has been mentioned in many cases submitted 
before the African Commission. But in most cases, it has been in connection with matters 
concerning individuals rather than a group or community.662 Moreover, this right has been 
discussed more in its dimension as a fundamental right to vote and stand for election. This is 
probably what led Bojosi to observe that formally, states are required to do no more beyond 
                                                             
661 Ouguergouz (2003) 176. 
662  African Commission Communication 246/02 Mouvement Ivoirian des droits humains (MIDH) v. Cote 
d'Ivoire paras. (2008) 78-79; African Commission Communication 251/02 Lawyers of Human Rights v. 
Swaziland (2005) (Hereinafter the Lawyers of Human Rights case) para. 62; African Commission 
Communication 97/93014 (2000) John K. Modise v. Botswana para (Hereinafter the John K. Modise case)  
para. 97; African Commission Communication147/95-149/96 Sir Dawda K. Jawara v. Gambia (The) 
(2000) (Hereinafter the Dawda case) para. 67. 
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the facilitation of free, fair and periodic elections.663 This view would be accurate only in so 
far as the fundamental right to participate in the government can be reduced to the ability to 
vote and stand for election. But because in practice this fundamental right should go beyond 
these exercises, such an interpretation appears limited. For instance in a context of direct 
democracy, people do not need to choose representatives to decide on their behalf. In this 
case, the need for election disappears, while the one for participation still subsists. 
Furthermore, even where representatives are to be chosen, the fundamental right to 
participate in the government should imply also the possibility for the people to check on 
decisions made on their behalf after elections and make their representatives accountable at 
any stage of governance. The argument here can be deduced from the similitude made by the 
African Commission between the concept of “government” and “governance” in Lawyers of 
Human Rights v. Sudan.664 Interpreting article 13 (1), the African Commission observed that 
“political parties are one means through which citizens can “participate in governance”.665 
Thus, if “participate in the government” equals “participate in governance”, it becomes clear 
that this fundamental right must enjoy an extensive interpretation because, as defined in this 
study, governance is not only concerned with structural aspects that include institutions and 
actors who exercise the power to decide within the state, but also with all steps taken and 
how they are coordinated to produce decisions on matters of public interest.666 Therefore, to 
reduce the understanding of the fundamental right to participate in the government simply to 
a right available only during an electoral process would be prejudicial to citizens as it will 
prevent them from getting involved in decision-making on non-electoral matters. They will 
not enjoy full packages of opportunities that democratic governance is supposed to offer in 
terms of participation.  
 
Along the same line, Bojosi rightly observes that the restrictive interpretation of this 
fundamental right bears the dangers that some ethnic subgroups may not be adequately 
                                                             
663 Bojosi KN. “Towards an effective right of indigenous minorities to political participation in Africa” in (ed.) 
Dresso S. Perspectives on the rights of minorities and indigenous rights in Africa (Pretoria: PULP, 2010) 
281-296; 288. 
664 Lawyers of Human Rights case, supra note 662. 
665 Id., para. 53.  
666 Börzel and Risse (2010) 114. 
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represented in the government as a result of the election outcome.667 In fact, the statement of 
this scholar who advocates a broad interpretation as to who are the holders of this 
fundamental right, seems to read in the provision of article 13 (1) the fact that groups are 
also concerned with the enjoyment of this right. Without embracing the issue of “adequacy” 
in representation, the African Commission decision in Katangese Peoples’ Congress (KPC) 
v. Zaire668 provided an affirmative answer to the question. People or groups can indeed 
claim their fundamental right to participate in the government as an entity. In the Katangese 
case, Moke, a leader of the KPC, the only political party at that time representing the people 
of Katanga, brought a collective demand before the African Commission trying to rely on 
provisions of the African Charter to achieve the independence of Katanga.669 Deciding on 
the merits of the case, the African Commission held that: 
 
in the absence of evidence that the people of Katanga are denied the right to participate 
in government (…), Katanga is obliged to exercise a variant of self determination that 
is compatible with sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaïre.670 
 
What is interesting to note here is that the African Commission argument rested on the view 
that violation would have occurred if the Katangese people were “denied the right to 
participate in government”.671 In other words, the African Commission interpreted this 
fundamental right as applying to the Katangese as a “people”. The certainty about this comes 
from the fact that the African Commission, when developing its line of reasoning, made a 
direct link with the exercise of self-determination which is entrenched as a people’s right. 
Actually, on the one hand, the view of the African Commission suggests that if the 
Katangese people were really denied participation in the government, then as a “people”, 
                                                             
667 Bojosi (2010) 288. 
668 The Katangese case, supra note 67. 
669 The fact that the Communication was initiated by one individual does not alter the fact that it was a 
collective demand made on the behalf of the Katangese peoples. Thus, in acting in his capacity as the 
KPC president, it is clear that Moke could somehow involve the Katangese people in his demand. In the 
Endorois case, the African Commission has clearly established that the question of whether certain 
members of a local community may ascertain communal rights on behalf of the group is a question that is 
settled by the internal arrangements of that community. Endoris case, supra note 67, para 162. This 
means that at the level of the African Commission and the African Court, there is the possibility to have 
one individual demand which includes collective interests. 
670 See the Katangese  case, supra note 67, para 6. 
671 the Katangese  case, supra note 67, para 6. 
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they would have qualified to exercise the variant of self-determination that leads a group of 
peoples to become independent and form a new state. The African Commission statement 
may lead to the general deduction that article 13 can enjoy a collective application as well 
and be relied on by groups or communities to take part in decisions having a direct impact  
on them. Affected communities can indeed rely on the provisions of this article to claim a 
fundamental right to participate in the governance of mineral resources.    
 
3.2.1.2 The rights to receive information and to express and disseminate one’s opinions  
 
3.2.1.2.1 Scope of the rights 
 
Article 9 of the African Charter provides that “Every individual shall have the right to 
receive information. Every individual shall have the right to express and disseminate his 
opinions within the law.” 
 
The rights contained in this provision are actually interdependent. Indeed, it is quite difficult 
to express and disseminate one’s opinion without having the appropriate information. This is 
what explains the fact that this fundamental right is analysed under the first dimension which 
looks at community participation as a fundamental right. It is assumed here that information 
is part of the process of participation. If affected communities must participate in mineral 
policy and projects, they are supposed to express views on relevant questions in connection 
to their welfare and livelihood with the view to secure their rights and interests. For such a 
purpose, they need to be provided with the appropriate information. In 2002, the African 
Commission adopted a declaration of principles on freedom of expression in Africa where it 
asserted that the fundamental rights in article 9 are particularly critical when the information 
sought is necessary for the exercise or the protection of any of the fundamental rights in the 
Charter.672 Actually, freedom to access information is a key element that brings transparency 
and accountability in governance, it enables citizens to perceive how public affairs are 
managed and facilitates the exposure of any form of corruption;673 it constitutes a powerful 
                                                             
672 ACHPR /Res.62(XXXII)02: Resolution on the Adoption of the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of 
Expression in Africa (2002) (Hereinafter “African Commission declaration of principles”) para. IV 2. 
673 Maputo Declaration: Fostering freedom of expression, access to information and empowerment of people 
(UNESACO, 3/52008) para.6. 
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tool by which people may check how far their fundamental rights and interests are given 
priority in the governance.  
 
If community participation must be equalized to a right to prior informed consent, affected 
communities should dispose of relevant information concerning the mineral project for 
which they are called to express their view.674 In this regard, Ward explained that: 
 
for a process to be informed, all parties involved, including the state, private 
industry, and the affected indigenous peoples, must have access to and share 
accurate information regarding potential impacts of a project...675 
 
Thus, if affected communities have to express and disseminate their opinions in the 
governance of mineral resources, the disclosure of information is compulsory. Nevertheless, 
since the fundamental rights in article 9 have been given an individual dimension as well, the 
question will raise also as to whether affected communities are entitled to rely on them as a 
group. In addition,  some other important issues to deal with are whether access to 
information and freedom of expression are regulated in the national law in accordance with 
standards developed by the African Commission and then whether the African Charter can 
be used as a tool to claim information from private parties such as mineral corporations. The 
answers to these questions determine how far the holders of these fundament rights in article 
9 can go in requesting information and expressing their views in connection with governance 
of public matters. 
 
 
The fundamental rights to receive information, to express and disseminate one’s opinions 
that have been ensconced also as individual rights were identified as well by the African 
                                                             
674 Anaya J. “Indigenous peoples’ participatory rights in relation to decisions about natural resource extraction: 
the more fundamental issue of what rights indigenous peoples have in lands and resources” (2005) 22 (1) 
Arizona Journ al of International & Comparative Law 16. 
675 Ward T. “The right to free, prior, and informed consent: Indigenous peoples' participation rights within 
International Law” (2011) 10 (2) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 83. 
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Commission as a cornerstone of democracy.676 This is obviously because freedom of 
expression is the sine qua non condition for the existence of any democracy.  
 
According to Somovia, to inform and be informed is a social need that is an essential 
component in the improvement of mankind and in a society's capacity for development.677 
This statement implies that information is not only a need for individuals but also for a 
group or community of people in their quest for the achievement of developmental goals. 
Somovia even goes further in comparing information to health, food, housing, education and 
employment because as these latter needs, it plays a relevant role in the realisation of 
development.678 As to the expression or dissemination of information, though it stands as a 
seed of freedom of expression which actually is a fundamental right that is practically 
exercised at the level of each individual or human being, the fact that identity or similarity 
of opinion may exist between several people makes it possible to bring out a collective 
expression or dissemination of opinion. This double dimension of freedom of expression is 
well explained by Verpeaux who points out that: 
 
Freedom of expression possesses the specific characteristic of being an individual 
right which stems from every one’s spiritual freedom but which is conceivable 
only for communication with others. It then has a collective or public dimension. It 
necessarily has a collective dimension because expression means something only if 
addressed to others.679 
 
Verpeaux’s remarks imply that expression of opinion is necessarily part of an issue or 
debate that interests a group of people. This is particularly true in respect of a 
majoritarian model of democracy where the view of the majority emerges from an 
addition of individual opinions that converge.  
 
                                                             
676 Resolution on Freedom of Expression and the Upcoming Elections in Zimbabwe,  The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Commission) meeting at its 42nd Ordinary 
Session held from 15 - 28 of November 2007, in Brazzaville, the Republic of Congo. 
677 Somovia J. “Democratization of communication: From minority social monopoly to majority social 
representation” in (1981) 2 Development dialogue 23. 
678 Id.,23. 
679 Verpeaux M. Freedom of expression: In constitutional and case law (Strasbourg: Council of Europe 
2010) 32.  
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Making a comment in respect of communities’ environmental rights in Zambia, the 
World Bank observes that effective consultations between stakeholders require inter 
alia having access to background information related to the health and environmental 
impacts of different sources which may have caused pollution in the past.680 This 
assertion demonstrates the important role that individual fundamental rights may play 
in the implementation of other fundamental rights in their collective dimension. 
Nevertheless, before reviewing the jurisprudence of the African Commission in support 
of this collective dimension of the rights, one important remark needs to be made. This 
is related to the formulation of article 9. Actually the fact that this article requires the 
exercise of the right to express or disseminate opinions to be “within the law” is likely 
to circumscribe the reach of this right because such a formulation constitutes what is 
often described as a “claw back clause”.  
 
Claw back clauses are the ones that permit the state to limit fundamental rights ab initio 
within provisions of domestic law and without underlying circumstances within which 
these rights may be restricted. This wide discretion conferred to national legislation is 
uncommon compared to other international instruments on fundamental rights where 
one finds instead derogation clauses that allow the state to limit only certain rights 
during the time of war or public emergencies (see for instance article 4 of the ICCPR, 
article 15 of the ECHR). Under derogation clauses, some rights, for instance, the right 
to life and the right to freedom from torture and inhuman treatment, are declared non-
derogable in all circumstances while precise conditions and legal requirements are set 
up for permissible derogation for others rights.681 As aptly observed by Hansungule, 
there is little or even no room for arbitrariness under derogation clauses due to 
precisions they offer, while under claw-back clauses opportunities for abuses are there 
                                                             
680 Wolrd Bank “ZCCM Investment Holdings Plc. Zambia-Copperbelt Environment Project: 
Environmental Impact Assessment E539” (World Bank, 2002) 9; Available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/03/05/000112742_200403051527
01/Rendered/INDEX/E5390vol.2.txt [accessed 20/6/2013]. 
681 See arts. 2 and 3 of the ECHR and the UN ECOSOC Siracusa principles on the limitation and derogation of 
provisions in the ICCPR, Annex UN Doc E/CN.4/1984/4 (1984) paras. 58-60. 
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because of the considerable discretion afforded to the state.682 But in practice, as 
reflected in the work of the African Commission, some provisions of the Charter may 
be used to attenuate the negative effects of claw-back clauses. First of all, the African 
Commission had the opportunity to determine that: 
 
  The only legitimate reasons for limitations to the rights and freedoms of the African 
Charter are found in article 27.2, that is that the rights of the Charter ‘shall be 
exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and 
common interest’.683 
 
Commenting on article 27 (2), Ougeurgouz observes that since the aim of this provision 
is to reconcile the exercise of fundamental rights in the Charter with the protection of 
certain relevant interests, it would be wrong to place any other limitations that are not 
necessary to protect the said interests.684 This view seems accurate in so far as, the 
interpretation of article 27 (2) given by the African Commission suggests that limitations 
that do not fulfil this purpose are “illegitimate”.685 But practically, this interpretation of 
the African Commission is not a totally satisfactory solution because several reasons may 
be brought forward by the government under the labels of “collective security”, 
“morality” and “common interest”. The interpretation of interests as enumerated in article 
27 (2) of the African Charter must be very strict to avoid abuses by African 
governments.This is why the second restriction to claw-back clauses found in the work of 
the African Commission is of great relevance. Using the opportunity to rely on general 
rules and principles of international law offered by the African Charter in its articles 60-
61, the African Commission has specified that national authorities should not enact 
provisions which restrict fundamental rights and freedoms in the Charter contrarily to 
                                                             
682 Hansungule M. “Towards a more effective African system of human rights: ‘Entebbe proposals’” Paper 
presented at the First International Conference on: The application of the death penalty in 
Commonwealth Africa organized by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (10-
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683 African Commission Communication 105/93, 128/94, 130/94, 152/96 Media Rights Agenda, 
Constitutional Rights Project, Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria 
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684 Ougeurgouz (2003) 433. 
685 The Media Rights Agenda case, supra note 683, para. 69. 
162 
 
international law standards.686 This implies that any restriction that stands in stark 
contrast to developments made in international law customs, conventions and 
jurisprudences related to fundamental rights, should not be acceptable. In this respect, the 
principle developed within the UN may be of considerable importance concerning the 
right to information. Indeed, according to the principles endorsed in 2000 by the UN 
Special Rappoteur on the issue: 
 
  A refusal to disclose information may not be based on the aim to protect 
Governments from embarrassment or the exposure of wrongdoing; a complete list of 
the legitimate aims which may justify non disclosure should be provided in the law 
and exceptions should be narrowly drawn so as to avoid including material which 
does not harm the legitimate interest.687 
 
More specifically, in its Declaration on Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa, the 
African Commission emphasised that “Any refusal to disclose information shall be subject 
to appeal to an independent body and/or the courts.”688 
 
These two principles suggest that, under international standards, reasons for a refusal of 
disclosure must be strictly enumerated within the national legislation, that in no case they 
should aim at hiding a wrongdoing and that they may be subject to an appeal before a quasi-
judicial or a judicial body.  
 
Also, concerning the reach of the right to information in article 9, though it is basically 
public information held by the state that is primarily targeted, the African Commission has 
underlined the principle that information held by private bodies (for instance mineral 
companies) must also be accessible whenever they are necessary for the exercise or 
protection of any right.689 This presages some measures of horizontal applicability of 
                                                             
686Id. para. 64-65.; African Commision Communication 101/93 (1995) Civil Liberties Organisation (in respect 
of the Nigerian Bar Association) v. Nigeria (Hereinafter Nigerian Bar Association case) para. 16; African 
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fundamental rights contained in the African Charter. In Zambia, a lack of clarity on the 
procedure that the mineral company used to select community projects was perceived by the 
Kyafukuma community in Solwezi as a barrier to their development, to such an extent that 
one of its members contended that projects realised by the firm represented a drop in the 
ocean compared to revenues it generated.690 More specially, because of the relevant role that 
NGOs have played in the advocacy of affected communities in Africa, an open-question is 
whether they can legitimately request information from the state or private organisations 
whenever they stand for the cause of anyone of these communities.This happened with 
Amnesty International which at several occasions requested information from mineral 
corporations, but without success.691 As a result, this international non-profit organisation 
has come up with the conclusion that mineral companies are often reluctant to disclose 
information on how their activities will affect people.692 Amnesty International describes the 
situation in the following words: 
 
  While some information may legitimately be considered confidential, companies 
frequently take the approach that they will not disclose data unless required to by 
law. Amnesty International found a general reluctance among companies to disclose 
information on the environmental and social impacts of their operations. Although 
companies claim to have undertaken studies on a range of such important issues as 
health and fisheries, these studies are rarely made available. [A company X]693 
claimed to have undertaken studies on marine resources and to have commissioned a 
study called ‘Air Quality, Precipitation and Corrosion Studies of Qua Iboe Terminal 
(QIT) Flares and Environs’. Amnesty International asked [company X] for copies of 
these studies but did not receive them.In 2006, [a company Y] reportedly carried out 
a study that looked at the impact on marine life of wastewater disposed of at sea. 
Amnesty International could not find this study and received no response from 
[company Y] to a request for a copy. During an interview with Amnesty 
International in Port Harcourt on 1 April 2008, [company Y] claimed to have studies 
that looked at a range of impacts of oil operations, which the company said it would 
supply. Amnesty International never received any of these studies. In response to a 
request for information from Amnesty International, [a company z] claimed that it 
                                                             
690 Ngosa F. and Van Alstine J “Seeking benefits and avoiding conflicts: A community-company assessment of 
copper Mining in Solwezi, Zambia” (2010) 19; avaialble at 
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had to have permission from the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) and 
the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), the partner organization and 
regulator respectively, in order to release environmental data. When Amnesty 
International asked if NNPC or DPR had ever refused to allow [company z] to 
provide communities or NGOs with environmental data, the company said they did 
not believe so, but that was apparently because they had never asked NNPC or DPR 
if they could release such information. [Company z] has operated in the Niger Delta 
almost half a century.694 
 
This description by Amnesty is just indicative of strained relations that generally exist between 
companies and NGOs in the extractive industry. In this respect, what is obvious thus far is that 
if NGOs would be entitled to request the disclosure of information, it would only be as the 
result of the fact that they are acting on behalf of the holders of these fundamental rights, 
namely affected communities. How far they can act in this regard enters in the scope of the 
general discussion in the coming section dedicated to the analysis of the locus standi. 
 
3.2.1.2.2 Interpretation of the right in the jurisprudence of the African Commission 
 
The fundamental rights in article 9 of the African Charter have been referred to more in 
connection with prisoners detained for the purpose of banning them from expressing a political 
opinion.695 What is interesting to notice in the African Commission jurisprudence is the fact that 
fundamental rights contained in this article have also been given a collective application. In one 
case, the African Commission explicitly underlines that the intimidation and arrest or detention 
of journalists for articles published and questions asked, deprives not only the journalists of 
their right to freely express and disseminate their opinions, but also the public, of the right to 
information, which is a breach of the provisions of article 9.696 By using the word “public”, one 
can assume that a collective dimension was developed by the Commission in so much as the 
etymology of this word always refers to a group of people. When the public or people receive 
information, this is with the aim to use it for some purpose. Among them is often the expression 
of their approval or disapproval of government policy on what has been or is to be done within 
the society. In Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation and Media Rights 
Agenda v. Nigeria, the African Commission pointed out that freedom of expression was vital to 
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the participation in the public affairs of the country.697 In the context of this study, this assertion 
implies that community participation is impossible without members of the affected community 
enjoying the possibility to exercise their fundamental rights in article 9. Though the African 
Commission did not refer directly to article 9 in the Endorois case, it explicitly mentioned that 
affected communities must give an “informed” consent in matters that are critical to their 
welfare.698 Therefore, the collective dimension of the fundamental rights entrenched in article 9 
comes from the fact that decisions affecting a community require the opinions of individuals 
that are part of that community, either through direct or indirect democratic channels.699 
 
Unfortunately, as aptly observed by Olaniyan, the fundamental rights in article 9 are the less 
respected in developing regions simply because seeking or attaining the truth regarding public 
matters is wrongly interpreted as inherently injurious to the government.700  In Africa, most of 
time, it has been fundamental rights’ activists who have been victims. Just by way of 
illustration, beside the case of Ken Sarro-Wiwa in the Niger Delta already mentioned, there is 
the case of Floribert Chebeya in DRC who was mysteriously killed by some members of the 
police because he was advocating fundamental rights.701 This case which has become well 
known all around the world has left behind a landmark of how freedom of expression is yet 
disregarded by some African governments. Doing a comparative approach, Olaniyan has found 
that provisions in article 9 are less specific than those found in article 19 of the ICCPR and 
article 13 of the American Convention of Human Rights that both refer to the right to “seek” 
information. Olaniyan concludes that such a formulation is better because it suggests the 
obligation of the government to provide information upon the request of citizens.702 Though 
Olaniyan’s observation points to a relevant issue in terms of drafting, if the only distinction 
between the African Charter formulation and the one found in these instruments lies in the use 
                                                             
697 African Commission Communication 140/94, 141/94, 145/94 Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties 
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of “receive information” instead of “seek information”, then there is no fatal deficiency in the 
African system. This is simply because no matter which one of these formulations is adopted, a 
natural deduction commands that the recognition of a fundamental right to an individual or 
group of persons automatically creates in turn an obligation in that those to whom the law 
applies are compelled to abide by it.703 Thus, it naturally follows that whenever government 
agencies or private organisations possess information that is pertinent to the well-being of 
citizens, they are obliged, except in the cases mentioned above, to release and put it at their 
disposal. In practice, the African Commission has adopted a resolution that addresses this 
shortcoming. This is the resolution adopted in 2002 on the declaration of principles on freedom 
of expression in Africa, where provision is clearly made that everyone has the right to access 
information held by public and private bodies.704 This implies in practice that affected 
communities are by law empowered to request information not only from their government, but 
also from any third party, including mineral companies, provided the information sought is 
necessary for the exercise or protection of any fundamental rights. Moreover, recently some 
NGOs participated in a forum just before the 51th session of the African Commission where 
they made some recommendations to this institution in the form of a Resolution on Access of 
Information in Africa.705 In this document, they clearly specified that access to information is to 
seek and receive information from public and private bodies.706 Actually instead of focusing on 
the debate between “receive information” and “seek information”, the real drafting issue of 
article 9 lies in the inclusion of the “claw-back clause” as already mentioned previously. 
 
Before closing this subsection, it is interesting to underline one statement made by the African 
Commission in Huri – Laws v. Nigeria.707 The Commission has specified that in the regulation 
of fundamental rights in article 9, African governments should not infringe on any of their other 
obligations under the African Charter.708 This assertion implies that despite the existence of a 
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claw-back clause, access to relevant information regarding mineral projects should not be 
refused or hidden from affected communities anytimetheir other fundamental rights guaranteed 
in the Charter are infringed on or threatened.  
 
3.2.1.3 The right to a fair trial  
3.2.1.3.1 Scope of the right 
 
In terms of article 7 (1): 
  
Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: (a) the 
right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his 
fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, regulations 
and customs in force; (b) the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a 
competent court or tribunal; (c) the right to defense, including the right to be 
defended by counsel of his choice; (d) the right to be tried within a reasonable time 
by an impartial court or tribunal. 
 
This provision of the African Charter establishes the fundamental right to have his/her cause 
heard before a national judicial or quasi-judicial body, which in other terms is referred to as the 
right to a fair trial.709 By entrenching this fundamental right, the African Charter has sought to 
reiterate the ideal asserted previously by the OAU founding fathers according to which justice 
was one of the essential objectives for the achievement of African peoples’ aspirations.710 Since 
community participation now appears among such aspirations, and is being contemplated by 
affected communities as a means to redress their marginalisation in the bilateral model of 
mineral resource governance (state-mineral company), it is obvious that legal avenues which 
may serve to fulfill this aspiration and provide a feeling of justice to communities must be 
explored.  In practice, the right to a fair trial is made of a twofold component. On the one hand, 
it implies the right to defend oneself when accused and to have legal assistance in a proceeding 
that is fair and public before a competent, independent and impartial body. This can be seen as a 
passive dimension in so much as in this case, the exercise of the right will only happen once its 
holder is sued. On the other hand, the right is built on the possibility to have access to justice 
                                                             
709 See the African Commission Rsolution on the right to recourse and fair trial adopted at its 11th ordinary 
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and bring a claim alleging violation of a fundamental right in the African Charter. This is the 
active dimension known as the right to access justice,711 the one with which community 
participation is more concerned.  
 
Affected communities should be able to approach the court if their fundamental right to 
participation is not respected by the state and the mineral corporation. In this case, access to 
justice becomes a key strategy through which they can secure a space for their opinions 
regarding the mineral project.712 Baumgartner observes that for individuals as well as groups, 
litigation is one important way through which they make their preferences count.713 Thus, 
access to justice will make it possible for affected communities to claim before the court that 
their exclusion from the decision-making process by other stakeholders is a violation of the 
fundamental right in article 13 of the African Charter. It is obvious that for such a strategy to be 
efficient, community participation as well as access to justice must be considered as 
fundamental rights.  The ultimate goal in this fundamental-rights based approach is to obtain a 
remedy before the court once it is established that the right at hand has been violated.714 This is 
what prompted the International Court of Justice to assert in the Barcelona Traction case 
(Belgium against Spain) that fundamental rights also include the protection against the denial of 
justice.715 Thus, providing affected communities with a fundamental right to participation, but 
without an option to access court can easily lead to a denial of justice. This is because, they will 
possess the right but without formal legal means to enforce it. It has been further observed that 
the more a country grants access to domestic courts, the more likely it is to comply with its 
international law obligations related to fundamental rights.716 It is believed that if the outcome 
of the litigation is favourable to the complainant, it will have a general deterrence effect in that 
any potential perpetrator will be reluctant to commit a violation in future.717 In so far as this 
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remark may be accurate, it implies that the more courts would reach the conclusion that the 
fundamental right to community participation was infringed on, the more other stakeholders 
would become reluctant in the future to exclude affected communities and ignore their views as 
regards mineral projects. This confirms the relevance of the right to access justice as a key 
factor that can make community participation really effective. 
 
Providing further explanation on the substance of article 7, the African Commission in section C 
of the Principles and Guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal assistance adopted in 2005 
asserted that: 
 
(a) Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by competent national tribunals for acts 
violating the rights granted by the constitution, by law or by the Charter, 
notwithstanding that the acts were committed by persons in an official capacity. 
(b) The right to an effective remedy includes: 
1. access to justice; 
2. reparation for the harm suffered; 
3. access to the factual information concerning the violations. 
 
This provision of the guidelines emphasises once again the capital role that information, access 
to justice and remedies may play in the legal efforts to make participation effective through the 
African Charter normative framework. Nevertheless, an abusive use of access to justice should 
be avoided by affected communities in so far as it may create a negative impact in the 
investment climate in that companies can develop reluctance to invest in the country if they feel 
that litigation has become the golden rule even for small misunderstandings that can be settled 
amicably.718 Therefore, whenever they are approached, enforcement machineries face a 
challenge to reach a decision which balances both sides’ interests which all are relevant in the 
development process of the country. This exercise is so sensitive that judges or referees must be 
aware of the big responsibility that rests on their shoulders when deciding a case. Unfortunately 
it has happened in Nigeria that judges decided to make interests of investors prevail, considering 
for instance that economic interests should be prioritised over environmental rights.719 
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Since article 7 consecrates an individual right, it is also questionable if affected communities as 
a group are entitled to resort to it. Furthermore, it remains enigmatic whether the restriction 
regarding the locus standi before the African Court can be reconciled with the fact that access to 
justice is a fundamental right for its holders. Of course, one may object that the provisions of 
article 7 only concern remedies sought before national jurisdictions. However, as will be seen 
when discussing the exhaustion of local remedies rule, actions brought before regional courts 
adhere to the principle of subsidiarity and reflect therefore a prolongation of the need to satisfy 
the demands of justice where national courts have failed to do so. Thus, if the right in article 7 
can be claimed in respect of primary organs of enforcement (national courts), it would not be 
reasonable to consider that this should not be the case with regard to subsidiary bodies (regional 
enforcement machineries).720 Though Fancioni points out that access to justice is a fundamental 
right only in the context of domestic law and that a rule of customary international law 
supporting the same approach for international proceedings does not exist yet,721 the fact 
remains that the declarative system established by the protocols is likely to promote 
discrimination among Africans because some will be able to approach the African Court and 
others not, depending on what the position is in the country they want to sue. 
 
 
Article 7 is a fundamental right vested in individuals and which can be involved in a passive or 
active way in the protection of their entitlement to a fair trial. Obviously, it is clear that 
individuals who are members of an affected community can exercise it on their own behalf; but 
whether this fundamental right can be claimed by the community as a whole remains a formal 
challenge because it is not part of collective rights entrenched in the African Charter. In this 
respect, it appears that the same remark that was made in respect of article 13 is also valid here. 
As demonstrated in the Katangese case, the fact that one member of a group can be entitled to 
bring a case on the behalf of the entire community makes it possible to support a collective 
application of this right as well. In this situation, the individual is not exercising access to 
justice in his own interest, but in the best interest of the group whose a fundamental right has 
been allegedly violated. Since the need for justice can exist for an individual as well as an entity 
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made of a group of peoples, it is logical to assert that the right to access to justice must also 
enjoy a collective dimension. This is particularly true when one considers that access to justice 
is part of the rule of law through the imperative for states to establish an independent and 
impartial judiciary.722 In other words, if access to justice is not granted, how would one be able 
to assess the extent to which a court is independent and impartial? Therefore, it appears 
paradoxical to conceive that a country whose system of governance rests on the rule of law may 
afford to judicially protect individuals’ rights but fail to provide such a possibility for collective 
rights.  
 
3.2.1.3.2 Interpretation of the right in the jurisprudence of the African Commission 
 
Article 7 has been interpreted in the jurisprudence of the African Commission very often in its 
passive dimension. In many cases, it was the fact that the victim was either unfairly tried in the 
court or arrested without being prosecuted that led to the violation of the right. In the Dawda 
case where a former president of Gambia brought accusations of terror and arbitrary actions 
against the military government which overthrew its government by a coup in 1994, the fact that 
the minister of interior could detain anyone without trial for up to six months, and could extend 
the period ad infinitum was found by the African Commission to be an infringement of 
article7(1) (d) of the Charter.723 In Krishna Achuthan (on behalf of Aleke Banda), Amnesty 
International (on behalf of Orton and Vera Chirwa), Amnesty International (on behalf of Orton 
and Vera Chirwa) v. Malawi, the fact that persons on the behalf of whom the communications 
were brought had been detained for up to 12 years either without a trial taking place in some 
cases, or with a trial that had taken place  before a traditional court, but without legal 
representation in other cases, was considered by the African Commission as a violation of 
article 7.724 There have been cases also where article 7 was dealt with by the African 
Commission in its active dimension. For instance, in Civil Liberties Organisation (in respect of 
the Nigerian Bar Association) v. Nigeria where the complainant protested against a decree 
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which organised the Nigerian Bar Association and as such, prohibited recourse to court, the 
African Commission found that the said decree violated article 7 as it deprived individuals from 
access to justice.725 Though no case has so far been brought before the African Commission in 
which an affected community was refused access to justice, it is predictable that if such a 
situation occurred, the Commission and even the African Court would find a violation of article 
7. Therefore, article 7 is critical in the protection of fundamental rights of affected communities 
in the mineral field. It offers them a viable option to make their views considered whenever 
other stakeholders deny them the right to participate effectively in decisions related to a mineral 
project. 
 
3.2.2 The second dimension: Community participation as a channel to emphasise other 
fundamental rights 
 
Under this section, the main objective is to demonstrate how community participation can serve as 
the means through which affected communities should exercise other fundamental rights which 
are directly relevant for the realisation of sustainable developments objectives through the mineral 
exploitation.  
 
3.2.2.1 The right to self-determination 
 
3.2.2.1.1 Scope of the right 
 
Article 20 of the African Charter provides that: 
 
All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable and 
inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political status 
and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they 
have freely chosen. 
 
Colonized or oppressed peoples shall have the right to free themselves from the bonds of 
domination by resorting to any means recognized by the international community. 
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All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the States parties to the present 
Charter in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or 
cultural. 
 
The fundamental right to self-determination is now considered a customary principle of 
international law.726 In respect of developing regions, including Africa, this right was originally 
conceived as a reaction to the past colonial dominion.727 In this regard, a document was adopted 
in the UN on the declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
in 1960 where it was asserted that: 
 
The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation 
constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the 
United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-
operation.728 
 
This quote expresses the predominant view that led to the abolition of colonialism in 
Africa, but also raises another issue, which is the self-determination perception beyond 
colonisation as reflected in some scholars’ writings. While Cassese has observed that the 
right to (external) self-determination for colonial people ceases to exist under customary 
international law, once colonialism is banished,729 Fodella contended that it remains an 
open question whether the right to self-determination can be applied to small groups like 
indigenous peoples.730  Fodella’s concern is raised by the fact that the “peoples” to which 
the concept of self-determination refers are not defined in legal terms in related 
international instruments.731  
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If one adopts a restricted view, it is clear that the fundamental right to self-determination 
would not apply to communities living within a country, simply because initially it was 
conceived as the legal basis to support national liberation movements in colonised 
countries. Moreover, even in such a restrictive approach, Cassese’s view remains 
debatable because if the right to self-determination has to cease in any way whatsoever for 
people that succeeded to gain independence, the consequence would implicitly be that they 
should return to colonial rulership that would again determine their political choices and 
socio-economic options. Indeed, the concept of independence is contingent on the one of 
self-determination in that the former cannot exist without the implementation of the latter. 
Independence is conditioned by the continual exercise of self-determination.  
 
Actually, Ozdën and Golay’s remark brings more light to the debate in demonstrating that 
an extensive perception of self-determination fits better in the post-colonial context. These 
scholars aptly observe that the restatement of the fundamental right to self-determination 
in the ICCPR, the IESCR  and the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among states, respectively in 1966 and 
1970 implies that it was extended to all peoples, colonised or not.732 This is correct 
insomuch as the rationale under which these international instruments were adopted goes 
beyond the concept of colonisation to more generally even regulate the relationship 
between states that are already independent. This is also true in respect of the African 
Charter, because the context within which this right was included in this instrument is one 
where most African countries where already free from colonialism (1981).733 The certainty 
about this can be drawn from the second subsection of article 20 of the African Charter 
where reference is made not only to “colonised people”, but also to “other oppressed 
peoples”. Otherwise, if one really supports the view of Cassese,734 it is still possible to 
contend that self-determination remains relevant within independent states with regard to 
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Lenin and Gramsci’s concept of “internal colonialism”.735 Cassese himself has elaborated 
on the concept of “internal self-determination” in the context of independent countries.736 
The concept of “internal colonialism” has been referred to political dominations, economic 
exploitation and social discrimination of a group of people within a country.737 Therefore, 
the fundamental right to self-determination in the context of this study must be approached 
within this extensive post-colonial perspective, including a possible application to affected 
communities in so far as they may be captured as people in the reach of article 20. 
 
The fundamental right to self-determination is naturally a people’s right in so much as it 
refers to a group of individuals holding the prerogative to decide upon their destiny. As 
observed in the preceding section, this fundamental right has been developed first of all in 
an international dimension, when colonised people sought to free themselves from the 
rulership of colonising countries. This is what some scholars have qualified as “external” 
self-determination to differentiate it from the modern form which they qualified as 
“internal” self determination, meaning the fundamental right of the people to freely choose 
their desired political and economic regime.738 Thus, it can be assumed that it stands as a 
response to “internal colonialism”.  
 
Cassese notes that in this case, this fundamental right goes beyond choosing among what 
is on offer from one political or economic position only.739 Put in the context of 
community participation in the mineral sector, this assertion would imply that the choice 
of affected communities should not be reduced to what are the suggestions from the 
government or other third parties (multi-national companies or international donor 
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agencies), but moreover, always be the result of their freedom to decide what is politically 
and economically appropriate for their own development.  
 
Of course, the government has the duty to intervene and prevent mis-use of this 
fundamental right, particularly when it is used for illegitimate purposes. Indeed, what must 
be avoided is that leaders of communities living in mineral-rich areas of the country, 
manipulate members of their communities to use this fundamental right as an argument to 
free themselves from the central government authority and enjoy exclusive benefits from 
natural resources found there. This is probably the reason why, as will be seen in the next 
section, the African Commission was very careful when interpreting self-determination in 
the Katangese case. Indeed, from an economic perspective, the leitmotiv behind the 
Katangese secession in DRC has always been the desire of the leaders of this province to 
get rid of the central government to takeover a substantial part of the revenue generated by 
their mineral resources.740  
 
To avoid the pitfalls of either situation, the exercising by the central government of its 
prerogatives in the redistribution of revenues must strictly remain motivated by the 
necessity to maintain a balance between areas of the country that possess a lot of natural 
resources and those that are deprived or poorly endowed.On the other hand communities 
and their leaders living inside the country should not rely on self-determination as a 
pretext in refusing to share a portion of their mineral revenues nationally. Nevertheless, it 
remains important to keep in mind that in the spirit of the African Charter, self-
determination is a fundamental right vested in the people and not in the government. Thus, 
even when using their prerogatives, government officials should be aware that they remain 
responsible to the will of the people, be it nationally or at local level.741 This remark is 
relevant because the outcome of self-determination is not always predictable. The 
International Court of Justice held that what is essential is that the outcome reflects the 
free and voluntary choice of the people concerned.742 However in the context of this study, 
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the analysis of article 20 will not include the self-determination variant which leads to the 
creation of new states. Indeed, though a persistent exclusion of a community from political 
and economic decision-making processes can become a genuine pretext for secession, it is 
not the primary aim of this study to support the transformation of affected communities 
into new states. Self-determination has several facets (political, economic and socio-
cultural) which from an external point of view imply inter alia the right to decide on the 
political status of a people within the international community, including the right to 
separate from the existing state of which the group concerned is a part, and create a new 
one.743 However from an internal perspective, this is not the case as it does not necessarily 
imply a claim to secession, but rather consists of a demand for the exercising of some 
fundamental rights within the boundaries of an existing state, for instance the right to 
decide on the form of government and the identity of rulers, the right to exercise control 
over natural resources and the right of a community within the state to participate in 
decision making.744 At this level, community participation as a means to exercise these 
fundamental rights becomes an expression of self-determination. The interaction between 
both concepts is well perceived in Bernhardt’s theory of “democratic self-determination”. 
This scholar put forward the “affectedness principle” according to which democratic self-
determination is described as an ongoing process that requests that those affected by a 
decision should participate in its making.745 Thus, an affected community as a distinct 
people within a country should be able to rely on this variant of self-determination to claim 
their fundamental right to participate in the governance of the mineral sector and ensure 
throughout the decision-making process that whatever is set up, matches the socio-
economic objectives they seek to achieve within their community. If self-determination in 
article 20 of the African Charter can be interpreted to imply this, then there is no doubt 
that affected communities can rely on this provision. 
 
                                                             
743Van Walt MC. and Seroo O. “The implementation of the right to self-determination as a contribution to 
conflict prevention: Report of the international conference of experts held in Barcelona from 21 to 27 
November 1998” (UNESCO 1999) 12-13. 
744 Id. 12-13. 
745 Bernhardt B. “A theory of democratic self-determination: Affectedness, sovereignty, and nonterritorial 
political boundaries” discussion paper written for One Earth Future Foundation (2010) 6-7. 
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3.2.2.1.2 Interpretation of the right in the jurisprudence of the African 
Commission 
 
There are not many cases on self-determination of communities living inside a country that 
were put before the African Commission. This is probably because in the few 
communications that have been dealt with thus far,746 the African Commission has 
generally demonstrated a high reluctance to support the variant of self-determination which 
leads to the creation of a new state, leaving room for a presumption of its adherence to the 
principle of Uti posidetis developed by the OAU member states in 1981 in Cairo.747 For 
instance, in the Katangese case, the African Commission referred to the fact that Zaire 
(DRC today) was a member of the OAU, in support of its argument that it was obligated to 
uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country.748 The same reasoning was 
developed in another case, Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al. v. Cameroon, where 14 
individuals brought a communication on behalf of the people of South Cameroon, alleging 
that they had become part of Cameroon as a result of “forceful annexion” to the 
francophone part in 1961 following a tacit approval by the British government. Therefore, 
because of the suffering they have been enduring since then, they claimed that their 
fundamental right to self-determination as entrenched in article 20 of the African Charter 
entitled them to become an independent state.749 Here again, the African Commission 
underlined the fact that Cameroon was a member state of the OAU as a reason that 
compelled it to uphold the sovereignty and integrity of this country.750  
 
                                                             
746 African Commission Communication 266/03 Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al. v Cameroon (hereinafter the 
Southern Cameroon case) (1999); Report on mission of good offices to Senegal of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1–7 June 1996) in Tenth Annual Activity Report of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1996–1997) (hereinafter the Casamence case), 
ACHPR/RPT/10th, Annex VIII (1997); The Katagese people case, supra note 67. 
747  In 1964, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted in Cairo a resolution stating that 
“that all Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of 
national independence”. Resolution on Border Dispute Among African States, AHG/Res. 16(I) (1964). 
This is what has come to be known as the Uti possidetis principle, seen as a stumbling block to African 
ethnic groups’ initiatives to raise their autonomy up to the level of becoming independent states. The aim 
behind this principle was to keep African borders intangible. 
748 The Katangese people case, supra note 67, para. 5. 
749 See the South Cameroon case, supra note 746, paras. 1-18.  
750 Id., para 190. 
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Behind this African Commission trend to promote the Uti possidetis principle, one can 
legitimately accept the belief of commissioners that self-determination as conceived in the 
African Charter was not foreseen as a tool to generate more independent states all over the 
continent. Such deduction is corroborated by the fact that in both above-mentioned cases, 
the panel of commissioners made a special reference in their argumentation to the fact that 
Zaire and Cameroon were part to the African Charter.751 In the Southern Cameroon case, 
the African Commission even went so far as to assert that secession was not recognised as 
a variant of the right to self-determination within the context of the African Charter.752 
Nevertheless, despite this strong support for the OAU uti possidetis principle, the African 
Commission has left a small door open to a possible interpretation of self-determination in 
the African Charter that would lead to the creation of a new state.  
 
The case for this exception is justifiable because, as pointed out in the preceding 
subsection, the outcome of self-determination is not predictable. In the Katangese case, the 
African Commission took the stance that the territorial integrity of Zaire could be 
questionable where concrete evidence of fundamental rights’ violations, coupled with the 
denial of the fundamental right to participate in the government, existed.753 In the Southern 
Cameroon case, the African Commission reached the conclusion that, despite the violation 
of some fundamental rights, the fact that the fundamental right to participate in the 
government in article 13 was not violated, the highest variant of self-determination could 
not be exercised by the Southern Cameroonians.754 This double conditionality suggests the 
idea that participation in the government is implicitly viewed by the African Commission 
as a means to secure fundamental rights or fight against their violation. The Commission 
also underlined that it is “massive” violations of fundamental rights that are to be taken 
into consideration. Therefore, this African Commission interpretation of self- 
determination proves that the African Charter has not only embraced the OAU uti 
possidetis principle as a tool to safeguard territorial integrity in Africa, but has gone as to 
embrace exceptional circumstances that could necessitate the creation of a new state. This 
                                                             
751 Ibid., para. 190 and the Katangese people case, supra note 67, para. 5. 
752 See the South Camerooncase, supra note 746, para. 200. 
753 See the Katangese people case, supra note 67, para. 6. 
754 See the South Camerooncase, supra note 746, paras. 194-195.  
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perspective has been the reason for the legitimation of the creation of the state of South 
Sudan in 2011after the referendum held in Sudan. Nevertheless, as pointed out previously, 
it is not the purpose of this study to promote community participation as a pretext to 
secession.  
 
In both the Katangese and South Cameroon cases, the African Commission called for the 
exercise of self-determination variants that are compatible with sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, contending that autonomy within a sovereign state can be exercised under the 
African Charter in terms of local government, confederacy, federation or any other form of 
governance that is in accordance with the wishes of the people.755 In this dimension, 
community participation by affected communities becomes a way of expression of their 
fundamental right to self-determination in the mineral sector. It is the tool through which 
they determine critical issues in direct connection to their welfare. For instance, through 
participation, they can determine the environmental regime to which a mineral project 
must adhere to.  
 
3.2.2.2 The right to freely dispose of wealth and natural resources  
 
3.2.2.2.1 Scope of the right 
 
Article 21 of the African Charter provides that: 
 
All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. This right 
shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall a people 
be deprived of it. 
 
In case of spoliation the dispossessed people shall have the right to the lawful 
recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation. 
 
The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be exercised without 
prejudice to the obligation of promoting international economic cooperation based 
on mutual respect, equitable exchange and the principles of international law. 
 
States parties to the present Charter shall individually and collectively exercise the 
right to free disposal of their wealth and natural resources with a view to 
strengthening African unity and solidarity. 
                                                             
755 Id., para. 191; the Katangese people case, supra note 67, para. 4. 
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States parties to the present Charter shall undertake to eliminate all forms of 
foreign economic exploitation particularly that practiced by international 
monopolies so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages 
derived from their national resources. 
 
Permanent sovereignty over wealth and natural resources became an effective principle of 
international law in the aftermath of World War Two as well. In respect of developing countries, 
it was initially developed, as the people’s right to self-determination, in the context of their 
struggle for decolonisation.756 In fact, this fundamental right is deeply rooted in self-
determination in so far as the exercise of sovereignty over economic resources is conditioned by 
a people’s enjoyment of the prerogative to determine what it deems suitable. As already 
underlined in the introductory chapter, African leaders in their quest for independence held 
within the UN that if natural resources had to profit the development of their peoples, the latter 
had to enjoy the freedom to decide how and to what extent these resources had to be exploited.757  
 
The principle was gradually crystallised in some UN resolutions (523 (VI), 626 (VII), 1803 
(XVII), 3201 (S-V1), 3281(XXIX)) and then codified in international instruments like the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR in 1966; and the Charter of  Economic Rights and Duties of States 
(CERDS ) in 1974. But surprisingly, after stubbornly promoting the people’s right in their quest 
for independence, African leaders made no mention of it in the text of the OAU Charter adopted 
in 1963. As a result of this, a confused application of the principle could be observed in the first 
three decades of the post-colonial era (1960s-1980s), with African leaders behaving as if 
sovereignty over natural resources was vested in them rather than their people.758 This was 
perceptible through the instauration of authoritarian regimes in many new independent African 
countries, characterised inter alia by the mismanagement of mineral revenues.759 Despite the fact 
that the African Charter later on in 1981 clearly entrusted this fundamental right to the people, 
the confusion is still ongoing. Sovereignty over wealth and natural resources is classically still 
                                                             
756  Schrijver (1997) 3. 
757 Id. 82. 
758 Duruigbo  (2006) 35. 
759 Human Rights Watch “The human rights impact of local government corruption…, supra note 73; 
Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa (2006).  
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exercised by African rulers, without any regard to what the will of the people are, to such an 
extent that one can legitimately wonder who the real holder of the right is.  
 
Jackson qualified this dilemma as the new sovereignty game of post-colonial Africa and 
concluded that sovereign rights entrenched in the African Charter are the rights of rulers rather 
than those of the peoples.760 Indeed, the free disposal of wealth and natural resources has always 
represented a powerful tool cherished the more by governments of developing countries in so far 
as it empowers them to take actions with strong legal effects in the economic sphere.  
 
Chowdhury observes that the principle has been invoked by states largely in the context of 
relations between host countries and multinational companies engaged in the exploration of 
natural resources in their territories.761  
 
In Africa, this has been highlighted by for instance, the wave of nationalisation that occurred in 
many countries during the 1970s.762 Also a recent illustration in this regard can be taken from the 
revision of mineral contracts initiated unilaterally by DRC government in 2009 to upgrade the 
margin of fiscal revenues.763 As aptly recalled by Kymlicka, in democracy, any power that the 
government possesses is not inherent, but delegated.764 This implies that whenever the 
government enforces sovereign rights, they do it on behalf of the people that are the real holders 
of these rights. As it is clear from the African Commission jurisprudence, when the African 
Charter mentions people’s rights, it is always with reference to the people and not their 
                                                             
760 Jackson RH. Quasi states: Sovereignty, international relations and the third world (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) 157. 
761 Chowdhury SR. “Permanent sovereignty over natural resources – substratum of the Seoul declaration” in 
De Warrt P. and Peters P. (eds.) International law and development (Boston: Martinus 
NijhoffPublishher, 1988) 64. 
762 Nigeria, DRC and Zambia had nationalised large petroleum and mineral companies. Rood LL. 
“Nationalisation and indigenisation in Africa” (1976) 14(3) The Journal of Modern African Studies 432-
434. 
763 Kabange NCJ. (2010) 67-71. 
764  Kymlicka W. “Two dilemmas of citizenship education in pluralist societies” in (eds.) Locker A., Crick 
B., Anette J. (eds.) Education for democratic citizenship: Issues of theory and practice (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003) 60. 
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government or even the state.765 Nevertheless, though under this international instrument it is 
easy to seize the demarcation between the “government” and their “people”, this is not the same 
in the context of approaches developed in national systems, especially regarding sovereignty 
over mineral resources.  If ownership of natural resources has to be taken as the criterion, 
arrangements made within national laws display different approaches.  For instance, in the 
Nigeria Minerals and Mining Act of 2007, section 1(1) provides that: 
 
  The entire property in and control of all Mineral Resources in, under or upon any 
land in Nigeria...is and shall be vested in the government of the federation on the 
behalf of the people.766 
 
If this provision is to be interpreted strict sensu, it means that the owner of mineral resources in 
Nigeria is the government. However, it is questionable whether the fact that this provision 
underlines that this ownership is vested for and on the behalf of the people can make any 
difference. In a true democratic system, the answer should be “yes” because in such a context the 
exercise of this ownership is presumably fulfilled by a government that has been mandated by 
the people through elections and which one way or another, remains accountable to the people. 
Nevertheless, despite the return to a civil and elected government in 1999, Nigerian rulers have 
continued to display a lack of accountability to their people.767 A report from Amnesty 
International has noticed that the Nigerian federal government allocated permits, licences and 
leases to survey, prospect for and extract oil to the oil companies that were then automatically 
granted access to the land covered by their permit, lease or licence, without the people affected 
by these decisions having a say beforehand.768 
In South Africa, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 (2002) provides in 
its preamble 2 that “mineral and petroleum resources belong to the nation and that the state is the 
                                                             
765  When international fundamental rights treaties entrench “people’s rights”, they creates at the same time 
an obligation for the state towards their peoples to protect, promote and fulfil them through their 
governments. Therefore, confusion between both concepts would lead to the government being at the 
same time holder of the right and debtor of the obligations attached to it, which is irrational. Knop K. 
“Statehood: Territory, people and government” in Crawford J. and Koskenniemi M. The Cambridge 
companion to international law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 95-116.  
766 This formulation was adopted following to the provision of s. 44 of the 1999 Constitution. 
767 Amnesty International “Nigeria: Petroleum, pollution and …”, supra note 342, 10.  
768  Id., 9. 
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custodian thereof.”  Here if the concept nation can be interpreted to mean the South African 
people, then it is clear that the ownership is vested in them. Indeed though the debate within the 
sociology scholarship has tended to discuss more the relationship between concepts of nation and 
state,769 it can be assumed that the objective approach to what constitutes a nation remains a 
people-centred one. Symmon-Symonolewicz provides a definition that is simply worded, but 
explicit enough to perceive this people-centred characteristic. According to this scholar, a nation 
is: 
a territorially-based community of human beings sharing a distinct variant of modern 
culture, bond together by a strong sentiment of unity and solidarity, marked by a clear 
historically-rooted consciousness  of national identity, and possessing or striving to 
possess, a genuine political self-government.”770 
According to this definition, a nation first of all represents a community of human beings or in 
another word a “people”. In the South African context, because the white paper published in 1998 
states that the government’s long-term objective is to vest all mineral rights in the “state” for the 
benefit and on the behalf of all the people, one may choose to take another stance and contend 
that the nation as mentioned in that paragraph of the preamble refers rather to the state. Even in 
this case, because this formulation is quite similar to the one of the Nigerian mineral law, it would 
call for the same interpretation. Also, the fact that in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act,771 the legislator has made a clear demarcation between the nation and the state, 
underlining that the latter is the custodian of the wealth belonging to the former raises a question: 
who then is the South African nation? In the light of the preamble, any attempt to answer this 
question may not result in the state, because if it was the case, a distinction between the owner 
and the custodian in the formulation of this paragraph would be useless. Even if the legal effects 
of a preamble remain a subject of discussion among scholars, at least its primary function is to 
reveal the intention of the legislator. Therefore, it is doubtless that reference is made to the South 
African people as being the South African nation. It is rather the South African state which is 
assigned the role of “custodian”.  
                                                             
769 See the different school of thoughts presented by Chenillo DA. Social Theory of the Nation-State: The political 
forms of modernity beyond methodological nationalism (Oxon: Routledge, 2007). 
770 Symmon-Symonolewicz K. as quoted by White W. Nation, state, and territory: Origins, evolutions and 
relationships (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007) 27. 
771 Contrarily to the white paper which was only a guideline, the Mineral Petroleum Resoureces Development 
Act is a law that holds binding effects.  
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If one agrees that “nation” and “people” are interchangeable expressions, another question that is 
raised, is what explains the continuing demand for nationalisation in this country?772 If 
nationalisation amounts to the transfer of ownership to the nation and if the nation is to be 
regarded as the whole of the South African people, should one not assume that mineral resources 
already belong to the people? Logically, after the entrenchment of the principle in the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act, this demand cannot be justified, at least at a rhetorical 
discourse level. However, the truth is that this call for nationalisation finds its meaning only when 
one reconciles it with past injustices that led the apartheid regime to discriminate against some 
racial groups in terms of equal access to the mineral industry.  
At the end of apartheid in 1990, as a result of land dispossession that occurred under the Black (or 
Natives) Land Act No. 27 (1913) and the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970, the white 
minority held approximately 87 % of land and the majority were confined to the remaining 
13%.773 As a result, the first post- apartheid government led by President Mandela and the African 
National Congress planned to redistribute 30% of the land over a period of 20 years of 
democracy, so that black people would own 43%.774 In 2004, beside the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act, a Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the 
South African mineral industry was released. This document called for the transfer of mineral 
assets’ ownership to historically disadvantaged South Africans. In 2010, a reviewed version of 
this Charter underlined that 26% of this transfer must be achieved before 2014. One year later, the 
South African Chamber of Mines announced that 28% of mineral assets were already owned by 
blacks.775 By the beginning of 2012, the South African mineral resources minister made a 
statement at the Indaba Conference in Cape Town that “South Africa will not nationalise its 
                                                             
772 ANC YL Discussion Document “Towards the transfer of mineral...”, supra note 182. 
773 Levin R. and Weiner D. “The agrarian question and emergence of conflicting agricultural strategies” in South 
Africa” in Matlhape S. and Munz A. (eds.) Towards a New Agrarian Democratic Order (Amsterdam: Saert 1991) 
91.  
774 Modisane C. “Why SA needs nationalisation” (2012); Available at  http://www.news24.com/MyNews24/Why-
SA-needs-nationalisation-20120624 [accessed on 8/3/2013]. 
775   Cohen M. “Black Ownership of South Africa’s Mining Industry at 28%, Chamber Says”; Available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-24/black-ownership-of-south-africa-s-mining-industry-at-28-chamber-
says.html [accessed on 9/3/2013]. 
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mines” while later on that same year the ANC youth leader Julius Malema and his supporters kept 
on claiming nationalisation.776  
All these positions reveal a serious conflict of opinion within the South African society, as well as 
the extent to which the mineral industry is contemplated by the people as a key factor for its 
development.777 In fact, it seems that the populist views that advocate nationalisation want 
ownership of mineral resources to be restored to the people as a whole, while the government 
whose positions have been controversial778sees the alternative to be simply the increase of private 
ownership to the historically disadvantaged South Africans, who appear to be mainly blacks. This 
divergence of opinion points to the fact that the issue is beyond a simple crystallisation of the 
principle in the legislation and lies in practical aspects. Indeed, as was already mentioned, on a 
simple rhetoric stance, there is no need for nationalisation because the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act has already vested ownership in the nation.  
Despite the need for land reforms, the priority in the mineral industry today is to reflect on the 
implementation of better strategies to redistribute mineral wealth and benefits to all South 
Africans on an equal basis. As Godsell aptly underlines, the real issue is how South Africa can 
best achieve the creation of wealth and its fair distribution.779 It would be irrational to interpret 
sovereignty over natural resources as meaning that every South African should possess a mineral 
company; while at the same time it must be accepted that no matter who runs the business (state 
or private owners), people must enjoy benefits generated from this industry as part of this 
sovereignty. This is where the conception of a people’s right as entrenched in the African Charter 
can really help to solve the problem. It is not about writing the word “nationalisation” within the 
law, but to clearly establish what the prerogatives of those who the law entrusted with economic 
sovereignty, are. Therefore, it is relevant to interpret the statement in the Mineral and Petrolum 
                                                             
776 Hweshe F. “South Africa 'will not nationalise mines'” , available at 
http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/policies/mining-070212.htm[accessed 8/3/2013]. 
777 This is understandable in so far as South Africa represents the the world’s largest reserves of platinum, manganese, 
chrome, vanadium and gold. Chamber of Mines “Facts & figures” (2010); Available at 
http://www.bullion.org.za/Publications/Facts&Figures2009/F&F2009.pdf[accessed on 9/3/2013]. 
778 The controversy can be perceived if one for instance compares the government position held in the white 
paper regarding the need to vest mineral resources in the state and the one expressed at the Indaba 
conference in 2012. 
779 See the view of Godsell has quoted by Mathebe A. South African nationalization (Bloomington: Xlibris 
publishing, 2010) 11. 
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Resources Development Act on nation ownership in the light of what has been the interpretation 
of article 21 of the African Charter in the African Commission jurisprudence.  
As already mentioned in chapter 2, this study focuses more on the situation at the local level 
rather than at the national one. The key issue is whether affected communities in South Africa 
have any claim to sovereign rights with regard to mineral resources found in their areas. It is 
nevertheless suitable to suggest that debaters should have a comparative look at what has been the 
experience, cost and results in other African resource-richcountries that went through that 
process.780 
In DRC, the ownership of mineral resources is determined by the general clause found in article 9 
of the Constitution (2006) which holds that “the state exercises permanent sovereignty, including soil, 
sub-soil, water and forests, the air spaces, river, lake and sea...” 
This provision is unclear whether or not the exercise of sovereignty by the state is to be 
interpreted as its ownership of mineral resources. An interpretation along the lines of the 
ownership being vested in the state is very plausible considering the fact that no reference is made 
to the Congolese people in this article. This was the case in past constitutions where it was said 
explicitly that the soil and the sub-soil belonged to the state.781 If this interpretation is the one to 
be accepted, it therefore stands in stark contrast to the African Charter which vests sovereignty in 
the people rather than the state. 
In Zambia, the Mines and Mineral Development Act 7 (2008) provides in section 3 that “All 
rights of ownership in, searching for, and mining and disposing of, minerals are hereby vested in 
the President on behalf of the Republic.”782 
 
This provision clearly established that ownership of mineral resources is vested in the president. 
One can therefore easily contend that in Zambia, sovereign rights over natural resources are the 
rights of the ruler rather than the people, as was assumed in Jackson’s remarks. However, such an 
interpretation would be in stark contrast with section 1(2) of the Constitution (1996) which 
                                                             
780 See for instance, the case of Gecamines in DRC (1967) or ZCCM in Zambia (1968) which collapsed after a 
government decision to nationalise. 
781 See art. 14 of the 1967 Constitution as revised on 31/12/1971 and art. 9 of the 2003 Constitution.  
782 The same provision was already present in the Zambia Mines & Minerals Act No 31 (1995). 
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provides that “All power resides in the people who shall exercise their sovereignty through the 
democratic institutions of the State in accordance with this Constitution.” 
 
If section 3 of the Zambian Mineral Act had to be confronted with this constitutional provision, 
the president would just act as a representative of the people who actually are the real owners of 
the sovereignty over natural resources, otherwise there would be incompatibility between the two 
legal texts. 
 
To sum up this point on mineral resources ownership, one can easily observe that every national 
system has its own perception of sovereignty over natural resources, which does not necessarily 
match the one prevailing at the continental level pursuant to the African Charter. What is 
advisable is that provisions of national law be interpreted with regard to article 21 of the African 
Charter and that whenever there is incompatibility, this latter provision should prevail. This is 
because following section 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a state party to a 
treaty cannot invoke its international law as justification for its failure to apply it.783 However, the 
conclusion reached by Viljoen after his survey of the application of the African Charter in 16 
African countries, is that this legal instrument is invoked by domestic courts depending on the 
status that it enjoys in that national system.784 If in countries with a monistic system, the 
invocation of the African Charter provisions can be done directly, this is not however the case in 
countries with a dualistic system where an Act of Parliament needs to be passed before it can 
come into effect. Neverthess, no matter the arrangements made at the national level, it is clear that 
the African Charter will prevail and be applied whenever a case is dealt with at the level of the 
African Commission or the African Court.785 Therefore, since all African countries have ratified 
the African Charter, one can firmly conclude that sovereignty over wealth and natural resources is 
a fundamental right of the people and not of their states or rulers. 
 
But the question is whether a portion of the population living within the country, namely an 
affected community, can be entitled to resort to this right to claim their right to control mineral 
projects within their area.  
                                                             
783 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties adopted in 1969. 
784 Viljoen F. “Application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights by domestic courts in Africa” 
43 (1)(1999) Journal of African Law 15. 
785 Arts.1 and 62 of the African Charter. 
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If local communities were entitled to invoke sovereign control over the mineral industry, the 
implication would be that sovereignty can be conceived not only at the national level, but at the 
local one as well. For indigenous peoples this possibility has already been acknowledged under 
international law,786 but the question remains open for other communities that are not regarded as 
indigenous.787 What would be the legal base for their claim to control governance of mineral 
resources within their areas?  
 
Firstly, because equality is a fundamental right, it can be contended that it would be unfair to 
restrain this prerogative only to indigenous peoples. It is a principle of international law that all 
peoples, both at national or local levels, are to be treated equal.788 Thus, if indigenous peoples 
have a right over natural resources, the concept of “equality” imposes also that such recognition 
be given toother local communities. Secondly, in the context of this study, the best answer to this 
question should be sought in the extent to which the African Commission has interpreted the 
concept “people”. As stressed earlier, the African Commission has applied this concept to local 
communities living within a country, provided only that they have enough distinctive features to 
be identified as a people.789 When applying the people’s rights, the African Commission does not 
seem to make a difference between indigenous and other communities. For instance in the 
Katangese case, the African Commission did not look at the internal composition of the people, 
asserting that whether they consist of one or more ethnic groups was of no relevance.790 In the 
Endorois case, the African Commission even held a generalised discourse twice, asserting 
explicitly that “a people inhabiting a specific region within a state could also claim under article 
21of the African Charter.”791 
 
The same approach was adopted by the Working Group on Indigenous People established by the 
African Commission in 2000 with the mandate to study the implication of the African Charter for 
                                                             
786 UNDRIP (2007) 
787 The term “indigenous” refers often to the people who first occupy the land. But it may happen that an ethnic group 
or community has established itself later on in an area, without being the first occupant. Should they be denied 
this right even though their livelihood is dependent on natural resources found in their area?    
788 See art. 2 of the UNDRIP (2007). 
789 See the Endorois case, supra note 67, para. 162. 
790 See the Katangese case, supra note 67, para. 3. 
791 See the Endorois case, supra note 67, paras. 255, 267. 
190 
 
the indigenous people’s well-being and make appropriate recommendations thereto. In its final 
report to the Commission, this working group held the view that: 
 
... as the African Charter recognises collective rights, formulated as rights of 
‘peoples’, these rights should be available to sections of populations within 
nation states, including indigenous people and communities.792 
 
Therefore, the main requirement for the application of article 21 as for all other people’s 
rights in the African Charter, seems to be simply that the affected community must be 
regarded as a “people”, no matter it being indigenous or not. Now, whether the people’s 
right in article 21 has to be formally called sovereignty or not does not really matter. What is 
critical is that because it is a fundamental right that is bestowed upon affected communities 
at a local level, they must enjoy a certain level of power that enables them to protect their 
vital interests. In this context, an affected community which constitutes a “people” can rely 
on article 21 of the African Charter in so far as its rights and interests are concerned.  
 
3.2.2.2.2 Interpretation of the right in the jurisprudence of the African Commission 
 
Thus far, the African Commission has received up to 13 cases alleging a violation of article 
21 of the African Charter, but it is only in three communications that the infringement was 
established.793 The first case where the Commission found a violation was the one of Ogonis 
submitted in 1996.794 In this case, the military government of Nigeria was accused of having 
infringed on people’s rightsin the Niger Delta through activities of the state oil company, the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC), where it was part of the shareholders 
together with Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC). In respect of article 21, 
the complainants contended that a violation had occurred because the Nigerian government 
failed to monitor the NNPC’s operation and had paved the way to the exploitation of oil 
reserves in Ogoniland, and also because the Ogonis were not part of the decisional process 
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that led to this exploitation.795 The African Commission upheld these contentions in the 
following terms: 
 
The destructive and selfish role played by oil development in Ogoniland, 
closely tied with repressive tactics of the Nigerian Government, and the lack of 
material benefits accruing to the local population, may well be said to constitute 
a violation of article 21.796 
 
The second case where article 21 was found infringed on, was in the inter-state 
communication opposing DRC v. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda.797 In this case, DRC had 
alleged the violations of some fundamental rights, including the one in article 21, by the 
respective armies of these countries in the eastern part of the country where there had been 
rebels’ activities since August 1998.798 In its decision on the merits, the African 
Commission found that the illegal exploitation and looting of natural resources of DRC by 
these armies amounted to a violation of the fundamental rights entrenched in article 21 of 
the African Charter.799 
 
The third case is the Endorois case. In this communication, the complainants alleged that the 
government of Kenya had infringed on the African Charter by forcibly removing the 
Endorois from their ancestral lands, without proper prior consultation and adequate and 
effective compensation.800 In respect of article 21, the complainants alleged that the forced 
eviction had prevented the Endorois community from access to vital resources and that the 
mineral concessions that had been granted in the land did not give them a share in the 
exploitation, and as such they constituted an infringement.801 The African Commission 
found that because the Endorois had never received adequate compensation or restitution of 
their land, the respondent state had violated article 21.802 
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From these African Commission cases, there are interesting conclusions to be drawn from 
for this study. Firstly, these cases demonstrate that the fundamental right contained in article 
21 can be exercised both at the national level and the local one. Secondly, they reveal that 
the application of this article to a local community simply requires that this community can 
be regarded as a “people”, even if it is not an indigenous one. Thirdly, another conclusion 
that emerged especially from the Endorois case is that the exercise by a local community of 
prerogatives flowing from article 21 is not absolute, but conditioned by a necessary 
relationship with the livelihood of this community.803 Drawing on an example from the 
Inter-American Court, the African Commission has embraced the view that affected 
communities enjoy prerogatives attached to article 21 only in so far as the exploitation of the 
mineral resources affects their livelihood and that in such a case the state is compelled to 
consult them.804 But in practice, simply because mineral activities always have an 
environmental impact, it is quite obvious that affected communities arealways likely to be in 
a position to exercise their prerogatives contained in article 21 and make the implementation 
of any project or policy dependent upon their consent.  
Fourthly, article 21 constitutes the legal base upon which affected communities are entitled 
to claim material benefits in the course of mineral resources exploitation.805 This may 
include benefits like the construction of necessary infrastructure for the community and the 
retrocession of mineral royalties. Whenever an affected community can establish that they 
enjoy no benefits, a breach of article 21 will occur. 
Community participation is a powerful tool that enables affected communities to uphold 
their fundamental rights in article 21. By effectively participating in the decision-making 
process of mineral policies and projects that have direct implications for their life, affected 
communities are given the opportunity to secure their vital interests.  
In the Ogonis case, the African Commission made the following observation: 
 Furthermore, in all their dealings with the oil consortiums, the government did 
not involve the Ogoni communities in the decisions that affected the development 
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of Ogoniland. The destructive and selfish role played by oil development in 
Ogoniland, closely tied with repressive tactics of the Nigerian Government, and 
the lack of material benefits accruing to the local population, may well be said to 
constitute a violation of Article 21.806 
 
To draw this conclusion that article 21 was violated, the African Commission has brought 
forward two elements. These are the non-involvement of Ogonis in the decision-making and 
their non-sharing of material benefits in the course of the exploitation. If a relationship 
between these two elements can be attempted, one can logically assume that the 
participation of affected communities in the decision-making process is a means through 
which these latter communities can make sure that they obtain some material benefits to 
which they are entitled pursuant to article 21. The connection between the two is simple to 
establish. On the one end, following the formulation of article 21, the main purpose of this 
provision is to guarantee the enjoyment of material benefits to affected communities, protect 
them against illegal exploitation and provide them with compensation in case of spoliation, 
while on the other hand, as underlined previously, the main motivation for affected 
community participation is the need to ensure that their view is considered in the decision.  
In such a context, community participation is a key strategy through which objectives 
attached to the fundamental right entrenched in article 21 can be achieved. The same 
principle of participation was underlined in the Endorois case in which the African 
Commission observed that the exercising of the fundamental right in article 21 requires the 
consultation of the affected community.807 
3.2.2.3 The right to development 
 
3.2.2.3.1 Scope of the right 
 
Article 22 of the African Charter provides: 
 
All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural development 
with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the 
common heritage of mankind. 2. States shall have the duty, individually or 
collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development. 
                                                             
806 The Ogoni case, supra note 104, para. 55. 
807 The Endorois case, supra note 67, para. 268. 
194 
 
 
Development is the highest aspiration of any people. This is the reason why it appears today 
among people’s rights. However, the compatibility between development and fundamental 
rights has been a serious issue dividing economists and jurists for a long time. This 
divergence of approaches is well summed up in the writings of Seymour and Pincus as 
follows:  
 The relationship between the disciplines of [fundamental] rights theory and 
economics is often awkward and at times openly hostile. Departing from contrasting 
conceptions of ‘the good’, mainstream economists and rights theorists have tended 
to talk past, rather than to, each other. Thus, for many economists, any attempt to 
posit and enforce a [fundamental] right to basic services is either fanciful or 
counterproductive, or both. [Fundamental] rights theorists counter that economists 
are too quick to hide behind the impracticality of realising rights, particularly 
economic and social rights, when in many cases violations are primarily the result of 
explicit political decisions rather than resource scarcity or other physical or 
institutional limitations.808 
 
As a result, it was assumed that fundamental rights must be undermined for the sake of 
economic development.809 An argument advanced by proponents of this view has been that an 
exaggerate attention to rights instead of duties does not match the requirements of production 
and consumption.810 For instance, the fundamental rights discourse was seen as an impediment 
to the need for a strong state able to enforce some unpopular measures such as the forced 
labour of people or any other relevant decision to advance the economy.811 However, over the 
years, reactions have emerged against this separatist view. Progressive scholars have rejected 
this assumption and rather advocated a concept of development which is integrative of 
fundamental rights. Among them, there is Osibanjo who used the experience with past military 
regimes in Nigeria to demonstrate the fallacy of the argument that compromising fundamental 
rights may be necessary for rapid economic development.812 This scholar observes that 
fundamental rights’ violations actually constitute a subterfuge and catalyst for corruption, 
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which in practice declines efforts made to achieve development goals.813  Another objection 
comes from Tlakula who contends that gross violations of fundamental rights is inimical to a 
long lasting development and that this latter cannot be nurtured in countries where the rule of 
law does not exist and where people are marginalised and live in degrading conditions.814 As 
to Olowu, he insists on the necessity to link fundamental rights to development discourses and 
considers that the fulfilment of fundamental rights is part of the process for the achievement of 
development.815 
There is no way that one can speak development nowadays where fundamental rights are not 
given proper consideration. From a formalistic point of view, this progressive approach to the 
relationship between development and fundamental rights peaked in the UN 1986 declaration 
which recognised development as a fundamental right. In this declaration not only 
fundamental rights are seen as a component of a true development, but development itself is 
part of those fundamental rights. This is what progressive scholarship qualifies henceforth as 
therights-based approach to development.816 Under this approach, it is asserted that the 
improvement of well-being which is the ultimate goal of development implies the realisation 
of fundamental rights.817 It is in this respect that Panda points out, for instance,that the process 
towards the realisation of development implies the exercise of the following rights:  
 ...sovereignty over natural resources, self-determination, popular participation 
in development, equality of opportunity [and] the creation of favourable 
conditions for the enjoyment of other civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights.818 
 
In the context of this study, it is relevant to recall that the late Senegalese jurist M’Baye was 
one of the first scholars to express the idea of a right to development in his 1972 inaugural 
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lecture at the International Institute for Human Rights.819 This remark is important because 
M’Baye is one of the founding fathers of the African Charter. It can therefore be assumed that 
he has played a critical role in the inclusion and formulation of this provision. However, while 
M’Baye’s understanding of this right implies both an individual dimension and a collective 
one, the formulation of article 22 seems to look at this right only from the latter perspective.820 
This is because when compared to the formulation found in the article 1 (1) of the UN 
Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRD) where it is mentioned that it is a right 
enjoyed by both “every human being” and “all people”, article 22 of the African Charter only 
refers to “all people”. Discussing the content of this right in general, Ouguergouz embraced a 
balanced approach which looks at the right to development as “an individual right which can 
be exercised collectively”.821 However, if one considers Ouguergouz’s theory of “synthesis 
right” and the rights-based conception which both imply that development in substance 
implies the fulfillment of all fundamental rights,822 it becomes obvious that it should not be 
regarded as a right that can be exercised either individually or collectively only. Since, 
individuals’ rights are distinct from people’s rights and that as fundamental rights, both types 
are relevant to the achievement of development, the right to development is undoubtedly made 
of both dimensions. So contrarily to Ouguergouz’s restrictive approach, it can also be 
conceived as a prerogative to be exercised by a people in a collective way. The question is 
now whether and, if yes, how far affected communities may exercise this fundamental right in 
the mineral industry. 
 
As for other people’s rights, the question whether an affected community can rely on the 
people’s right to development as entrenched in article 22 is determined by the extent to which 
the African Commission has approached the concept “people”. As observed previously, the 
Commission has embraced an extensive conception including communities living within a 
country. Therefore, it is clear that affected communities may rely on article 22 to secure their 
right to development in connection with mineral policy and projects having a direct impact on 
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their livelihood. The African Commission jurisprudence on the right to development that will 
be reviewed in the next paragraph provides evidence of this fact. However, the critical 
question is how far an affected community can claim to exercise this prerogative in a context 
where a country always consists of different ethnic groups and communities living inside its 
territory. 
 
The first step in answering this question is to distinguish between the development plan 
designed at the national level and the one made at the level of each community. It is clear that 
affected communities would be entitled to exercise their prerogative attached to the provision 
of article 22 only in respect of the development plan designed at the local level. But even in 
this case, the central government must use its margin of autonomy to make sure that the plans 
made locally do not encroach upon development objectives defined nationally. For instance, 
in respect of benefits generated by the mineral industry and as all areas of a country are not 
always endowed with the same quantity of resources, the central government must ensure that 
tension does not arise between communities by implementing a national policy of fair 
redistribution.823 It is not because an affected community is entitled to exercise its 
fundamental right in respect of mineral projects affecting its livelihood, that benefits must 
accrue only to that community and generate an “island of development”.824 This is why 
community participation as envisaged in this study rests on the principle that development 
objectives defined at local level must fit in the general development process of the country.825 
In other words, the exercise of the fundamental right to development at local level must be 
done in a compatible way with its exercise at the national level.  
 
3.2.2.3.2 Interpretation of the right in the jurisprudence of the African Commission 
 
The African Commission has had the opportunity to decide on the fundamental rights’ 
development entrenched in article 22 in three cases, namely the DRC and Endorois cases 
already mentioned and the Sudan Human Rights Organisations and Centre on Housing 
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Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Sudan.826 Before reviewing the stance taken by the African 
Commission in these cases, one can notice that surprisingly article 22 was not alleged to be 
infringing on the Ogoni case. This is surprising because the way the oil project was reported 
to be badly managed before the Communication should have led to the conclusion that the 
Ogonis’s rights to development in article 22 had been violated. Nevertheless, because of the 
interconnection of development with some other fundamental rights, the same conclusion was 
reached based on other provisions of the African Charter.827 
 
In the DRC case, the African Commission analysed the fundamental right to development in 
article 22 in respect of the whole population, and established a link with the violation of 
article 21, contending that the deprivation of the Congolese people’s right to freely dispose of 
their wealth and natural resources had also occasioned the violation of their right to 
development.828 
 
As to the Endorois case, the complainant alleged that the failure of the Kenyan government to 
involve Endorois in the development process and ensure the continued improvement of their 
well-being amounted to a violation of article 22.829 The African Commission upheld this 
contention and found that the respondent state had failed to create conditions favourable for 
Endorois’ development inter alia by excluding them from the decision-making process 
regarding the mineral project undertaken in their land and not providing them with adequate 
compensation for the loss of their land.830 
 
In the Sudanese case, the African Commission had to deal with an alleged violation of article 
22 in that the complainant contended that attacks and forced displacement against 
communities living in the Darfur region of Sudan denied them the opportunity to engage in 
economic activities.831 The African Commission ruled that this right had been effectively 
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violated and urged the Sudanese government to rehabilitate economic and social 
infrastructure such as education, health, water and agricultural services in order to facilitate 
the return of the displaced people.832 
 
What can be learned from this jurisprudence is the principle developed by the African 
Commission that, be it at the national or local levels, whenever an activity threatens the well-
being of the people, it automatically violates article 22. Therefore, because the respect and 
fulfilment of fundamental rights are part of the people’s well-being, there is no way the 
mineral industry can contribute to the achievement of development of affected communities 
while degrading their well-being through violation of fundamental rights.  
 
To perceive how community participation contributes to the fulfilment of the fundamental 
right to development in article 22, one needs to look at the reasoning made by the African 
Commission in respect of the right to freedom of choice. In the Endorois case, the African 
Commission embraced the view that “freedom of choice” is part of the right to development 
and that a “lack of choice” contradicts the guarantees of the right.833 This assertion simply 
implies that in the development process, people have the right to choose which development 
model is right for them. Implicitly, the possibility to express this choice requires that the 
beneficiaries of the development foreseen, participate and determine the suitability of any 
project which impacts on the development process. In the Ogoni case, though article 22 was 
not involved, the African Commission rebuked the Nigerian government as well for not 
involving the Ogonis in the decisions affecting the development of Ogoniland.834 Therefore, it 
is clear that the African Commission sees participation as a way to guarantee that the right to 
development and all commitments that it requires are respected in the implementation of any 
policy or project relevant thereto. It is at this level that community participation is to be 
viewed as relevant for the fulfilment of the right to development in connection with mineral 
activities affecting them. 
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What is particularly relevant to observe is that the African Commission has rejected the conception 
of participation which would amount to a simple consultation, emphasising rather the imperative 
that for participation to be effective and fruitful, it must generate the free, prior and informed 
consent of the people.835 Thus, because the freedom to choose is part of the right to development, 
effective community participation contributes somehow to the fulfillment of this fundamental 
right. It is through effective community participation that affected communities may express their 
choices in the mineral resources governance and canalise benefits coming from there towards the 
achievement of development objectives set at the local level.  
3.2.2.4 The right to environment  
 
3.2.2.4.1 Scope of the right 
 
Article 24 of the African Charter provides that “All peoples shall have the right to a general 
satisfactory environment favourable to their development.” 
 
This provision of article 24 clearly situated the fundamental right to environment in the context of 
development. For decades, there has been a tug of war between both areas. Environment and 
development were viewed as irreconcilable opposites.836 But, since the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development of 1992, the ideological trend has shifted. The interrelationship 
between the environment and development has been increasingly asserted837 to such an extent that 
it is now widely recognised that, for long-term economic development to be sustainable, 
environmental quality must be conserved. As a consequence, foreign investment activities, that 
are an engine of economic growth, have found themselves facing higher environmental standards 
than in the past.838 It is in this dimension that the fundamental right to environment must be 
analysed in respect of the relationship between affected communities and mineral companies.  
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Zazueta observes that very often marginalised groups benefit the least from unchecked economic 
growth while bearing a high burden of environmental degradation.839 This is particularly true in 
respect of mineral activities which are naturally damaging to the environment, but for which 
affected communities in Africa often reap little benefits.840 It has become a tradition for many 
African governments to require an assessment of environmental impacts before the mineral permit 
is delivered to the operator. However, as demonstrated in the introduction of the study, this 
procedure has often failed to protect the environmental right of affected communities because of 
their exclusion or marginalisation among stakeholders, and also because of factors like corruption 
within the government and mismanagement of public funds. The effective enforcement of article 
24 of the African Charter should actually meet this deficiency and offer a better guarantee to the 
beneficiaries of the right. Nevertheless, the formulation of article 24 is unclear as to the real 
content of the fundamental right to environment that at times has led to a paradoxical 
interpretation. Some scholars have deduced from the formulation of article 24 that this provision 
implies that development considerations must be given preference over environmental measures 
in the event of conflict between the two and that it can only be invoked where it will not infringe 
on the requirements of development.841 It is clear that in the context of this study, this approach 
cannot be given consideration, because sustainable development as defined in chapter two implies 
that a true development cannot be reached without the respect for fundamental rights, among 
which the environmental right appears as a critical one because it concerns not only conditions of 
present generations but of the future ones as well. As aptly observed by Amechi, the inclusion of 
this fundamental right in the African Charter is to be regarded as an acknowledgement of the 
importance of a healthy environment for the development of Africa.842 Indeed, instead of 
embracing an interpretation that tends to devaluate environmental considerations in the 
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development process, article 24 should be understood as promoting a model of development 
which accommodates the environment within which its beneficiaries are living.  
 
In terms of beneficiaries, contrarily to the approach developed in the American systems that look 
at the fundamental right to environment as an individual right,843 the African Charter entrenches it 
as a “people’s right”. In this context, it is clear that the fundamental right to environment should 
be enjoyed not only by the whole population, but also to communities living within the country. 
This is a logical inference in so far as environmental degradation can directly affect groups of 
people living in a specific corner of the country.  
 
Also concerning the scope of this fundamental right, it does require not only a prior assessment 
before the starting of the project, but also the implementation of the project in a less damaging 
manner and the obligation to rehabilitate the land after mineral exploitation.844 It is at these three 
levels that affected communities can make use of article 24. In any case, affected communities can 
recourse to the preventive strategy developed in western societies in order to deal with 
environmental degradation. Indeed in Europe as in the United States, the subscription of an 
environmental assurance is often demanded prior to development for various polluting 
activities.845 Following their fundamental right in article 24, affected communities may compel 
mineral corporations to present such insurance as a precondition to the starting of the mineral 
project. Of course, to apply this strategy will require new developments in the insurance market of 
African countries, because the common regime would be insufficient to support the cost of 
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environmental damage which is always high. If this technique is applied, it may help affected 
communities to secure their compensation for environmental damages. 
 
3.2.2.4.2 Interpretation of the right in the jurisprudence of the African Commission 
 
In respect of affected communities, the only case that has directly involved article 24 is the one 
related to the situation of Ogonis. When one considers the increase of mineral activities all over 
the continent these last years, this poor statistic confirms the assumption made at the beginning of 
this study, that the application of the African Charter provisions in the mineral sector has been a 
less explored option. 
 
In the Ogonis case, the African Commission explicitly held that: 
 
The right to a general satisfactory environment, as guaranteed under article 24 of the 
African Charter or the right to a healthy environment, as it is widely known, therefore 
imposes clear obligations upon a government. It requires the state to take reasonable 
and other measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote 
conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable development and use of 
natural resources.”846 
 
When explaining the meaning of this assertion, the Commission stressed that the 
government is obliged to order or at least permit independent scientific monitoring 
whenever the environment is likely to be threatened by a project, publish environmental 
and social impact studies prior to any major industrial development operation and provide 
affected communities with information and meaningful opportunities for their members to 
participate in the final decision.847 This African Commission’s approach demonstrates 
clearly that the government has an active role to play in respect of the protection of 
environment. It must not be passive. Moreover, the fact that the government must be 
involved in environmental protection does not deny the principle that those whose 
livelihood would be affected must participate in the decision-making process. The Nigerian 
government was blamed by the African Commission because it failed to involve the 
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Ogonis in all its dealings with oil consortiums.848 This same principle that led the African 
Commission in the Endorois case to assert that affected communities have a right to free, 
prior and informant consent in matters of capital importance849 is equally valid when it 
comes to policy or decisions that raise environmental issues. 
 
The implementation of these obligations raises some practical difficulties. For instance, with 
regard to the independent monitoring, a study from Amnesty has pointed out that African 
governments have generally little capacity to initiate this process with the consequence that the 
task is often left to the companies themselves that finally supply the government with data that are 
rarely verified.850 Moreover, the same report has come up with the observation that it is hard for 
the government to implement its obligations in connection with fundamental rights every time that 
it is itself among the shareholders of the mineral company.851 These difficulties therefore stand as 
a strong argument to support community participation because it can help people to themselves 
supply the shortcomings of their rulers regarding the protection of their vital interests. However, 
environmental issues require a certain level of scientific knowledge which is not always at the 
reach of members of affected communities. This is probably what led one scholar to observe that 
villagers or peasants are sometimes right and sometimes wrong when it comes at solving 
environmental problems and that the key solution is to create a process through which the views 
of all stakeholders are tested in order to come up with a decision that is comprehensible and 
rational.852 
 
Community participation is the tool through which affected communities are empowered to watch 
over their environmental rights at all stages of mineral exploitation. An affected community that 
takes part in the process before the implementation of the policy or project, during the execution 
of mineral projects or then, at the closure is able at each stage to oppose any threat or violation of 
its fundamental right to environment as entrenched in article 24. To the extent that this provision 
can be legally enforced, community participation offers a wonderful platform to affected 
communities to resist the forced implementation of policy and project by the government and 
                                                             
848 See the Ogonis case, supra note 104, para. 55. 
849 See the Endorois case, supra note 67, para. 291;  
850 Amnesty International “Nigeria: Petroleum, pollution and …”, supra note 342, 50. 
851 Id., 50. 
852 Zazueta (1995) vii. 
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mineral corporations which is generally accompanied by oppression. Not only do they need to be 
informed and heard, but their point of view must determine the viability of the policy and 
project.853 
 
3.2.3 Application of the African Charter provisions in the mineral sector 
 
The application of the African Charter in the mineral industry is of capital importance to this study 
because it determines how far affected communities can rely on this instrument to secure their 
fundamental rights in respect of projects that have serious implications for their development. 
Generally, a distinction is made between the vertical application and the horizontal one. 
 
3.2.3.1 Vertical application 
 
The conventional wisdom so far is that international human rights law creates obligations 
or places duties only on states.854 This is what is known as the vertical application meaning 
that individuals are protected against the violation of their fundamental rights by the state 
or public bodies or officers acting on behalf of the state.855 It is in this context that the 
African Commission has made clear what the obligations of states’ parties to the African 
Charter are. In the Ogonis case, the Commission pointed out four levels at which 
obligations of the states were manifested. The states have the obligation to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil fundamental rights 
 
The obligation to respect entails that:  
 
                                                             
853 See the Endorois case, supra note 67, para. 291; the Ogonis case, supra note 104, paras.52, 55. 
854 Knox JH. “Horizontal Human rights law” 120 (1) (2008) American Journal of International Law 1, 
Christoffersen J. “Denmark Drittwirkung and conflicting rights-viewed from national and international 
perspectives” in Oliver D. and Fedtke J. (eds.) Human Rights and the private sphere (London: Routledge, 
2007) 34; De Brabandere E. “Human rights considerations in international investment arbitration” in 
Fitzmaurice M. And Merkouris P. (eds.) The interpretation and application of the European Convention 
of Human rights: Legal and practical implications (Boston/Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) 183-2016. 
855 Corrin F. “From horizontal and vertical to lateral: extending the effect of human rights in post colonial 
legal systems of the south pacific” (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 31. 
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the State should refrain from interfering in the enjoyment of all fundamental 
rights; it should respect right-holders, their freedoms, autonomy, resources, and 
liberty of their action. With respect to socio economic rights, this means that the 
State is obliged to respect the free use of resources owned or at the disposal of 
the individual alone or in any form of association with others, including the 
household or the family, for the purpose of rights-related needs. And with 
regard to a collective group, the resources belonging to it should be respected, 
as it has to use the same resources to satisfy its needs.856 
 
The state is also obliged: 
 
 to protect right-holders against other subjects by legislation and provision of 
effective remedies. This obligation requires the State to take measures to protect 
beneficiaries of the protected rights against political, economic and social 
interferences. Protection generally entails the creation and maintenance of an 
atmosphere or framework by an effective interplay of laws and regulations so 
that individuals will be able to freely realize their rights and freedoms.857 
 
The obligation to promote is interwined: 
 
 with the tertiary obligation of the State to promote the enjoyment of all human 
rights. The State should make sure that individuals are able to exercise their 
rights and freedoms, for example, by promoting tolerance, raising awareness, 
and even building infrastructures.858 
 
Finally the state is obliged:  
to fulfil the rights and freedoms it freely undertook under the various human 
rights regimes. It is more of a positive expectation on the part of the State to 
move its machinery towards the actual realisation of the rights. This is also 
very much intertwined with the duty to promote mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph. It could consist in the direct provision of basic needs such as food or 
resources that can be used for food (direct food aid or social security).859 
 
This description of states parties’ obligations by the African Commission is explicit enough 
that one can easily anticipate and capture what is expected from the government in any 
                                                             
856 See the Ogoni case, supra note 104, para. 45. 
857 Id., para. 46. 
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particular context. In respect of this study, some assertions made by the African Commission 
call for particular attention. Firstly, when the African Commission observes that the state 
must give proper consideration to the resources belonging to a collective group as they are 
supposed to satisfy its needs, this implies that anytime benefits brought by mineral resources 
are not returned to affected communities proportionally to what they may reasonably expect, 
the government is automatically in breach of its obligation to respect. Secondly, the 
government has the duty to protect rights-holders against violations by other subjects. 
Dickson describes the scenario as a complaint by an individual that the state has indirectly 
violated his fundamental right because a non-state actor has transgressed the said 
fundamental right.860 This principle is what led the African Commission to find that the 
Nigerian government was in breach of its obligation to protect the Ogonis, arguing that this 
obligation implies the duty to protect from damaging acts that may be perpetrated by private 
parties.861 If the same principle is to be applied in the context of this study, it means that it is 
the government that is liable towards affected communities for any fundamental rights 
violation by mineral companies. In this regard, Brabandere observes that in the absence of 
directly imposed and enforceable fundamental rights against foreign investors, it is not the 
international responsibility of these latter ones that is at issue, but rather the one of the host 
state.862 This approach makes sense to the extent that at the first front of responsibility, it is 
the government that is accountable towards its people based, as mentioned previously, on 
democratic considerations such as for instance, the fact that representatives are chosen and 
given a mandate through election to uphold people’s interests, and also on the general 
obligation pending upon the host state to exercise control over investments it has admitted 
inside its territory. However, the open question is whether the regime of responsibility should 
stop there and not be somehow extended to the mineral corporation which in practice is the 
effective perpetrator of the fundamental right violation. In practice, when victims are 
                                                             
860 Dickson B. “Horizontal application of Human rights” in Hegarty A. and Leonard S. (eds.) Human rights: 
21st century (London/Sydney: Cavendish Publishing, 1999) 59. 
861 See the Ogoni case, supra note 104, paras. 57-58. 
862De Brabandere (2012) 191. 
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operating on national level, they generally tend to file law suits directly against mineral 
corporations where the domestic law allows such a direct application.863 
 
Another assertion of the African Commission that deserves particular attention is its 
perception of the obligation to promote, which includes the necessity for the government to 
make sure that rights-holders are able to exercise their fundamental rights and freedoms. This 
principle is very critical to the fact that whenever the government does not put in place a 
mechanism or platform through which affected communities can participate in mineral 
projects which impact on their development, it fails to offer them an opportunity to exercise 
their fundamental rights and should therefore be found in breach of its obligation to promote.  
 
3.2.3.2 Horizontal application 
One of the most controversial issues in international human rights law today is whether or 
not its provisions should be applied to private parties and obligations put on them. This is 
what is known as the horizontal application, which means the implementation of fundamental 
rights in the sphere of relations between private parties. At the international law level, such a 
horizontal application has generally not been accepted so far, except now in some criminal 
matters. The classic objection raised against horizontality is often the fact that compulsory 
enforcement would subject individuals to international obligations, whereas international 
human rights law was developed as a tool to protect individuals against the abuse of power 
by states and not otherwise.864 The rationale behind this argument is presumably the 
traditional theory which considers that individuals are not subjects of public international 
law.865 As aptly explained by Manner, this theory suggests that because an individual is not a 
subject of this law, he/she has no rights and duties whatsoever under it and therefore cannot 
invoke its provisions for his/her protection, nor violate its rules.866 However, one can easily 
                                                             
863 See the discussion below related to the horizontal application. 
864 Christoffersen (2007) 34; Kinley D. and Tadaki J. “From talk to walk: the emergence of Human rights 
responsibility for corporations at international law” (2003-2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International 
law  937. 
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observe that from 1896 when the theory was formulated867 up to now, the approach to this 
question has significantly evolved and exceptions to the rule have been established. The fact 
that individuals are at the heart of international human rights law today as “subjects” departs 
from the traditional approach. As such it is a lex specialis. Lopez and Quénivet explain that 
though it is the responsibility of the states to ensure that their legislation complies with 
international treaties on fundamental rights and that their domestic courts deliver judgments 
abiding by international standards, yet individuals enjoy the ability to seek the protection of 
their fundamental rights by bringing a case at the international level.868 
 
This progressive approach strongly raises a parallel reasoning question. If individuals are 
now entitled to be subjects of international law when it comes to the protection of their 
fundamental rights, why should it not be the same in respect of duties or obligations imposed 
by these fundamental rights?  
 
As already observed, the objection rests on the view that international law on fundamental 
rights was developed as a tool to protect individuals against the arbitrary use of power by 
states.869 As a consequence, this legal system does not embrace non-state actors’ 
responsibility, except to the extent that states are made indirectly liable for violations 
committed by them. A well-established exception to this rule in modern international law is 
the possibility now for individuals to be trailed before international criminal jurisdictions for 
serious fundamental rights violations that amount to either crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, genocide or aggression.870 Moreover, despite the traditional objection in international 
law, it is noteworthy that reference to the duties of the individual is not unknown to the 
universal and regional systems.871 The African Charter is very explicit in this regard as it 
does not just include the concept of “individual duties”, but provides a more extensive and 
                                                             
867 Id. 
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detailed enumeration which is the result of its drafters’ belief that formulations in other 
international instruments were so vague as to be meaningless.872 From articles 27 to 29, the 
African Charter enumerates explicitly what the duties of individuals are, such as for instance 
the mutual respect and tolerance towards a fellow being.  
 
In the context of this study, what actually deserves particular attention in the African Charter 
is not only the fact that it offers a detailed enumeration of individuals’ duties, but that it 
explicitly establishes the principle according to which “the enjoyment of rights and freedoms 
also implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone.”873An interaction between 
rights and duties should imply that for every fundamental right entrenched in the African 
Charter there is a corresponding obligation not only explicitly for the state, but implicitly for 
individuals as well in their mutual relations.874 The evidence of this is more obvious in the 
context of human development where the necessity for individuals to respect each others’ 
fundamental rights is perceived as part of the general obligation pending upon members of 
the society to advance and enhance the development process.875 Thus, the development 
context is the appropriate standpoint from which the interdependence principle between 
fundamentals rights and obligations attached to them can be well apprehended in respect of 
private parties’ duties.  
 
Following the above reflections, especially the one underlying the exception in respect of 
international criminal law, it is legitimate to contend that from a theoretical viewpoint 
nothing prevents individuals from bearing obligations in respect of fundamental rights and 
incuring direct responsibility for their violations. It is more the liability of mineral 
corporations that is at stake. There is no strong legal argument to support the non-liability 
regime of corporation in international law. If this is already happening in the domestic 
system of many countries, there is no valid justification why this should not be the case as 
well under international law.  
                                                             
872 Réunion des experts pour l’élaboration d’un avant-projet de Charte Africaine des droits de l’Homme et 
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Under international law, the question as to what responsibility multinational corporations 
should assume towards the society where they operate, started to be formally envisaged in 
the 1970s. The generic term sometimes used to identify the issue is corporate social 
responsibility (CSR).  In 1974 the UN Economic and Social Council established a 
Commission on Transnational Corporations with the mandate inter alia to elaborate a UN 
Code of conduct on Transnational Corporations.876 The draft of the code that was presented 
to the UN ECOSOC in 1990 was not adopted because of disagreements between the 
developed and developing countries. While the first group sought more protection for 
transnational corporations, the latter group emphasised the need to better regulate the 
activities of these corporations.877 Similar initiatives were undertaken during the same period, 
with the ILO adopting the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy in 1977 and the OECD the Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprise in 1976.878 In 2003, Draft Norms on the responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises were proposed by a Sub-commission of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights.879 Since the document sought to impose binding obligations 
on these entities directly under international human rights law, a vehement opposition 
developed between the business community and fundamental rights advocacy groups, which 
led to the failure of the initiative. In 2005, following the request of the said Commission, UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a special representative on the issue of fundamental 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. Harvard Professor John 
Ruggie was given the assignment to move beyond the stalemate and clarify the roles of both 
state and non-state actors in the cross-cutting relations between business and fundamental 
rights. It is consecutive to this, that a few years later, in 2008 the special representative 
produced a document know as the UN "Protect, Respect and Remedy".880 In 2008, the UN 
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Council on fundamental rights which replaced the above mentioned commission welcome 
the Framework and requested the UN Special representative to make it operational by 2011. 
Therefore, the special representative concretised this assignment in 2011 by formulating 
guiding principles to implement the Framework.881 
 
Other mechanisms of control also exist either at the global level, regional or sub-regional 
ones like the EITI (2002), the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (2003), OECD Due 
Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and 
High Risk Areas (2010), the Mineral Certification Scheme of the International Conference on 
the Great Lakes Region (2010).  
 
All these instruments are constitutive of soft law rather than hard law in so far as they are not 
binding upon corporations but serve simply as guidelines.  Actually, the main weakness of 
the current regime regulating the behaviour of multinational corporations under international 
law is the fact that it rests on the principle of “voluntarism”.882 This principle implies that 
international law is limited to suggesting to multinational corporations which behaviour they 
should adopt, while it is up to their good will to adhere or not to these suggestions.883Indeed, 
guidelines on due diligence suggest precautionary measures that corporations should take, 
especially when working in a context very critical to fundamental rights. In the natural 
resources field, they provide guidance to multinational corporations as to how they should 
conduct their activities. However, nowadays they appear disproportionate to contain the 
power of multinational corporations because they are not assorted with a sanction regime in 
case of non compliance. This shortcoming makes affected communities almost defenceless 
when facing serious violations by mineral corporations. It is a serious flaw in so far as, in its 
current state, international law appears as a limited legal system only able to hold states liable 
for fundamental rights abuses perpetrated by corporations that did not abide by fundamental 
rights standards suggested unto them. This traditional approach is somehow illogic because, 
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except in certain case of legal incapacity,884 one cannot be sued for the criminal activity of 
the main perpetrator, whereas this latter one is being left free of any charge. This is not to 
contend that the state must not incur liability for fundamental rights abuses by corporations 
operating within its territory, but simply that it is irrational that the responsibility regime be 
limited at this level and failed to capture corporations themselves. The huge capacity of 
multinational corporations working in the natural resources field to infringe fundamental 
rights has now been demonstrated in several cases adjudicated world wide.885 It is undeniable 
that a soft law regime appears inadequate to contain their strike-force. As aptly observed by 
Garvey and Newell, the current system of regulation does not match the growing power of 
multinational corporations.886 Along the same line, Mullart argues that the advent of 
economic globalisation has made obsolete the state-centric perception that fundamental rights 
is a domain of governments, because multinational corporations increasingly bear more 
direct responsibility in fundamental rights violations.887 Of course, it is true that from a 
practical standpoint, should such perspective be embraced, the triggering process of their 
responsibility will be very challenging because as a juristic person, they act through their 
representatives. However, should one consider that this legal fiction is a genuine excuse to 
hold them non-liable when they participate somehow in fundamental rights abuses? The 
simple logic commands that someone must directly respond for the grief committed. If the 
state can be held indirectly liable for its lack of due diligence, the corporation itself may be 
directly held responsible at least through its representatives.888 Such a minimalist approach 
will have the advantage to discourage representatives from engaging the corporation into 
activities that may lead to serious fundamental rights abuses.  
 
                                                             
884 See the case of children for who parents or guardian can incur responsibility in certain circumstances. 
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Amao points out that the current limitation existing under international law is the main 
reason of the ongoing failure to establish a workable framework for CSR.889 But a sound 
perception of the problem would lead to take the other way around and consider that it is the 
failure to work out an effective model of CSR by main international law-makers that are 
states, which imposes limitations on international law. The inability of states to come up with 
a common vision about what the legal substance of CSR should be and how its principles 
may be enforced to monitor multinational corporation behaviour890 is the reason why 
corporate liability under international law remains light.891 In the midst of this ambiguity, a 
better strategy can be to leave aside points of disagreement and focus more on common 
grounds or relevant characteristics. Though CSR is generally presented as a broad concept 
which embraces all ethical aspects of doing business in a country, some of the main elements 
that emerge from perceptions developed by scholars in their writings are the necessity to 
meet preconditions for doing business in the society concerned, the imperative of making 
corporation activities profitable to the host community and the need for corporations to 
assume liability for their wrong actions.892Since the UN framework incorporates all these 
elements, it can serve as the normative ground on which discussions can be initiated at a 
global level to agree on a binding regime to held multinational responsible for their 
fundamental rights violations. There is obviously a need for an international law reform in 
the sense of a better protection of fundamental rights against the threat that multinational 
corporations activities represent. The minimum consent already exists now within both 
international and national legal system that at least corporates should be socially responsible, 
so why then continue to promote a soft international law regime which obviously has its 
limitations? Why not seek for a more effective regime?Actually no valid argument can 
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oppose a constraining regime of CSR, not even the view that multinational corporations are 
not direct participants in the elaboration of international law norms.893 Indeed, the adherence 
to the rule of law principle does not require that one has forcefully to be part of the law 
making process before abiding by the rules established under the law in force.894 Otherwise, 
what can then justify the fact that multinational would claim the application of bilateral 
investment treaties in their relations with the host state since they were not participants to the 
elaboration of those treaties? 
 
From a practical standpoint, corporations can well be bearers of fundamental rights 
obligations.895 It is true that corporation as legal persons are fictious and that as such they 
cannot practically always be approached as is the case for natural persons. However, the 
simple fact that corporations are juristic person does not prevent them from being debtors of 
fundamental rights obligations. A capital argument in this regard arises from a simple 
analogy which suggests that if this has to be the case, then the state, because being as well as 
a juristic person, should not be able to incur liability whenever fundamental rights are 
infringed. 
 
The African Commission standard position so far is that international law on fundamental 
rights: 
 
  imposes obligations on States to protect citizens or individuals under their 
jurisdiction from the harmful acts of others. Thus, an act by a private individual 
and therefore not directly imputable to a State can generate responsibility of the 
State, not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence 
[footnote 50] to prevent the violation or for not taking the necessary steps to 
provide the victims with reparation.896 
 
This assertion that was made in a communication brought against the Zimbabwean 
government demonstrates that, despite the recognition of individuals’ duties in the African 
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Charter, the African Commission approach on the issue does not depart from the classic 
approach currently in force under international law. It is on the shoulders of the state that 
liability for corporation wrong doing rests. The same position was held in the historical 
Ogoni case where the African Commission found that the Nigerian Government had violated 
its obligation to protect communities living in the Nigeria Delta against interferences by the 
oil company in the enjoyment of their fundamental rights.897 Nevertheless, despite the lack of 
horizontal direct application, the African Charter remains a suitable legal regulation to 
undertake the protection of affected communities in the governance of mineral resources. 
This is because in terms of rights’ enforcement it offers an additional alternative to affected 
communities whenever national judicial and quasi-judicial bodies fail in this task. The Ogoni 
case demonstrates that whenever the government is involved as a shareholder with the 
mineral company, it is almost utopian to expect that it will enforce fundamental rights 
standards against the joint-venture. In this context, Prihandono observes that, if a violation 
occurred, it is difficult to expect that national courts will maintain their impartiality.898 While 
in the Ogoni case, the African Commission was unable to determine whether local remedies 
were exhausted,899 in the Endorois case, the domestic court in the first instance struck out the 
matter on procedural grounds and then in a second instance, dismissed the case contending 
that the complainants had been properly consulted and compensated for the loss.900 This was 
totally in stark contrast with the decision reached later by the African Commission that held 
that no proper compensation had taken place.901 However, this single case would be 
insufficient to establish the tendency of national courts under the African system to be 
clement towards their government, though as comes out of Moravcsik’s work it is a natural 
predisposition of national courts in this situation to be less active than their international 
counterparts.902 Thus, though the primary forum for the enforcement of fundamental rights 
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lies within the national jurisdiction, it is indubitable that the enforcement machineries set up 
by the African Charter at the regional level should provide affected communities with a 
feeling of more independence and neutrality than domestic courts. It is not always predictable 
how national judges will behave faced with standards imposed by international fundamental 
rights whenever their governments have infringed them.903 
 
Despite the above-mentionned arguments, it would nevertheless be suitable for the African 
system to improve its approach towards horizontal application through, for instance, a future 
revision of the African Charter by the AU that would clearly establish corporate direct 
responsibility for grave fundamental rights abuses.904 However this should not be done in a 
way that would prejudice the promotion of private investment for which the demand is still 
high in most African economies. Indeed, if one considers the observation of Adeyeye 
according to which the need for direct liability of corporations is most obvious when 
considering the case of developing countries,905 it is clear that African countries would 
appear at the first frontline of such a demand. This is firstly because Africa is a region vastly 
endowed with mineral resources and then because multinational mineral corporations have 
been involved in many fundamental rights violations all over the continent,906 which included 
the most atrocious ones.907 To balance this progressive approach, it can be suggested that 
multinational corporations will be held directly responsible for fundamental rights abuses 
either as accomplices or main perpetrators and be sanctioned under international law when 
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which millions of Congolese were killed. UN Report Addendum to the interim report of the Group of 
Experts on the DRC concerning violations of the arms embargo and sanctions regime by the Government 
of Rwanda S/2012/348 (UN 2012); Final report of the UN group of experts on DRC (2008) ; Report of 
the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of DRC 
(UN 2001); see also the case in the Angola war that lasted twenty seven years and where multinational 
corporations were involved in what has been qualified “diamond blood”. Reno W. “The real 
(war)economy of Angola” in (eds.) Cilliers J. and Dietrich C. Angola’s war economy: The role of oil and 
diamonds (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000) 221.  
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national mechanisms fail in this assignment, but  only in cases of extreme gravity like crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, genocide and aggression.908 This can be the minimalist regime 
under which to launch a constraining regime upon multinational corporations in international 
law because this kind of abuse requires deliberate forcefully willingness for their 
perpetration. Despite difficulties raised by the application of the mens rea criterion to juristic 
persons,909 developments under the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Nuremberg Tribunal910 offer grounds to at least support the 
proposal that the corporation criminal liability should be incurred by its representatives who 
made and executed the decision involving the entity in the criminal operation, while the 
corporation itself may respond to civil aspects of its responsibility which often raise the issue 
of adequate compensation for which it is presumably more solvable than its representatives. 
In this context, it is relevant to point out that since 2009, the AU has made a formal proposal 
for the African Court to be given criminal jurisdiction to try international crimes like 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.911 Though the study on the implications 
of extending the Court’s jurisdiction was finalised in 2010, the draft protocol to that effect 
has not been yet approved. From the perspective of the present discussion, this decision by 
the AU opens the door to a new dimension of horizontal application in so far as individuals 
who commit these crimes would become defendants before the African Court, and no more 
merely states. However it remains to be seen whether the Court will follow the classic 
approach of international law or depart from it in respect of corporations’ liability. 
 
Pending such a reform, affected communities should just satisfy themselves with the liability 
incurred by the government for lack of “due diligence”. In this regard, it is worthy to 
underline that if community participation can take place before the establishment of any 
                                                             
908 As will be demonstrated below, this is a logic deduction of the complementarity or subsidiary principle 
that governs the relationship between international mechanisms of enforcement and the national ones. 
909The criminal intention or knowledge that an act is wrong, that the accused must have had at the time of 
committing the offense. 
910 The jurisprudence developed through these tribunals demonstrates that criminal liability can be incurred 
by juristic persons. By way of illustration, see Prosecutor v. Furundzija, ICTY Case No. IT-95-17/1-T 
(Trial Chamber Dec. 10, 1998); The Nuremberg Trials (U.S. v. Goering), 6 F.R.D. 69, 112 (Int’l Mil. 
Trib. 1946). 
911 Decision Assembly/AU /Dec.213 (XII) of February 2009; Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.292 (XV) of July 
2010. 
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mineral project, it can help prevent future fundamental rights violations by setting conditions 
under which the mineral corporation would operate. 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the normative content of the African system with the aim to see 
whether it can really accommodate an effective model of participation for affected 
communities in the mineral sector. The provisions of the African Charter are really 
supportive of the fundamental rights to participate in governance and all other fundamental 
rights that are relevant to the realisation of sustainable development. This, despite the fact 
that some shortcomings could be identified, like for instance the claw-back clause issue or 
the lack of direct horizontal application in respect of mineral corporations’ liability. Thus far, 
norms on people’s rights in the African Charter constitute the largest legal basis on which 
affected communities can rely to protect their fundamental rights and interests in mineral 
projects. The fact that the Charter was ratified by all African countries makes it available for 
all African affected communities. Enforcement bodies should be prompt to interpret its 
provisions of the African Charter to the extent that provisions are given the meaning likely to 
afford the best protection to affected community. This has been the general trend developed 
in the jurisprudence of the African Commission.  
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Chapter four: Enforcing community participation under the institutional frameworks 
of the African Charter 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
There are three institutional levels at which one can seek the quasi judicial or judicial 
enforcement of fundamental rights enshrined in the African Charter. These are respectively 
national courts, the African Commission and the African Court. Accordingly, to analyse how 
community participation may take place in the mineral sector under provisions of the African 
Charter requires a critical look at arrangements made in respect of each of these enforcement 
machineries. In this chapter, what is more critical is to highlight the extent to which members 
of affected communities can make positive use of these institutional mechanisms.   
 
4.2 The perquisite of local remedies exhaustion and domestic courts 
 
Before a case is taken to the African Commission, a number of conditions that need to be 
fulfilled are set in article 56 (5) of the African Charter, among which the requirement that 
local remedies must first be exhausted. This specific condition is the one that actually makes 
national courts the first judicial instance where provisions of fundamental rights are to be 
enforced. Thus, under this section, the study wants to analyse how the African Commission 
has interpreted this rule and to what extent domestic courts can help to enforce fundamental 
rights in the Charter. However, because in the search for a strategy to enforce fundamental 
rights against corporations, the extraterritoriality has often been looked at as a possible 
option, it will be interesting to see how far it can support fundamental rights of affected 
communities in mineral exploitation.  
 
4.2.1 A flexible approach to the local remedies exhaustion rule as a positive factor for 
affected communities 
 
The local remedies exhaustion rule can be described as the requirement that national courts 
must be given the opportunity to redress an alledged violation of fundamental rights before 
the matter can be taken before international or geional bodies. Lopes and Quénivet explain 
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that the rationale for this rule is based on the fact that if all claims were made directly at the 
international level, international bodies would be overwhelmed with a lot of files with the 
consequence that decisions on cases would be delayed.912 In fact, the intervention of 
international enforcement machineries is generally governed by the international law rule of 
“subsidiarity”.913 This rule determines the domain of competence between larger 
communities and small ones, commending that the former ones should refrain from 
intervening in matters which may be efficiently administered and decided by the latter ones, 
and that interventions by the larger ones will be justified only in case smaller units failed to 
fulfil their mission properly.914 NollKaemper who looks at subsidiarity as a consequence of 
the sovereignty principle, observes that states are entitled to reserve a primary role for their 
courts in the adjudication of international claims and that in doing so, they may refuse that an 
international proceeding takes place when national options to remedy the issues have notyet 
been used.915 This confirms the assertion made previously that states are the main entities 
upon which the primarily obligationrests to make sure that international fundamental rights 
are implemented within their national jurisdiction. In the context of the African Charter, 
article 1 requires that states parties adopt legislatives or other measures to give effect to 
fundamental rights contained in this instrument. Therefore, it is only in case of failure of 
arrangements made at the domestic level that institutional mechanisms set at the regional 
level should be resorted to. 
 
In the Ogoni case, the African Commission itself took the opportunity to explain the 
exhaustion of the local remedies rule which is an application of subsidiarity and observed 
that: 
 
One purpose of the exhaustion of local remedies requirement is to give the 
domestic courts an opportunity to decide upon cases before they are 
                                                             
912 Lopes and Quénivet (2008) 210. 
913 Ouguergouz (2003) 577; Carroza GP. “Subsidiarity as a structural principle of international human rights 
law” (2003) 97 (38) The American Journal of International Law 38-79. 
914 Jirásek J. “Application of the principle of subsidiarity on decision making of the ECJ in the area of 
Fundamental rights protection” Dny práva – 2009 – Days of Law: the Conference Proceedings, 
(MasarykUniversity, 2009); Carroza (2003) 39-40. 
915 Nollkaemper A. National court and the international rule of law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
26. 
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brought to an international forum, thus avoiding contradictory judgements 
of law at the national and international levels. Where a right is not well 
provided for in domestic law such that no case is likely to be heard, 
potential conflict does not arise. Similarly, if the right is not well provided 
for, there cannot be effective remedies, or any remedies at all.Another 
rationale for the exhaustion requirement is that a government should have 
notice of a human rights violation in order to have the opportunity to 
remedy such violation, before being called to account by an international 
tribunal. (See the Commission’s decision on Communications 25/89, 
47/90, 56/91 and 100/93 World Organisation against Torture et al./Zaire: 
53 )[sic] 1. The exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement should be 
properly understood as ensuring that the State concerned has ample 
opportunity to remedy the situation of which applicants complain. It is not 
necessary here to recount the international attention that Ogoniland has 
received to argue that the Nigerian government has had ample notice and, 
over the past several decades, more than sufficient opportunity to give 
domestic remedies.Requiring the exhaustion of local remedies also ensures 
that the African Commission does not become a tribunal of first instance 
for cases for which an effective domestic remedy exists.”916 
 
These statements by the African Commission reveal that in the view of this institution, the 
application of the local remedies exhaustion rule aims to fulfil three main purposes which are to 
avoid contradictory judgements between national and international instances, give an opportunity 
to the government to remedy a violation before taking the case to the international level and 
prevent the international body to work as the court or tribunal in the first instance. All these 
purposes do not call for a particular observation, except the one upholding the avoidance of 
contradiction between judgments rendered at the national level and decisions delivered at the 
international one. Indeed, it is questionable whether this can be regarded as a legitimate purpose 
in so far as international or regional judges are also called upon to work independently,917 but in 
no case can they be compelled or tied by the interpretation given by national judges. As already 
said previously, the purpose of the local remedies exhaustion rule in this specific context should 
be rather described as the necessity to give an opportunity to national courts to redress or remedy 
any fundamental right violation before it is taken to international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies 
which in that case would act almost as an appellate institution. For instance, as already observed 
                                                             
916 See Ogoni case, supra note 104, paras. 37-39. 
917 UN OHCHR Human rights in the administration of justice: A manual on Human rights for judges, 
prosecutors and lawyers (New York/Geneva: UN Publication 2003) 119. 
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previously, the purpose of contradiction avoidance does not match the outcome in the Endorois 
case where the African Commission found that the respondent state had violated some 
fundamental rights in the African Charter and that adequate compensation had to be paid to the 
community, while the national court previously ruled that the complainant had been properly 
compensated.918 
 
It is also relevant to observe that article 56 (5) of the African Charter has established an exception 
by underlying that the obligation to exhaust local remedies ceases whenever it is obvious that this 
procedure is unduly prolonged. This assertion actually implies that whenever proceedings started 
at the national level are unnecessarily delayed to such an extent that it hampers the proper 
administration of justice, the complainant is allowed to drop off and bring the case straight to the 
African Commission. However, a difficulty arises because the African Charter has not determined 
the lapse of time and circumstances within which a procedure may be regarded as “unduly 
prolonged”. In the absence of such an indication, it is clear that the appreciation was left at the 
discretion of the African Commission. 
 
Therefore, a review of the application of the rule by the African Commission reveals that this 
institution has in practice adopted a very kind interpretation of article 56 (5) which in many cases 
has led it to admit communications on the pretext that local remedies where either inexistent or 
unavailable or ineffective.919 Of course, where local remedies were available, but obviously not 
resorted to by the complainant without any reasonable explanation, the Commission has clearly 
declared the inadmissibility of the communication.920 Nevertheless, the flexibility of the African 
Commission in applying this provision comes from the observation that at times it has admitted 
communications where there was no clear indication that the complainant had tried to use local 
remedies or even where they had failed to do so but yet the commission admitted the case. In the 
                                                             
918 See the Endorois case, supra note 67, paras. 59 and 298. 
919 By way of illustration, see the Huri – Laws case, supra note 706, para. 39; the Dawda case, supra note 
662, para. 35; See the Lawyers of Human Rights case, supra note 662, para. 27; African Commission 
Communication 25/89-47/90-56/91-100/93 Free Legal Assistance Group, Lawyers' Committee for 
Human rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l'Homme, Les Témoins de Jehovah v. Zaire (1995) 
(Hereinafter Témoins de Jehovah case) paras. 37-38.  
920 By way of illustration see African Commission Communication 260/02 BakweriLand Claims Committee v. 
Cameroon (2004) para. 56; African Commission Communication 258/02 Miss A v Cameroon (2004) para. 
26; African Commission Communication 235/00 Curtis Francis Doebbler v. Sudan (2000) para. 117; 
African Commission 310/05 Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre v. Sudan (2009) paras. 81-82.     
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Ogoni case, the Commission declared the case admissible whereas the communication did not 
contain any information on any actions taken before national court.921 The argument of the 
African Commission has been that when the respondent state does not provide a substantive 
response when the complaint of violations is brought to its attention by the Commission itself, 
this institution must decide on the merit of the facts.922  In the Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al v. 
Cameroon, the African Commission did not provide any explanation on its decision to admit the 
case despite the failure of the complainant to resort to national court.923 In this case, it seems that 
the African Commission had tacitly adhered to the claimant’s argument that there is no remedy in 
national law for self-determination.924 Moreover, the African Commission has demonstrated 
another measure of its flexibility by asserting that the exhaustion of local remedies is not 
necessary where there are massive violations of fundamental rights.925If it can be assumed that the 
violation of an affected community’s fundamental rights includes the mass of the people living 
within this community, the conclusion should be that the exhaustion of local remedies rule should 
be never applied in this case. However, this theoretical deduction would be challenged by the fact 
that in practice the African Commission had explicitly looked at this requirement in the Endorois 
case.926 
 
Actually, if one has to sum up the formal requirements as developed by the African Commission, 
these imply that remedies must exist in the national legislation, that should be efficient to address 
the violation and that national courts must be able not only to deliver adequate judgments, but 
also to implement them. Whenever these conditions are blatantly missing, there is no need to stick 
on the rule of exhaustion. In the case of Lawyers for Human Rights againstSwaziland, the 
communication was declared admissible merely on the observation that the King of the 
respondent state was likely to utilise the judicial power vested in him through a proclamation 
                                                             
921 See the Ogoni case, supra note 104, para. 40. 
922 Id. 
923 See the South Cameroon case, supra note 746, paras. 81-87. 
924 Id., par. 81. 
925African Commission Communication 54/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 à 196/97 and 210/98 Malawi African 
Association and Others v Mauritania (2000) para. 85; African Commission Communication 279/03-296/05 
Sudan Human Rights Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v. Sudan (2009) 
(Hereinafter the Malawi African Association and Others case) para. 103. 
926 See the Endorois case, supra note 67, para. 59. 
225 
 
made in 1973 to overturn court decisions.927 The Commission considered that based on past 
experience where this prerogative had been used to disregard court’s decisions, chances for the 
complainant to obtain remedy and redress the situation were minimal to such an extent that it 
amounted to unavailability and ineffectiveness.928 
 
The flexibility developed by the African Commission is really a positive element for the 
advancement of fundamental rights because the context in which the judicial system functions in 
many African countries is one where the executive put pressure upon judges, trying to compell 
them by all means to deliver unfair decisions.929 Therefore, wherever the national judicial system 
appears powerless and ineffective to secure fundamental rights, the rule of local remedies 
exhaustion is of no use. For affected communities, this is a good approach, in so far as the long 
delay that the process to obtain a remedy from national courts may occasion, is likely to prolong 
the threat or even the violation of fundamental rights that an ongoing mineral operation can cause. 
There is a need for expeditious justice when it comes to the protection of fundamental rights, 
especially when it involves a group of people. Therefore, the African Commission approach is a 
rational one as it offers more guarantees to the protection of affected communities’ fundamental 
rights. 
 
4.2.2 National courts as the forum of first instance 
 
Though the study focuses on the role that regional enforcement machineries established by the 
African Charter and its protocol thereto can play, it seems interesting to see to what extent 
national courts can help to secure affected communities against fundamental rights abuses in the 
mineral sector. In this respect, Frynas has observed that as other regions of the World, Africa has 
experienced an increase in litigation against multinational corporations these last decades, 
                                                             
927 See the Lawyers of Human Rights case, supra note 662, para.  27. 
928 Id., para.  27. 
929 Kabange NCJ. “The challenges for the advancement of Human rights and democracy in Africa in the 21st 
century” (2012) 2(1) Sacha Journal of Human Rights 26; United States General Accounting Office-
Foreign assistance, U.S. anticorruption programs in Sub-Saharan Africa will require time and 
commitment: Report to the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
Senate (April 2004)10-11. 
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especially concerning environmental and labour rights.930 An illustration in this regard was taken 
from Shell and Chevron in Nigeria, for which it was reported that: 
 
There has been a significant rise in litigation between oil companies and those affected by oil 
operations in Nigerian courts. In the period 1981-86, 24 compensation claims against Shell 
went to court in Nigeria. In early 1998, Shell was reportedly involved in over 500 pending 
court cases in Nigeria, out of which 70 per cent, or roughly 350 cases, dealt with oil spills, 
the other 30 per cent, or 150 cases, dealt mostly with other types of damage from oil 
operations, contracts, employment and taxation.2 In the whole of the 1980s, Chevron 
reportedly had only up to 50 court cases in Nigeria. In early 1998, Chevron was involved in 
over 200 cases, of which 80-90 per cent, or roughly 160-180 cases, dealt with oil spills, other 
types of damage from oil operations or land acquisition for oil operations.931 
 
One of the well known decisions is Shell against Farah.932 In this case, the affected communities 
filed a lawsuit to claim compensation for environmental pollution which resulted from Shell’s 
failure to rehabilitate the land spoiled by the oil well blowout which occurred in 1970.933 While 
Shell claimed that it had already rehabilitated the land and that a compensation of ￡22000 was 
paid, the communities claimed that it was not the case and that as a result of all this they could not 
use the land to farm anymore. The Nigerian court of appeal awarded them 4.6 million Naira as 
compensation.934 This decision is now considered a landmark decision because after its 
pronouncement, it has been observed that the amount of compensation increased in cases decided 
thereafter.935 In South Africa as well, corporations have faced lawsuits for fundamental rights 
violations. In fact, under the South African criminal law, corporations can be made liable under 
the theory of “vicarious liability”.936 It happened, for instance, that corporations were found liable 
for the failure of their directory board to provide safe working conditions and other benefits to 
employees.937In a group action initiated against Gencor in 2001, miners who sued the company 
                                                             
930 Frynas (1999)121.   
931 Id., 372. 
932 Ibid.  
933 Frynas (2004) 372. 
934 Id. 
935 Ibid. In the same line, see also Shell v. Tiebo VII (1996) 4 NWLR) where the Court awarded 6 million Nera 
to an affected community for environmental damage caused by an oil spill from Shell which occurred in 
1987. 
936 Vicarious liability is the liability incurred by one person for the delict committed by another one, in this 
case, by the corporation for the act of its agents.  
937 See for instance, Boyd v. Stuttaford & Co 1910 AD 101; Mkize v. Martens 1914 AD 382 as reported by 
Nana CN. “Corporate criminal liability in South Africa: The need to look beyond vicarious liability” 
(2011) 55 (1) Journal of African Law 89. 
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for the illnesses they suffered from exposure to asbestos, accepted 448 million Rand as 
compensation.938 Moreover, in the Bafokeng case against Impala mentioned previously, it is 
because of litigation supporting their ownership on land that members of this community 
succeeded to put pressure on Impala and get an increase in royalties, though finally through an out 
of court settlment. It took over ten years of legal wrangles before this settlement could be reached, 
but it was worth it in the end.939 
 
The above developments in Nigeria and South Africa prove that at times it is possible for national 
courts to support the fundamental rights of affected communities in the mineral sector. However, 
knowing the high prevalence of corruption which is still haunting the judiciary in many African 
countries, the capacity of domestic courts remains obviously limited. In fact, the extent to which 
national courts may protect affected communities’ fundamental rights depends particularly on the 
quality of the judiciary. Where independence and impartiality of the judiciary are not well rooted 
in the system, the potential for court to protect these communities can be significantly limited. In 
a corrupt judicial system, African judges are often put under pressure from the executive and 
compelled to render justice contrary to what the law prescribes. Many reports demonstrate that 
this is a serious issue faced by many African countries.940 For instance, in Anvil Mining Ltd. c. 
Association canadienne contre l'impunité,941 where the mineral corporation was sued for its 
alleged participation in a war crime in DRC because it had provided logistical support to the army 
in a military operation which led to the massacre of people in the town of Kilwa near the 
company's silver and copper mine in Katanga, justice could not take its normal course because of 
interference and obstruction which led to all the defendants being acquitted.942 Furthermore, 
whenever investments are seen as more valuable than fundamental rights in the development 
process, there is always the risk that the court decision will be inefficient to redress the violation. 
                                                             
938 McCulloch J. “Beating the odds: The quest for justice by South African asbestos mining communities” 
(2005) 32 (103) Review of African Political Economy 73. 
939 Legal fight for royalities increase started in 1985 and was settled out of court in 1999. Manson and Mbenga  
(2003) 28. 
940 United States General Accounting Office (2004)10-11. See also reports by Transparency International 
Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
941 Anvil Mining Ltd. c. Association canadienne contre l'impunité 2012 QCCA 117 (Hereinafter the Anvil 
Minig case). 
942 Global witness et. al. “Kilwa Trial: a denial of justice a chronology (October 2004 – July 2007)” 23-24; 
Available athttp://raid-uk.org/docs/Kilwa_Trial/Kilwa-chron-EN-170707.pdf [accessed 16/5/2013]. 
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This has occurred, for instance, in the Nigerian case of Irou against Shell BP where the judge 
refused to grant an injunction to the oil company to stop its operations that were damaging the 
environment, based on the pretext that the oil sector is the main source of the state’s revenue.943 
Temitope observes that after this case, judges have, at several other occasions, supported the 
position that economic considerations should prevail over environmental rights, even in cases 
where operations of oil-companies had adverse effects on host communities and the 
environment.944 This is a wrong approach in so far as it disregards the sustainable development 
requirement which makes the protection of environment one of the core components of 
sustainability.  
 
The uncertainty brought by all the above shortcomings is what prompted African victims to start 
considering extraterritorial adjudication as a possible way to remedy fundamental rights violations 
by corporations. This is one of the avenues that affected communities can contemplate under the 
exhaustion of local remedies rule, but of course in this case the African Commission will not 
make it a compulsory requirement because such a step will depend on the victims’ own 
discretion.  
 
Particular developments have taken place in the American jurisdiction in respect of the liability of 
multinational corporations for fundamental rights abuses that have happened in Africa. This 
liability has often been discussed in respect of the US Alien Tort Statute of 1789 (ATS). This Act 
has been long contemplated as a worldwide reference in terms of extraterritorial legislation based 
on which multinational corporations could be sued for fundamental rights violations.945 The ATS 
consists of a single sentence in the Judiciary Act of 1789 which holds that "the district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." This was initially interpreted as giving foreign 
nationals the possibility to sue multinational corporations before US federal courts for 
fundamental rights abuses committed abroad.946 Most litigation has taken place in the US Courts 
                                                             
943  See Irou v. Shell BP as explained by Frynas (1999) 122. 
944 Temitope (2010) 435. 
945 One can refer to the abundance of publications within the scholarship on the legal reach of this statute. 
946 Since the inception of the statute entrenchment hundreds of years ago, an average of 150 lawsuits have been 
initiated thus far. Childress III DE. “The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational 
Litigation” (2012) 100 The Georgetown Law Journal 713. 
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of appeal for the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits,947 before finally reaching the US Supreme 
Court recently. Among the most notable successful case are Doe against Unocal948 and Wiwa 
against Royal Dutch Shell.949 In the Doe case, court proceedings were initiated by Burmese 
villagers against the multinational corporation Unocal for its alleged direct complicity in 
fundamental rights abuses committed by the Burmese military in Burma. A few years after the 
commencement of the proceedings in 2005, the corporation agreed to compensate the plaintiffs 
and provide funds for development initiatives to improve living conditions of peoples affected by 
the pipe line project in which it was involved in Burma. In the Wiva case, the proceedings were 
initiated by the Ogoni people following the conflict of oil exploitation by Shell, particularly in 
respect of the execution of nine of their leaders, among who Ken Saro-Wiva was the main one. 
Here as well, the multinational corporation agreed to settle the matter in 2009 through a 
compensation of US$15.5 million. Nevertheless, when interpreting this ATS, two conflicting 
views have emerged from the American courts.  
 
On the one hand, it has been contended that, corporate liability for fundamental rights violations 
can be established under the ATS provided that the conduct of the corporation falls under the torts 
reprobated by the statute. This was, for instance, the view held inre South African Apartheid 
Litigation,950 where a class action was brought before a New York Southern District Court in 
2002 by a group of black South Africans, who claimed to have suffered damages from the 
apartheid regime and therefore decided to sue some multinational corporations like Ford Motor 
Co., Daimler, IBM, Fujitsu and two international banks for aiding and abetting fundamental rights 
abuses by this regime in violation of international customary law.951 While in the first instance, 
this court dismissed the class action on the grounds that aiding and abetting were not within the 
scope of the ATS,952 the second circuit which acted as an appellate court held that corporations 
could indeed be sued for aiding and abetting under the ATS.953 But the court held that two 
requirements had to be fulfilled for this, namely the fact that the corporation conduct must be 
                                                             
947 Adamaski TM. “The Alien Tort Claims Act and corporate liability: A threat to the United States’ 
international relations” (2011) 34 (6) (2) Fordham International Law Journal 1504. 
948 Doe v. Unocal 248 F 3d 915 (9th Cir 2001). 
949 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Shell 2009 WL 498088. 
950 In re South African Apartheid Litigation (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2009) par. 1. 
951 Id., par. 1. 
952 Ibid., para. 2. 
953 Ibid., para. 2. 
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wrongful and that the corporation must be aware that its actions will assist the perpetrator in the 
commission of the tort.954 The court dismissed the demands of plaintiffs because these 
requirements could not be established against each defendant.  On the other hand, when deciding 
the case of Kiobel against Royal Dutch Petroleum where another lawsuit was brought against this 
latter company on behalf of the late Dr Barinem Kiobel, an Ogoni leader and 11 other Nigerians 
from the Ogoni community for alleged crimes against humanity, torture and extrajudicial 
executions, and other international law violations committed with the complicity of the defendant 
between 1992 and 1995 against the Ogoni people, the second circuit embraced the view that 
corporations cannot be sued under the ATS because under international customary law they are 
not held liable for fundamental rights abuses .955 
 
In the midst of these divergent approaches, the US Supreme Court was called to deliver a decision 
on this matter in the same Kiobel case which went before it for review.956 The debate which 
opposed lawyers of parties before this highest jurisdiction included the question of whether the 
responsibility of corporations for fundamental rights violations should be determined based on the 
American domestic law, or on international law which does not yet formally accept such direct 
responsibility. In its decision, the US Supreme Court simply rejected the previous position held by 
the lower courts that the ATS offers aliens the possibility to bring a case before US federal courts 
for tort actions committed by multinational corporations.957 This has been seen by fundamental 
rights advocacy groups as a serious regress in the extraterritorial protection of fundamental rights 
by the American system.  
 
Many other non-African legal systems provide the possibility to initiate lawsuit on an 
extraterritorial jurisdiction basis,958 but the limit that this solution imposes is that it cannot always 
be predicted how foreign courts will behave and interpret provisions serving as legal grounds on 
which court proceedings may be initiated. This is particularly true when extraterritoriality is not 
                                                             
954 See the In re South African Apartheid Litigation case, supra note 949,  par. 1. 
955 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 621 F.3d 111, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2010). 
956 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. 2012/2013). 
957 See the Kiobel case, Id. 
958Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Germany, Switzerland ... For more developments, one may read De Jong A. 
Transnational corporations and international law: Accountability in the global business environment 
(Glos/Massachusetts: Business and Economics 2011) 128.  
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unequivocally expressed in provisions of the law and that claimant must rely on presumptions. 
Despite this uncertainity, exteritoriality may be beneficial for affected communities since it has 
been observed that the amount of compensation offered by extraterritorial courts has been much 
larger than the one commanded by African courts.959 This is a positive element that can make 
extraterritoriality a viable option for affected communities whenever they succeed in overcoming 
procedural barriers when approaching the foreign court.  
 
Above all, it has been contended that litigation can benefit affected communities in many ways, 
like getting compensation for material damages or the moral satisfaction of the demand for justice 
resulting from the fact that the liability of the mineral corporation was established in a court 
decision.960 Therefore, national courts, be it in the host country or abroad in case of 
extraterritoriality, must be aware of the significant role that they are called upon to play in the 
protection of affected communities’ fundamental rights in their relations with other powerful 
stakeholders, especially the mineral corporations. Whenever they fail to do so, regional or 
international bodies must be given the opportunity to fill the gap. 
 
4.3 Second level of enforcement: The African Commission    
 
4.3.1 Organisation of the African Commission  
 
The Charter of the OAU made very little reference to the concept of fundamental rights and 
mentioned their protection simply as general statements regarding the welfare and well being of 
Africans.961  In fact, the OAU was preoccupied with more pressing issues such as unity, non 
interference in internal affairs and liberation.962 Practically, it served as a discussion shop for 
African states but displayed considerable reluctance in intervening in systematic human rights 
abuses by various regimes in the region.963 The situation shifted when in 1981 the African Charter 
was adopted and five years later when it came into operation. From that time, the African 
continent became equipped as the European and inter-American systems with a regional 
                                                             
959 Frynas (2004) 373. 
960 Id., 379. 
961 Ankumah (1996) 4. 
962 Para 3. of the Preamb. and art. 2 of the OAU Consitutive Act (1963). 
963 Smith RKM. Textbook on international Human rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 132; The argument 
advanced to justify this attitude had been generally the principle of non interference in the internal affairs of OAU 
member states. 
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instrument protecting fundamental rights. Unfortunately, instead of embracing the early proposal 
of creating an African Court to curtail observance of fundamental rights on the continent,964 OAU 
member states rather opted for an African Commission with the status of a quasi-judicial body. 
The reason for such a choice was said to be found in the fact that the African Charter was infused 
with, and reflected, the African traditions965 that favour dialogue and consensual settlement of 
issues rather than the adversarial adjudicative process proper of Western countries.966 This 
argument fell short and was somewhat confusing, because it could not explain why domestic 
courts were then deemed suitable to handle fundamental rights issues in respect to the exhaustion 
of local remedies. Presumably, the true motive behind such a compromise stemmed from the 
drafters desire to accommodate African leaders967 as they were not yet prepared to accept the 
hegemony of an African court that would make them accountable for fundamental rights 
violations through compulsory decisions. Viewed from the perspective of states, this reluctance to 
establish binding enforcement machinery was probably also the result of what Moravcsikdescribes 
as the fear of governments to pay the high cost of sovereignty surrender by delegating power to 
international judges to deliver decisions that at times override national ideals, political cultures or 
traditions.968 Therefore, the African Commission was established as a quasi-judicial body 
deprived of the necessary authority to deliver binding decisions, issuing recommendations to 
respondent states rather than orders. 
 
Article 31 of the African Charter provides that the African Commission is composed of 11 
members chosen from among African personalities of the highest reputation, known for their high 
morality, integrity, impartiality and competence in matters of human and people’s rights. In the 
                                                             
964 See the Law of Lagos Conference on the rule of law organised in 1961 by the International Commission of Jurist 
and where participants called African governments to establish an African Court to which fundamental rights 
cases could be referred.  
965 Preamble of the African Charter, para. 4.  
966 Udombana NJ. “Toward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better late than never” (2000) 3 (5) 
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 72-75. In reaction to this argument, Mangu observes that 
reconciliation and consensus are not unknown to other peoples (America and Europe) whose fundamental rights 
systems include a regional court. Mangu (2004) 152.  
967 Keba Mbaye spoke of the ‘AfricanState’, but I rather refer in a synonymic way to African leaders because of the 
rupture that existed at that time between the leaders and their people. Many of the positions expressed in the 
international fora emerged from dictatorship regimes. I thus share the view that the true reason was the 
unwillingness of many African leaders to engage in the effective prevention and repression of fundamental rights 
abuses that originated mostly from the political arena in which they ruled. Udombana (2000) 75.    
968 Moravcsik (2000) 227.  
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same article, provision is also madefor them serving in their individual capacity. This simply 
means that as members of the African Commission, they do not act as representatives of their home 
governments. To emphasise this principle, the rules of procedure of the African Commission 
précised that holding a position within the African commission is incompatible with any activity 
that may compromise the independence and impartiality required in the functioning of this body, 
such as members of the government, diplomatic representatives or any other political binding 
function or activity that can have such effects.969With no more than one national from the same 
country,970 members of the African Commission are chosen through a secret ballot by the 
Assembly of the AU Heads of States and governments from a list of individuals nominated by 
states parties to the African Charter.971 
 
4.3.2 Mandate of the African Commission  
 
The African Commission is a quasi-judicial body with the mandate to promote, protect and 
interpret the fundamental rights guaranteed by the African Charter and to carry out all other tasks 
which may be entrusted to it by the AU Heads of States and Government assembly.972 
 
4.3.2.1 Promotional mandate 
 
Article 45 (1) of the African Charter provides that the African Commission is enjoined to promote 
fundamental rights all over the continent through the collection of documents, the study and 
research on African fundamental rights problems, the organisation of seminars, symposia and 
conferences, the dissemination of information related to fundamental rights and by encouraging 
national and local institutions concerned with fundamental rights to do the same. In so doing, the 
African Commission may formulate and lay down, principles and rules aimed at solving legal 
problems relating to fundamental rights and which can offer guidance to African governments in 
the design of their national legislations. The African Commission may also co-operate with other 
African and international institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of fundamental 
rights. 
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Besides this information, research, consultation and cooperation, Ouguergouz observes that article 
62 of the African Charter adds another task to the African Commission’s promotional mandate 
which is the consideration of periodical reports from states’ parties.973 As formulated, this article 
only compelled states parties to provide for reports, without specifying to which body they have 
to be submitted. As a result, this issue was raised in the initial stages just after the African Charter 
came into force. At its third ordinary session in 1988, the African Commission took a step to fill 
the gap by asserting that it was the only appropriate organ of the OAU which could not only study 
the periodic reports, but also make pertinent recommendations to states parties.974  Accordingly, 
the OAU entrusted the African Commission with this prerogative and gave this body the 
assignment to prepare guidelines for periodic reports.975  The Guidelines for national periodic 
reports under the African Charter were finally released in 1989.976The document was too detailed 
and complex and was finally amended later on in 1998. The very same year it was reported that 
only 21 of states parties had submitted reports.977 Not only was this number below half of the total 
number of OAU member states, but even countries that submitted reports did not do it on a 
regular basis.978 According to Evans and Murray, this is presumably due to the fact that the 
Commission endeavoured more to involve the states in its work rather than to behave as an 
effective monitoring institution.979 At present, the number of state reports has increased, but still 
without the regularity required in article 62 of the African Charter. In 2012, the record of the 
African Commission indicated that six States had submitted all their Reports, 14 were late by one 
or two reports, 22 late by three or more reports and 12 had not submitted any reports.980 
 
Despite some shortcomings, the African Commission has generally taken positive steps to achieve 
its promotional mandate. For instance, beside its involvement in the activation process of the state 
                                                             
973 Ouguergouz (2003) 519. 
974 Evans M. and Murray R. “The state reporting mechanism of the African Charter” in (eds) Evans M. and 
Murray  R. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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976  Guidelines for National Periodic Reports under the African Charter (1989). 
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Nijhoff Publishers, 2001) 189. 
978  Id., 189. 
979 Evans and Murray (2008) 56. 
980  African Commission “State reports and concluding observations” http://www.achpr.org/states/reports-and-
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reporting mechanism, the African Commission has often proceeded to do the printing and 
dissemination of the African Charter and its rules of procedures, to organisations which in large 
numbers were attending seminars and conferences related to fundamental rights concerns. At 
times, in collaboration with national and international NGOs, it made recommendations to states 
parties regarding legislatives adjustments.981 Nevertheless, the survey made in the context of this 
study reveals that many people ignore the enforcement machineries of the African Charter. Few 
are those who at least know the existence of the African Charter. Therefore, the challenge is still 
big for the African Commission in terms of promoting the fundamental rights in the Charter.  
 
4.3.2.2 Protective mandate 
 
Article 45 (2) of the African Charter defines the protective mandate of the African Commission as 
the duty to ensure that fundamental rights are protected under conditions laid down in the Charter. 
It is in this context that the African Commission is entitled to receive and examine state 
communications or other communications.982 In practice, only one inter-state communication has 
been decided on,983 the rest being cases involving individuals or communities against respondent 
states. It is also in the context of the protective mandate that it appears logic to consider the fact-
finding missions and the adoption of resolutions on the situation of fundamental rights in states 
parties as initiated by the African Commission. Indeed, though Ouguergouz contended that it is 
hard to locate these initiatives in any of the Commission’s functions as defined in article 45,984 it 
is clear that no matter the approach with which these actions are taken, the fact that the ultimate 
outcome is to remedy, if any, a fundamental right violation, places them undoubtedly within the 
area of the protective mandate. 
 
In fulfilling its protective mandate, the African Commission delivers recommendations that are 
not binding upon states985 and can also release provisional measures whenever necessary.986 It is 
at this level that the African system was severely criticised before the establishment of the African 
court with regard to its efficiency. The inability to compell states has several times undermined 
                                                             
981  See a summary of activities as summed up by Ouguergouz (2003) 519-524. 
982 Arts.47-59 of the African Charter. 
983  See the the DRC case, supra note 796. 
984 Ouguergouz  (2003) 519. 
985  Art. 58 of the African Charter. 
986  R. 98 of the Rules of procedure of the African Commission (2010). 
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the work of the African Commission to such extent that it has been portrayed as a toothless dog – 
all bark and no bite.987 But nevertheless, as will be seen, despite working in an environment full 
of adversity, the African Commission has played an important role in the advancement of 
fundamental rights on the continent. 
 
4.3.2.3 Interpretative mandate 
 
Article 45 (3) requires that the African Commission provides an interpretation of any provision of 
the African Charter on demand of a state party, an institution of the AU or an African 
organisation recognised by the AU. The objective that this provision wants to achieve is to 
provide clarification on the real reach of any provision within the African Charter. Practically, it 
is in this context that the African Commission recently adopted during its 52nd ordinary session 
general comments pertaining to Article 14(1)(d) and (e) of the Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.988 Of course, here the African 
Commission has extended the scope of its interpretation mandate following subsection (1) (b) of 
article 45 which empowers it to formulate and lay down principles and rules aimed at solving 
legal problems relating to fundamental rights.989 
 
4.3.3 Admissibility of communications 
 
There are a number of conditions that a communication needs to fulfill before it is deemed 
admissible to be examined by the African Commission. Admissibility of cases before this body is 
regulated by Article 56 of the African Charter and rules 113 to 118 of the rules of procedures. The 
main requirements set within these provisions are that the Communication must indicate the name 
of its authors, be compatible with the AU Constitutive Act and the African Charter, not be written 
in disparaging or insulting language directed against the respondent states, its institutions or the 
AU, not be based exclusively on news discriminated through the mass media, be sent after the 
exhaustion of local remedies, if any and unless it is obvious that the procedure is unduly 
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prolonged, be submitted within a reasonable period and not deal with cases which have been 
settled by states parties involved in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter, the AU 
Charter or the provisions of the African  Charter. These requirements are cumulative and should 
all be adequately fulfilled for a communication to be admissible.990 
 
In practice, the African Commission had the opportunity to make application of these 
requirements, at time underlying the implications of some of them. For instance, it was pointed 
out that the obligation to indicate the name of authors of the communication does not imply that 
the name of victims must be necessarily provided.991 Regarding the language of the 
communication, in Ligue Camerounaise des Droits de l’Homme v. Cameroon, the African 
Commission declared the communication inadmissible because it held that “Paul Biya must 
respond to crimes against humanity; 30 years the criminal neo-colonial regime incarnated by the 
duo Ahidjo/Biya; regime of torturers…. government barbarisms”.992 Some scholars have 
criticised this decision on the ground that it was a denial of the freedom of expression of the 
victims’ feeling arising from the trauma caused by the fundamental right violated.993 As to the 
requirement that a communication must not be exclusively based on news disseminated through 
the mass media, the African Commission in the Dawda case underlined that it is not because 
some aspects of a communication made up of news from the mass media that it should ipso facto 
be rejected and that what is important is whether the information is correct.994 Concerning the 
exhaustion of the local remedies rule, the way the African Commission perceives its application 
was already discussed above in relation to the involvement of national courts in the first instance. 
On the reasonable period within which the communication must be submitted after the exhaustion 
of local remedies, the African Commission has not clearly determined the period as is the case in 
the European and Inter-American systems that adopted a six months period after the final decision 
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is delivered and the complainant notified.995 In respect of the condition that the communication 
does not deal with cases which have been settled by states parties involved in accordance with the 
principles of the UN Charter, the AU Charter or the provisions of the African Charter, this simply 
implies that it must not be a case already settled or being settled through another international 
body. 
 
What needs to be noted from all the above is that the African Commission has often considered 
admissibility requirements with enough flexibility to allow victims of violations to access its 
jurisdiction and obtain a remedy. 
 
4.3.4 Locus standi before the African Commission  
 
The African Commission is competent to receive communications from a state party against 
another one (articles 47-54) and other communications (article 55). The locus standi of states 
parties, clearly formulated in the text of the African Charter, gave rise to a huge debate within the 
scholarship as to the meaning of “other communications”, giving birth to divergent opinions 
regarding whether or not cases submitted by individuals could be considered. While some were of 
the opinion that the African Commission was not entitled to receive communications from 
individuals and that other communications related to cases of massive and serious violations 
referred to in article 58,996 others have rather asserted that other communications indeed include 
the possibility to hear a case from individuals.997 As the time passed by, the practice of the 
African Commission has demonstrated that this institution received and decided cases submitted 
by individuals.998 At present, it is possible to contend that the African Commission is one of the 
regional enforcement bodies which offer a very open locus standi. The floor is open not only for 
victims, but even for non-victims that have knowledge of any fundamental rights violation. While 
this is obvious in cases of massive and serious violations and in individual cases, the initial rules 
of procedures of the African Commission adopted in 1998 allowed a submission on the behalf of 
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the victims only to the extent that he or she was unable to submit the case.999 As pointed out by 
Viljoen, the standard practice of the African Commission remains that the author of the 
communication (be it the victim or non-victim) must indicate a name, even if anonymity is 
requested.1000 This absence of a victim requirement is a good approach in terms of strategies to 
maximise the protection of fundamental rights. In a context where many individuals and local 
communities are at times ignorant of their fundamental rights, through the African Charter and all 
its enforcement machineries, to limit access to the African Commission only to victims would 
have considerably slowed down the work of this institution. In respect of collective rights, the 
African Commission has adopted the actio popularis doctrine1001  for cases where there are 
massive and serious violations of fundamental rights.1002 This is surely the case whenever 
fundamental rights of a whole affected community are infringed by a mineral corporation. For 
instance, the experience demonstrates that of the few cases that have been taken before the 
Commission in respect of affected communities’ natural resources, it was NGOs that initiated the 
communications on behalf of the victims.1003 These latter organisations may therefore bring a law 
suit against mineral corporations in respect of any fundamental rights of affected communities. 
 
4.3.5 Prospects of compliance with the decisions of the African Commission 
 
Decisions of the African Commission have the main characteristic of being non binding. It is in 
this respect that most criticism was levelled at this institution at its outset and thereafter. Some 
scholars have made a record of several cases where recommendations from the African 
Commission were, totally or partially, not complied with by the respondent state.1004 Though in 
certain cases, the Commission’s recommendations were abided to,1005 the general situation 
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remained confused due to the fact that, because of the non-binding character, compliance was left 
to the discretion of the respondent state. Though it might be true that the legal force of decisions 
delivered by an international body is dependent on the moral and legal authority which 
governments and other members of the international community attach to published reports and 
conclusions of this body,1006 it is predictable that if decisions of the African Commission were 
made “formally” binding, the situation would be better. Compliance has been such a serious 
challenge in the work of the African Commission that, during its 22nd ordinary session held in 
1997, the issue was raised by its secretary and it was decided that recommendations made by the 
Commission should be included in its annual report forwarded to the OAU AHSG for 
adoption.1007 It seems that the strategy behind this was to involve the AHSG in the follow up of 
the implementation of its decisions. But this approach did not bear fruit. Since the African 
Commission had no clear follow-up policy to monitor the steps taken by state parties to 
implement its recommendations, following up on implementation was largely left to the victim or 
the author of the communication. This was until the rules of procedure of the African 
Commission were revised in 2010. Rule 112 set time limits first of six months within which 
parties must report all measures, if any, taken or being taken by the state party to implement the 
decision of the Commission, and then a further three months, within which it may invite the State 
concerned to submit further information on the measures it had taken in response to its decision. 
However, despite all these initiatives, respondent states are yet bold enough to explicitly reject 
decisions of the African Commission. For instance, in the 2012 annual report of the African 
Commission it was mentioned that in the case of Kenneth Good against Botswana in 2010,1008 the 
respondent State argued that it is not bound by the decision of the Commission.1009 The African 
Commission also has the authority to deliver provisional measures wherever it appears urgent to 
prevent irreparable harm to the victim (s) of the alleged violations.1010 
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This is particularly relevant for affected communities as a tool to stand against any contractual 
arrangement made between the government and the mineral company and which represents a 
threat to their fundamental rights even before its execution. Unfortunately, even in this case, 
respondent states have at times disregarded or neglected provisional measures by the African 
Commission. A well known example of this was the attitude displayed by the Nigerian 
Government in the case against International Pen and others NGOs.1011 In this case where Kenule 
Beeson Saro-Wiwa, a writer and Ogoni activist, the president of the Movement for the Survival of 
the Ogoni People, and eight other Ogonis were sentenced to death by a domestic tribunal, the 
Nigerian Government ignored the call of the African Commission through a provisional measure 
to suspend execution. This was explained in the African Commission decision in the following 
terms: 
 
The Secretariat of the Commission faxed a note verbale [Sic] invoking interim measures under 
revised Rule 111 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Nigeria, the Secretary General of the OAU, the Special Advisor (Legal) to the Head of 
State, the Ministry of Justice of Nigeria, and the Nigerian High Commission in The Gambia. 
The note verbale pointed out that as the case of Mr. Saro-Wiwa and the others was already 
before the Commission, and the government of Nigeria had invited the Commission to 
undertake a mission to that country, during which mission the communications would be 
discussed, the executions should be delayed until the Commission had discussed the case 
with the Nigerian authorities.  No response to this appeal was received before the executions 
were carried out.  On 7 November 1995 the Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) confirmed the 
sentences of death and on 10 November 1995 all the accused persons were executed in secret 
at the Port Harcourt Prison.1012 
 
Another case is the one of Interights and others (on behalf of Bosch) against Botswana where the 
respondent state also proceeded to the execution of the complainant despite the African 
Commission’s call for a stay of execution pending examination of the communication.1013 These 
non-compliance cases of provisional measures simply consolidate the observation that the difficulty 
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to implement the Commission’s recommendations remains the heart of weaknesses experienced by 
this institution in its functioning.  
 
Faced with such shortcomings, one can legitimately wonder on what basis the African 
Commission will be able to enforce fundamental rights of affected communities in the mineral 
industry? 
 
Despite the fact that decisions of the African Commission are not binding, it still have some 
potentials to contribute to the advancement of the fundamental rights-based approach to 
community participation on the continent. The African Commission should for instance, maximise 
the use of its promotional mandate to educate affected communities and raise awerness among 
them about the protection that the African Charter and its enforcement machinery offer them.  In 
this respect, several activities, as pointed out previously, have been initiated all over the continent, 
even if the challenges remaining are considerable in terms of people’s knowledge of the system 
set by the African Charter. Moreover, the African Commissiom has fulfilled its interpretative 
mandate somehow successfully. Besides the case of article 14 of the Protocol mentioned above, 
the Commission has seized the opportunity to further elaborate on socio-economic rights and even 
to read in the provisions of the African Charter some other rights that are not formally 
entrenched.1014 Another way the African Commission may be uselful is through its ability to adopt 
a resolution establishing specialised working groups. In this regard, it is noteworthy that in 2009, 
the African Commission had used this prerogative to establish the working group on extractives 
industries, environment and human rights rights violations. 1015 The assignements of this group 
imply: 
 
- examine the impact of extractive industries in Africa within the context on the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights;  
                                                             
1014 See the guidelines and principles on the implementation of socio-economic rights adopted by the African 
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- research specific issues pertaining to the right of all peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and 
natural resources and to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development; 
- undertake research on the violations of human and peoples’ rights by non-state actors in Africa;  
- request, gather, receive and exchange information and materials from all relevant sources; 
- inform the African Commission on the possible liability of non-state actors; 
- formulate recommendations and proposals on appropriate measures and activities for the 
prevention and reparation of violations of human and peoples’ rights by extractive industries; 
- collaborate with interested donors institutions and NGOs; and 
- prepare a comprehensive report to be presented to the African Commission.1016 
 
The African Commission can resort on activities of this group to get specific information on the 
situation of affected communities. This was the case in Maricana case which happened in South 
Africa and where 34 miners were shot dead by security forces during a strike to demand better 
working conditions. After the African Commission has sent an urgent appeal to the South African 
government in the aftermath of unfortunate incidents and that a commission of inquiry had been 
established, the working group continued to follow the situation on the behalf of the African 
Commission.1017 Pending the result of the investigation, the working group carried out a visit in 
South Africa in May 2013 to visit the Maricana site and get in touch with local NGOs working in 
the field of extractive industries. 
 
4.4 Third level of enforcement: The African Court   
 
4.4.1 Historical background  
 
As the years passed by, the inability of the African Commission to render compulsory 
pronouncements only spurred more demands for a more effective system. The situation was 
revised in a two step process. First through the establishment of an African Court on Human and 
                                                             
1016 Id. 
1017 Commission Africaine des droits de l’Homme, Rapport du Groupe de travail sur les Industries extractives, 
l’Environnement et les Violations des droits de l’homme en Afrique) présenté à l’occasion du 25ème  
anniversaire de la Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples (la Commission), 52ème session 
ordinaire tenue à Yamoussoukro du 9 au 22 octobre 2012, 11. 
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Peoples’ Rights in 1998 (1998 Protocol)1018 and then in 2004 through the merging of this latter 
with the Court of Justice of the AU to become the African Court of Justice and Human Rights1019 
(in the 2008 Protocol). However, the 2008 Protocol has not yet entered into force. This will 
happen only after 15 states have ratified it. As Hasungule rightly observes, it is unfortunate that 
the AU has started the process of ratification afresh, leaving aside the previous adherence of states 
to the 1998 Protocol.1020 Such “resetting” will inevitably delay the coming into force of the 2008 
Protocol because 26 states will have to go through the same process again.1021 In the meantime, 
the African Court of Human and People’s rights remains in function.1022 
 
4.4.2 Organisation of the Court  
 
A useful analysis of the African Court’s organisation should consider its composition, its 
jurisdiction, the people or entities that have locus standi and the remedies that may be granted to 
the victims of fundamental rights violations. 
 
4.4.2.1 Composition of the Court 
 
The 1998 Protocol provides for eleven judges elected in their individual capacity as well, with no 
more than one from the same member state of the AU, chosen in regard of their high morality and 
recognised practical, judicial or academic competence and experience in the field of fundamental 
rights.1023  Independence is required from judges in article 17 which provides that “the 
independence of the judges shall be fully ensured in accordance with international law.” This 
requirement is very important for the efficiency of the African Court because judges must deliver 
their opinions and decide cases without interference from external influences. But the question in 
                                                             
1018 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (1998). It entered into force on 24/1/2004 after its ratification by 15 states. 
1019 Decision on the Merger of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Court of Justice of the 
African Union, Assembly/AU/Dec.83 (v), adopted on July 4-5, 2005, Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 45 (III), para. 4. 
Resources arguments and potential areas of common jurisdiction were among the reasons that militated for the 
merger of both courts. Hansungule (2009) 235. 
1020 Hansungule, Id., 237. 
1021 Some African countries are still in the process of ratifying the 1998 Protocol. For instance, Ghana deposited its 
declaration on 10/3/2011. 
1022Assembly/au/dec.427(xix) Decision on the Protocol on amendments to the Protocol on the statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights doc. Assembly/au/13(xix) a. 
1023 Arts.11 and 12.of the 1998 Protocol. 
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this regard is what the meaning of “in accordance with international law” is. Underlining the fact 
that in 1985, the Seventh UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders had adopted the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary and that these 
latter had been subsequently unanimously endorsed by the UNGA, the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and points out that independence involves both individual and 
institutional relationships.1024 This means that judges taken individually must give their opinions 
without any external influences, but also that the Court as a corporate body should function free 
from such influences. 
 
From a list provided by member states, judges are elected by secret ballot by the AU Assembly 
according to the 1998 Protocol.1025 The term is for six years, with the possibility to be re-elected 
once.1026 
 
4.4.2.2 Jurisdiction of the Court 
 
The jurisdiction of the African Court may be analysed in two different compartments including, 
its contentions jurisdiction and its advisory jurisdiction.  
 
4.4.2.2.1 Contentious Jurisdiction of the Court  
 
The analysis of the contentious jurisdiction also needs to be undertaken through two different 
compartments, the jurisdiction ratione materiae and the jurisdiction ratione personae. 
 
a) Jurisdiction ratione materiae 
 
The African Court was established to complement and reinforce the functions of the African 
Commission.1027 However, concerns have been raised in terms of defining what should be the 
inter-action between these two institutions, and what role each one should fulfil since they both 
share a common goal, that is to promote fundamental rights and protect them all over the 
                                                             
1024  UN OHCHR (2003) 119. 
1025 Arts.14 and 15 of the 1998 Protocol. 
1026 Art.15 of the 1998 Protocol. 
1027 Para.7 of the Preamb. and art.2 of the 1998 Protocol. 
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continent.1028 They are both called to interpret and apply the African Charter and any other 
relevant fundamental rights instruments ratified by the States concerned.1029 To harmonise the 
relationship between both institutions, the rules of the African Court adopted in 2009 and those of 
the African Commission as revisited in 2010 required a meeting between both institutions at least 
once a year and whenever necessary to guarantee a good working relationship between them.1030 
 
If one considers the context in which the African Court was established, complementarity should 
imply that the Court would work to add something that was missing in the functioning of the 
Commission. In this respect, it is clear that the main area in which the African Court was set to 
supplument the work of the African Commission was in respect of its lack of enforcement power, 
its inability to deliver binding decisions. However, even in this case, there is still inconsistency in 
the interactions between both institutions. For instance, how should one reconcile the fact that the 
African Court was established to fill up the gap left by a lack of effectiveness in the work of the 
African Commission with the fact that this same Court can deliberately decide to refer a case to 
the Commission as stipulated in article 6 of the 1998? Indeed, why would the Court decline to 
offer a binding remedy to a fundamental rights violation and leave the matter to be solved under a 
non-binding regime? This procedure is paradoxical to the complementarity sought with the 
establishment of the Court. It may lead to absurdity and cause delays in so far as the Commission 
itself can consider referring the matter to the Court in case the respondent state has not complied 
with its recommendations.1031 Nevertheless, so far the cases that have been referred to the 
Commission by the Court are those where individuals had no locus standi before this latter 
institution because of the lack of the respondent state’s declaration.1032 
 
                                                             
1028 Ebobrah ST. “Towards a positive application of complementarity in the African Human Rights system: Issues of 
functions and relations” (2011) 22 (3) The European Journal of International Law 663-688; Ingange wa Ingange 
JD. “The African Human rights system: Challenges and prospects” (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, UNISA 2010) 
289; Elsheikh IAB. “The future relationship between the African Court and the African Commission” (2002) 2 
African Human Rights Law Journal 253. 
1029 Art.7 of the 1998 Protocol. 
1030 R. 29 of the Rules of the Court (2009) and r. 115 of the African Commission Rules (2010). 
1031 R. 116 of the African Commission Rules of procedure (201). 
1032 D Amare and M Amare v. Mozambique and Airline Mozambique N.005/2011; S Ababou v. Algeria N.002/2011. 
For discussion on the respondent state declaration, see infra under the section on access to Court.  
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Ebobrah observes that some of the challenges the issue of complementarity raised in the African 
system have been or are still being experienced in other international legal systems having a two-
tiered institutional structure.1033 The truth is that more clarification needs to be brought forward by 
the AU Assembly as to the respective areas of operation of both institutions. This will help avoid 
duplication of functions resulting in redundancy, waste of resources, lengthening of the time and 
institutional tension which often comes as a result of the struggle for supremacy.1034 The same 
reasoning is applicable to the relationship between the Court and the African Committee of 
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of Children1035 that also enjoy some monitoring and 
interpretative prerogatives in respect of children fundamental rights.1036 
 
What one needs to keep in mind as to the material jurisdiction of the African Court is that it is 
entitled to hear and decide on cases which involve the interpretation and the application of the 
African Charter, the Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, or any other legal 
instrument relating to human rights, ratified by the States Parties concerned.1037 Of course because 
of the merger, the material jurisdiction of the African Court goes beyond this, but the study here is 
only concerned with its competences to decide cases related to fundamental rights. An important 
remark in this regard is that unlike courts in other regional human rights systems,1038 the African 
Court enjoys a broader jurisdiction which goes beyond the African Charter and embraces all 
relevant fundamental rights instruments ratified by the respondent states.  
 
It is also important to note that as mentioned previously, the material jurisdiction of the African 
Court would be extended to the trial of international crimes like genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes if the draft protocol thereto is approved.  
 
                                                             
1033 Ebobrah (2011) 665. 
 1034 Id., 665. 
1035 Hereinafter “African Committee of Experts”. 
1036 See the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990). 
1037 Art. 28 of the 2008 Protocol; art.7 of the 1998 Protocol. 
1038 See the European Court whose material jurisdiction is limited to the application of the European Convention and 
its protocols (arts. 32, 33 and 34 of the European Convention), and the Inter-American Court also whose material 
jurisdiction is circumscribed to the application of the American Convention (art. 62 (1) of the American 
Convention). 
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The jurisdiction ratione personae refers generally to the competence of a Court to bring a person 
into its adjudicative process and take cognisance of the suit.1039 If this definition can be applied to 
the African Court, it implies that this institution is vested with the power or competence to hear a 
case in respect of persons who are covered by provisions of African Chart, the protocol thereto 
and all international instruments ratified by the respondent state. However, in practice, scholars 
tend to focus their discussions of personal jurisdiction on the question of who may bring a case 
before the Court as determined in article 5 of the 1998 Protocol and article 29 of the 2008 
Protocol.1040 This approach is somewhat confusing because it implicitly suggests that the concept 
of “jurisdiction ratione personae” and the one of “locus standi” are identical in their meaning 
and thus, interchangeable. Locus standi is actually the legal ability of a victim or peoples who 
may act on his/her behalf to initiate legal proceedings in a court.1041 As such this concept is to be 
analysed from the perspective of the individuals, people and organisations that enjoy the capacity 
to approach the court, while personal jurisdiction is to be rather examined from the perspective of 
the Court itself in respect of all those that fall under its power or competence. This means personal 
jurisdiction is broader as it includes all the persons whose fundamental rights are covered by the 
African Charter, its protocol and other international instruments ratified by the state concerned, no 
matter the issue of standing which in fact, as will be seen, may vary depending on the declaration 
of the respondent state.  
 
4.4.2.2.2 Advisory jurisdiction of the African Court  
 
It is current that a court established at the international or regional level enjoys some competences 
to deliver advisory opinions.1042 In the case of the African Court, both protocols have provided for 
advisory jurisdiction, but in a little bit different perspective. In the 1998 Protocol, the African 
Court may give an opinion on any legal matter relating to the African Charter or any other 
relevant instruments on fundamental rights, at the request of a member State of the OAU, the 
OAU, any of its organs, or any African organisation recognised by the OAU and provided that the 
subject matter of the opinion is not related to a matter being examined by the Commission. It is 
                                                             
1039 Roberts R.III. “Jurisdiction ratione materiae et personae in Louisiana” (1952) 12 Louisiana Law Review 211. 
1040 Ougouergouz F. “The African Court of Justice and Human Rights” in (eds.) Yusuf AA. and Ouguergouz F. The 
African Union: Legal and institutional framework (Leinden-Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) 128. 
1041 Mwalim C. The Nigerian legal system (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2007) 325. 
1042 See arts. 65 to 68 of the ICJ statute; art. 64 of the American Convention. 
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for instance in this respect that the Pan African Lawyers Union and the South African Litigation 
Centre requested the African court to provide an advisory opinion on the legality of the SADC 
Tribunal suspension and legal issues pertaining to it.1043 Under the 2008 Protocol, such an option 
is no more available for CSOs as the ability to request an advisory opinion is now limited solely to 
the AU Assembly, parliament, executive Council, Peace and Security Council, the Economic, 
Social and Cultural Council, financial institutions or any other organ of the AU as may be 
authorised by the Assembly. A demand for advisory opinion must not be related to a pending 
application before the African Commission (or the African Committee of Experts as added in the 
2008 Protocol) responds to the necessity to prevent a double and contradictory interpretation 
within the African system. As aptly pointed out by Ouguergouz, it would have been prejudicial to 
the integrity of the quasi-judicial function of these bodies if the Court were to give interpretations 
of legal issues that are divergent from those of the Commission.1044 
 
4.4.3 Admissibility of a case 
 
The 1998 Protocol expressly requires that the submission of a case to the African Court should 
comply with the requirements set in article 56 of the African Charter in order to be admissible.1045 
However, the 2008 Protocol is silent on this matter. Rule 116 provides that whenever the 
Commission is requested to give its opinion on the admissibility of a case before the Court, it 
should consider the matter in accordance with article 56 of the African Charter and other 
applicable rules. The rule of procedures of the Court adopted in 2009 and which is currently 
applied by the African Court also contains a similar provision in the rule 34 (4). Moreover, since 
article 31 (d) enjoins the African Court to consider general principles of international law, it is 
obvious that the merged Court will have to consider the exhaustion of the local remedies 
requirement which is now acknowledged as part of customary international law.1046 
 
4.4.4 Locus standi before the African Court 
 
                                                             
1043 The request was introduced on November, 23 2012.  
1044 Ougouergouz (2012) 137. 
1045 Art.6 (2) of the 1998 Protocol. 
1046 Boczek BA. International law: A dictionary (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2005) 59-60; Rosene S. The 
International Law Commission's Draft articles on state responsibility: Part 1, articles 1-35, part 1 (Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff publisher, 1991) 31. 
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Under the 1998 Protocol, only the African Commission, states parties, African inter-
governmental organisations and African national human rights institutions enjoy unconditional 
and direct standing before the African Court. As for non-profit organisations and individuals, 
following a comprehensive reading of articles 5(3) and 34 (6) of the 1998 Protocol, they are 
entitled to bring a case directly before the Court only if the matter involves a state that has 
formally acknowledged competence of the Court to this end. This is an unjustified limitation 
because access to effective remedies remains illusory for victims of fundamental rights 
violations whenever such a declaration is not made. Though it is true that in a roundabout way, 
individual plaintiffs and non-profit organisations may successfully obtain effective ruling from 
the Court using the channel of the African Commission, this route is dependent on the 
Commission’s discretion; thus occasioning further delay to the enforcement process. As for the 
previous decision to opt for a commission instead of a court, the reason for this restricted choice 
presumably sprung from a desire to accommodate states that still feel uncomfortable with the 
settlement of fundamental rights issues by a regional court.1047 Access to the African Court 
would provide individuals with a much needed alternative to judicially enforce their rights. 
Thus, the restrictive approach to the locus standi is antithetical to the pressing demand for a 
more effective system, and more so to the very fact that individuals rather than governments are 
the main bearers of the fundamental rights in the African Charter. In fact, statistics reveal that 
except for one inter-state dispute, all cases brought before the African Commission involved 
individuals, local communities and non-profit organisations as complainants. If the 
establishment of the African Court is to be seen as a response to the ineffectiveness experienced 
by complainants in past decisions and recommendations of the African Commission, the 
restrictive nature of the Court accessibility calls into question the court’s very essence. The 
                                                             
1047 Another one can be the fear to experience overflow of pending cases since it is obvious that victims will be 
more comfortable to apply directly to the court. However, despite the pertinence of such an argument, it cannot 
legitimise the restriction because it does not match the rational which led to the establishment of this body, 
namely to satisfy the demand for an enforcement mechanism able to deliver binding decisions. In a 
comparative perspective, despite the growth of pending cases before the European Court since the entery into 
force of the Protocol 11, this phenomenon has not led to a call for a resurrection of the late European 
Commission, but to simple internal reforms in the functioning of the court under protocol 14. Council of 
Europe “Supervision of the execution of judgments and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: 6th 
annual report of the committee of Ministers” (2012)11-13; Available  
at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Source/Publications/CM_annreport2012_en.pdf  [accessed 
on 26/6/2013]; Egli P. “Another step in the reform of the European Court of Human Rights: the report of the 
group of wise Persons”68 (2008) ZaöRV 155. 
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irrational side of this approach has been evidenced in practice by two initial cases in which the 
African Court had to decline its competence and refer the case to the African Commission 
because respondent states had not made such a declaration.1048 This is why in another 
interesting case, the provision of the 1998 Protocol restricting access to court was directly 
challenged by the claimant before the African Court itself. In Femi Falana against African 
Union,1049 the applicant, a Nigerian national, decided to sue the AU as a representative of 54 
members states, contending that article 34 (6) of the 1998 protocol which makes direct access to 
court by individuals and NGOs pending upon a declaration by member states, is inconsistent 
with provisions of articles 1, 2,7,13, 26 and 66 of the Charter.1050 The AU in its reply started by 
emphasising the distinction that must be made between the organisation itself and its member 
states and then concludes that not being a state, neither a party to the Charter and its protocols, 
no case can be brought against it in connection with its member states obligations.1051 The Court 
followed the argument of the AU and decided that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the cases 
because the Union enjoys a legal personality different from the legal personalities of its member 
states.1052 
 
Though one may find the argument of the Court valid, the contentions of the applicant yet open 
doors to some critical questions: 
 
1. What is the rationale for restraining access to the court for individuals and NGOS? 
 
2. Does this rational, if any, goes in line with the objective of advancing human rights in 
Africa? 
 
Regarding the first question, the reason for this restricted choice presumably sprung from a 
desire to accommodate states that still feel uncomfortable with the settlement by a court. But 
technically, one can legitimately suspect that the drafters of the protocol decided to restrain 
                                                             
1048 See the D Amare and M Amare case, supra note 1041; the S Ababou case, supra note 1032. 
1049 Femi Falana v. African Union N. 001/2011; see also Atabong Denis Atemnkeng v. The African Union 
Application N.014/2011. 
1050 See the Femi Falana case, Id., para 3. 
1051 Ibid., paras. 42-44. 
1052 Ibid., paras. 56-68. 
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access to the court in order to keep some space for the African Commission in the litigation 
process. Otherwise, all individuals and NGOs would directly take their cases to the African 
Court because of its ability to deliver final and binding decisions.  
 
Whether this choice advances fundamental rights in Africa is, however, questionable. It can be 
argued that a preliminary intervention by the African Commission would be useful to bring 
more light to the Court. Though the argument is worthy, one finds more interesting the view 
that, instead of constraining individuals and NGOs to refer to the Commission wherever a state 
declaration is not made, recourse to the African Commission should be left at the discretion of 
the Court itself in case it finds it necessary to enlighten a case. Actually, it is obvious that 
applying to the African Commission with the expectation to see the case reaching the Court 
following an application by the African Commission itself does not contribute to the 
advancement of fundamental rights because by delaying the process towards an effective 
remedy, it negatively affects the effectiveness of the African System. 
 
In the context of this study, since these provisions of both protocols only mentioned individuals 
and NGOs, it is questionable if there is any room for groups to accede to the Court. If the literal 
rule of interpretation is to be applied,1053 it may easily lead to the contention that drafters of both 
protocols omitted to explicitly address the issue of groups or communities’ standing before the 
Court. However, the simple fact that the mandate of the African Court includes the protection of 
people’s or collective rights is enough to assert that groups or communities may enjoy standing 
before the Court. In this case, their complaint would reach the African Court either through the 
channel of the African Commission or directly through NGOs or individuals provided that the 
respondent state made the declaration in this respect. There is an interesting case where the 
African Commission brought the matter before the African Court on the behalf of a local 
community. In African Commission v. The Republic of Kenya, the applicant initiated proceedings 
against the respondent state, alleging serious and massive violations of the Ogiek community 
fundamental rights whose eviction had been decided by the respondent state in 2009.1054 Pending 
                                                             
1053 Under this rule of interpretation, provisions of the legal instrument are interpreted according to their common 
sense in the ordinary language. They are understood according to their literal meaning. Zander M. The law-
making process 6th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 130. 
1054 African Court Application no. 006/12: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights v. Republic of Kenya 
(Hereinafter the Ogiek community case). 
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a decision on the merit of the case, the African Court granted provisional measures on March 15 
2013, commanding the respondent state to refrain from any act that may cause irreparable 
prejudice.1055 As to individual submissions, this was the case in the Katangese communication, 
where Moke as a leader of the Katangese’s people initiated a demand on behalf of the whole 
community.1056 It is nonetheless questionable if a respondent state would ever make a declaration 
just for a particular local community living within its territory.    
 
4.4.5 Remedies by the African Court 
 
All fundamental rights that are entrenched without any possibility of remedy should they be 
violated, are rendered meaningless. This fact clearly suggests the idea that the establishment of 
an African Court with the power to deliver authoritative decisions should serve as a catalyst to 
translate these rights into a living reality for deprived peoples. The 1998 Protocol requires the 
African Court to grant an appropriate order, including fair compensation where necessary.1057 
The African Court may also take provisional measures if it considers that circumstances so 
require.1058 
 
Tthe monitoring of judgments and their execution are assigned to the Executive Council of Justice 
Ministers.1059 But, in case of persistent refusal to comply, the 1998 Protocol provides that the 
court must report to the AHSG.1060 This simply implies that in the monitoring of the state’s 
compliance with the court decisions, there must be an interaction among the three (the African 
Court, the Executive Council of Justice Ministers and the AHSG). Thus, because the African 
Court is an organ of the AU, the AHSG can address directives requesting that states comply with 
the court decisions.1061 If a state still fails to abide, the AHSG can apply sanctions as provided in 
the AU Constitutive Act. But except the denial of transport and communication links with other 
                                                             
1055 Id. para. 25. 
1056  See the Katangese case, supra note 67. 
1057 Art. 27 of the 1998 Protocol. 
1058 Art. 27 of the 1998 Protocol. 
1059 Art. 29 of the 1998 Protocol. 
1060 Art. 31 of the 1998 Protocol. 
1061 This is the result of a combined reading of r. 4 (1) and r.36 of the Rules of Procedure of the AU Assembly 
(2002). 
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member states, the AU Constitutive Act has not specified what these sanctions should be, leaving 
it at the discretion of the AHSG.1062 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1062 Art. 23 (2) of the AU Constitutive Act (2000). 
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4.5 Schematic presentation of the ways affected communities can make use of the African 
Charter enforcement machineries 
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4.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has reviewed the institutional perspectives of the African system with the aim to 
see whether it can really implement an effective model of participation for affected 
communities in the mineral sector. It has been noticed that there is potential in the African 
Commission to play a relevant role in the enforcement of the fundamental rights-based 
approach to community participation in the mineral sector despite the fact that its decisions are 
not binding. Its flexibility concerning admission of cases and the locus standi, the ability to 
request periodical reports from member states, the establishment of a working group dealing 
with extractive industries, environment and fundamental rights violations and the excersise of 
its promotional madate are some of the tools and avenues that this body may use to promote 
and protect the fundamental rights of affected communities in the mineral sector.  As to the 
African Court, the authority to deliver binding decisions is a considerable advancement for the 
protection of fundamental rights on the continent. Mutua held that the mere addition of the 
Court cannot by itself address all the weaknesses of the African system.1063 However, its 
relationship with the African Commission needs to be further elaborated and clarified to avoid 
dysfunction or confusion within the system. A question can be raised about the relevance of the 
African Commission in the fundamental rights-based approach to community participation if it 
is unable to deliver binding decisions. The Commission remains of utility to provide more light 
on the understanding of any fundamental right in the Charter, but it can also participate in the 
advancement of communities’ rights through its promotional mandate by requesting 
information from states on a regular basis and by sensitising these communities by way of 
campaigns on the possibilities that the African Charter and the Protocol thereto offer to the 
protection of their rights. Moreover, since direct access to the court is still restricted, the 
African Commission remains the channel through which affected communities can reach this 
judicial body in cases where the respondent state declaration is non-existent.  
                                                             
1063 Mutua M. “The African Human Rights Court: A two legged stool?” in (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 
343. 
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From all the above, challenges need to be addressed in order for the normative and institutional 
components of the African system to offer the maximum protection to affected communities in 
the mineral sector.  
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Chapter five: Challenges to the fundamental rights-based approach to 
community participation under the African Charter 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the precedeing chapter, it has been seen that there is enough potential in both the normative 
and institutional components of the system established under the African Charter to support 
and make effective community participation in the governance of mineral resources. The 
chapter served to answer the question whether the fundamental rights-based approach 
undertaken under the African Charter could achieve the objective of an effective participation 
of affected communities. In this chapter, the purpose is to determine the prerequisites for the 
provisions of the African Charter to help practically the fundamental rights-based approach to 
be effectively implemented and thus produce the desired results. These prerequisites can be 
described as challenges to the fundamental rights-based approach to community participation 
under the African Charter. Since the desired results are mainly to empower affected 
communities using solutions that the African Charter and its protocols offer affected 
communities to prevent or remedy any violations in their pursuit of sustainable development 
goals through mineral exploitation, and to compel African governments and mineral 
corporations to give due respect to their fundamental rights in the implementation process of 
mineral projects, some of the challenges that need to be looked at in the context of this study 
are:1064 
- The necessity to formalise community participation and mechanisms supporting other 
fundamental rights in the mineral legislation which is the lex specialis of the field. As will 
be seen, this challenge arises out of article 1 of the African Charter; 
- The extent to which affected communities need to be equipped with the appropriate 
capacity to participate efficiently in mineral and development projects and make use, when 
it becomes necessary, of mechanisms set by the African Charter to enforce their 
fundamental rights.This challenge specifically touches on the capacity-building of affected 
                                                             
1064 It is not possible to foresee all challenges because of particularities found at times in the context of each 
country. The challenges looked at here are those that generally face any African country no matter the context. 
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communities in terms of knowledge, ability to conduct negotiation, required skills to take 
employment in the mineral project, establishment of an appropriate process to reach a 
community decision; the ability to access the African Court and obtain appropriate 
remedies in case a violation occurrs. 
- The extent to which African governments and mineral corporations may be compelled to 
abide by decisions that emanate from the African Charter enforcement bodies, in which   
fundamental rights of affected communities are upheld. This challenge raises a special 
concern related to the commitment and determination of the AU and its organs to constrain 
member states abiding by decisions enforcing fundamental rights. 
In 2011, the AU, in collaboration with regional economic communities, adopted a guideline on 
the strategy to advance fundament rights in Africa.1065 This document which contains a five 
years plan of action (2012-2016), tries to develop a strategy to address the challenges faced by 
the African system.The AU advocates the application of a fundamental rights-based approach 
in development policy and planning and suggests that technical support must be provided to 
organs and institutions at both national and regional levels to realise this application.1066 
Therefore, while discussing the above-mentioned, the analysis will include a look at what has 
been adopted in the AU strategy.   
5.2 Necessity to update the mineral legislation and effectively implement its provisions 
Article 1 of the African Charter provides that: 
 
 The member states of the Organization of African Unity parties to the present 
Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in this 
Chapter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect 
to them. 
 
Except for countries where treaties require prior adoption in the form of statutes by the 
parliament, one can really wonder what the relevance of such a provision is for fundamental 
rights lawmaking wherever the Charter can be applied directly. An attempt to answer this 
question should lead to the observation that the inclusion of this provision in the African 
Charter is actually consecutive to the principle that implementation of fundamental rights is 
                                                             
1065AU Human Rights strategy for Africa (2011). 
1066 Id., 4. 
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first of all states’ responsibility.1067 Despite the existence of a treaty or convention, each state 
should take the responsibility to organise its legal system to such an extent to comply with its 
international obligations. Vijoen explains it by contending that in order to meet the rationale of 
its adoption, a treaty needs to be felt at the national level and that for such a purpose, effective 
legal and other mechanisms must be organised in the domestic system to make it effective.1068 
Since it is the mineral sector with which this study is concerned, it is relevant that the 
legislative framework organising this sector be in line with fundamental rights entrenched in 
the African Charter in order to facilitate their implementation in the mineral project. Therefore, 
the normative component of mineral legislation must be updated to the extent that it can 
accommodate the fundamental rights based approach. 
 
One reason for a specific update in mineral legislation is the fact that when mineral companies 
want to invest in a country, beside the attractiveness of the country’s geological potential, the 
very first thing that captures their attention is the investment regime established in the mineral 
code.1069 This is particularly true when the fiscal regime is defined in the mineral code or 
Act.1070 In the context of the South African mineral law, it was observed that though the 
mineral sector can be somehow affected by any existing legislation or policy, it is more directly 
impacted by legal instruments specifically addressing mineral matters.1071 Another reason 
comes from Langton’s observation that mineral legislation plays a key role as a tool through 
which interests of all stakeholders involved in the mineral project may be brought to 
balance.1072 The possibility for mineral legislation to fulfil this function is obvious because it is 
naturally supposed to lay down the foundation on which mineral agreements should be 
concluded. It should define the legal structure and process through which negotiations should 
                                                             
1067 Lopes and Quénivet (2008) 211-212. 
1068 Viljoen F. “An introduction to the Protocol on the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights on the  
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1069 Otto J. “Global changes in mining laws, agreements and tax systems” (1998) 24 (2) Resources Policy79, 81. 
1070 Id. 83. 
1071 Mining Qualification Authority “Sector skills plan for the mining and minerals sector 2005 to 2010”; 
Available at  
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1072 Langton M. “introduction” in (eds.) Langton M. and Longbottom J. Community futures, legal architecture: 
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be conducted until the agreement is signed.1073 As such, it can be deduced that it represents a 
strategic tool through which the effectiveness of community participation can be reinforced.  
 
Community participation as approached in this study has double implications for the 
organisation of the mineral legal regime of a country. Firstly, the fact that participation is to be 
regarded as a fundamental right, implies that this perspective must clearly appear in the mineral 
legislation. In this respect, Langton aptly observes that the disparity of regimes between states 
is such that some offer the opportunity to affected communities to mitigate detrimental impacts 
and increase benefits in mineral projects, while others undermine or simply disable the 
development capacity of these communities.1074 Thus, from silence to a consultation without 
much precision on the nature of the process, and then to an effective participation where 
communities’ views influence the outcome of the decision-making process, the general 
situation in Africa seems to be at the middle stage. Though community participation is a 
general discourse shared now in the AU, its effective implementation in the mineral sector is 
not yet developed all over the continent.1075 Indeed, where the law is not silent, participation is 
often reduced to a process in which consultation is a mere formality to fulfil in order to provide 
a measure of legitimacy to the project, but without a clear explanation of what the prerogatives 
of affected communities are.  
Looking at the countries selected in this study, DRC is a benchmark of African countries which 
are yet at the preliminary stage, the one where the mineral legislation is almost silent on 
community participation. Its mineral code does not say anything about how an affected 
community must get involved in the process that leads to the approval of a mineral project. The 
only reference is made in article 281 to the community’s right to compensation by the mineral 
company, whenever its activities, once already started, cause damages. In South Africa, the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (2002) does not explicitly address the issue 
of community participation. As already observed, the only exception is the possibility for an 
                                                             
1073 Godden L. and Tehan M. “Legal forms and their implications for long-term relationship and economic, 
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1075 See art. 3 (g) of the AU Constitutive Act; AU AMV (2009) 16, 27. 
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affected community to assert its ownership of the land and obtain the preferent right provided 
in section 104 of the Act. There is nevertheless a general provision in section 10 of the Act 
which holds that interested and affected persons may submit their comments about any 
application for prospecting or mining rights within 30 days of being informed by the regional 
manager. But in case they have any objection to the project, the same provision asserts that the 
Minister is the one who has the last say. In Nigeria as well, as previously mentioned, despite 
the requirement of the owner or occupier’s prior consent, the Mineral Act provides the 
government with a discretionary power to bypass this requirement. Even the Petroleum 
Industry Draft Bill proposed to reform the Nigerian oil sector since 2008 confers to the 
president of the republic the discretionary power to grant a license without a regard to the 
consent of affected communities.1076 
 
The silence in the Congolese mineral code and the paradox found in the South African and 
Nigerian mineral statutes exactly reflect the current status that community participation often 
enjoys on the continent,1077a scenario where consultations amounts to what Katy and Mamen 
describe as a smokescreen process, lacking substance and creating the illusion of a democratic 
process.1078 Zambia could be a benchmark of regimes where community participation is indeed 
enforced at the third stage, meaning where affected communities’views influence the outcome 
of the decision-making process. However, despite being entrenched in section 127(1)(c) of the 
Zambia Mines and Mineral Development Act of 2008, the requirement of prior consent has not 
been really implemented in practice.1079 Nevertheless, if the recent decision obliging Mopani 
Copper Mine to suspend its activities and involve affected communities in discussions,1080 
marks the new trend that the Zambian government intends to follow, it can be hoped that 
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community participation will enjoy more effectiveness in that country. The situations described 
in this Zambian case reveal furthermore that the challenge of updating mineral legislation also 
touches to the behavior of government officials in connection with what is provided in the legal 
text. The operationalisation of the provisions to enforce community participation in mineral 
projects will always undergo a very heavy process if government officers in charge of 
implementation chose to act regardless of what is provided in the law.1081 This is what made a 
group of scholars to assert that the assessment of the extent to which a mineral project has a 
positive incidence on affected communities’ development requires not only an appropriate 
legislation, but also an administration that is effective to implement policy.1082 For instance, the 
government office where applications for a mineral license are screened, should practically 
require that the formal proof of affected communiies’ consent be included among documents 
submitted by the applicant. Therefore, as a prerequisite, any section in the mineral legislation 
which allows, either explicitly or implicitly, the government to neutralise the impact of prior 
consent must be repealed from the mineral legislation. 
The second implication that the approach embraced in this study would have on the legal 
regime organising the mineral sector, would be that because community participation works as 
a channel to emphasise other fundamental rights in the monitoring of mineral projects, the 
mineral legislation should include provisions through which affected communities are 
empowered to protect them. This is why for instance, when addressing its recommendations to 
the Congolese Government in respect of the planned revision of the mineral code, Global 
Witness has suggested that it should contain clear provisions stating that: 
 
- Damage from pollution is the responsibility of the company or companies 
holding the relevant mining permit. Where subsidiaries are created by a parent 
company for its operations in the DRC, the parent company is ultimately 
responsible for the subsidiary’s actions, or its failure to act, including in 
relation to due diligence and financial matters. Full disclosure of information 
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related to environmental pollution caused by mining activities should be made 
public on a regular basis by the mining-rights holder. 
 
- A fund held in an escrow account should be created by the company or 
companies holding the relevant mining permit to compensate local 
communities that are negatively affected by mining activities. 
 
- In the event that expropriation or the forced removal of people from their land 
cannot be avoided, this should be carried out in a humane and culturally-
sensitive way (for example, people should not have to move into areas where 
their language is not spoken). Those displaced must also receive fair 
compensation. Resettlement should be part of the compensation and should 
place people in a situation similar to or better than before. Any compensation 
payable by the company or companies holding the mining rights should be 
prompt and in accordance with a contract that should be made public. The 
right to collective redress should also be guaranteed in the new code for 
communities affected by mining activities.1083 
 
These suggestions by Global Witness focus more on the obligation to compensate and the 
possibility for affected communities to use legal avenues to get redress. In fact, it has become a 
recurrent issue in developing countries that when a natural resources project is established, 
affected communities often fail to be properly compensated.1084 Though most mineral 
legislation provide a right to compensation,1085 in practice they are often not properly enforced. 
Affected communities often contend in practice that they were not at all compensated, or as 
they should have been.1086 Therefore, there is not only a need for more precisions in the 
legislation wherever provisions seem unclear or are missing, but also the need for effective 
enforcement wherever affected communities’ compensation is already organised in the law. In 
this respect, once the provision is clearly established in the mineral legislation, the capacity of 
affected communities to negotiate compensation needs to be increased to avoid past scenarios 
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of inadequate compensation.1087 The same remark is also valid for the issue of rehabilitation. 
Because the mitigation of environmental pervasive impacts is critical for the welfare of future 
generations, the mineral legislation must be more specific on how affected communities must 
secure the guarantee that the land will be rehabilitated fully long in advance and provide the 
possibility for such a provision to be enforced against the government and the mineral company 
in case of failure to do so. Also, to ensure that affected communities benefit from mineral 
projects, the legislation must also address the issue of community shares in royalties and how 
this should be paid to them.1088 
 
There are many other relevant issues that can require to be properly addressed in the mineral 
legislation depending on the context of each country. What one should simply keep in mind is 
that the legal framework regulating the mineral sector in every African country should be 
updated wherever necessary, to the extent that it matches fundamental rights of affected 
communities in the African Charter. In fact, the public-private parternship in development have 
several organisational and institutional challenges that its success is conditionned by the 
establishement of appropriate appropriate policy and structures through which the private 
partner, which in this case is the mineral corporation, will bring its contibution to efforts 
devoted to acheive development. 1089 In the context of a people-centred development, this 
should lead to the removal of all mechanisms existing in current mineral legislation which 
serve to paralyse the choices of affected communities; and the inclusion of provisions 
supporting their freedom of expression and empowering them to enforce their fundamental 
rights in the mineral project. For this purpose, CSOs together with marginalised communities, 
should put pressure on lawmakers of African resource-rich countries to amend their mineral 
legislation and put them in line with fundamental rights standards imposed by the African 
Charter. The AU should also, as suggested in its strategic document, make its technical support 
available to help national institutions in the update of mineral legislation in line with the 
fundamental rights approach to development as advocated by this organisation.1090 On the other 
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hand, though under international law, “non-interference in states’ internal affairs” is 
sovereignty’s most fundamental principle, the ratification of the African Charter by all AU 
member states and their progressive adherence to the Protocol on the African Court endows 
regional enforcement machineries with sufficient legal basis to question the government in 
respect of its obligations in the Charter. In Purohit and Moore v. Gambia,1091 the African 
Commission interpreted its mandate in article 30 of the Banjul Charter as empowering it to 
examine the extent to which a domestic law complies with the provisions of the African 
Charter and concluded that, following the rule established in article 14 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1980), such a prerogative is subsequent to the consent 
expressed by the respondent state to be bound by obligations under the Charter. At the closing 
of this case, the Commission found that the Gambian Lunatics Detention Act was inconsistent 
with provisions of the Charter and needed to be replaced by a more compatible legislation.1092 
The same orientation can be cast onto the African Court in as much as article 28(c) of the 2008 
Protocol entrusts it with the mandate to decide on cases involving the interpretation and 
application of the Charter.1093 
 
5.3 Empowering affected communities through capacity building  
 
Affected communities should no longer be seen as mere recipients of development 
programmes; but instead as critical stakeholders that have an important role to play in the 
management of development projects taking place in their areas. However, at the same time, 
there is this undeniable reality that rural people in Africa have long been the worst educated, 
with the consequence that there capacity of participation in decision-making remains weak. 
Therefore, even though one may contend that fundamental rights exist in the African Charter to 
support their participation in decision-making, how would they take steps to seek enforcement 
of these rights if they do not know what is provided and how they should approach the Charter 
enforcement bodies? 
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Though a unanimous definition does not exist, capacity building is often perceived as a process 
of helping peoples to help themselves.1094 The concept can be understood here as the process 
through which members of an affected community, taken individually or collectively, are 
provided with the capacity to address community’s problems in respect of a mineral project 
and determine their own values and priorities in the achievement of sustainable development 
goals throughout this project.1095 This approach implies that members should be equipped with 
the necessary knowledge to identify and address matters that affect their community in the 
context of mineral activities and that the whole community should be able to reach an 
agreement on values and objectives to be prioritised in the realisation of development 
projects.1096 This challenge of capacity building is so critical that Aburge and Akabzaa contend 
that one reason why many affected communities in Africa end up with poor compensation is 
their insufficient ability to negotiate directly with the mineral company.1097 Therefore, the 
capacity building of affected communities undeniably conditions the success of the 
fundamental rights-based approach under the African Charter. As such, relevant aspects of 
capacity building of affected communities are analysed here in respect of the education of 
community members in terms of their fundamental rights in the African Charter and the 
possibility to resort on regional enforcement machineries, the necessity to raise their 
understanding of implications that mineral operations may have on their livelihood and to 
equip them with the necessary skills to take employment in the sector and the need to have 
appropriate modalities of decision-making.  
5.3.1 Education on fundamental rights 
Discussing the participation of aboriginal communities in mineral agreements in Australia, 
O’Faircheallaigh observes that one key factor that determines the extent to which affected 
communities can achieve benefits from negotiations and avoid undesirable outcomes 
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corresponds to the extent to which they can mobilise the bargaining power they possess, and 
take advantage of any opportunities to enhance it.1098 In the African context, this assertion 
implies that members of these communities should be fully aware of their fundamental rights 
and able to use all the legal powers bestowed on them to get them enforced. But the capacity of 
affected communities to take legal actions is generally hindered by the fact that many Africans 
are yet ignorant of their fundamental rights and the mechanisms established by the African 
Charter for their enforcement. It is part of the generalised issue of illiteracy in Africa, for which 
the continent remains one with a high rate.1099 Especially in rural areas, members of affected 
communities are often not educated and at times even unable to write. This lack of knowledge 
continues to be a barrier that prevents African peoples from claiming and exercising their 
fundamental rights, despite efforts deployed by international governmental and non-
governmental organisations.1100 During the research survey made in the context of this study, 
many interviewees both in the rural and urban areas of the countries selected in this study, 
confessed that they were ignorant of the African Charter and its system, while those few that 
declared their awareness enjoyed only a limited knowledge about it. Okafor has particularly 
observed that despite good initiatives by CSOs that consisted of taking cases to treaty bodies 
on the behalf of victims, members of these organisations are for the most elitists who often do 
not speak the native language of those they want to represent.1101 This remark is pertinent in so 
far as it does not deny the role played by CSOs in the work of the African Commission, but 
rather highlights another field in which CSOs need to deploy much efforts, that is to ensure the 
transmission of the knowledge of the African Charter system to African peoples that they often 
contend to defend, into a language that they understand best. 
AU Strategy in this regard is to increase the promotion and popularisation of fundamental 
rights, norms all over the continent by 2014.1102 Concerning the educational challenge, the AU 
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wants to develop thematic material on fundamental rights that can be easily accessible all over 
the continent by 2014 and also to erect an “AU model” of educational institutions.1103 As 
indicators of progress, the AU projects to look at the statistical increase of the usage of African 
instruments on fundamental rights at the national level. State reports are one of the means 
through which the will and commitments of African governments to that effect will be 
assessed.1104 
What can be said in this respect is that the AU must not only focus on the behaviour of 
governments, it should also try to build up a strong partnership with CSOs working at the 
grassroots level. This was underlined at several occasions like for instance at the NGOs forum 
preceding the fiftieth ordinary session of the African Commission held in Gambia in 2011.1105 
It was observed there that the implication of CSOs is critical to the process of raising concerns 
and promoting fundamental rights in the African Charter and all other instruments that 
compose the African system; and also that Africans themselves should collaborate and get 
involved in this process of popularisation.1106 Indeed, this approach can be well-done through 
the African Commission’s promotional mandate. CSOs that have helped this institution thus far 
in this task must continue to deploy as much effort, because empowerment is a continual 
process, they should be granted with necessary resources to back up the African Commission’s 
work. This means that beyond the development of the strategy as to the role of different actors 
in the advancement of fundamental rights on the continent, the AU must be able to mobilise 
funds needed to achieve educational programmes and raise more awareness among African 
peoples. In fact, whatever the strategy may be, the AU will have to find and make financial 
resources available for its implementation.  
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Along the same lines, it is possible to contend that this challenge on the knowledge of 
fundamental rights in the African Charter also faces members of the judiciary in many African 
countries. This inference comes from the observation that in many fundamental rights cases 
taken to the national courts, the provisions of the African Charter are often not put in the front 
line of legal discussions.1107 This situation does not necessarily express ignorance by judges, 
but is often the result of a simple disregard of the Charter, due at times to the fact that it is not 
in the same format as national law in monistic systems.1108 This trend has been particularly 
observed in African Francophone countries where, for instance, it was reported that the reliance 
on the African Commission’s decisions in the case law is not a developed practice.1109 This 
confirms the assertion made previously that it is not easily predictable how national judges will 
behave faced with standards imposed by international fundamental rights law.1110 National 
judges at least need training to fully understand and in-depth how the system established under 
the African Charter should influence the domestic legal system. 
5.3.2 The minimum understanding of a mineral project and empowerment with 
employability skills 
This challenge specifically concerns local communities living in the surroundings of a mineral 
area and whose livelihood is likely to be directly affected by mineral operations. It is one thing 
to claim the right to participate in the governance of mineral resources, but it is another one to 
possess the knowledge of what needs to be achieved in the process of participation. As 
mentioned previously, a mineral project is very technical in some aspects and the affected 
communities need to be introduced to certain key concepts that may be at the centre of 
discussions with other stakeholders.1111 
There is also the necessity to provide members of affected communities with necessary skills to 
work in the mineral sector. Indeed, if the creation of jobs is to be among benefits brought by a 
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mineral project, it implies that members of affected communities must enjoy preference in the 
process of recruitment. This cannot happen if they do not possess the required skills. In 
Zambia, members of the Mushitala communities complained that people from outside 
benefited more from employment opportunities than they did in the Kansanshi mine, due to the 
facts that their education and skills were very limited and that the recruitment structure and 
policies failed to facilitate their selection.1112 
Accodring to Guerra, the duty is incumbent on mineral companies and governments that should 
inform and educate affected communities about the activities projected or already being carried 
out, and train them to acquire employability skills.1113 Without rejecting this view, it would be 
advisable to also involve mainly CSOs in this exercise, because it is naturally predictable that 
mineral companies will hardly present what might be the wrong side of the project. The same 
can be thought of the government whenever it is already favourable to the projects. According 
to Abruge and Akabzaa, “there is a feeling that state interests are now so closely intertwined 
with those of mining companies that there is little sensitivity to social and environmental issues 
arising from mining activities.”1114 The 2012 African Mining Review observes that the EITI 
participatory approach which includes NGOs is accepted by many African governments but 
with some measures of suspicion because it emphasises control on financial revenues from the 
extractive industry.1115 This means that a government which is satisfied with opacity and 
clientelism as methods of mineral resources governance will not be comfortable with the 
involvement of NGOs. Therefore, the implication of broader national constituencies, of which 
CSOs are also a part, is a measure of safeguard for affected communities.  
 
Furthermore, it is not during negotiations or discussions that members of affected communities 
must learn technical aspects of mineral operations. They need to be equipped with such 
knowledge before anything happens, and for this task, NGOs specialising in the natural 
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resources field can really be of great value. For instance, they need to understand what the 
meaning of mineral rents and royalties are otherwise they may not easily proceed with their 
claim for the financial benefits that must return to them. On this issue also, the African 
Commission can also make a use of its promotional mandate to partnership with local NGOs 
and spread the knowledge of basic concepts of mineral projects. Affected communities must be 
able to understand what the impact will be of the mineral project so that they appreciate how 
fair and equitable the compensation should be.1116 Also, because the beneficiation brought by 
mineral activities includes the creation of jobs, members of affected communities need to be 
trained about mineral operations so that they may get the necessary skills to work in the 
field.1117  
5.3.3 Defining appropriate modalities of participation in decision making 
The participation of affected communities in the decision-making process of a mineral project 
implies that they must express their views under the label of the fundamental right to express 
and disseminate opinions as provided in article 9 (2) of the African Charter. This is also part of 
the fundamental rights to self-determination and to participate in the government.  Therefore, 
structural arrangements need to be made to facilitate this exercise. This implies forcefully that 
the decisional power must be decentralised, because participation is irreconcilable with the 
concentration of power at the centre.1118  As already observed, the way structures are 
decentralised depends on arrangements made within each society. Therefore, the 
decentralisation models of many African countries that have failed to effectively include 
peoples in decision making1119 should be reformed to make room for affected communities’ 
participation in mineral matters decisions impacting on their livelihood. This requires a 
democratic mode of operations, but the question is whether they should act through direct 
democracy or indirect democracy relying in this case on their representatives. This challenge 
needs to be carefully considered otherwise it will paralyse the functioning of community 
participation. A proponent of direct participation contends that: 
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A full debate between the supporters and opponents of a specific project, followed 
by a free and fair election, offers an accurate measure of community opinion on a 
proposed project and a democratic solution to issues that are far more important to 
the lives of voters than the typical election of the next set of government 
officials.1120 
 
In the context of the African illiteracy problem, this approach would be very dangerous since 
it implies that members of affected communities would directly decide on every matter in 
connection with the mineral project, including even those which they have no appropriate 
knowledge of. Though where people are few in number, direct democracy appears to be the 
appropriate mode of participation in decision-making,1121 it might be unadvisable to apply it 
where people do not have the appropriate competence on subject matters of the decision. The 
experience of some local communities in African countries has revealed how challenging 
direct democracy can be, with difficulty to reach consensus on decisions because of the 
absence of co-ordination, conflict of leadership and opposing views.1122 Moreover, in case the 
interest of more than one affected community is at stake, the majoritarian mode of decision 
imposed by a vote can easily lead to conflict and tension. The probability for such a situation 
to happen is great, naturally when one of the communities is in the minority.1123 Smith sees it 
as a prejudice to the voice of the minority and contends that legal safeguards need to be put in 
place to avoid abuses. A balance needs therefore to be found by maybe, leaving some aspects 
of the negotiation to sole representatives. Indeed, article 13 of the African Charter 
accommodates both variants of democratic arrangements (direct and indirect). Thus, it could 
be advisable for issues of high technicality or those that may raise tensions between 
communities that these latter ones take participation indirectly through their representatives, 
while matters which do not require a high level of comprehension would be left to the 
discretion of the whole community.1124 This matches Khwaja’s observation according to 
                                                             
1120 McGree B. “The community referendum: Participatory democracy and the right to free, prior and informed 
consent to development” (2009) 570 Berkeley Journal of International law 574. 
1121 Hansen (2005) 2. 
1122 Rono and Aboud (2003) 92; Mwegbi G. “South African Local Government: 10 years later”; Available at 
http://www.afesis.org.za/Local-Governance-Articles/south-african-local-government-10-years-later , 
(accessed 165/5/2013).  
1123 Smith (2011) 33. 
1124 For instance, priority in the realisation of development infrastructure can be decided by the whole 
community, while the appreciation of compensation and environmental impacts can be left to the 
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which community participation improves project outcomes in non-technical decisions, but 
worsens them in technical decisions.1125 However, because of concerns about the issue of 
corruption,1126 it would be imperative in this case to provide affected communities not only 
with the ability to make their representatives accountable, but also to oppose any decision that 
blatantly stands in stark contrast with their vital interests, as its implementation would amount 
to the violation of their rights in article 13. In DRC, for instance, it was reported by Global 
Witnesses that the mineral industry in Katanga is characterised by a high level of corruption 
which not only involves representatives from the government but also traditional chiefs of 
indigenous communities.1127 In respect of the traditional model of governance, it is 
questionable whether the fact that the community consent is to be given by the head of the 
community, as for instance provided for in section 127 (1) (c) of the Zambian Mineral law, 
can match the standard of democratic governance. As already mentioned, the dichotomy that 
can arise from such a model was perceivable in the relationship between Chevron and 
affected communities in the Niger Delta where following protests by community members, 
the company had to drop its previous approach in MoUs where relations with the 
communities were made with traditional leaders.1128 While community members complained 
that profits were flowing just to the leaders instead of benefiting the whole mass of the 
people, after the shift in Chevron approach, leaders started to complain that they felt 
marginalised and had lost homage payments and direct contact with the company.1129 In the 
South African Bafokeng community, this issue is solved through the Kgotha Kgothe, a 
community meeting where members are given anopportunity to directly discuss issues with 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
representatives. Knowledge is not required to decide on priorities, but on compensating and environmental 
issues, it is an imperative. These are just suggestions to avoid delays because in communities, everybody do 
not have the same level of knowledge. 
1125 Khwaja AI. “Is increasing community participation always a good thing?” (2004) 2-3 Journal of the 
European Economic Association 427. 
1126 World Bank (2012) 20. 
1127 Global Witness “Une corruption profonde: Fraude, abus et exploitation dans les mines de cuivre et de cobalt 
du Katanga” 14-16, available at http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/import/kat-doc-fr-lowres.pdf 
[accessed 2/5/2013]. 
1128 Faleti (2008) 24. 
1129 Id., 24. 
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the Kgosi (King of Bafokeng) and the Supreme Council (traditional government of 
Bafokeng).1130 
 
The challenge here can only be addressed in a conception where no matter what democratic 
arrangements are made for the decision-making, the fundamental right to participate in 
governance of mineral resources and all its implications are regarded as the supreme 
prerogative of those affected by the project. This means that even if indirect participation is 
adopted, the resistance of affected communities to the outcome of negotiations will remain 
legitimate. In respect of the CDAs for instance, the World Bank has pointed out that they may 
not necessarily represent broad community consent.1131 Mechanisms of safeguard should be 
foreseen to avoid undemocratic positions from representatives. For instance, a withdrawal 
clause1132 can possibly be included to allow the community to obtain the cancellation of the 
agreement entered into between representatives and the mineral company whenever it does 
not match the priorities defined by the community. In respect of environment, because of the 
technical character of the assessment, affected communities can, as already observed, make a 
subscription to an environmental insurance by the mineral company as a prerequisite for the 
starting of the mineral project. Also, the exercise of the veto is not an option welcomed by 
other stakeholders, but this is actually the logic outcome of a fundamental rights-based 
conception. Bernhardt aptly observed that in democratic deliberations, those who run the risk 
of having their fundamental rights violated by a decision must enjoy a veto power over that 
decision.1133 This scholar emphasises nevertheless that this veto must not be idealised as the 
standard mode of decision-making, but be of utility only after institutional arrangements set 
up to facilitate dialogue and negotiation have failed. This is the correct perception of how 
veto should be used by affected communities. Instead of denying them such a prerogative 
which is consecutive to their fundamental rights, the best approach is to have it as an 
exceptional process. In practice however, affected communities will generally have a positive 
                                                             
1130 Cook SE. “The business of being Bafokeng: The corporatization of a tribal authority in South Africa” 
(2011) 52 (2) Current Anthropology 152. 
1131 World Bank (2012) 75. 
1132 Id., 71. 
1133 Bernhardt B. “A theory of democratic self-determination, affectedness, sovereignty and non-territorial” 
University of Colorado discussion paper (2010) 1-18. 
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attitude towards a mineral project provided that there is a constructive dialogue that promotes 
their fundamental rights and interests.1134 
 
All the above mechanisms that affected communities may use in democratic deliberations 
should result from an existing policy expressed through legislation organising the governance 
of mineral resources at the local level and in the design of which affected communities should 
also participate. The mode of decision-making should be highly conceptualised with a 
fundamental rights component to avoid frustration of affected communities in the process of 
participation. It is only in such a context that the African Charter and other relevant 
international instruments can really support and enhance effective community participation 
under the fundamental rights-based approach.  
 
5.4. Access to the African Court as a challenge  
Access to the African court is one of the challenges in relation to the protection of the 
fundamental rights of individuals and groups all over the continent. As already pointed out, 
the restriction found in both protocols is antithetical to the advancement of fundamental rights 
in Africa. Despite the fact that the discretionary power of governments to make the 
declaration or not to grant access to the Court to individuals and NGOs is an implicit fallout 
of the sovereignty acknowledged to states under international law, it is no less evident that 
looking at the restriction beyond the territory of a single state, it entrenches discrimination 
between Africans at the continental level. Indeed, the fundamental right to equality enshirned 
in article 3 of the African Charter loses its meaning by the simple fact that some Africans will 
enjoy access to the Court and some others not. In practice, this is a serious impediment to the 
effectiveness of the fundamental rights-based approach to community participation in so far 
as affected communities will almost be deprived of the possibility to compell their 
governments through a binding decision, the discretion to approach the court being vested in 
this case in the African Commission.  
It has been contended that the principle of non-discrimination is a cross-cutting theme of 
access to justice in the international law context where the possibility of adjudication seeks 
                                                             
1134 Guerra (2002)13. 
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inter alia to prevent or repair any harmful actions to fundamental rights.1135 Therefore, the 
issue of access to the African Court needs to be seriously discussed by the AU and reforms 
should be allowed to let individuals, groups and NGOs have direct access in order to banish 
this discriminatory selection. Since the coming into operation of the African Court under the 
1998 Protocol, among the 14 cases which went before this body, besides the three cases that 
were rejected on the grounds that the AU and the Pan African Parliament, as separate entities 
from members states, are not parties to the African Charter and its Protocol1136 and another 
one where the respondent states did not sign the protocol,  the 10 others were dismissed 
because in all of them the respondent state had failed to make the declaration required for 
individuals and NGOs to have direct access to the Court.1137 This majority amounts to 71, 4% 
of cases where the Court could not decide on the merit because of this procedural 
requirement. These statistics confirm indeed the observation that as long as this limitation of 
access to the African Court will be carried on, it will seriously undermine the potential of this 
institution to secure affected communities participation. Actually, the restriction is 
inconsistent with the letter and the spirit of the African Charter, especially its article 7 of the 
Charter which provides the fundamental right for individual (and implicitly groups)1138 to 
have his/her cause heard by an impartial court and tribunal within a reasonable time. 
Unfortunately, the AU document of strategy to advance fundamental rights is silent about this 
issue. The time has come for members of the AU AHSG to question their commitment to 
move Africa forward in the protection of fundamental rights and realise that this rule needs to 
be changed and wide access granted to the victims.  
5.5 Enforcement of regional decisions and political will as challenges 
The enforcement of decisions delivered under the African system is one of the serious 
challenges that need to be overcome for the fundamental rights-approach to bear its fruits.  
 
                                                             
1135 Pring and Siegele (2005) 271. 
1136 See the Femi Falana case, supra note 1058 and the Atabong Denis Atemnkeng case, supra note 1058, in 
respect of the AU; see also Application 010/2011 Efou Mbozo’o Samuel v. Pan African Parliament; 
Application 007/2011 Youssef Abadou v. The Kingdom of Morocco. 
1137 Statistics are made here based on cases published on the Court’s website up to June 20, 2013; Available at 
http://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/judgments/other-decisions [accessed on 20/6/2013].    
1138 See the previous discussion on art. 7 in Chapter 2. 
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Since the African Commission has been indexed for its shortcomings in this area, more 
attention should now be focused on the African Court that is formally vested with the power 
to deliver binding decisions. As already observed, it is the AU Executive Council of Justice 
Ministers that is in charge of monitoring the execution of judgments1139 and in case of non-
compliance the Court must transfer the case to the AU AHSG.1140 This final step reveals that 
a strong political will is needed within the AHSG to back up the work of the Court and oblige 
the stubborn states to abide by the judgments. Indeed, political will is this motivating force 
that generates concrete actions to achieve objectives predefined. However, it remains an open 
question as to how far members of the AHSG are aware of their responsibility in this regard. 
This question is inspired by Linde’s and Louw’s observation on the ASHG failure to follow 
up communications that were referred to it by the African Commission in its initial stages.1141  
 
If the ASHG displayed little commitment as regards the African commission’s 
communications, what then would motivate the belief that they would take a different stance 
in the case of the African Court? So far the very case of non-compliance that is well-known is 
the one where the African Court in 2011 ordered provisional measures against the Libyan 
government to stop any action that would result in loss of life or prejudice the physical 
integrity in violation of international fundamental rights.1142 The Court requested the Libyan 
government to report within 15 days on arrangements it had made to implement the measures 
ordered.1143 Unfortunately, the Libyan government did not comply with the Court’s order. 
This was probably due to the intensive war going on there. Nevertheless, the ability of AU 
AHSG to aptly follow up compliance with decisions of the African Court must not be 
restrained to times of peace and quietness. This is because the experience demonstrates that 
massive and serious violations of fundamental rights often happen in times of disturbance and 
conflict.1144 The AHSG is vested with the power to impose sanctions to a non-complying 
state by virtue of article 23 (2) of the AU Constitutive Act which holds that member States 
                                                             
1139 Art. 29 of the 1998 Protocol and art43 (6) of the 2008 Protocol. 
1140 Art. 46 (4) of the 2008 Protocol. 
1141 Van der Linde and Louw (2003) 181. 
1142 See African Commission v. Libya Application 004/2011, para. 25 (1). 
1143 Id., para.25 (2). 
1144 A best illustration can be taken as well in the Rwandese genocide of 1994. 
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failing to comply with the decisions and policies of the Union may be subject to sanctions 
such as the denial of transport and communications links with other members and other 
measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly. Interestingly, 
article 23 (2) was formulated in a very flexible way that allows the AHSG to adopt any 
sanction it deems efficient and adopt it in a particular case. This confirms therefore that it is a 
matter of political will at the level of the AHSG. How far the AHSG will support judgments 
of the African Court determines the maximum efficiency that the African system will now 
enjoy in respect of the binding nature of decisions that uplift fundamental rights. This is 
critical for affected communities in so far as having a judgment that is not complied with 
amounts somehow to a statu quo.  
 
In a comparative perspective, it is worthy to note that in the European system, as well as the 
monitoring of judgments, implementation is conducted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
European council, while in the inter-American system, non-compliance with the Court’s 
judgments is reported to the General Assembly of the OAS. Both systems had also to face a 
similar challenge,1145 but the situation improved as the years went by.1146 Indeed, difficulties 
experienced at the beginning are sometimes due to the fact that the processes of the 
establishment of a regional organisation are steadily marked by political interests of member 
states and that improvement comes as they demonstrate more commitment to achieve the 
objectives defined at the outset. Ugiagbe observes that contrarily to the European Court 
which grew alongside political organs of the European Union and the inter-American Court 
which enjoyed the same development despite being established after but at early, the situation 
                                                             
1145 Cavallaro JL. and Brewer SE. “Reevaluating regional human rights litigation in the twenty-first century: the 
case of the Inter-American court” (2008) 102 American Journal of International Law 774. 
1146 Roper SD. and Barria LA. “Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights: A test case for enforcement 
and managerial theories of state Compliance”, Prepared for delivery for the 2011 Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, 1-4 September (2011) 19; Available at 
http://www.stevendroper.com/Roper%20and%20Barria%20APSA%20Paper.pdf [accessed on 5/5/2013]; 
Morse T. "Member state compliance with the judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights" 
(2005) 33 (3) (4) International Journal of Legal Information 320-344. 
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of the African Court is made tougher by the fact that it is a latecomer in a context where 
political organs of the AU were already highly developed.1147  
 
Without making it a general principle, there is a case at the African sub-regional level to 
support this argument. Indeed, though the Tribunal of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) was provided for in article 9 of the treaty adopted in 1992, it is only in 
2005 that it was inaugurated and become effectively operational, whereas political organs 
were already largely developed.1148 This time lag between the development of political bodies 
and the establishment of the Tribunal is certainly one of the factors that explain the decision 
of the SADC AHSG to suspend this judicial body in 2010 and later to curtail its jurisdiction 
to inter-states matters only, just after its ruling against Zimbabwe in the matter that involved 
the dispossession of two Zimbabwean farmers (Campbell and Tembani).1149 It can be 
assumed that President Mugabe after expressly qualifying the judgment of “non sense” and 
“of non consequences”,1150used his influence to push the AHSG towards the adoption of the 
resolution suspending this institution. Nevertheless, despite the suitability of a concomitant 
progress between political and judicial organs in the life of a regional organisation, it is clear 
that no matter the context, much rests on the real political will of the body to which is 
assigned the task to back up decisions of the court. In the context of this study, it implies that 
the fundamental rights-based approach will deliver the maximum of its promises for affected 
communities only to the extent that the AU AHSG will demonstrate enough commitment 
pressuring the respondent state to comply with the court decision’s protecting their rights.  
 
It is surprising that the AU strategy to advance fundamental rights did not specifically discuss 
this aspect. But at least it was mentioned that state reports is the means through which the will 
and commitments of African governments will be scrutinised.1151 
 
                                                             
1147 Ugiagbe TB. “The African Court of Justice and Human Rights: Future political and jurisdictional realities 
and challenges”, available at http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=714 [accessed on 
3/5/2014]. 
1148 In fact the SADC came as the transformation of the former Southern African Coordinating Conference. 
1149 Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v. Zimbabwe [2008]SADCT 2 (November 2008). 
1150 Campbell v. Zimbabwe [2009] SADCT 3 (June 2009) para.4 (3). 
1151AU Human Rights strategy for Africa (2011) 4. 
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5.6 Conclusion  
 
The positive inputs expected from the fundamental rights based-approach to community 
participation will not occur any how. Several challenges need to be addressed for this 
approach undertaken under the provisions of the African Charter, to provide a strong legal 
platform on which community participation should take place and be effective. Those 
addressed here are some of the basic ones. The analysis has demonstrated that they should be 
overcome at two levels, namely at the level of normative arrangments and then at the societal 
institutions. The situation is such that normative reforms are dependent on wether actors 
within societal institutions are willing to commit themselves to raise up community 
participation at the standard of fundamental rights. For instance, because mineral legislation 
must be brought into accordance with the model of development that is integrative of 
fundamental rights, it is obvious that a great responsibility rests on the shoulders of law-
makers in African resource-rich countries to make concrete proposals which are inclusive of 
affected communities’s aspirations. Actually, challenges reviewed throughtout the analysis 
require the direct implication of all actors that may exert influence on mineral governance in 
order to facilitate the implementation of fundament rights in the African Charter in mineral 
activities held within affected communities. Beside ordinary stakeholders that are the 
government, the affected communities and the mineral corporations, other entities like the 
AU, international dornor agencies and CSOs have also somehow an important role to play in 
addressing these challenges. Therefore, the approach to community participation in the 
perspective of the African Charter has far more implications that go beyond local boundaries 
and even across national boders. Its success calls for a global mobilisation in the international 
society as well as in the national one, and is rooted in a spirit of collaboration and cooperation 
between actors in the public and private spheres. 
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      Chapter six: Conclusion: summary of the findings and recommendations 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The main concern of this study was to find out whether and, if yes, how the fundamental 
rights-based approach to community participation could help improve the governance of 
mineral resources in Africa and contribute as such to the realisation of sustainable 
development at local level. Throughout the analysis of research questions raised by this 
approach, the study has come up with some findings on which final recommendations will 
be made. Moreover, it would be too presumptuous to assert that this study has addressed all 
issues related to the implementation of a fundamental rights-based approach to community 
participation in the governance of mineral resources in Africa. Questions therefore remain 
that call for further research and the debate is far from over. This is particularly true in so 
much as the demand for mineral resources, is likely to continue growing worldwide and 
affected communities will not stop championing their rights. 
Before going through each point raised in this concluding chapter, it is relevant to remind 
one about what have been the major discussions held in each part of the study.  Chapter one 
has provided the philosophical foundation of the research. After an overview of the 
background to the study, a description was made of the subject matter, the research problem, 
the aims and significance of the study. It has demonstrated that there is a need for 
effectiveness in the implementation of community participation in the mineral governance 
and that a progressive approach needs to be formulated. Then, this chapter also provided the 
literature review, the methodology used in the study and highlighted difficulties encountered 
in the completion of the thesis. Chapter two offered a theoretical analysis of different 
approaches to the concept of community participation and demonstrated that among them, 
the fundamental rights perspective better suites affected communities’ interests in mineral 
projects. Chapter three discussed the potential of the normative and institutional framework 
of the African Charter to serve as the legal basis for the fundamental rights-based approach 
and make community participation really effective. Chapter four looked at the practical 
challenges that need to be addressed under the African Charter system to successfully 
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uphold fundamental rights in mineral operations. All these chapters converge towards the 
elaboration of the present chapter which forms the general conclusion.   
6.2 Findings  
6.2.1 Findings and conclusions in terms of the aims of the study 
 
This study aimed to demonstrate that mineral governance could be improved in Africa if 
community participation is really made effective. The rationale of this assertion rested on the 
belief that by giving affected communities the possibility to get involved in discussions 
pertinent to a mineral project and other related development projects and influence the 
outcomes, they would be empowered to exercise self-monitoring and manage all benefits 
that could flow from mineral operations taking place in their surrounding areas. This proved 
to be true in practice. Indeed, even if it stands among exceptions to the general situation 
prevailing on the continent, the case of the Bafokeng community has demonstrated how 
beneficial an effective partnership between affected communities and other stakeholders can 
be. Significant development initiatives have been realised because this community, the 
mineral corporation Impala and the South African government agreed to cooperate and 
advance their mutual interests in the platinum exploitation. After the long legal wrangle that 
led to the Bafokeng recognition of their benefits flowing from their ownership of the mineral 
land, this community was able to increase its royalties and exercise real control in the 
exploitation of platinum. This model should therefore inspire all African resource-rich 
countries. It is only when participation produces positive results that it becomes meaningful 
to affected peoples. If affected communities can say yes or no and see their will respected by 
other stakeholders, if they can question the government and the mineral company on critical 
issues, such as, for instance, on royalties, environmental impacts, opportunity of employment 
for community members, and get proper answers from them, then they will be able to 
increase transparency and accountability in the management of mineral projects. Where 
communities’ involvement is made binding and not optional, they are given the chance to 
advocate a sustainable model of development that governance practices must accommodate. 
As explained by Hens and Noth, governance in the context of sustainable development 
requires a new way of implementing decisions, namely the participation of all the interested 
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groups in discussions relating to the sustainability aspects of the project.1152 It is in this 
context that affected communities can ensure that due consideration be given to their 
fundamental rights in the mineral project. This is in line with the aim of this study which was 
also to demonstrate that the fundamental rights-based approach, contrarily to a loose or soft 
approach, would make a significant difference in the search for effectiveness. The difference 
is that affected communities will impose their preferences not as a simple matter of opinion 
polling but as logic fallout of the fundamental rights they hold. This is what strengthens the 
contention made throughout this study that participation should be regarded as a fundamental 
right itself, and then also as a channel through which other fundamental rights are enforced 
in mineral governance. This dimension is still missing in the mineral governance of many 
African resource-rich countries, including DRC, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia. Even 
when prior consent is entrenched as a legal right as in the Nigerian or the Zambian mineral 
legislation, the relationship between affected communities and the mineral corporation is yet 
approached from a non-binding perspective, with the result that participation often becomes 
a simple formality intended to legitimise the project. In such a context, the potential of 
community participation to bear the expected inputs in mineral governance is undermined. 
Everything becomes dependent on the goodwill of the government and the mineral 
corporation to really consider claims of affected communities, and if not, violence becomes 
the language spoken by marginalised members of these communities. The tight relations 
developed so far between oil companies and communities in the Niger Delta sufficiently 
describe this reality. Nevertheless, as demonstrated when discussing the relevance of 
national courts, a serious commitment of domestic judges to protect fundamental rights can 
help mitigate this marginalisation where affected communities suffer in the decision-making 
process and monitoring of mineral projects. This is particularly true in national systems 
where judges are not only entrusted to award compensation but also enjoy the power to 
command the infringing activities by the mineral company be stopped.1153 This reinforces 
the finding that community participation needs to be reconceptualised to embrace a 
                                                             
1152 Bachus K. “Governance for sustainable development and civil society participation” in (eds.) Hens L. and 
North B. The world summit on sustainable development: The Johannesburg conference  (Dordrecht: Spring 
science & Business, 2005) 328. 
1153 See for instance, the Nigerian case of Irou v. Shell BP as explained by Frynas (1999) 122. In this case, 
though the judge expressed many reserves in the decision, it was reported that he enjoyed actually the 
prerogative to go far beyond and stop activities of the abusing company. 
285 
 
fundamental rights-based approach if it is really meant to influence decisions in the mineral 
sector. This is not to be accepted as optional, but rather as an imperative by which all 
stakeholders should abide. In the specific context of the mineral industry, this role of 
fundamental rights is one which corresponds with the description given by Dresso, namely to 
provide a legal and political framework to oppose abuse of power and actions which are 
contrary to the well being of the people.1154 
 
6.2.3 Findings in terms of the research questions and hypotheses 
 
The research work attempted somehow to fill the gap left by questions that are insufficiently 
addressed in the existing literature. The first concern was the fact that, despite the increasing 
acknowledgment of its importance, the strategy to make community participation effective in 
practice has not been given much attention. The study sought to identify at which level 
frustration commonly arises in the process of participation and what can be done to offer a 
better and faster response. Indeed, the importance of community participation in governance 
has become so evident that it is now a generic term used in the discourse of all stakeholders, 
not only by affected communities themselves and CSOs working on their behalf, but also by 
government officials, international donor agencies and mineral corporations. Community 
participation is now largely accepted as a means through which more accountability and 
transparency can be brought to the management of mineral resources, especially in terms of 
benefits that must flow to affected communities and the consideration that should be given to 
their fundamental rights. It is also seen as a necessary step for reducing the costs raised by 
social tension resulting from the communities’ feeling that the mineral project is externally 
imposed on them. As was seen with respect to activities of Shell in Nigeria, conflicts with 
affected communities cause huge financial losses for the mineral corporation.1155 As a 
strategy to gain legitimatisation, community participation is also seen as a useful means to 
avoid delays that often result from the radical opposition of affected communities to the 
execution of mineral projects. However, how it should be enhanced or enforced remains 
uncertain. Actually, the existing disagreement among stakeholders as to how participation 
                                                             
1154 Dresso, supra note 161. 
1155 Watts (2009). 
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must formally take place disturbs the equilibrium needed in a system of governance that 
takes the sustainable development as its standard. While states, international donor agencies 
and mineral corporations are generally favourable to a soft approach to participation which 
corresponds with a process deprived of formal constraints to consider views of people 
affected by the project, CSOs and affected communities themselves advocate a coercive 
approach which imposes due consideration to the most affected people’s opinion and 
interests. Unfortunately, until now, it has been the former approach which has been 
predominant, giving rise to a strong contradiction between the demand for democratic 
practices, sharing in decision-making, transparency and accountability and what is really 
done in practice. As a consequence, environmental damages and negative social impacts 
caused by mineral operations are often undermined by a discourse which exalts the benefits 
of mineral investments more.1156 In developing countries, Szablowski promptly observes that 
the ability of state actors to respond to the pressing demand of securing fundamental rights in 
the development process is circumscribed by the quest to attract more foreign investment.1157 
The study confirmed the hypothesis that it is only through an approach based on fundamental 
rights that community participation can uncompromisingly enjoy real effectiveness and serve 
as a tool to enhance practices that match sustainable development requirements. As already 
mentioned, this approach starts by an appropriate definition of community participation as a 
fundamental right and then the perception of its role as a mechanism through which other 
fundamental rights are enforced in mineral projects. Effectiveness is guaranteed in this 
approach by the fact that affected communities share real power to approve or reject a 
project, to command its halt when it does not look after their best interests anymore, require 
transparency in the management of royalties and claim compensation and the rehabilitation 
of the closure. They can approach courts to enforce their fundamental rights which serve as 
the legal justification for their actions. Respect for the environment, the disposal of revenues 
generated by the exploitation of mineral resources, the self-determination of development 
priorities, do not make community participation a simple matter of privileges granted to 
                                                             
1156 Olowu (2009) 252; See also the process that led to the establishment of the Chad oil project as described by 
Nguiffo and Breitkop (1999). 
1157 Szablowski (2007) 27. 
287 
 
affected communities, but as a fundamental right bestowed on them. This is the major 
difference with the soft approach.  
Another research question that called for in-depth analysis was the models of democracy 
and decentralisation that would be better suited to make community participation more 
effective. In this regard, the main concern was to find out the extent to which democracy 
and decentralisation arrangements should accommodate the fundamental rights-based 
approach in order to build good governance in African countries. This was a critical 
question for research because African resource-rich countries have generally failed to 
capture the socio-economic demand of affected communities in mineral projects because 
of the malfunctioning of democracy and decentralisation in their societies. This is seen by 
Kimani as the result of the fact that affected communities have little say in the way mineral 
agreements and legislation should be formulated.1158 In fact, the incapacity to influence 
them automatically deprives affected communities from arguments to make their 
representatives and implicitly the mineral corporation, accountable. Indeed, if legitimate 
expectations of affected communities do not filter through to the mineral legislation in 
general and the mineral agreement in particular, what would justify any claim that their 
socio-economic demand was not satisfied by a particular mineral project?     
The first remark in this regard is that consensus exists among stakeholders that community 
participation has some structural implications for its implementation. The view is largely 
shared now that the establishment of a democratic and decentralised system of governance 
is a factor that preconditions the feasibility of any participatory initiative. In Africa, this is 
one of the results brought by the movement for the democratisation of the development 
process which took place in the 1980s.1159 In the context of sustainable development, the 
interaction between democracy, decentralisation and community participation is perceived 
as being of major importance because it determines the extent to which transparency and 
accountability can be achieved in the governance process. Therefore, a proper balance of 
the synergy existing between the three institutions is a key determinant of any success that 
may be reaped in efforts devoted to improve mineral governance in Africa.  
                                                             
1158 Kimani (2009) 4. 
1159 See for the process of adoption of the Arusha Declaration as described in the background of the study. 
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Between direct participation of communities and their indirect involvement through 
representatives, this study has suggested a middle path, because the negative effects of 
illiteracy, which is yet high and the risk of conflict between competing communities in the 
same mineral project can be prevented through discussion with a restrained group of 
representatives. Nonetheless, at the same time, members of the community must be able to 
directly express their opinions on some matters that do not require a high intellectual level. 
This is the case, for instance, in the decision-making process concerning development 
projects which need to be prioritised. Members of the community often know best what the 
urgent demands that need to be satisfied are. 
With respect to decentralisation, it has been agreed and found that the poor performance 
under past models adopted in many African countries 1160 requires that reforms be 
undertaken to increase possibilities to get peoples involved in decision-making. The model 
of decentralisation must be one where the interaction between affected communities and 
the local government is bottom up and not the reverse. Indeed, though decentralisation is 
generally defined as the transfer of power from the centre to sub-national levels,1161 local 
authorities should not regard themselves as being at first accountable to the central 
government,1162 but rather to their local people, as democratic governance means that the 
power belongs to the people. Genuine democratic and decentralised governance should one 
way or another empower local people to exercise control over the management process of 
mineral resources and make representatives accountable in respect of their welfare. 
Accordingly, the local government should work in a way that is supportive of affected 
communities’ interests and advocate the respect of their preferences in mineral projects. 
However, despite the existence of decentralisation in many African countries, the field of 
mineral resources still remains highly centralised, to such an extent that central authorities 
often enjoy large discretions to grant licenses and even bypass prior consent of 
communities where provided for in the law. This is what Adejumobi rightly considered 
dictatorship in the development process.1163 Though the central government must continue 
                                                             
1160 UNDP “Local governance and poverty reduction …”, supra note 196, 27. 
1161 Crawford and Hartman (2008) 1. 
1162This is a major difference with deconcentration where they act just as representatives of the centre. 
1163 Adejumobi (2008) 100-101. 
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to play its role of ensuring that the development process at the national level remains 
balanced in terms of resource redistribution, this study contends that mineral governance in 
Africa needs to be decentralised to ensure that affected communities are able to influence 
decisions on relevant matters touching directly on their development. Thus, it can be 
suggested, for instance, that royalties to which affected communities are entitled should be 
paid to the local authorities or directly to the communities themselves, instead of 
undergoing the long process of retrocession from the central government to the local 
structures.1164 
 All the above findings confirm the hypothesis according to which the fundamental rights-
based approach can only work where democratic and decentralised conditions are at the 
optimal, with a system of governance in which affected communities can make the 
government, mineral corporations, and even their representatives accountable. The concept 
of accountability cannot be removed from a genuine model of community participation. 
Another research question was the extent to which provisions of the African Charter could 
possibly be applied in the regulation of the mineral sector to secure fundamental rights. 
The concern of the study here was to find out how far affected communities could make 
use of the African Charter provisions and enforcement mechanisms to have their 
fundamental rights respected throughout the governance of mineral resources and how far 
the African Charter system could positively influence the functioning and behaviour of 
national institutions and other stakeholders working in the mineral sector. The African 
Charter protects both individual and collective rights, civil and political rights and socio-
economic rights.1165 Since the mineral industry is one of the society sectors which should 
generate opportunities to satisfy the socio-economic demands, provisions of the African 
Charter are able to secure the fundamental rights of people who are supposed to benefit 
from the mineral projects.  
In practice, if the fundamental rights-based approach is to be formally implemented, it 
would need a legal base or be entrenched in at least one legal instrument where victims can 
                                                             
1164As demonstrated in the DRC case, the risk of retrocession is the fact that the affected communities may 
suffer delays to receive their share and be deprived of necessary funds to finance development projects. 
1165 See para. 7 of the African Charter. 
290 
 
resort to prevent or remedy a violation. The finding of this study in this regard is that the 
system built on the African Charter provides the normative and institutional architecture 
for a progressive approach in the extractive industry. At the normative level, not only does 
this instrument make their participation to be regarded as a fundamental right and thus 
oblige other stakeholders not only to protect it, but also as a challenge for the realisation of 
other fundamental rights directly relevant for sustainable development through processes 
of negotiation, execution and closure of the mineral project. Besides the specific 
fundamental right to participation in article 13, the panoplies of other fundamental rights, 
including both individual and collective ones like the rights to receive information, to 
express and disseminate one’s opinions in article 9, the right to access justice in article 7, 
the right to self-determination in article 20, the right to freely dispose of wealth and natural 
resources in article 21, the right to development in article 22 and the right to environment 
in article 24 all provide the standard at which other stakeholders must define their 
relationship with affected communities in mineral operations. Under the regional system 
established by the African Charter, affected communities enjoy a broad range of legal 
possibilities to remedy the failure of other stakeholders, with triple levels at which they can 
seek enforcement. Starting with the exhaustion of local remedies that may be available 
before national courts, affected communities can then approach the African Commission 
and then, provided the respondent state made the required declaration, take the matter to 
the African Court. The scope of the protection granted to affected communities is therefore 
very large and should be regarded as a positive element for the desired model of mineral 
governance which seeks to protect the fundamental rights of affected communities. In this 
respect, the study stressed the complementarity existing between national courts and supra-
national bodies under the principle of subsidiarity. This complementarity is such that the 
risk found at each level can be dealt with at another level. For instance, the risk of 
obstruction to justice resulting from the executive branch’s pressure on the judiciary in 
national courts should be absent at the level of the African Court because this body is not 
directly dependent on any African state member of the AU. This presumption is reinforced 
by articles 2 and 3 of the African Court rules of procedure of 2010 which forbid a member 
of the Court to hear a case involving either its home state or any other state by virtue of 
which he or she was elected. At the same time, because of lack of horizontality in 
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international law, the inability of the African Commission and the African Court to directly 
sanction multinational corporations, it can be supplied by national courts in countries 
where judges are empowered to punish corporations for fundamental rights abuses. 
Nevertheless, the study has come to the conclusion that in a reforming perspective, because 
nothing substantially prevents corporations to hold fundamental rights obligations and 
because the devastative potential of their activities has been largely demonstrated in 
developing countries, the African system could be innovating by creating direct 
responsibility for corporations in case of grave violations of fundamental rights.       
By emphasising affected communities’ fundamental rights, the African Charter provides 
them with the necessary weapon to compel other stakeholders to consider their views in 
development matters raised by the mineral project. But despite the fact that it has been in 
existence for three decades now, its application in the mineral sector remains very low. 
One of the reasons found in this study is lack of awareness about the system it has 
established, especially in rural areas. The consequence is such that there is an ongoing gap 
between what is provided for in the text of the Charter and what is going on in the field. In 
the Action Plan for implementing the AMV proposed in 2011. by the AU Commission, it 
was found that there was a mismatch between the expression of public participation rights 
in formal instruments and their implementation.1166 The plan asserts that such a gap 
generates inadequacy in participation which leads to conflict between mineral investors 
and affected communities.1167 This is the situation in many African resource-rich countries, 
where theoretically affected communities are among the holders of the fundamental right 
to participate in article 13 of the African Charter, but whose participation in mineral 
projects is yet made dependent on the good will of other stakeholders like the states and 
mineral corporations and in a format which does not necessarily ensure the taking into 
account of their views and interests.  
                                                             
1166AU Commission et al., “Building a sustainable future for Africa’s extractive industry: From vision to 
action: Action plan for implementing the AMV” (2011) 24; Available at 
http://www.africaminingvision.org/amv_resources/AMV/Action%20Plan%20Final%20Version%20Jan%2
02012.pdf [accessed on 25/5/2013]. 
1167 AU Commission et al., (2011).  
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This observation opens the door to another finding of this study according to which for the 
fundamental rights based-approach to be properly implemented under the African Charter, 
some challenges need to be seriously addressed. If they can be overcome, improvements 
will obviously flow in the governance system. The first one identified was the need for 
updates in the mineral legislation. Though the African Charter establishes a general regime 
for fundamental rights, mineral legislation should accommodate their application in the 
field. This is arguably because as the lex specialis of the field, it is the primary source of 
law that mineral investors look at. It will be therefore easy to make them aware of the due 
consideration that they should give to affected communities’ fundamental rights in mineral 
operations. This is in line with the provision of article 1 of the African Charter, which 
compells, AU member states to adopt legislative measures to give effect to rights, duties 
and freedom contained in the African Charter. Though the right to compensation is at times 
emphasised, mineral legislation of countries reviewed in this study do not include affected 
communities’ fundamental rights at the standard of the African Charter. For instance, while 
prior consent is in line with the requirement of participation in decision-making which 
results from article 13 of the African Charter, the possibility for the central government to 
bypass it reduces its nature to a privilege rather than a real right held by affected 
communities. Affected communities must not only be compensated when violations occur, 
but participation should empower them to prevent potential infringements through the 
ability to approve or disapprove a project.  
Another challenge is related to the capacity-building of affected communities. Actually, 
the simple recognition of their fundamental rights in the legal text is not enough, affected 
communities need to be aware of their rights and know how to resort on them in their 
interaction with other stakeholders. This raises, for instance, the issue of education on 
fundamental rights, the ability to discuss and to negotiate with other stakeholders on the 
mineral project and other related development projects, the possession of employability 
skills by the majority of community members and a clear definition of the modalities 
which should lead to a community decision. In the Endoris case, the African Commission 
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held that capabilities of a local community should improve to foster the realisation of 
development.1168  
Apart from of all these concerns, there are challenges proper to the functioning of the 
African Charter enforcement machineries. Access to the African Court needs to be 
broadened to increase the possibilities for affected communities to approach judges 
whenever their fundamental rights are infringed on. Moreover, there are issues like the 
clarification of the role that each enforcement body must play to avoid muddles in the 
relationship between the Commission and the Court, and the necessity to get decisions of 
the African Court enforced once violations are established. On the other hand, affected 
communities should be careful not to abusively use legal avenues offered by the African 
Charter, because excessive litigation spoils the reputation of the mineral corporation. The 
fundamental rights-based approach must not be seen at first glance as synonymous to 
litigation, but rather as a strategy to increase the level of consideration that the government 
and the mineral corporation, should give to affected communities’ aspirations in mineral 
developments and other related development projects. It is only in the case of persistent 
denial and violations of their rights that they should seek enforcement before courts. 
6.3 Recommendations 
 
The implementation of community participation in mineral governance requires a real 
commitment from all stakeholders. Therefore, closing recommendations should be made in 
respect of the responsibility of each of them in this regard. 
 
Starting with African governments, they should demonstrate more commitment to achieving 
the vision of a mineral-led development in which fundamental rights of affected communities 
are given due respect. This is part of the AU general vision, which supports the application of 
fundamental rights in the development process.1169 In this regard, African governments 
should devote all their efforts to ensure that operations and pratices in the mineral industry 
comply with provisions of the African Charter. Actually, though emphasising community 
                                                             
1168 See the Endorois case, supra note 67, para. 283. 
1169Id. 4. 
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participation, this study acknowledges the critical role of the government. The only difference 
is that contrarily to the much pronounced discretion it enjoys in the bilateral model of 
governance (state-mineral company), in the three-leg model (state-affected communities-
mineral corporation), the role of the government needs to be adjusted.  
Firstly, the government must continue to fulfil its assignment of coordinating the 
development process in order to maintain equilibrium in every part of the country in the 
sharing of benefits and opportunities. But, in doing so, the government must make room for 
the participation of those who will suffer directly from the potentially negative impacts of the 
mineral project, to express their approbation or disapprobation of the project throughout the 
decision-making process.1170 Given that the fundamental right to community participation is 
likely to promote transparency in the management of mineral resources and thefore, 
strengthen good governance, the government must step up its efforts to ensure that 
democracy, decentralisation and accountability are effective, as all three determine the extent 
to which participation will be useful and effective in the development process. Of course, 
what can be tricky is the case where the choice of the affected community is totally irrational. 
But even in this case, the government cannot decide to disregard the prior consent of the 
community because it is part of democratic requirements.  
Secondly, the government must build and strengthen the state-capacity to establish a 
framework which will facilitate the implementation of sustainability in the mineral industry. 
This implies the incorporation of fundamental rights’ aspects in all state mineral policy, a 
good use of mineral revenues and for the most, the integration of the mineral industry in a 
vision of economic diversification. This is critical because the government must ensure that, 
despite the existence of mineral activities, affected communities are still able to run other 
activities that are also important for the economy, like for instance farming and fishing. One 
can contend that all these assignments arising from the perception of what the role of the 
government should be under a fundamental rights based-approach, can only be feasible in the 
context of a social democracy rather than one of a liberal democracy. This is simply because, 
as observed, in the former type, the ideological foundation generally rests on the belief that 
                                                             
1170As will be discussed in the next section, how to mitigate irrationality in the choices of affected communities 
is part of the questions that call for further research. 
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the government assignment is to ensure equality and social justice between citizens, giving 
priority to common interests over individual ones, while in the latter model, the government 
intervention in the private sphere is very limited, with the emphasis put on the duty to protect 
an individual’s freedom against outside invasion from other individuals or groups.1171 
However, as aptly observed by Adejumobi, community participation has been appropriated in 
the development discourse of neo-liberalism where it is viewed as fully compatible with a 
liberal agenda.1172 The best illustration comes from the World Bank policy which, despite 
promoting liberalisation, emphasises the necessity to have community participation in the 
development process.     
Along the same line, it can be suggested that the win-win principle advocated nowadays in 
mineral agreements by many African governments in their relations with investors must be 
extended to embrace the best interests of affected communities, which include respect of their 
fundamental rights.1173 On this specific point, the government must organise mechanisms to 
prevent the risk of having mineral agreements signed by a political elite pursuing their own 
short-term interests to the detriment of the people’s long term interests. 1174 A screening 
process can be established prior to the signing of the agreement. For instance, in a 
comparative perspective, it is reported that in Netherlands, Parliament must scrutinise a state 
contract in which the main object implies a transaction above 50€ millions before its 
signature.1175 Moreover, from a practical viewpoint, the win-win principle cannot be effective 
anymore between parties in a bilateral model of mineral agreement (state-company). This is 
because of the high cost that communities’ opposition can bring in the mineral project 
whenever they are excluded. As seen throughout this study, the government can no more be 
fully entrusted to guarantee interests of affected communities in mineral negotiations. 
Affected communities must be empowerd to take action against any decision of the 
government in the mineral sector that violates their fundamentals rights. Despite the continual 
                                                             
1171 Hinnfors (2006) 23-26; Pinkey (2003) 13; Lumumba Kasongo (2005) 8-9. 
1172Adejumobi (2008) 99. 
1173Kimani (2009) 4. 
1174Marysse S. and Geenen S. “Win-win or unequal exchange? The case of the Sino-Congolese cooperation 
agreements” (2009) 47 (3) Journal of modern African studies 391. 
1175 Conseil de l’Europe Forrces armées et services de sécurité: Quel contrôle démocratique? (Paris: Conseil 
de l’Europe Publishing edition, 2009) 207. 
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demand for an increase of foreign investment, government officials must be aware that as 
long as affected communities’ preferences and claims are not satisfactorily dealt with, the 
climate within which mineral investments take place will continue to remain characterised by 
disapprobation and violence. In such a context, the risk of financial loss not only exists for the 
mineral corporation, but also for the government in terms of taxes. African resource-rich 
countries are competing to attract foreign investments in the mineral sector as they provide a 
considerable source of revenue to the government. However, this should not be done at any 
cost. Government officials must be careful to not reverse the equation in that it is 
development that is made to profit human beings and not human beings to serve and sacrifice 
their vital interests for the sake of a utopian development. This is why African governments 
should also avoid exaggerating the role that foreign investments should play in the 
development process. Such exaggeration is what at times makes government officials 
misconceive the role of mineral corporations as they cannot replace the state’s responsibility 
to ensure the realisation of socio-economic objectives. Mineral corporations are partners with 
the state, but should not be seen as the first actors on which the burden of realising the 
development rests.   
To demonstrate their commitment, African governments must undertake practical actions. At 
the normative level, African governments should work on their national mineral legislation to 
bring them in accordance with fundamental rights granted in the African Charter. Legislative 
provisions should clearly explain who determines priorities at the local level, how affected 
communities should be involved in decision-making and how they influence the outcome of 
discussions, how royalties should be paid to them, how they should be compensated and what 
the legal steps are that they should take when their fundamental rights are infringed on.   
As far as mineral corporations are concerned, they should accept to raise up the standard of 
community participation to such an extent that they cease to see it as simply a means to 
legitimate the project, but rather as an effective strategy to involve affected communities and 
contribute to the achievement of development objectives in a sustainable manner. This 
implies that in their relation with affected communities, they should acknowledge that their 
prerogatives are to be adjusted in accordance with their fundamental rights, with the 
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consequence that their capacity to influence the decision-making process should increase.1176 
For this, mineral corporations should reject the fallacy that mineral investments and 
fundamental rights are irreconcilable. In fact, the aim of a partnership between all 
stakeholders is definitely to take account of their mutual interests. Thus, if the corporation 
can succeed in capturing the expectations of affected communities in the mineral project, of 
course in a way that does not prevent the maximising of benefits, the development process 
will be one that is peaceful and integrative of sustainability practices. Indeed, it is obvious 
that a mineral project which really offers benefits like employment opportunities, necessary 
infrastructures like roads, schools and hospitals, with enough precautionary measures on 
environmental degradation, will certainly get the support of affected communities. Under 
such conditions, the mineral corporation will be able to avoid the high financial cost that a 
conflict with communities may occasion. However, this is possible only where there are 
mechanisms through which affected communities can hold corporations accountable for the 
ways in which their actions impinge upon their livelihood.1177 It is a positive advancement 
that mineral corporations accept now that they have a social responsibility towards peoples 
affected by their activities, but much remains to be done in terms of how this responsibility 
must be properly formulated to be effective.1178 
To international governmental organisations, the recommendation is that they should deploy 
all their efforts to support a process of participation where other stakeholders are compelled 
to respect fundamental rights of affected communities and where these latter can judicially 
enforce them through the life cycle of the mineral project. The World Bank, for instance, 
should remember that the absence of some measure of democracy in the SAPs is one of the 
reasons that led to its rejection by African people.1179 Since fundamental rights are now 
uncompromisingly seen as part of the development process, the World Bank should not 
refrain from joining in this integrative approach. In this respect, because effective community 
participation is a vital element which somehow determines the successful execution of 
development policies and projects in any field of its member states’ economy, including the 
                                                             
1176 Garvey and Newell (2005) 389-391. 
1177 Id., 390. 
1178 Amao (2011) 243, Horiggan (2010) 34-35. 
1179 Ibhawo (1999) 159-161. 
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mineral field, the World Bank, despite difficulties pointed out, that states should accept the 
truth that the fundamental rights based-approach is more efficient than the soft approach in 
empowering affected communities with the ability to influence decisions having a direct 
impact on their development. It was observed that when development initiatives took place 
without affected communities being involved, mineral corporations tended to believe that 
they had fulfilled their obligations arising from the CDA, despite considerable dissatisfaction 
and disagreement with NGOs and local communities.1180 The World Bank should therefore 
offer its full support to an approach which is likely to bring more effectiveness to 
participation in development.  
As to the AU, it must deploy all its efforts to pressure its member states to organise their 
mineral sector in accordance with their international obligations. The AU should request 
them to see to it that practical democratic arrangements be established to facilitate the 
participation of affected communities in decision-making regarding mineral projects. The AU 
should make a permanent follow-up to check out whether mineral policy developed by 
African governments respond to the fundamental rights-based approach to development and 
whether they abide with the standards of the African Charter or not. In this respect, reports 
that African states are compelled to submit to the AU in the context of the NEPAD/APRM 
and to the African Commission in respect of the advancement of the rights enshrined in the 
African Charter can serve as a tool to assess the commitment of African states.1181 Moreover, 
through activities of the African Charter enforcement bodies, one should be able to perceive 
how AU member states abide by their obligations. For instance, in the exercise of its 
promotional mandate, the African Commission could multiply its visits to African resource-
rich countries to examine the situation of affected communities, and try to make the system 
known to Africans much more. For this purpose, the AU should make sure that enough 
financial means is made available to allow this institution to realise its assignments.  
The AU should also seriously consider the issue of broadening access to the African Court. 
This is a strong option since affected communities’ fundamental rights in the mineral sector 
will not be fully protected until they have easy and wider access to this transnational 
                                                             
1180 Environmental Resource Management “Mining Community …, supra note 138, 10. 
1181 See art. 62 of the African Charter and s. 15 of the APRM Base Document (2001). 
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mechanism of enforcement. The possibility to access the African Court actually determines 
the extent to which this body may be of use to affected communities. Indeed, a binding 
decision from the African Court could be one of the efficient ways to constrain the state and 
the mineral corporation to give a proper consideration to the view and best interests of the 
community affected by a mineral project. If access remains restricted as it is at present, the 
African Charter will only offer a small corridor of solution for affected communities and even 
delay the process of enforcement of their fundamental rights. As was aptly observed in the 
Atemnkeng case, restriction to court access gives the violator state power to prevent victims 
from making their voices heard and from obtaining justice.1182 The AU and AHSG should 
therefore take the necessary action to enlarge access to the African Court. Also, in case 
litigation takes place at the regional level, the AU and AHSG must develop tactics and adopt 
a rigorous approach to make respondent states comply with the decisions of the African 
Court. Otherwise, despite having a judgment in hands, victims will continue to suffer 
injustice and prejudice caused by the violation of their fundamental rights. 
With regard to CSOs, the recommendation is that they should continue to assist affected 
communities and advocate on their behalf the implementation of a fundamental rights’ based 
approach in the relationship between the communities and other stakeholders. As was pointed 
out already, the jurisprudence of the African Commission demonstrates that they have played 
a relevant role in bringing communications before this body. Beyond the adjudicative 
process, they can be also of great support in the popularisation of the relevant fundamental 
rights’ instruments and the education of affected communities. They should help and assist 
affected communities in building their capacity to negotiate with the government and mineral 
investors and to claim their royalties and define their priorities in development initiatives. 
They should also train them on how to use the different enforcement possibilities available 
under the African Charter. CSOs must be aware that in the African context, they enjoy more 
trust in the eyes of affected communities as compared to the government. They should 
therefore take advantage of being among the most trusted institutions in the society to 
consolidate the capacity of affected communities and pressure other stakeholders to 
effectively consider the view of these communities in the decision-making process. 
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Finally, affected communities themselves need to be aware of their fundamental rights. They 
should not ask for participation in mineral projects as if this was a privilege that other 
stakeholders were granting them, but should claim it as being part of their fundamental rights. 
They should be eager to learn what legal arrangements are made in the African Charter to 
make their fundamental rights enforced in the mineral operations. This is because when 
participation is approached as a privilege, their share of authority in the power relation with 
other stakeholders becomes insignificant or quasi-inexistent.1183 Furthermore, they should 
work seriously on the appropriate modality to reach community decisions and on how to 
agree on priorities in development initiatives. This is particularly critical because if they are 
not able to speak the same language in discussions held with other stakeholders, it would be 
very difficult to perceive what their main position is. Obviously, be it through direct or 
representative democracy, divergent opinions will inevitably arise,1184 but what is of major 
importance is to develop strategies through which a common position can emerge from the 
community. This is why for instance, before engaging in discussions with other stakeholders, 
leaders of affected communities must encourage communication among their community 
members. They should multiply opportunities for members to meet and discuss development 
issues of their communities. Furthermore, affected communities should be able to define their 
expectations at a level which is rationally feasible. During the negotiation process with the 
mineral corporation, they should avoid exaggeration in terms of benefits to draw from the 
mineral project.  
Affected communities should also avoid an abusive use of legal enforcement machineries as 
excessive litigation may have a negative impact on the investment climate. This is a 
recommendation for all three parties since actually the ideal is that all stakeholders interrelate 
in good faith to prevent recurrent conflicts which one way or another prejudice the good 
advancement of the mineral project. It is in the interest of the government and the mineral 
corporation to avoid conflicting relations with affected communities, because as said 
previously, this may delay the execution of the project, cause financial prejudice to the 
investor and fiscal loss for the government. During the violence which occurred in the Nigeria 
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Delta during the summer of 2009, it was reported that Shell was losing 20 million US dollars 
per day, which finally led to the closure of its operations in the west.1185 The firm should be 
aware that its reaction to affected communities’ interests could impact on its economic 
performance.  
 
From a legal perspective, Frynas explains it as the fact that an increase in litigation between 
the company and affected communities may have an economic impact on the financial health 
of the firm by bringing costs when what he calls the “legal liability risk” occurs.1186 In other 
words, the more the company is exposed to the payment of compensation arising from its 
liability for damages caused to the communities, the more it can suffer loss. In respect of 
litigation in Africa, this risk is reported to be very high when the matter is dealt with in 
transnational litigation through the extraterritorial jurisdiction mechanism, because the 
amount of compensation awarded is often far higher than those granted by African domestic 
courts.1187 Thus, depending on how the corporation chooses to interact with affected 
communities, positive outcomes can be generated like, for instance, the articulation of a 
shared vision to assist in the settlement of development issues raised in the area, while 
negative outcomes will surely occurr when downplaying their concerns, with a possible 
succession of events that could undermine the efforts of the firm in the maximising of 
profits.1188 It is advisable that mineral corporations particularly approach their relations with 
affected communities from a fundamental rights perspective.  
 
Experience demonstrates that where mineral operations have disregarded affected 
communities’ fundamental rights, violence characterises the environment within which 
activities of the company are conducted. This is true not only in respect of the external 
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dimension of the company’s relations with the communities, but as well in the internal 
relations between the company and its employees, among which some community members 
can be part of.  
 
Concerning the external dimension, for instance, the youth of affected communities in the 
Niger Delta has often resorted to militancy to protest against the exploitation of oil without 
due regard to their fundamental rights. 1189Aminu explains this phenomenon by the 
frustration-aggression theory borrowed from the work of another scholar and according to 
which the human frustration leads to the development of aggressive behaviour.1190  
 
As to the internal dimension, an illustration of how the situation can degenerate when labour 
rights are not properly considered, can be taken from the tragedy which happened in 2012 in 
South Africa at the Marikana mine where many striking miners were either killed or severely 
injured in a confrontation with the police and the company security staff.1191 Nevertheless in 
their relationship with mineral companies, affected communities must be careful not to 
exaggerate their emphasis on their legal means of constraints. Frynas sees in it as a double 
risk. The first would be a reputational risk arising from the bad publicity that litigation can 
cause the firm’s image. This issue is so sensitive that Frynas assumes that even a legal victory 
in litigation cannot compensate for the adverse image generated by the lawsuit after several 
years of legal wrangle.1192 The other risk identified by Frynas is for the national economy in 
that the increase of the legal liability risk and the reputational risk could discourage investors 
and lead to a reduction in the flow of investment to African countries.1193 Though the decision 
to invest in a country is dependent on several factors, it is clear that mineral investors will feel 
                                                             
1189 Obi (2010)  226-236; Abila SE. “Historic and philosophical foundation of minority groups in Niger Delta” in 
(eds.) Emiri F. and Deinduomo G. Law and petroleum industry: current challenge: Essay in honor of Justice 
Kate Abiri (Lagos: Malthouse Press 2009)185. 
1190 Aminu SA. “The Militancy in the oil rich Niger Delta: Failure of the federal government of Nigeria” in 
(2013) 4 (11) Interdisciplinary journal of contemporary research in business 817. 
1191Alexender P. et al Marikana: A view from the mountain and a case to answer (Auckland Park: Jacana 2012) 
15. 
1192 Frynas (2004) 378; see also Akpan GS. “Host community hostility to mining projects: A new generation of 
risk” in (eds.) Bastida E., Wälde T. and Warden-Fernádez J. International and comparative mineral law and 
policy: Trends and prospects (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005) 320. 
1193 Frynas, Id. 
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uncomfortable to work in an environment where they have to face court proceedings very 
often.  
 
When a divergence of views arises which is likely to degenerate into a conflict between the 
community and the company, it is advisable that affected communities first attempt to explore 
the possibility of an amicable settlement before resorting to legal mechanisms of enforcement 
like courts. This suggestion if taken into consideration will help mitigate the negative impacts 
that a drastic legal approach can have on the relationship between stakeholders. This is in line 
with the letter and the spirit of the African Charter and the 1998 Protocol which both provide 
for the possibility of an amicable settlement where feasible.1194 The government should 
therefore contribute to this by fostering a platform or structure of consultion where affected 
communities can freely engage in discussions with all other stakeholders and try to reach a 
compromise on relevant questions linked to the mineral project. 
 
Thus, the responsibility to preserve the investment climate is incumbent to all stakeholders. If 
mineral corporations can positively respond to affected communities’ social demands, if the 
government can create an appropriate structure for interaction, and if affected communities 
can use legal avenues only when conciliation has become impossible, then the fundamental 
rights-based approach will accommodate an investment climate that matches the sustainable 
model of development. 
 
6.4 Questions for further research 
The merit of community participation in a mineral-led development process has been 
established throughout this study. It has been demonstrated that involving affected 
communities in the decision-making process of mineral projects and other related 
development projects in a way that makes their view binding on other stakeholders, can bring 
positive inputs in mineral governance. However, a question that may be naturally raised is 
whether this should be contemplated as a panacea. It is important to keep in mind that 
peoples’participation in decisions affecting their livelihood is unavoidable because, it is part 
                                                             
1194 Art. 52 of the African Charter, art.9 of the 1998 protocol. 
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of democratic governance requirements. However, challenges identified in chapter four of 
this study suggest that, community participation is not a strategy to be applied blindly under 
the pretext of getting positive results in any situation. Khwaja observes that overstating the 
importance of community participation in the development process can lead to its 
misunderstanding and misapplication.1195 For instance, it is questionable what the conceivable 
solution should be in case the choice expressed by an affected community to reject a mineral 
project is blatantly irrational. This issue is part of community participation limitations and is 
very critical because the whole country cannot be deprived from potential benefits of a 
mineral project just because of any thoughtless refusal by a local community.1196 Therefore, it 
is imperative that a mechanism be established to rationally balance the benefits and 
limitations of community participation. Since the fundamental rights based-approach provides 
the possibility for affected communities to engage in litigation in case of persistent 
disagreement with other stakeholders, it is possible to suggest that judges should be the ones 
who ultimately assess the rationality of the position expressed by an affected community. 
However, even in this context, the ambiguity does not totally disappear. Because decisions 
related to the formulation and implementation of public policies are to be made by those who 
have been democratically elected,1197 one can deem inappropriate the intervention of judges. 
In practice, judicial review by courts has often been criticised when it involved decisions 
made by the two other branches (executive and legislative) on the grounds that it is 
undemocratic to have judges who are not elected to question decisions of representatives who 
have been democratically elected.1198 Though such an approach rests on a rational argument, 
the truth is that in any genuine democratic system, the judiciary plays a vital role as courts are 
established with the aim to inter alia protect peoples’ fundamental rights. In a democratic 
system based on the supremacy of the rule of law, the judiciary has to test legislation and 
                                                             
1195 Khwaja (2004) 428. 
1196 Indeed limitations here concerned both the fact that the affected community’s decision can be irrational and 
the fact that there can be a clash between local interests and those of the whole country. Khakee A. “Assessing 
the political dimension of structural planning process” in Borri D., Khakee A. and Lacirignola C.  (eds.) 
Evaluating theory-practice and urban-rural interplay in planning (Dordecht: Springer 1997) 110. 
1197  Marquez E. My country and my people (Quenzon City: Rex Book Store, 1998) 115. 
1198 For more insights on the different views, once can read Zurn CF. Deliberative democracy and the institution 
of deliberative democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 132-134. 
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administrative actions against values and principles imposed by fundamental rights.1199 It is in 
this context that the intervention of the courts and even transnational bodies like the African 
Commission and the African Court,1200 to assess the choice of affected communities can be 
justified. However, what constitutes a question for further research in this regard is how far 
judicial bodies should go and what principles and values should prevail in their assessment. 
This is a question that can be reflected on in future discussions on community participation. 
Nonetheless, it can be anticipated that judges will avoid excessive activism which will lead 
them forcefully to substitute their own view to the one of the affected community.  
 
The question about rationality gives rise to further discussions on another issue. If it is to be 
considered that each individual who is part of the community has his/her own perception of 
what is rational, and because the opinion of the community is basically formed through an 
addition of individual opinions, the challenge is to find out how individual rights should 
intertwine with collective rights. The analysis of this question is particularly relevant because 
as Joong-Seop observed, the emergence of communal collectivism can easily hinder the 
development of individual freedom and personal preference when it rests on the fallacy that 
community members should be homogeneous in their perception of shared norms and values. 
1201 Since each member of the community holds a fundamental right to express his/her 
opinion, further research needs to be undertaken on how individual preferences should be 
weighted in the process of community participation. When a community member disagrees 
with the group, it becomes questionable how his/her fundamental rights should be taken care 
of in development initiatives launched at the local level. This question relates to the debate on 
how the minority and the majority must be accommodated in democracy.    
 
Another question which deserves further research is whether in the consideration of affected 
communities’ fundamental rights, there should be a hierarchy. This question especially arises 
in the process of defining priorities in development projects that should be funded with 
                                                             
1199 See Matiso and others v.Commanding officer, Port Elizabeth Prison and another 1994 (4) SA 592 (SE) 594. 
1200 In the case of the African Commission and the African Court, their intervention is further legitimised by the 
fact that they were established through an international treaty which was regularly ratified by member states. 
1201  Joong-Seop K. “Toward Human rights in the local community: Multiple approaches to implementation” 
(2010) 39 (1) Development and Society 124-126. 
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mineral revenues. For instance, if the fundamental right to health is perceived as prevailing 
over the fundamental right to education, then it means that the construction of a hospital 
should be given priority over the construction of a school. How the views of affected 
communities’ members may possibly be reconciled in this regard is also questionable. This is 
a critical issue because empowerment and capacity building do not concern only the external 
dimension of the relationship with other stakeholders, but also the internal dimension which 
includes the way members of the group agree on their priorities. 
 The debate on the hierarchy of fundamental rights has often been held in respect of the 
primary importance attached to either civil and political rights or socio-economic rights.1202 
However, the intellectual level at which discussions are held by scholars makes it hard to 
suggest that different approaches promoted in their writings may be easily implemented in 
African rural areas. As stressed earlier, this is particularly because of the issue of illiteracy. 
Actually, from a purely theoretical point of view, if one adheres to the assumption that all 
fundamental rights are interdependent in the process of their enforcement, the debate on 
hierachisation is void of all meaning. But because, in practice, considerations and approaches 
are different in the arrangements of each society, the discussion is somehow relevant. 
Because values privileged within a group of people contribute de facto to favour certain 
interests,1203 further research needs to be undertaken on how the hierarchy of values defined 
in the context proper to each affected community should be captured throughout the 
implementation process of the fundamental rights based-approach. Therefore, the extent to 
which a particular fundamental right may influence the process of defining priorities in 
development cannot escape the debate on cultural relativism.1204 Briley observed that “people 
with different cultural backgrounds have different expectations, norms and values, which in 
turn have the potential to influence their judgements and decisions as well as their subsequent 
                                                             
1202See for instance, Konvitz MR. Fundamental Rights: History of a Constitutional Doctrine (New-
Brunswick: Transaction publishers, 2009) 1-18; Farer T. "The hierarchy of Human Rights" (1992) 8 (1) 
American University International Law Review 115-119. 
1203 Campbell (2010) 198. 
1204 From a legal perspective, the concept of cultural relativism generally refers to the idea that for a right or a 
rule to be valid, it must match the culture of the society where enforcement is sought. Donnelly J. “Cultural 
relativism  and universal Human rights” (1984) 6 (4) Human Rights Quarterly 400-401. 
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behaviour.”1205 The question should specifically include the analysis of how cultural 
relativism may shape the implementation of the fundamental rights based-approach in the 
decision-making process concerning the mineral project and other related development 
projects. In such a context, it is not enough to only understand the political and socio-
economic contexts of an affected community when addressing development issues, one 
should go beyond that and scrutinise the cultural background which generates local values 
through which priorities are set.1206 However, this exercise will be valid only for values which 
are compatible with fundamental rights. This is one direction that scholars’ discussions on the 
fundamental rights-based approach to development may be orientated in the future. 
To avoid the trap of monopolising the debate on community participation, this study suggests 
that multidisciplinary approaches should be encouraged for future research on issues which 
call for further research. This is because solutions which are elaborated on from different 
perspectives are likely to be more responsive to societal problems. 
At the closing of this study, there is a firm conviction that the research work undertaken here 
has somehow brought a positive input in the debate on community participation in 
development. But from theory to practice, much remains to be done by actors involved in the 
governance of mineral resources to ensure effective participation of affected communities in 
line with the fundamental rights based-approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1205 Briley D. “The effect of culture on decision-making and judgment” (2007) 13 Research frontiers 1. 
1206 Voda A.L. “Do cultural factors influence economic development?” (2012) 1 (1) Academic Research 
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